22347	----	[Transcriber's Note: The spelling of Westmoreland has been modernized to Westmorland, and employes (with an acute accent over the second e) has been changed to employees. Variant spellings of macintoshes and mackintoshes have been retained as printed.] THROUGH CANAL-LAND IN A CANADIAN CANOE BY VINCENT HUGHES. The Boy's Own Paper. OCTOBER 7, 14 & 21, 1899. Bearing in mind that variety is the spice of existence, I determined that I would temporarily desert the dear old Thames, with whose waters I had become so familiar, and try fresh fields and pastures new during my approaching holidays. Accordingly, I took a friend (who had been my boon companion on many a previous trip by land and water) into my confidence, and after due deliberations, befitting an enterprise likely to be of a novel character, we determined to explore the comparatively un-known canals that commence from the Thames, at Brentford, and thread their way through England from south to north, and end at Kendal in Westmorland. One thing that largely influenced us in deciding upon this route was that we had recently become possessed of a light and well-built Canadian canoe that had been sent us by an English resident in France, where he had been using it in exploring the picturesque portions of the Seine. We fortunately had a friend connected with the Grand Junction Canal Company, and through his kindly offices were enabled without much difficulty to obtain passes allowing us to journey over the different canals which we had mapped out as the waterway to follow. This part of the undertaking having been successfully disposed of, we turned to and overhauled our craft, and saw to the getting of the outfit which we should require in order to make the trip a success. By the time that all our arrangements were in a complete state, the day fixed for the start arrived, and it found us brimming over with cheerful anticipation of the good time in store for us during the next three weeks, and in the best of health and spirits. We were "up betimes in the morning," as quaint old Samuel Pepys has it, and journeying down to the boat-house at Kew, where we had left our canoe overnight, soon got afloat and on our way, without mishap or delay of any kind. What a glorious August day it was! The sun shining brightly in a cloudless blue sky overhead, the birds singing blithely in the trees upon the banks, and the water sparkling and lapping beneath our bows; no wonder we took it all as a good omen for the success of our trip. Heading up-stream, we soon shot beneath the railway bridge at Kew, and pass through dirty, straggling old Brentford, entered the Brent, where a short paddle brought us to the first lock. Getting through in our turn, after a short delay caused by a string of canal barges coming through to catch the morning tide, we entered upon the Grand Junction Canal, which extends form here to Braunston, a distance of some hundred and six miles. An enjoyable paddle through fairly pretty and diversified scenery brought us to Hanwell, where we had to negotiate a cluster of five or six locks, all grouped together within a short distance, for the purpose of carrying the water over a sharp rise in the ground. We had a brief chat here with an old bargee, from whom we got some useful advice, not wholly free from chaff, and proceeded upon our way, arriving about midday at West Drayton, where an _al fresco_ lunch on the bar was much appreciated. Resuming our journey after refreshing the inner man, we passed Uxbridge and Harefield, and so out of Middlesex into Hertfordshire. The town of Rickmansworth being passed, Watford, about a mile from the canal, was settled upon as our first stopping place; and evening approaching, we went ashore to seek our well-earned repose for the night. Early to bed and early to rise was the programme, so after a light supper and a brief stroll around the outskirts of the town, we turned into bed and were not long in seeking the sleep that is said to be the reward of an easy conscience. The sun shining through our window in the morning got us out of bed at an early hour, and we were soon splashing about in the sunlit waters of the canal. A delightful dip ended, we returned to our quarters for breakfast, and from the looks of genuine admiration expressed upon the countenance of our landlady, I should judge that our appetites did us full credit. Afloat once more, we paddled by easy stages past Cassiobury House, surrounded by a glorious well-wooded park, and then reached King's Langley, to which an interest attached as having been the birthplace of Edward III. We found the scenery all along this portion of the canal typical of rural England, the various inns by the wayside recalling the delightful types made familiar by the brushes of Dendy Sadler and Yeend King. We soon found to our cost that the tropical summer weather was responsible for the presence of numerous wasps, whose attentions were rather too pressing to be altogether pleasant. While engaged in trying to allay the burning pains of a bad sting upon Jacky's arm, we were advised by a rustic on the bank (whose sympathetic grins upset my chum almost as much as the wasps) to try some clay from the canal-side as a remedy. We were sceptical at first, but were subsequently astonished at the soothing effects of this novel panacea for wasp-stings. Here is a wrinkle for any of my readers who should happen to get stung by the ferocious little pests. At Boxmoor, where we next arrived, we observed, during a saunter around the village, a curious stone erected to the memory of a highwayman rejoicing in the most un-romantic name of Snooks, who was hanged here at the beginning of the century for robbing the King's mail. Paddling on farther, we passed Berkhampstead (a corruption of Berg-ham-sted, the home on the hill), with its picturesque castle, much in request by picnic parties, and duly arrived at Bulborn, near Tring, and during a stroll around the latter town we observed a column erect to commemorate the completion (in 1832) of the canal along which we were journeying. We stopped for the night at Bulborn, a typical bargee's village, and after our usual morning dip proceeded on our way in good time. As the day wore on, we got well into Buckinghamshire, and shortly after came to Stony Stratford, remarkable in history as being the place where the ill-fated young Edward V was seized by Richard Duke of Gloucester. A paddle of some length brought us to the Stoke entrance of the well-known Blisworth Tunnel, which is a mile and a-half in length, and forms the first of a series along the route. Seeing one of the curious little tug-boats about to proceed through the tunnel, we obtained permission from one of the very grimy crew to place our canoe aboard, and, this safely accomplished, the tug puffed and snorted up to the entrance, hitched on to a string of barges, and with a deal of fuss and smoke entered the tunnel. The journey through this subterranean passage was a most novel one to us who had never been through a tunnel of this description before. The intense darkness, only illuminated by the light from the boiler fire, was most uncanny, while the wonderful reverberations and echoes occurring in the tunnel quite startled us until we became used to the situation. The roof seemed so low that we instinctively stooped our heads to avoid getting them removed from our shoulders, an action which caused immense amusement to the skipper, who, in the manner of his kind, accentuated the eerie feeling of the place by spinning all sorts of creepy yarns about canal boatmen who had mysteriously gone overboard in the pitch dark, and never been seen again. We drew a long breath when we emerged into the welcome