A discourse upon questions in debate between the King and Parliament. With certaine observations collected out of a treatise called, The diffrence between Christian subjection, and unchristian rebellion. This text is an enriched version of the TCP digital transcription A36115 of text R14262 in the English Short Title Catalog (Wing D1625). Textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. The text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with MorphAdorner. The annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). Textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. This text has not been fully proofread Approx. 44 KB of XML-encoded text transcribed from 9 1-bit group-IV TIFF page images. EarlyPrint Project Evanston,IL, Notre Dame, IN, St. Louis, MO 2017 A36115 Wing D1625 ESTC R14262 99859637 99859637 111732 This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership. This Phase I text is available for reuse, according to the terms of Creative Commons 0 1.0 Universal . The text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. Early English books online. (EEBO-TCP ; phase 1, no. A36115) Transcribed from: (Early English Books Online ; image set 111732) Images scanned from microfilm: (Thomason Tracts ; 12:E69[26]) A discourse upon questions in debate between the King and Parliament. With certaine observations collected out of a treatise called, The diffrence between Christian subjection, and unchristian rebellion. Bilson, Thomas, 1546 or 7-1616. True difference betweene Christian subjection and unchristian rebellion. 16 p. s.n., [London : 1643] Caption title. An expanded edition of: A discourse upon the questions in debate between the King and Parliament. Includes selections from: Bilson, Thomas. The true difference betweene Christian subjection and unchristian rebellion. Reproduction of the original in the British Library. eng Prerogative, Royal -- Great Britain -- Early works to 1800. Great Britain -- Politics and government -- 1642-1649 -- Early works to 1800. A36115 R14262 (Wing D1625). civilwar no A discourse upon questions in debate between the King and Parliament. With certaine observations collected out of a treatise called, The dif Bilson, Thomas 1643 8481 164 0 0 0 0 0 193 F The rate of 193 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the F category of texts with 100 or more defects per 10,000 words. 2000-00 TCP Assigned for keying and markup 2001-10 SPi Global Keyed and coded from ProQuest page images 2001-11 TCP Staff (Michigan) Sampled and proofread 2001-11 TCP Staff (Michigan) Text and markup reviewed and edited 2001-12 pfs Batch review (QC) and XML conversion A DISCOURSE UPON QVESTIONS In debate between the KING and Parliament . With certaine Observations collected out of a Treatise called , The Diffrence between Christian Subjection , and unchristian Rebellion , HAving beene a by-stander , and observing so well as I could how this great game hath beene played on both hands ; betweene the King and Parliament ; I have wondred to finde considering the Declarations on both part● ) that with great expence of time and money they have made a shift to argu : themselves into a civill warre . And the the ●onder is no lesse to heare the varietie of opinions ; some asserting his Ma●e●ties proceedings , some the Parliaments , and some affirming that the thing in variance belongs to neither , divided from the other ; for ( say they ) it is but who shall rule arbitrarily , in cases to which the Law hath not fully or not at all extended ; which the King calls his Prerogative , the Parliament ( as matters now stand ) theirs . To take the better view of the present differences , looke a little way backe upon the actions of precedent times . It hath beene the generall beliefe of this Nation ( ●pon what reason I cannot judge ) that the designe of his Majesties late father King James was to wynde up this government ●o the height of France , the better to ho●d correspondence with forraig● Princes , whose power encreasing their riches , and both together their reputation , it was a shame to be left behind , but finding the times averse , and being the best Astrologer in the world what the successe should be of ●i● owne actions , he betooke himselfe to the ●atisfactions of his age which he could acquire , and left the complement of this to his Majestie that now is● in whose person were concurrent a title indubitable , setled by a succession , and the activitie and glory that is insepa●able to youth , and the fresh assu●ption to the Throne of three Kingdoms . The first dis●olved Parliament ( to stumble at the first step ) seem'd ominous to some , others tooke it for a tryall , and in pursuance of the designe . And the rather for that ( his Majesties Protestations to govern by the laws , and his late answer to the petition of right notwithstanding ) the exaction of loane money immediately following , the erection of Monopolies , and the forcible taking of the Subsidie of Tunnage and Poundage , begat an universall diffidence in the people of his Majesties personall promises , and an opinion , that his best resolutions were easily overthrowne by the counsell of others , and so consequently that his actions were not his owne : which opinion true or false when ever it got beliefe , hath proved fatall to the Princes or to the people of this Kingdome : For the Nation hath hated to be governed by many Viceroyes , and resents to insolencies in their Princes so much as defects , rapes , murthers , and particular depredations , being more tollerable , when the vertues of the Kingly Office have a happy influence and latitude upon the whole bodie of the Common-wealth And yet to speake a truth , the same argument that aggravates the violations in government may be a reasonable excuse for his Majestie ( and the same that the reverence