blinking daylight at the other end of the tunnel, and soon after bade good-bye to our whilom friend the skipper. I can imagine no place more calculated to quickly shatter the nerves and break the health of a human being than one of those foul, suffocating tunnels under the hills. On this occasion we stopped for the night at Blisworth and put up at a wayside inn possessing the curious sign of the "Sun, Moon, and Seven Stars" (the only one in England we were told), where we met with quite a reception, the news of our approach having gone ahead of us, we afterwards discovered. Before proceeding next day, we had to clear the canoe of the dirt and rubbish collected during the passage of the tunnel. Upon this day we passed through six locks in close succession, as well as another tunnel, and skirted the village of Ansley, once the property of Lady Godiva, of the uncomfortable ride fame, soon after which we left the waters of the Grand Junction at Braunston (Warwickshire), and entered upon those of the Oxford Canal. A hard day's paddle, of no particular interest, brought us to Willoughby, where we put up for the night. We awoke next morning to find the weather damp and misty, so we dispensed, for the first time, with our morning dip, and lingered somewhat over breakfast to make up for it. _A propose_ of eating, I should mention that all along the way we had come fruit was in abundance, and as for apples--well, we fairly revelled in them. To my mind a good English apple, fresh picked from the tree, and with the dew upon its sun-kissed cheeks, cannot be beaten the whole world over. During a portion of this day we had to face a strong head-wind, which made the travelling rather hard, and severely taxed the patience and skill of the steerer. Happening to chaff him once or twice when the wind got the upper hand and nearly slewed the canoe round, he challenged me to try my hand and do better. Accepting the challenge, and in the rashness of youthful confidence, I ventured to wager him that I could take the canoe, single-handed and empty, up to a certain point and back again, during which I should, of course, have to turn broadside on to the full force of the wind. The outcome of it was that we quickly landed and emptied the canoe of all impedimenta in case of mishap, and then I started off--not so confidently, though, I may add--on my uncertain way. All went well until I attempted to turn, and then the full force of the wind catching me suddenly, over I went, after a vain attempt to steady the canoe, souse into the canal. Coming to the surface, I called out (when I had emptied my mouth of as much canal-water as I could) to Jacky that I was all right, and then, amid his uproarious mirth, I struck out for shore, pushing the canoe in front of me. A brisk rub down and a change of flannels (we were in a secluded spot, fortunately) soon mended matters, and by the time Jacky had emptied the canoe of water and stowed away our belongings, I was ready to start again, thoroughly cured for the time being of over-confidence in my canoeing powers. After a stiff paddle through charming woodland scenery, and passing _en route_ Bedworth, the most active part of the Warwickshire coal-fields, we reached Nuneaton, where we went ashore and engaged a room for the night under the hospitable roof of the White Horse. A stroll around Nuneaton before bedtime afforded us much delight, as the old town is full of antiquity, and is also known to fame as the birthplace of George Eliot. In the morning we took mine host's little son and daughter with us in the canoe as far as Atherston, where we sent them safely back by train, thoroughly delighted with their novel experience, ours being the only craft of the kind that they had ever seen in those parts. When we arrived at Caldecote we went ashore to explore the place, and noticed with much interest a monument erected to the memory of one George Abbott, who in days gone by defended Caldecote Hall against a Royalist attack led by Prince Rupert. So stubborn was the defence that the defenders melted down the pewter dishes and plate to cast bullets. We noted with pleasure that the lives of those gallant Roundheads were spared when the garrison finally had to surrender. We proceeded on through the Birmingham Canal, passing close by Coventry, and arrived at Fradley, where we obtained a charming view of Lichfleld Cathedral in the distance. We rested for the night at Fradley (our bill for an excellent supper, bed, and breakfast coming to the modest sum of 3_s_. 6_d_. for the two of us), and early next morning got afloat. We were now on the North Staffordshire Canal, having covered about 160 miles since the commencement of our journey. We shortly after began to get in the heart of the Pottery District, and the scenery for some distance assumed the aspect peculiar to manufacturing centres. Past Armitage, Rugeley, Colwich, and several other towns and villages we paddled, until we reached Little Heyward, where we stopped about midday for lunch. Re-starting after a rest, we were overtaken by a monkey-barge, the skipper of which kindly gave us a tow for some miles, until we arrived, in the afternoon, at Stone, where we went ashore for tea and a look round the town. On several occasions we took advantage of the good-nature of the bargees and their wives, and obtained a tow behind their barges when we wanted a rest. On the whole, we found them a most interesting and sociable lot of people, and on more than one occasion we were invited on board, as honoured guests, to partake of tea with the skipper and his family. Life on board one of these slow-moving canal barges appeared to me to possess many charms. The barge people seem to pass a sort of amphibious existence, belonging neither to the land nor to the water, but having a human interest in each. The women and children almost wholly live aboard their floating homes, often never stepping ashore from one day to the other and going about their domestic duties, as well as those connected with their calling, with all the precision and cheerfulness in the world, as if there were nothing strange or out-of-the-way in their surroundings. Then the scenery through which they pass. To anyone who is capable of appreciating the beauties of Nature in the slightest degree, there must be something soothing and elevating in constantly being brought face to face with Nature in all her varying charms. Now gliding calmly past a water-side village, with the children running out to give you a greeting; then through a waving, poppy-starred cornfield, or past low-lying meadows, with the meditative cattle standing knee-deep in the sweet pasturage, and anon a bend in the canal carries you past wood-lands where the trees meet overhead and form a cool canopy through which the rays of the sun can only penetrate here and there in slanting beams. When my thoughts wander in this groove, I often marvel at people electing to live in stuffy, smoky towns, when the charms of the country are at their bidding. Proceeding on our journey after tea, we eventually arrived at Stoke-on-Trent, and went ashore to seek shelter for the night at a wayside cottage. We got afloat in the morning after our swim and a hearty breakfast, and proceeded past the outskirts of the town, which we were not sorry to leave behind. It came on to rain soon after we left Stoke-on-Treat; but as we were well prepared with macintoshes to face the elements, we proceeded cheerily on our way. After paddling for about four miles we came to the entrance of another long tunnel, which we entered, after taking the precaution to provide ourselves with candles. We had a nasty experience in navigating through this tunnel, which I should not much care to encounter again. After proceeding cautiously for some distance, during which we had to avoid a ducking, and possibly a swamping, from the numerous "weep-holes" that let showers of land water descend from the roof, our candle suddenly went out and left us in total darkness. To make matters worse, a lot of land-water was coming through the tunnel, which, together with the backwash of a tug some little way ahead of us, tried us considerably, and finally wedged our canoe between the two walls of the tunnel. We did not relish the situation at all, I can assure you, especially as we could not take stock of our whereabouts; but after a deal of rocking and shoving (during which we had a narrow escape from capsizing), we managed to get the canoe clear of the walls, and worked our way backwards, hand-over-hand, to the mouth of the tunnel. After this experience we were strangely unanimous as to the desirability of going through in some less risky manner (we accused each other of "funking" afterwards), and accordingly sought the aid of a man, a boy, and a wheelbarrow, and in this unconventional manner conveyed our goods and chattels overland to the other end of the tunnel. In the course of our journey along the canals we passed through a number of these tunnels, including the one that starts close to Chatterby Station, and goes under Yield and Golden Hills. The passage of barges through some of these tunnels is performed in a very curious manner, as owing to the roofs being too low to admit of tugs passing through, the heavily laden canal barges have to be "footed" along by men and boys lying on their backs and pushing against the roof or walls of the tunnel. As may be imagined, but slow progress is made in this manner, the passage of some of the tunnels occupying upwards of an hour. In some cases, however, the tunnels are provided with a narrow tow-path running through them, which, of course, greatly facilitates the passage, as when once momentum is obtained, a man and a boy can tow a barge through without much difficulty. We next reached Harecastle, in Cheshire, where we landed for lunch. Re-starting, after doing justice to a good feed, we soon encountered a cluster of thirty-five locks (think of it) all grouped together within a distance of six miles. Finding the negotiating of two or three a weariness of the flesh, we cast around for help, and fortunately came across a "locked-out" coal-miner, who for two shillings cheerfully trotted on ahead, and opened each of the remaining locks ready for us by the time we arrived, thus giving us a welcome rest after a spell of hard work. After getting through the locks we had a straight-away paddle of some nine miles, which was a pleasant change after the slow and tedious progress we had lately been making, and passing by Alleyfield and Sandbach Station, brought our day's journey to an end at Middlewich, where we are glad to leave the canoe at the lock-house, and make preparations for passing the night. Proceeding next morning, with the sun shining and everything looking fresh and lovely after the rain of the previous day, we got into the picturesque, country peculiar to the salt district. Some distance out of the town we obtained a pleasant tow of a few miles behind a barge going in our direction, and from an old lady in a picturesque sun-bonnet; who came out of the cabin to chat with us, we got the welcome information that we should pass through a wonderful nut-grove on the banks of the canal, where she prophesied that we should have a real royal time. And she was about right! Such a profusion of filberts I never have seen before. The trees literally were interlaced across the canal, and being in a perfectly out-of-the-way spot, where scarcely anyone but the canal-boat people passed, the branches were simply weighed down with the toothsome nuts. We were told by our informant that the filberts were anybody's property; so when we came to where the trees were heaviest laden we paddled beneath the bough and soon had picked enough to fill the bows of the canoe. You may be sure we never wanted for filberts upon the rest of the day's journey. I pictured with what delight the average schoolboy would have hailed that nut-grove, especially as the gathering of the nuts from the bank would have entailed torn clothes, many tumbles, and unlimited scratches. After passing through lovely country, we arrived at Preston Brook, where we joined the Duke of Bridgewater Canal (now the property of the Manchester Ship Canal Company). Here we decided to stop for tea, after which we once more proceeded on our way, and after an uneventful paddle, brought our day's journey to a close at Grappenhall, where we obtained comfortable quarters for the night at a cottage on the canal side. Up at six-thirty next morning, and after cleaning out the canoe and indulging in our morning swim, sat down to a good breakfast, to which we did ample justice. Once more afloat, we made good progress towards Manchester, but after about an hour's paddle it came on to rain in torrents, and continued so until we reached Cottonopois, which we fetched at about one o'clock. I have always been given to understand that it does little else but rain at Manchester, and certainly on this occasion the much-maligned city did not belie its reputation. However, we did not trouble ourselves much, about the rain, as we had mackintoshes and sou'-westers on. Presenting much the appearance of a pair of ancient mariners in our get-up, we entered Hulme dockyard, safely berthed our canoe there, and prepared to spend the next two days with friends in the city. After passing two very pleasant days, during which we saw all that could be seen during such a brief stay, we said good-bye to our hospitable Manchester friends and pushed on towards our destination and in due time reached Booth Town, close to Barton moss, passing _en route_ Old Trafford Park. Near by here we arrived at the famous swivel bridge by which the Bridgewater Canal is carried over the Manchester Ship Canal. We happened to get to this point just as the bridge was opened to traffic for the first time, and as we paddled across in state we were hailed and told that ours was the very first canoe to have the distinction of crossing the new waterway. During the rest of the day's paddle we were in the very heart of the coal-mining district, and our progress caused no little comment and wonder to the crowds of "locked-out" miners and their families. So embarrassing became their attentions at length that we had to abandon our original intention of landing at Wigan, owing to the numerous crowd awaiting our approach at that place. Twice we essayed to get ashore, but finally, not appreciating the appearance of the motley crowd, we pushed on until we reached Plank Lane, where, the crowd of idlers being a little less dense, we summoned up pluck enough to venture ashore. Even here we found ourselves the centre of attraction to the people; rough miners crowding around as we lifted our canoe from the water, to stare in amazement at our appearance, some even going so far in their admiration of our little craft as to pass their hands along its polished sides, all the while expressing their opinions in such a broad vernacular as to be almost unintelligible to our Southern ears. They thought it was a joke upon our part when we told them that we had paddled all the way from London in the canoe. The way they nudged each other and winked solemnly was most expressive. Their attentions at last became so overwhelming that we were compelled to give the craft into the care of the friendly lock-keeper and beat a hasty retreat. Our host at Leigh very kindly afforded us a much-wished-for opportunity of exploring a