of the English nation to their Princes hath ever uses ) those acts of injustice were not the kings but his Ministers : for what other opinion could the king retaine , then what the Judges delivered for law , and the Divines for Gospell : for these had made a generall definition of a king , and applyed it to all Princes , and those had made a generall day of judgement upon all the laws , and subdued them to the will and pleasure of those Princes : and being mindfull of their owne interest , and how much it concerned them to make the king absolute , whom they had hope absolutely to rule : they would needs make a king by the standard out of Gods Word , that his subjects might be slaves for conscience sake : And by examples taken from the kingdome of the Iewes , they invested him with power essentiall to his office , to use at pleasure the persons or estates of his subjects ; of a divine institution , incomprehensible by lawes , if necessitie require a variation and under heaven no other Iudge of that necessitie besides himselfe : And having placed him in the ranke of God● gave him the like election , to governe the World by second causes , the fit officers of nature , or by miracles and wonders , effects of his immediate interposition ; by the grand Councels , Iudges , and inferiour ministers of the Lawes ; or by Pate●●● with non ●bstante● , Proclamations , and a divine prerogative . But to say a truth his Majestie hath of late admitted a better information of this kingdome of government ; and hath given many assurances by protestation to innovate nothing , yet this satisfies not , and the reason would be examined ; as also what those difficult questions are , whereof the sword must needs make the resolution . The ill satisfaction the people receive , notwithstanding the kings mighty protestations to governe by the laws , to defend the protestant religion , Priviledges of Parliament , &c. springs out of this Jealousie , that if it come into his Majesties pow●r to doe otherwise , he will doe so . For who can thinke ( say they ) having the s●me maximes in his mind , and the same couns●ll in his eare , that he hath had ; that hee will doe otherwise than hee hath done : That he will after the ruine of this Parliament , refuse the fruition of that which hath cost so much labour , when the danger is passed : who will believe he will have recourse for aid and advice to Parliaments ; when he shall remember to what sad exigents he hath beene re●uced by them , ( whereof that himself was any part of the cause shall be hid from his eyes ) how averse they are in their composition from the Genius of the Court , how apt to be mis●ed by a few , how unfit councellers in matters out of their usuall cognizance , wanting abilities to advise and modesty to be silent , how slow and lingering the remedies are for the maladies of the Common-wealth : who will not think how much better it is for the King ( if he can ) to satisfie the people upon the word of a King , on the word of a Gentleman , that their grievances shall be remi●ied as well without a Parliament ? who will not believe that he will rather choose to be the father of a Militia of his owne , who receiving their livelyhood out of his Coffers , shall helpe to fill them ; by whose hands he shall have power to mow the fertil meadows of Britain as often in the Summer as he pleaseth . And what shall hinder ? the Law ? no ; there shall be the same imminent necessitie that was pretended before , and there shall not want both Divines and Lawyers that shall say the King and his private councell are sole Iudges of that necessitie , shall the Kings promises and protestations hinder ? I cannot tell , it may be so , I wish the people of this Kingdome had such confidence in his Majesties personall promises , but if the King cannot him●elfe tell , i no King nor private man can tell , how his Councels and resolutions may change , when the ●●ate and condition wherein he made them is changed : if humane nature easily relapse to those things that it loves , and if the resumption of such illegall power , suggest not only the sweetnesse of riche● and dominion , but by false arguments comes apparelled with necessitie of the kingdoms preservation , I know not whether naked words subject to so much varietie of construction will be of force to resist so great temptation . Hazael being but a private person thought himselfe much injur'd when the Prophet made that cruell Character of his future behaviour , Am I ● dog ? yet he was so dogged , and few ( perhaps ) that knew him would ever have thought it . Therefore if his Majestie will have those promises believed , let him not apparantly go about to place himselfe in such a condition , that he may breake them at his pleasure . I know the Allegations for the manner of his Majesties present proceedings are , first the just vindication of his royall Prerogative ( whereof it is pretended violation hath beene made to the prejudice of himselfe and the people ) and wherewith he is trusted by God ; which trust he may not ●●sert , for Gods sake , his owne , and his peoples . For the Prerogative of Princes ( so much talked of and so little known ) it may in briefe be said , That all Princes have gaind Dominion by force or by bargaine , For to say that Adam , if he had lived to this time had beene king of the whole world , and therefore the king is first in order before the people , his naturall vassals ; and production is an Assertion invented to flatter Princes , for all men know that the multiplication of Colonies in Regions far distant from the first rules of Nations , must impell the necessitie of erecting many independent governments , and the necessitie will bee as great in the independency , as for the multiplicitie ) therefore by force or by contract they must commence : Dominion got by force , is