coal-mine. Getting up early in the morning, we proceeded to the mouth of the pit, entered the cage, and soon were speeding downward at a most alarming pace, accomplishing the distance of 700 yards in forty-five seconds. The sensation accompanying this rapid descent into the bowels of the earth was far from pleasant, but we quickly recovered when we reached _terra firma_, and, when we had become accustomed to the intense darkness, were soon able to follow our guide through the almost deserted workings. The miners were on strike, and only the engineers and others necessary to attend to the machinery for keeping the shafts and workings ventilated and free from water were on duty, so that the desolate stillness of the place impressed us more profoundly, perhaps, than if we had been surrounded by busy toilers. After going all over the mine, each with Davy lamp in hand--during which we had several times to chase our head-gear, which was blown off by the strong draught from the ventilating fans--we once more entered the cage and were quickly whirled upwards to the light of day. Next day we embarked rather later than was our usual custom, and paddled on towards Preston, having to traverse a portion of the river Ribble before we reached this town. Nothing very interesting or exciting occurred upon this day, except for a rather narrow shave we had of getting smashed up by a barge. It happened that one of us was towing, while the other remained in the canoe to steer. Just as we got to a very narrow strip of the canal near the entrance to a lock, we met some barges coming down in tow of a tug, and, as luck would have it, our tow-line fouled a tree stump just at the moment when the tail barge began to swing ominously over towards our bank. For a moment or two it looked as if the canoe must be crushed like an egg-shell between the bank and the barge, but fortunately at the critical moment an extra strong jerk on the tow-line got it clear, and with a run Jacky whisked the canoe through the narrow streak of open water, and we were safe. We stayed with friends at Preston for the next three days, and managed to put in a highly enjoyable round of sight-seeing, during which we paid a flying visit to Southport. Our stay at an end, we embarked once more, taking three of our friends with us in the canoe as far as Garstang. Five people (in addition to luggage) in a small craft of this description was an exceedingly tight pack, and we had to strictly taboo any skylarking, else we should very quickly have got a ducking. At Garstang we left our friends, after a high tea; and after passing several towns and villages, at eventide reached Lancaster, which we made our headquarters for the night. I may mention that we met with great kindness and consideration from the officials during the whole of our journey along the Lancaster canal, one of the employees being told off to clear all barges out of our way, and see us safely, and with the least trouble to ourselves, to its end at Kendal; this thoughtfulness saving us much delay and inconvenience, and rendering this portion of our trip one of the most delightful experiences throughout the whole of our journey. Getting afloat in good time next morning, we bade farewell to Lancaster, and pushed on towards Crooklands, passing Nately and Ashton on the way. For a great portion of this part of our journey the surroundings were truly beautiful, the trees meeting overheard in many places, and forming a cool leafy canopy, while the water was so clear that we could distinguish objects lying upon the bottom quite distinctly, although the water averaged a depth of seven or eight feet. Our silent approach allowed us to come upon shoals of fish, which only darted away when our bows cleared the water immediately above them, a sight that roused all our angling instincts. At other spots along the canal the towering hills, with their crests enshrouded in mist, combined to make up as impressive a picture as can be conjured up by the imagination. Wild-flowers, blackberries, and sloes dotted the banks in profusion, and the occasional starting of a hare or the putting up of a rocketing pheasant from out of the woods, through which we passed at intervals conveyed to us a charming impression of Nature in all the glorious wealth of an early English autumn. At Hest Bank the canal approached the coast, which we followed for some distance allowing us to obtain an interesting view of Morecambe Bay. Arriving at Crooklands about seven in the evening, we left our canoe in charge there and walked into Milnethorpe, a distance of some three miles, and sought shelter for the night, with the consciousness that next day would see us at the end of our canal journey. Early next morning we are out and about and, breakfast despatched, we get afloat once more, with the sun shining, the birds singing, and a soft wind blowing from the south, making the last part of our trip every respect. We paddled along past the varied scenery on the banks, dotted here and there with villages and hamlets and occasionally a town. The last day on the canal we made a regular picnic of, landing on the grassy banks when we wanted to rest and eat, and pushing onward again when we were so inclined. In this manner we progressed past Hincaster, Sedgwick, and Natland, and at about three o'clock in the afternoon reached Kendal, where the canal system curiously ends in a sheer wall. We were now practically of our destination, and after carefully bumping the nose of the canoe against the headwall of the canal, we landed at the steps. Obtaining the assistance of a man with a horse and cart, we conveyed our craft to Kendal railway station, and after tea took the train (with the canoe stowed away in the guard's brake) to Windermere station. Now a difficulty arose as to how to get the canoe safely to Bowness-on-Windermere, a distance of about a mile and a-half. We were nearly at our wits' ends for want of a suitable conveyance, when a kindly disposed 'bus-driver offered to take the canoe inside the 'bus, which offer, needless to say, we literally jumped at; and seated outside with our craft stowed away inside the vehicle, we proceeded to our journey's end in this novel fashion, much to the amusement and edification of the numerous onlookers. After a short stay by the lakeside, we took our canoe by train back to London, and so brought to a close one of the most health-giving and enjoyable holidays it has ever been my lot to spend, and which I shall always recall with the liveliest feelings of delight. 
31383	----	generously made available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) [Illustration: WILLIAM O. HUDSON President, Board of Commissioners of Port of New Orleans] FOREWORD. Oh the mind of man! Frail, untrustworthy, perishable--yet able to stand unlimited agony, cope with the greatest forces of Nature and build against a thousand years. Passion can blind it--yet it can read in infinity the difference between right and wrong. Alcohol can unsettle it--yet it can create a poem or a harmony or a philosophy that is immortal. A flower pot falling out of a window can destroy it--yet it can move mountains. If Man had a tool that was as frail as his mind, he would fear to use it. He would not trust himself on a plank so liable to crack. He would not venture into a boat so liable to go to pieces. He would not drive a tack with a hammer, the head of which is so liable to fly off. But Man knows that what the mind can conceive, that can he execute. So Man sits in his room and plans the things the world thought impossible. From the known he dares the unknown. He covers paper with figures, conjures forth a blue print, and sends an army of workmen against the forces of Nature. If his mind blundered, he would waste millions in money and perhaps destroy thousands of lives. But Man can trust his mind; fragile though it is, he knows it can bear the strain of any task put upon it. All over the world there is the proof: in the heavens above, and in the waters under the earth. And nowhere has Man won a greater triumph over unspeakable odds than in New Orleans, in the dredging of a canal through buried forests 18,000 years old, the creation of an underground river, and the building of a lock that was thought impossible. The Industrial Canal and Inner Harbor of New Orleans History, Description and Economic Aspects of Giant Facility Created to Encourage Industrial Expansion and Develop Commerce By Thomas Ewing Dabney Published by Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans Second Port U. S. A. May, 1921 (Copyright, 1921, by Thomas Ewing Dabney). CONTENTS FOREWORD 2 THE NEED RECOGNIZED FOR A CENTURY 5 NEW ORLEANS DECIDES TO BUILD CANAL 8 SMALL CANAL FIRST PLANNED 13 THE DIRT BEGINS TO FLY 17 CANAL PLANS EXPANDED 22 DIGGING THE DITCH 27 OVERWHELMING ENDORSEMENT BY NEW ORLEANS 31 SIPHON AND BRIDGES 36 THE REMARKABLE LOCK 40 NEW CHANNEL TO THE GULF 48 WHY GOVERNMENT SHOULD OPERATE CANAL 54 ECONOMIC ASPECT OF CANAL 60 CONSTRUCTION COSTS AND CONTRACTORS 66 OTHER PORT FACILITIES 70 COMPARISON OF DISTANCES BETWEEN NEW ORLEANS AND THE PRINCIPAL CITIES AND PORTS OF THE WORLD 78 THE NEED RECOGNIZED FOR A CENTURY. There is a map in the possession of T. P. Thompson of New Orleans, who has a notable collection of books and documents on the early history of this city, dated March 1, 1827, and drawn by Captain W. T. Poussin, topographical engineer, showing the route of a proposed canal to connect the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain, curiously near the site finally chosen for that great enterprise nearly a hundred years later. New Orleans then was a mere huddle of buildings around Jackson Square; but with the purchase of the Louisiana territory from France, and the great influx of American enterprise that characterized the first quarter of the last century, development was working like yeast, and it was foreseen that New Orleans' future depended largely upon connecting the two waterways mentioned--the river, that drains the commerce of the Mississippi Valley, at our front door, and the lake, with its short-cut to the sea and the commerce of the world, at the back. When the Carondelet canal, now known as the Old Basin Canal, was begun in 1794, the plan was to extend it to the river. It was also planned to connect the New Basin Canal, begun in 1833, with the Mississippi. This was, in fact, one of the big questions of the period. That the work was not put through was due more to the lack of machinery than of enterprise. During the rest of the century, the proposal bobbed up at frequent intervals, and the small Lake Borgne canal was finally shoved through from the Mississippi to Lake Borgne, which is a bay of Lake Pontchartrain. The difference between these early proposals and the plan for the Industrial Canal and Inner Harbor that was finally adopted, is that the purpose in the former case was simply to develop a waterway for handling freight, whereas the object of New Orleans' great facility, now nearing completion, is to create industrial development. Under the law of Louisiana, inherited from the Spanish and French regimes, river frontage can not be sold or leased to private enterprise. This law prevents port facilities being sewed up by selfish interests and insures a fair deal for all shipping lines, new ones as well as old, with a consequent development of foreign trade; and port officials, at harbors that are under private monopoly, would give a pretty if the Louisiana system could be established there. But there is no law, however good, that meets all conditions, and a number of private enterprises--warehouses and factories--have undoubtedly been kept out of New Orleans because they could not secure water frontage. An artificial waterway, capable of indefinite expansion, on whose banks private enterprise could buy or lease, for a long period of time, the land for erecting its buildings and plants, without putting in jeopardy the commercial development of the port; a waterway that would co-ordinate river, rail and maritime facilities most economically, and lend itself to the development of a "free port" when the United States finally adopts that requisite to a world commerce--that was the recognized need of New Orleans when the proposal for connecting the two waterways came to the fore in the opening years of the present century. The Progressive Union, later the Association of Commerce, took a leading part in the propaganda; it was assisted by other public bodies, and forward-looking men, who gradually wore away the opposition with which is received every attempt to do something that grandfather didn't do. And on July 9, 1914, the legislature of Louisiana passed Act No. 244, authorizing the Commission Council of New Orleans to determine the site, and the Board of Port Commissioners of Louisiana, or Dock Board, as it is more commonly called, to build the Industrial Canal. The act gave the board a right to expropriate all property necessary for the purpose, to build the "necessary locks, slips, laterals, basins and appurtenances * * * in aid of commerce," and to issue an unlimited amount in bonds "against the real estate and canal and locks and other improvements * * * to be paid out of the net receipts of said canal and appurtenances thereof, after the payment of operating expenses * * * (and) to fix charges for tolls in said canal." This was submitted to a vote of the people at the regular election in November of that year, and became part of the constitution. To avoid the complication of a second mortgage on the property, the Dock Board subsequently (ordinance of June 29, 1918) set a limit on the total bond issue. To enable the development that was then seen to be dimly possible, it set this limit high--at $25,000,000. NEW ORLEANS DECIDES TO BUILD CANAL. The canal for which the legislature made provision in 1914 bears about the relation to the one that was finally built as the acorn does to the oak. It was to be a mere barge canal that might ultimately be enlarged to a ship canal. Its cost was estimated at $2,400,000, which was less than the cost of digging the New Basin canal nearly a century before, which was a great deal smaller and ran but half way between the lake and river. The panic of the early days of the World War shoved even this modest plan to one side, and it was not until the next year that enthusiasm caught its second wind. Then the leading men and the press of the city put themselves behind the project once more. As the New Orleans Item said, October 22, 1915, "the lack of that canal has already proven to have cost the city much in trade and developed industry." Commenting on the "astonishing exhibition of intelligent public spirit" in New Orleans, the Chicago Tribune said that "no other city in or near the Mississippi Valley, including Chicago, has shown such an awakening to the possibilities and rearrangements that are following the cutting of the Panama canal. * * * The awakening started with the talk of the new canal." Other papers throughout the country made similar expressions. In 1915 the engineering firm of Ford, Bacon & Davis made a preliminary survey of conditions and how development would be affected by the canal. At about the same time the Illinois legislature voted to spend $5,000,000 to construct a deep water canal, giving Chicago water connection with the Mississippi River; and the New Orleans Item linked the two projects