kept by force and stiled Tyranny , or else it dissolves into Government by contract , and so takes a lawfull forme . Therefore of the nature and latitude of the prerogative that rests in the hands of a Prince , that comes in by agreement with the people ; is the now dispute . It may be defined thus : A power to see the Lawes put in execution , and to doe that which is good for the people in cases to which the Lawes have not yet extended ; if there were no Lawes ( as perhaps there are not many in the first erection of a Monarchy ) but that all were trusted to the wisedome and goodnesse of the Prince , yet by all the reason in the world the intendment of that trust was to enable him to doe good , not to doe every thing . Now , where the Lawes are positive the Prerogative claimes no jurisdiction . The corruptions of Princes , and the extravagancies of the people occasioned Lawes , for bounds and limits to both : and it is a thing out of all question , that the first contract would have left no prerogative at all ; if all future needs and inconveniences of the government could at one intire view have beene presented to the people ; but that being impossible , the discretion of all common-wealths meeting in their representative bodyes , have given a stop by lawes to the progresse of any inconvenience as it hath beene emergent . His Majestie complaines that he is divested of his legall prerogative . That is , hee is denyed the power to execute the Lawes , with his owne sence and exposition upon them : And the Lords and Commons in Parliament pray to have reduced into a Law that Arbitrary power which hee hath of Custome exercised , in things to which the Lawes doe not fully extend : or to speake shorter , they are not willing to trust him any longer with a power undefined , which they have imployed to their harme byt desire to have it defined and limited ; that for the time to come it may bee so no more ; And this they expect from his Majestie as a duty of his office to the people , who if they are incapable of reason of state , yet are not incompetent Iudges of what is good for themselvs ; unlesse we shall maintain Aruments of France in England , and to the same end ; That the people are altogether ignorant of their own welfare , that the King only knowes it ; That is best with an implicite faith to trust him , and his Army , and Councell , with the safety of the Common-wealth , and every mans life and estate , That when France is free from feare of forraigne enemies , the subjects shall bee discharged of the oppressions ; In the meane time to make himselfe and his Mamalukes formidable to his neighbour Princes he hath transformed millions of Christ an soules into beasts , reducing them back to the Elements whereof they were made , yet they must not complaine nor defend their Lawes and liberties , lest they seeme to resist Authority : Nor supplicate the supreame Magestrate to governe according to right reason , and the Lawes of the Kingdom , least they seeme wiser than their teachers , to be short , I hope it will never be so in England . And if the English Parliament be at sometime mistaken ( as it is not to bee presum'd that they will bee ) yet they are not so much hurt by the inconvenience of that mistake , untill the next Parliament rectifie , as they are , if they shall be disabled from al competency to judg in matters tending to their own welfare . For the other branch of His Maiesties Allegation that the streightning on his Prerogative is prejudiciall to the people : It is true a Prince of high and magnanimious endowments cannot dispense with that liberty and the influen●e of his excellent personall vertues , if he be too much bound up by the dead letter of the Law ; for the actions of some have beene transcendent to all Lawes or examples ; and pittie it had been that they should have beene confined . And ( indeed ) the people doe lose willingly of their liberties to such good Princes which proves unhappie to them , when worse make a title to the same liberty , by such Examples ; And there is no surer a signe of a weake Prince , than to contest with the people upon these Presidents , rather seeking examples for his purpose amongst the actions of his predecessours , than desirous to be himselfe an example to posterity . How ever those Princes that have surmounted all Lawes in their glorious actions have been very rare , a festivall that comes but once a yeare ; which if it came every quarter , yet a good constant diet were much better . It is strange to finde how defective some are in the right understanding of the Mysteries they professe , what is it that a Prince would have , ( that affects not glorious vindications and conquests upon forraigne enemies ) to live safely , plentifully , and beloved of his people , to dye lamented , rich , and of a blessed memory ; this is all that can accrue to the best of the sonnes of men ; And if Princes did not proferre their wills before their profit ; if they did not shame lesse to picke lockes , pockets , and their subjects pursues , than to say , I thanke you ; if they did not chuse rather by force to justifie injustice , rapine and oppression , then to have any actions of themselves , or ministers called by such names , doubtlesse in a short time they could not chuse but arrive at an almost absolute dominion . For the arguments used to div●rt from honest accommodation● with the people , doe not appeare to me that ever they were entertain'd by those . Heroick Prince● that have fill'd the stories of all ages with their high and exc●llent glories , but by some of narrow and limited qualifications for government , one argument i● , That if the same wayes of munificence and bounty by which some Princes have ingratiated t●emselves , shoul● for some descents of Princes be pursued , the Crown , regall Authority , and