when it said, January 16, 1916, "the Illinois-Lake Michigan Canal and the New Orleans Industrial Canal are complementary links in a new system of waterways connecting the upper Valley through the Mississippi River and New Orleans with the Gulf and the Panama Canal. This system again gives the differential to the Valley cities in trade with the markets of the Orient, our own west coast, and South America." Commodore Ernest Lee Jahncke, president of the Association of Commerce, issued a statement to the press January 16, 1916, declaring that the prospect of the canal "brightened the whole business future of this city and the Mississippi Valley"; the New Orleans Real Estate Board and the Auction Exchange, in a joint meeting, urged its speedy building; and Governor Luther E. Hall, in a formal statement to the press January 16, 1916, gave his endorsement to the construction of the canal "long sought by many commercial interests of New Orleans," and said that work would probably begin in "three months." In August, 1916, the governor dismissed the Dock Board and appointed a new one. In the confusion attending the reorganization the canal project was again dropped. The New Orleans American, on August 28, 1916, attempted to revive it, but the effort fell flat, and the plan laid on ice until 1918. America had in the meantime thrown its hat into the ring, and the cry was going up for ships, more ships, and still more ships. National patriotism succeeded where civic effort had failed. New Orleans brought out its Industrial Canal project to help the country build the famous "bridge of boats." But this new phase of the plan was far from the canal that was finally built. In fact, the accomplishment of this project has shown a remarkable development with the passing years, reminding one of the growth of the trivial hopes of the boy into the mighty achievement of the man. Ships could not be built on the Mississippi River. The twenty-foot range in the water level would require the ways to make a long slope into the current, a work of prohibitive expense, and as nearly impossible from an engineering standpoint as anything can be. Early in 1918 a committee of representative Orleanians began to study the situation. This was known as the City Shipbuilding Committee. It comprised Mayor Behrman, O. S. Morris, president of the Association of Commerce; Walter Parker, manager of that body; Arthur McGuirk, special counsel of the Dock Board; R. S. Hecht, president of the Hibernia Bank; Dr. Paul H. Saunders, president of the Canal-Commercial Bank; J. D. O'Keefe, vice-president of the Whitney-Central Bank; J. K. Newman, financier; G. G. Earl, superintendent of the Sewerage and Water Board; Hampton Reynolds, contractor; D. D. Moore, James M. Thompson and J. Walker Ross, of the Times-Picayune, Item and States, respectively. On February 10, 1918, this committee laid the plans for an industrial basin, connected with the river by a lock, and ultimately to be connected with the lake by a small barge canal. Ships could be built on the banks of this basin, the water in which would have a fixed level. Mr. Hecht, and Arthur McGuirk, special counsel of the Dock Board, devised the plan by which the project could be financed. The Dock Board would issue long-term bonds, and build the necessary levees with the material excavated from the canal. The committee's formal statement summarized the public need of this facility as follows: "1. It will provide practical, convenient and fixed-level water-front sites for ship and boat building and repair plants, for industries and commercial enterprises requiring water frontage. "2. It will provide opportunities for all enterprises requiring particular facilities on water frontage to create such facilities. "3. It will permit the complete co-ordination, in the City of New Orleans, of the traffic of the Mississippi River and its tributaries, of the Intracoastal Canal, the railroads and the sea, under the most convenient and satisfactory conditions. "4. In connection with the publicly-owned facilities on the river front, it will give New Orleans all the port and harbor advantages enjoyed by Amsterdam with its canal system, Rotterdam and Antwerp with their joint river and ocean facilities; Hamburg with its free port, and Liverpool with its capacity as a market deposit. "5. It will give New Orleans a fixed-level, well protected harbor. "6. It will serve the purposes of the Intracoastal Canal and increase the benefits to accrue to New Orleans from that canal. "7. In connection with revived commercial use of the inland waterways upon which the federal government is now determined, it will open the way for an easy solution of the problem of handling, housing and interchange of water-borne commerce, and of the development of facilities for the storage of commodities between the period of production and consumption. "8. It will prove an important facility in the equipment of New Orleans to meet the new competition the enlarged Erie Canal will create. The original Erie Canal harmed New Orleans because Mississippi River boat lines could not build their own terminal and housing facilities at New Orleans." [Illustration: W. A. KERNAGHAN Vice-President RENÉ CLERC Secretary ALBERT MACKIE HUGH McCLOSKEY COMMISSIONERS Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans] This meeting made industrial history in New Orleans. The Hecht plan was studied by lawyers and financiers and declared feasible. Mr. Hecht summarized the confidence of the far-visioned men in the new New Orleans when he declared in a public interview: "I feel there is absolutely nothing to prevent the immediate realization of New Orleans' long dream of becoming a great industrial and commercial center and having great shipbuilding plants located within the city limits." And the Item said, in commenting on the undertaking (February 17, 1918): "Millions of dollars of capital will be ready to engage in shipbuilding in New Orleans the moment that piledrivers and steam shovels are set to work on the shiplock and navigation canal." It was a time of great industrial excitement. Victory was at last in the grasp of New Orleans. The eyes of the country were on New Orleans. The cry was, "Full Speed Ahead!" SMALL CANAL FIRST PLANNED. The plan, at this time, was to have a lock-sill only 16 or 18 feet deep. This would be sufficient to allow empty ships to enter or leave the canal, but not loaded. The mere building of ships was thus the principal thought, despite the rhetoric on commercial and industrial possibilities. Perhaps the leaders who were beating the project into shape were themselves afraid to think in the millions necessary to do the work to which New Orleans finally dedicated itself; perhaps they realized that the figure would stagger the minds of the people and defeat the undertaking, if they were not gradually educated up to the mark. Meeting on February 15, 1918, the Dock Board resolved unanimously to put the plan through, if it proved feasible. W. B. Thompson was president of the board; the other members were Dr. E. S. Kelly, Thomas J. Kelly, B. B. Hans and O. P. Geren. Later, E. E. Lafaye took Mr. Kelly's place on the board. The Public Belt Railroad board had in the meantime (February 13) voted to pay the Dock Board $50,000 a year; and the Levee Board (February 14) to give $125,000 a year. As the plans were increased, the Levee Board later increased its bit to $925,000. Mayor Behrman, Arthur McGuirk and R. S. Hecht laid the proposition before both bodies. Action was unanimous. Colonel J. D. Hill, speaking for the Belt Railroad Board, said: "I am glad that at last there has been outlined a plan which seemingly makes it possible to construct the canal. It will not only result in the eventual construction of a big fleet of ships, but will prepare the way for a tremendous industrial activity in other lines. The consensus has been that a navigation canal is needed to induce large manufacturers, importers and exporters to establish their factories and warehouses here. This project will be the opening wedge." Members of the Public Belt Board voting, besides Colonel Hill and Mayor Behrman (ex-officio) were Ginder Abbott, Arthur Simpson, John H. Murphy, W. B. Bloomfield, Adam Lorch, George P. Thompson, Thomas F. Cunningham, Victor Lambou, Edgar B. Stern and Sam Segari. Members of the Levee Board voting were: William McL. Fayssoux, president, Thomas Killeen, Thomas Smith, John F. Muller, James P. Williams, John P. Vezien. W. B. Thompson, president, put the matter before the Dock Board. "The idea" he said, according to the minutes of the meeting of February 15, 1918, "had always received his approval, and he thought that the mayor would recall that in the preparation, he with the city attorney, had a very considerable part in framing the same, and he had taken an active interest in the matter; he had always been in favor of the Industrial Canal, and he believed in the possibility of development of New Orleans through this, as a terminus; and it was entirely logical that the Dock Board should do all that may lie within its power to bring about the successful consummation of this project; the only doubt in his mind being as to the feasibility of the project from the financial standpoint. It seems now, however, that a plan has been devised, through efforts of the mayor and Mr. Hecht, which gives every promise of success. The co-operation of the city on behalf of the Public Belt Railroad, and of the Levee Board, apparently removed the difficulties in respect to the financial end. The Dock Board welcomes the assistance and co-operation of the city and of the Levee Board, but inasmuch as these boards are merely contributing certain amounts per year, and whereas the Dock Board is the obligor in respect of the principal of the bond issue, it devolves upon the Dock Board to use great caution before committing itself to any particular plan in a matter which so vitally affects the credit of the Dock Board, the city of New Orleans and the Levee Board. President Thompson further stated that he unhesitatingly endorsed the project and that he was sure that every member of the board agreed, and the board would be glad to give prompt consideration to the particular plan in question and reach some conclusion which will insure the realization of this great project." To estimate the probable cost of the canal, Mayor Behrman appointed the following committee of engineers: W. J. Hardee, city engineer; A. F. Barclay, engineer of the Public Belt Railroad; George G. Earl, superintendent of the Sewerage & Water Board; C. T. Rayner, Jr., engineer of the Levee Board and Hampton Reynolds, contractor. On February 22, the committee reported that, not counting real estate, a canal could be built for $2,626,876. This estimate called for a lock 600 feet long, 70 feet wide, and 18 feet deep, and a barge canal to the lake. The cost of constructing the lock was put at $1,370,660, and of digging the canal $1,256,216. This report was first received by a special committee composed of Mayor Behrman, W. B. Thompson, Col. J. B. Hill, R. S. Hecht and Major W. McL. Fayssoux. This committee referred it to the Dock Board, which adopted it February 22. Financial arrangements were completed at this same meeting. In order to have sufficient to pay for the land which would have to be expropriated for the canal, and to give some leeway, it was decided to issue bonds for $3,500,000, with an option of floating $1,000,000 more within 30 days. A financial syndicate, consisting of the Hibernia, Interstate and Whitney-Central banks of New Orleans, the William R. Compton Investment Company of St. Louis, and the Halsey, Stuart Company of Chicago, agreed to take the entire issue. The bonds were to run 40 years and begin to mature serially after 10 years. They were to bear 5 per cent interest, and to be sold at 95. They would be secured by a mortgage on the real estate of the canal site, and by the taxing powers of the state, for they were a recognized state obligation, as Arthur McGuirk, special counsel of the Dock Board, pointed out in his opinion of July 10, 1918. He added: "I am likewise of opinion that said bonds are unaffected by any limitations upon the state debt, or upon the rate of taxation for public purposes; that the said bonds are entitled to be paid out of the general funds, or by the exercise of the power of taxation insofar as the revenues, funds or property preferentially pledged or mortgaged to secure said issue may fail, or be insufficient, to pay the same." The following sat with the Dock Board and its attorneys at the meeting of February 22: Mayor Behrman, J. D. Hill of the Public Belt Railroad, R. S. Hecht, president of the Hibernia Bank, J. D. O'Keefe, vice-president of the Whitney-Central Bank, C. G. Reeves, vice-president of the Interstate Bank, W. R. Compton of the Compton Investment Company, H. L. Stuart of Halsey, Stuart and Company, W. J. Hardee, city engineer, and Hampton Reynolds, contractor. The selection of the site was left, by the state law, to the commission council. There were a number of possible routes, and the selection was made with the utmost secrecy to prevent real estate profiteering. At first the area bounded by France and Reynes streets was chosen. This was on February 28. On May 9, however, the site was changed to the area bounded by France and Lizardi streets, north from the Mississippi River to Florida Walk, thence to Lake Pontchartrain. This is a virtually uninhabited region in the Third District, through the old Ursulines tract. The site chosen for expropriation is five and a third miles long by 2,200 feet wide, 897 acres. For this land the Dock Board paid $1,493,532.24, which is at the rate of $1,665 an acre. The valuation was reached by expropriation proceedings. In the meantime, Commodore Ernest Lee Jahncke had asked to be allotted the first site on the Industrial Canal, and Doullut & Williams for the second. Both were for shipyards. The Foundation Company, which was operating a number of shipyards in various parts of the country, sent an engineer here to see if it would be feasible for the concern to build a shipyard here. Even before the piledrivers and dredges were on the job, the millions were being counted for investment in the city whose remarkable enterprise had won the admiration of the country. THE DIRT BEGINS TO FLY. Until the money for the bond issue should be available, the Hibernia Bank authorized the Dock Board to draw against it on open account. It only remained, then, to secure the authorization of the Capital Issues Committee of the Federal Reserve Board, which controlled all bond issues during the World War, to start the work. The grounds on which the authorization was requested summarize conditions that make possible a great industrial development in New Orleans, and will stand quoting. They are: "(a) Semi-tropical conditions, which make it feasible to work every day and night in the year; "(b) Admirable housing conditions which render it feasible for labor to live under most sanitary conditions in houses closely proximate to both the plants and the city, with sewerage and water connections, and with street car transportation facilities to and from the plants and to and from the amusement centers of the city; "(c) Ample labor supply and satisfactory labor conditions; "(d) Proximity to timber, steel and coal sources of supply with all water as well as rail