revenue would be destroyed , and nothing left whereby to oblige the people or wherein ●o be liberall . ' T●s true , indiscreet prosution hath consumed many Princes ( and that is indiscreet that is misimployed and lost ) it never avail'd ( that I have heard ) to the advanceme●t of any , nor doth it extend much further than the Kings chamber ; nor is it any Motive of affection in the people to heare , that the King is liberall of his purse to his servants and Favourites . A Princes bounty shines in a little spheare , if compared with the pe●ples , as his estate i● small , compared with the revenue of the whole Common-wealth ; his liberality cannot extend to all his subjects , theirs may to him ; it is ●ot that vertue that exalts him in the opinion of the people . And yet it is a liberality but not co●sumptive to his estate , nor destructive to his authority , but accumulative to both , liberality , justice whereof the impartiall distribution hath raised Princes into the ranke of Gods . And I am verily perswaded if there should fall out to bee so happy a race of Princes , who disposing all particular interests , should advance only publike justice and utility ; The Armes , trafficke , and tranquillity of their people , the honour , industry , and spirit of the Nations under their command ; that in a few descents they would become absolute , and clearely acquitted from all obligation to Lawes , or at least the execution would bee so long intermitted that with much difficulty they would ever come in force , and the restitution seeme as great an innovation , as of late hath been thought of Lawes in force long-layed aside for want of use ; And in the times of such Princes we heare no t●lke of prerogative , or liberty , the one is surrendred to the will of the Prince , the other imployed to the advantage of the people , and it is an infallible signe of great distempers in government when such disputes arise . To conclude the Prerogative is a trust which ( because no lawes are large enough to meet with all accedents ) resides of necessity in the person , or body politick , where the Soveraignty resides : And it is true t●e King is trusted by God with this Prerogative , as all in authority are in their degree to discharge themselves piously towards him , hone●●●y ●o those under their command : He is also trusted by his Subjects , who doe not say , they may resume their power upon breach of trust , but say , they ought ●ot to bee denie● when they desire those breaches to bee repaired and better fortified for time to come , and the trust exemplified into a Law as occasion shall requ●re : Nor is it re●sonable for ●ny Prince in the world to say , I have beene tr●sted , and if I or my Ministers have not in these and these particulars well di●charged ●hat trust , yet wee will bee trusted still , and you shall beleeve that matters shall be better herea●ter . What the priviledges of Parliament are , i● another great question , i● under the tearme be comprised the King , the Lords and Commons , the question may be better made , what is not within the power and priviledge of Parliament , for 't is on all hands confessed that the common-wealth may di●pose of it selfe ; but if the King be divided from them , what are then priviledge● ? truly none at all , if they cannot make a t●mporary provision to ●ave themselves without the Kings licence ; for take away safety , and priviledge is gone ; If they be safe , yet if it be better knowne to their adversaries then themselves , and that the continuance be at disc●et●on and good pleasure of another , if any be a more competent Iudge of their safety then them●elves they have no priviledge at all , say what they will . Nor can it possible be that both houses have power to preserve the body of the kingdom which they repres●nt , if there not be an inherent e●sentiall and underived authority in ●h●t assembly to preserve it selfe ( ●is granted in the P●inces minority , absence , or incap●ssity to gove●ue , the power to preserve and provide for the state , rests in the great counsell , and their diligates , doubtlesse the case is the s●me , if it be on like manner granted that the P●ince is divided from the body of his people ●y evill counsell ( to prove if the counsell be good or bad , examine the legali●y , it appeares in his Maiesties expres●es : and that of most remarke , is to declare law ( which being denied to the great counsell , must needs be taken to reside in the King and his privie counsell ) To have sole managing of the arms of the kingdome . And upon misprision of treason to sequester membe●s of Parliament to tryall in inferior Cou●●s . If this counsell he legall t' is good . If his Majestie were admitted the best Lawyer in the kingdom : Yet if the laws of this Kingdome have reserved the exposition of themselves to the Law-makers and not to the K. the advise● to appropriate that power to himself is not good , ●hat they haue done so , presidents are not wanting where the J●dges have humbly praid both houses to deliver ●heir sence of a doubtfull law , If these commissions of Array and breach of priviledges be declared illegall by them that have only power to declare law in dubious cases , then the advise by which they were done is not good , yet concerning this ●cruple of declaring law ; It 's true the Parliament cannot declare that to be law which is not . They cannot declare it to be the law of the land that my b●o●he● by a second venter shall inherit my land before my kinsman ten degrees off though that were great reason but they can declare that there rests no power by vertue of any trust in any person to convert the forces of the kingdome to the destruction of it selfe . And they may declare it legall to stop the a●ven●●●es and appro●hes to such power if it be attempted , his Majesty may array Arm and command his subjects against the Fr●nch and Spaniard not therfore to fight one against another , he may Array arm , and command them to suppresse Rebels ●o legality declared not therefore to oppresse , the Parliament , th●se are not very cons●quent to a reasonable man . It is no strange , nor are the examples rare to find how much Princes may bee mistaken in the councellor● friends and enemies ; for how hardly can that ma● be thought an enemy who studies nothing so much as to enlarge the power , and advance the pro●it of his Prince , Yet the abundant services of some have more mischiefe to their Masters than forraign armes or combination ever could , was it not taken for good service to invent a new revenue of 200000. l. per annum to supply the wasted tents of the Crowne . And would not he have bin esteemed rather a foole than no friend to the Kings profit that had advised to lay that downe after it was once or twice paid . Yet in his Majesties own judgment that tax had better never bin . And it had never bin if the advise had never bin . And the advice had never bin ; or not bin pernitious ; If the King had received the same from the greater councell as he did then from the lesse . I am of opinion though it rain not in Egypt , yet the inundations of Nilus are caused by raine in another region . And the black clouds that hung over Scotland and their troubled waters made them think it rained som where , and provide for the storm , for doubtlesse if the motion ●o ab●olute dominion and ruine of all laws , had not been so visible and swift in England as it was ; The new Service book , had never brought so many thousands Scots over Tweed . We may then conclude upon the whole matter ; That that physicke was not good that brought the body of the Common-wealth into so great distemper ; That the people though a moveable body like the Ocean , yet never swe●l ●ut when blowne upon by intemperate windes ; That that councell which hath caused the King to stake his Crowne , and the Kingdomes their safety , now the third time ; That hath contested with the great Councell for precedency in the Kings judgement , and hath obtained it ; That broke the last Parliament by the King , and would breake this by the Kingdom : Is not good for us , nor for those discree● Gentlemen ( if they understood their owne interest ) that labour so much to ●upport it . But that in every case wherein the generall state of the Kingdom is concerned , the advise ●h●t the body of the Kingdome gives , upon a view taken of it selfe is not onely least erronious , but by the Law not presum'd to erre . Neither can the suggestion● made against this Parliament ( indissoluble but by co●sent ) any way availe to countena●ce a forci●le dissolution , That they have too much handled the flowers of the Crowne , those that adorne the pe●son , ●f not constitute the office of the King ; That they go about to erect a new Aristocraticall government , or rather a Tyrannicall of 5. or 600. That this Assembly is no Parliament , His Majesty dissenting ; that the Major part of both Hous●s are gone to the King , or have left the rest , the remnant are a faction . To the first it is answered before ; that those rights of the Crowne whic● are by the positive and expresse Lawes of the Land vested in the King to uses , are not questioned ; except in case where it is manifest that the uses have been prevented ; And in that case no more is required but that the breache● be repaired , and that the influences of his Majesties Government may be transmitted unto the people by better Mediums , which is no prejudice to hi● Majastie , unlesse he imagine that he ought not to grant it , because it is desired ; That he is bound to relieve the people , but not at the peoples reques● . We will take it for granted that in any case it onely appertaines to our Soveraigne Lord the King to defend wearing of Arms . The use of this power vested in his Majesty is for defence of himself an● subjects , and can h●ve no other intendment by Law and reason , but suppose that by evill Councell that may be about a Prince ( by his own unwise Election , or Gods appointment when he gives Princes bad Councellours , or people ba● Princes for scourges to wanton and corrupted Nations ; ) this power is imployed to divide the Kingdome against it selfe , one Faction sees this power lodged in the person of the Prince , but never observes to what end , so sides with him . Another insist upon the end for which he was trusted , and defend themselves by Arms : Faction begets Civill warre : Civill warre dissolves the present Government ; After followes a forraigne yoke● if our neighbour Nations be not fast asleepe , or otherwise imployed : In this expectation , and in the ve●y minute when this imminent tempest is breaking upon our heads ; the representative bodie of the Kingdome prostrates it selfe at his Majesties feet , a●d beseech him to change ( not the Government ) but a few subordinate Governours , that he will shine upon his people through transparant and unblemished chrystall glasses , not through Sanguine , Murry , and Azure which make the Ayre and Objects beheld to seeme bloody , and blue ; Assuring him there is no other way to calme the Seas that begin to rage and to preserve from wreck the ship of the Common-wealth wherein his Majestie is himself imbarqued , and is the greatest adventurer . Now come in he Malignant Councellours , and tell his Majestie that these humble Supplications will ( if he yeeld to them ) turne to Injunctions : Ease them and do them right ( s●y they ) but not at the requst of Parliament ; Which is no lesse th●n to place him in a condition to do what he shal think to be right ; That is , w●at he shal be advised by them is right ; That is ( in many cases ) what ambition , hatred , covetousnesse , luxurie , lecherie , suggest to be right ; That is , flat tyrannie more absolute than the Turks . For the Introdu●tion of a new forme of Government , the Arguments are , That if the Parliament draw to it selfe the Jurisdiction of the maritime and land ●orces , the power to name Councellours and Judges● or prescribe a rule for their nomination , To make Lawes ( for t is all one if the King may not deny those that are presented to him by both Houses ) to perpetuate the sitting of this Parliament : The Soveraignty hath ( if these be allowed ) made no secret but a very apparant transition from the person of the King into the persons of the Parliament men . The Subjects of this Kingdome have never had one Example of a Parliament that hath gone about to make themselves Lords over their Brethren ; And if they would they cannot ; for when they forsake the duty o● their place● and the interest of the Kingdome , the Kingdome will forsake them ; and sometimes before : which though the people have dearly repented , yet it serves to prove that the subsistance of a Parliament is impossible if dominion or any other end be perceived then Reformation and preservation of the Common-wealth . In the Minority and absence of former Kings● opportunity was farre more favourable for such a designe then at this present , yet what Prince was ever hurt by his infan●y or absence , when they were trusted both with his dignity and revenue . And t is out of question , if his Majesty had been clearely concurrent with this Parliament for the punishment of Delinquents , and conservation of the peace , and Liberty of the Subject , they had never risen up into so high requests ; but take the Argument at the best , it followes not that the Parliament intends to assume Soveragne Authority , because when Ireland is in Rebellion . England in combustion , Scotland scarce quieted , France and Spaine in Armes , they do humbly supplicate his Majesty to entrust , for a short and limited time , the Militia under the commands of persons of Honour , that the Lords and Commons ( those whose blood and es●a●es must defend the State ) may repose saith in : yet this is not to be granted , and the feares and jealousies of his Majesties best Kingdome and most obedient Subjects held so unworthy of any regard or satisfaction , that they are esteemed and so published for frivolous and false pretended , meerly to obtain an unjust purchase out of the Kings prerogative . For the nomination of prime Officers , Councellours and Judges , I presume that request results out of the precedent misgovernment , and is intended onely for this time ; And peradventure the temper will be better for the people , that the King ( being once invironed with a wise and religious Councell ) appoint Judges and publique Officers , whom the people may , if there be cause accuse , and the Parliament judge ; nor would this branch of the Kings prerogative been reached at by the people , if the Judges ( who ought to be conservators of the Lawes● had not been the destroyers ; If the counsell of a few even in Parliament time , had not involved the whole state in a common calamity ; and contested with the Grand Counsell of the Kingdome assuming to t●emselves more zealous affection to his Majesty , a greater care of the Common-wealth and a better di●cerning what was necessary and fit for both , Yet the election of publike Officers is not without president in the times of former Kings ; But I would not have those Kings presidents to his Majesty , that such demands may not be president to us . Concerning the perpetuall Dictatorship of the Parliament , It may be deman●ed● why is the work prolonged by them , who aske why are you so long at worke ? why are Delinquents protected ? by what meanes are difficulties objected ? How comes t●is Rebellion in Ireland ? why doth the Parliament spe●d time in providing for their own safety ? which ought to be spent in redresse of publique disorders and vindication of the Subjects from oppression ? doe they pretend feare , because they would rule ? Let his Majesty render those feares apparently false , and concur more hartily than they in securing the Kingdome ; Let him grant Commissions for Ireland , let him grant guards for the Parliament as well to secure their feare as their danger : Why should his Majesty confirme their feares by discharging their Guards , and attemping their persons ; If he know them to be safe● let them know it also , or confute their fear to the understanding of the whole Kingdome , by granting their owne wayes of security , the next way to dete●t those apparitions of feare if they be false . And when the Religion of our Church is vindicated ; The vigour of our Lawes renewed ; A Guard of strength and terror provided for their future preservation ; The Rebellion in Ireland quelled ; His Majesties revenue examined and repaired ; particular Delinquents punished ; The Court of Justice reformed ; The banks founded by the industry of our Ancesters with so much blood and treasure against the inundations of the prerogative , or malignity of private counsels repai●ed and better fortified , then let us see what pretence will be made for continuation of the Session still . The English Nation will not doubtlesse sell their birth-right for a messe of pottage . Nor chang the government of a Prince ( time nor story remembring any other in these Kingdomes ) of extraction so i●lustrious of a title so indubitable , to be ruled by their equall , peradventure inferiour neighbours . To that allegation that this assembly is no Parliament in the Kings absence ; if it be understood when he is not present● it is an opinion so ancient as since his Majesty left the Parliament , for before I am perswade● it was never heard of : And it must follow thereupon ( as hath been answered ●efore ) that by the accedentall absence of the prince● or in sickne●●es that induce stupifaction , or in the first degrees of infancy , when the pow●● of the reasonable soul , have no latitude of operation , the state may be left without means to preserve it self , which is a great obsurditie to think . But if by the Kings absence be undestood the want of his voluntary concurrence in confirmation of the Acts and Ordinances of both houses , and that in such cases they are no Parliament , it may well be doubted if they have bin any Parliament during this Session : For the acts that have passed his Royall ascent ( so much amplified in his late declarations to the people ) are shrodely suspected to be with no great good liking of his Majestie . I am sure if they were voluntary , they were not exhibited with due circumstances , for through that opinion , his Majestie hath lost much of the thanks due for such transcendent graces , which no Prince , or inferior person , ought in discretion to loose . However that both houses legally convened and authorised to sit , do not by the Kings absence loose the essence and denomination of a Parliament , appears by presidents of former times , when in the absence of a Prince ( further distant in body then his Majestie is in minde I hope ) the estates have assembled themselves ( which is a little higher then was yet in dispute ) have administred oathes of fealtie to the subject , have named officers for publique services , and as well to superintend the peace of the Kingdom as the revenue of the King . And though there was not nor is any law authorising the assembling of a parliament in such a case , yet was the legallity of that parliament never questioned , nor will , of any other upon the same or the like occasion , when the matter to be treated on is the peace and safety of the Kingdome , whether the King be absent in body or minde , it changes not the question much . But which is a short answer to all that can be said is : that by an Act of all the estates , this Parliament is not disolveable , but by an Act of all the estates , therefore a Parliament untill that Act be passed . To the other part of the allegation that Major part of both Houses have left the rest , and are gone over to the King . It may be demanded why doth not then his Majesty send them up to adjourn the Parliament to Oxford or Cambridge , are they so fearfull of the Aprentizes of London , that they dare not appear to do his Majestie so great a service by shouting a yea or no in the house of Commons , how willingly would they adventure a battell that refuse to speak a word in a croud . Truly it were the way to put an end to all the controversie , to reverse with ease the acts that have given so great cause of repentance , to reduce the Parliament to termes of due obedience ; to save a multitude of offenders to weede out of both houses those factious members that insist so obstinately upon a trust reposed in them ; to distill out of the delinquent City of London much cordiall water to save the labour , charge , and hazards of warre , to save the purses , persons , and horses of the willing Gentry , who labour for those fetters ( such is the understanding of this time ) that their Fathers swet to be rid from ; For if armes be raised onely against a smal malignant party , a faction of a few Parliament men : The Major number would quickly deliver them up and what place could afford safety for them against the Ire of his Majesty and both Houses of Parliament . To such as put these Questions , What is the power and priviledge of Parliament , by what Law doe they impose Orders upon the people without the Kings Assent ? they seeme to me like them that dispute how legally the next houses are pulled downe , when the flame and windes make cruell vastation in the beautifull buildings of a populous Citie . They are honest m●n , and would faine be thought wise , but I doubt it is not in the o be of their understa●ding to comprehend● what power resides in the vast body of the people , and how unlimitedly that power operates , when it is animated by danger , for preservation of it selfe . A man may make the same observation upon them that is made upon Cato , who pleaded the Lawes and usages of peaceable times , when the liberty of that Common-wealth was at the last ●aspe , and would not be drove off it , till it was too late ; his argument was this in effect , That the Authors of Lawes for preservation of the Common-wealth , may not preserve it , but by their owne Creature . This was Cato his error , and is so confessed by all men yet ( I take it ) he was a better Statesmen then these disputants . The King was admitted Judge of the danger of the Common-wealth before the Parliament and it was appara●t for no other reason , but the better to levy mony ? Shall the Parliament sitting be a lesse compatent Judge ? As though a Physitian that saith you are not well , though you do not perceive it ; Give me five or ten peeces , I will c●re you , shall be the better beleeved then the man that hath been wasted with a Quotidian Fever sixteen yeeres together . They talke what the Parliament may doe , and what not , as though this were the Parliament that made an Act for pavement of an high-way , and had little other worke . Truely , if the regulation of a Trade , or creation of a Tenure , or erection of a Corporation were the Question in a peaceable time , it were easily resolved , that the Kings demurre should stand for a denia●l ; but to say the Kingdome may not defend and secure it selfe , who ever saith to the contrary , is to fight against the oldest and best knowne Law in nature , the Center of all Lawes , and the inseparable right of all Kingdomes , Corporations and Creatures . But they say the Kingdome is in no such danger ; who is a better Judge the repres●ntative body of the Kingdom it selfe ? not those that say so . Who like a man that standing upon the beach at Dover will not beleeve that the Sea hath any shore towards Fra●co , untill he be brought to the top of the Hill. It is not within their view to tell better then the Parliament whether there be danger or not . His Majestie indeed hath the most eminent place to observe what Collection of Clouds are in any quarter of the Heaven , and what weather it wi●● be , but his calculations ( supposed to be made by others from a lower ground ) are therefore not so well beleeved . But be it in danger or none it matters not much the Lawes have been in danger● ( none will deny ) and were recovered by another danger or had been lost : I● it be now peace ( as th●se men say ) it is the better time to secure them● if it be not peace , it is well to save the Common-wealth by any means whatsoever , and if the King concurre not so speedily as the occasion requires , the b●ame is not theirs that go before for his preservation and their own . To make an end , I wish an union of the three Kingdomes , under the same Government● Ecclesiasticall and Cavell ( if it be possible ) that this Crowne having three such supporters , and surrounded with the salt waters at Unitie , at Libertie , at Peace in it self may not fear the whole forces of the disjoynted contenent of Europe , That his Majestie would understand his Interest to be , to unite , not to divide his Subjects , and to remember with what Tropheyes the magnanimous Princes of former times have adorned their Funerals and Fame . That he will chuse rather to fight in the head of the Brittish Armies , for restitution of his Nephews to their lost , inheritance , than imploy them here to pillage and destroy his own subjects ; That he will first command the hearts , then the persons , then the estates of his subjects , and not begin at the wrong end : That in the Parliament may reside a Spirit of that Latitude and Noblenesse which ought to dwell in an Assembly of so much Honour and Gravitie , That just things be done for justice sake , without bowing lesse or more for the raging of popular surges in the South● or for the cold winds that blow from the North : That the conditions of peace may not be enhansed by any prosperous successe , but like the Noble Romane before and after the victorie the same : That his Majestie may be convinced of the Errour of his private Councels , by finding in the Grand Councell a quiet repose and a stable foundation of peace and plentie to his Royall Person and Familie . And lastly ( since his Majestie and his people thus divided cannot be happie ) that with all convenient Expedition , such as have studied this division between the Head and the Body , may h●ve their heads divided from their bodies . So farewell . Certain Observations , Collected out of a Treatise , called , The difference between Christian Subjection , and unchristian Rebellion ; Compiled by that judicious and learned Divine , Tho : Bilson , then Warden of Winchester , since Bishop there ; necessary in these times to be perused . Theophilus the Christian . Philander the Jesuite . Theop. CAses may fall out even in Christian Kingdomes , where the people may plead their right against the Prince , and not be charged with Rebellion . Phil. As when for example ? Theop. If a Prince should goe about to subject his Kingdome to a foraigne Realme , or change the forme of the Common-wealth from impery to tyranny , or neglect the Lawes established by common consent of Prince and People to execute his owne pleasure ; in these and other Cases which might be named ; if the Nobles and Commons joyne together to defend their ancient and accustomed liberty , Regiment and Lawes , they may not well be counted Rebels . Phil. You denied that even now when I did urge it . Theop. I denied that Bishops had authority to prescraibe Conditions to Kings , when they Crowned them ; but I never denyed that the People might preserve the foundation , freedome , and forme of their Common-wealth , which they foreprized when they first consented to have a King . I never said that Kingdomes and Common-wealths might not proportion their States as they thought best ; by their publique Lawes , which afterwards the Princes themselves may not violate . By superiour powers ordained of God , we understand not onely Princes , but all politicke States and Regiments , somewhere the People , somewhere the Nobles having th esame interest to the sword that Princes have in their Kingdomes , and in Kingdomes where Princes beare rule ; by the sword we doe not mean the Princes private wil against his Laws ; but his precept desired from his aws , & agreeing with his Laws ; which though it be wicked , yet it may not be resisted of any Subject with armed violence . Marry when Princes offer thei● Subjects no● justice but force , and despize all Lawes to practice their lusts ; not every nor any private man may take the sword to redresse the Prince ; but if the Lawes of the Land appoint the Nobles as next to the King to assist him in doing right , and with-hold him from doing wrong , then they be licensed by mans Law , and so not prohibited by Gods to interpose themselves for the safe-guard of equity and innocence ; and by all lawfull and needfull meanes to procure the Prince to be reformed ; but in no case deprived , where the Scepter is inherited , &c. FINIS . Notes, typically marginal, from the original text Notes for div A36115e-520 Allowed by publike Anthority to be set forth , as in the title page may appear . The third part , pag 279. verbatim . In some Cases the Nobles & commons may stand for the Publike Regiment and Lawes of their Countrey . Christian Kingdomes may settle their States with common consent of Prince and people , which the Prince alone cannot alter . The Princes sword , his Law , not his ●ust . Princes may be stayed from tyranny by their own Realmes though not deposed .