transportation facilities thereon; "(e) State control of the canal facilities and operation of the same, not for profit, but for the economical and expeditious development of shipbuilding." Two shipyards were established on the canal. They poured millions of dollars into New Orleans. The tremendous tonnage built in the United States during the war, and the slump in foreign trade that followed the armistice, due to financial conditions abroad, have caused many shipyards throughout the United States to close down, among them one of these at New Orleans. The other one is now finishing its war contracts, and will be more or less inactive until the demands of the American Merchant Marine and business in general open up again. If they are not used for shipbuilding, they can be used for ship repairing or building barges. And it is obvious that the same conditions that made ship building an economic possibility, will encourage other industrial production, especially production that requires the co-ordination of river, rail and maritime facilities. The Canal means millions of new money to New Orleans, as its proponents said it would. On March 12, the authorization of the Capital Issues Committee was given. On March 15, the George W. Goethals Company, Inc., was retained as consulting engineers on the big job. The services of this company were secured as much for its engineering skill, proven by its work on the Panama Canal, as for the prestige of its name. The Goethals Company, co-operating with the engineers of the Dock Board, which did the work, designed the famous lock and directed the entire job. George M. Wells, vice-president of the firm, was put in active charge of the work. General Goethals made occasional visits of supervision. The dirt began to fly on June 6, 1918. Before coming to New Orleans to take up his work, Mr. Wells, acting upon instructions of the Dock Board, called at the office of the Foundation Company in New York, whose engineer had already studied the possibilities of establishing a shipyard on the canal, and guaranteed an outlet to the sea by the time its vessels should be finished. The river end of the site chosen for the canal consisted of low and flat meadow land. There were a few houses helter-skeltered about, like blocks in a nursery, but the principal signs of human life were the cows that grazed where the grazing was good, and sought refuge from the noonday beams of the sun under the occasional oaks that had strayed out into the open and didn't know how to get back. The middle of the site--several miles in extent--was a gray cypress swamp, with five or six hundred trees to the acre, and always awash. The lake end was "trembling prairie" marsh land subject to tidal overflow and very soft. [Illustration: N. O. ARMY SUPPLY BASE] [Illustration: BUILDING LAKE ENTRANCE] With dredges, spades, mechanical excavators, piledrivers and dynamite the work opened. A great force of men began to throw up by hand, the levees that were to serve as banks for the turning basin, the lock and other portions of the canal. This levee would keep the liquid material, dredged out, from running back into the excavation. The turning basin, 950 feet by 1,150 feet, was an expansion of the original industrial basin. Situated several hundred feet from the lock, its purpose is to enable ships entering the canal from the river, and passing through the lock, to turn in, as well as to furnish a site for the concentration of industries. The Foundation Company had in the meantime decided to establish a shipyard on this basin; its engineers were on the ground, and its material was rolling. One dredge was sent around Lake Pontchartrain to commence boring in from that end. This could not be done on the river end. The Mississippi is too mighty a giant to risk such liberties. The 2,000-foot cut between the river and the lock would have to be done last of all, when the rest of the canal and the lock were finished, and the new levees that would protect the city against its overflow, were solidly set. But a few hundred feet from the turning basin, was Bayou Bienvenu, which runs into Lake Borgne, part of Lake Pontchartrain, and one of the refuges of Lafitte in the brave days when smuggling was more a sport of the plain people than it is now with European travel restricted to the wealthy. So through Bayou Bienvenu a small excavator was sent to cut a passage into the turning basin, to allow the mighty 22-inch dredges to get in and work outwards towards the lake and the lock site. The problem was further complicated by the Florida Walk drainage system, which emptied into Bayou Bienvenu, and by the railway lines that crossed the site of the Canal. These railways were the Southern Railway, at the lake end, the Louisville & Nashville, at the middle, and the Southern and Public Belt near the turning basin on Florida Walk. For them, the Dock Board had to build "run-around" tracks, to be used while their lines were cut to enable the dredging to be made and the bridges to be constructed. For the drainage, the plans called for the construction of an inverted siphon passing under the Canal, a river under a river, so to speak. In the meantime, however, the drainage canal had to be blocked off with two cofferdams, to cut off the water from the city and the bayou, and enable the construction of the siphon between. Additional railroad tracks, too, had to be built to handle the immense volume of material needed for the work; roads had to be built for getting supplies on the job by truck; the trolley line had to be extended for the transportation of labor. Week by week the labor gangs grew, as the men were able to find places in the attacking line of the industrial battle. Great excavators stalked over the land, pulling themselves along by their dippers which bit out chunks of earth as big as a cart when they "took a-hold"; the smack of pile drivers, the thump of dynamite, and the whistle of dredges filled the air. Buildings sprouted like mushrooms; in the meadow, half a mile from the nearest water, the shipyard of the Foundation Company began to take form. It was the plan to finish the Canal by January, 1920. CANAL PLANS EXPANDED. Work in the meantime had begun on the commodity warehouse and wharf, another facility planned by the Dock Board to relieve the growing pains. Built on the Canal, but opening on the river, it was to perform the same service for general commodities as the Public Cotton Warehouse and the Public Grain Elevator did for those products. Though not a part of the canal plan, the construction of the warehouse at this point was part of the general scheme to concentrate industrial development on that waterway. Later, the Federal Government took over this work and gave New Orleans a $13,000,000 terminal, through which it handled army supplies. It is still using the three warehouses for storage purposes, but has leased the half-mile double-deck wharf to the Dock Board, which is devoting it to the general commerce of the port. In time, the Dock Board hopes to get at least one of the buildings. There can be no doubt but that the enterprise of New Orleans in building the Industrial Canal had a great deal to do with the government's determination to establish a depot at New Orleans. On May 30, the news came out of Washington that the Doullut & Williams Shipbuilding Company had been awarded a $15,000,000 contract by the Emergency Fleet Corporation to build eight ships of 9,600 tons each. This was the largest shipbuilding contract that had been given the South. The Industrial Canal rendered it possible. The firm of Doullut & Williams had been engaged for fifteen years or so in the civil engineering and contracting business in New Orleans. Captain M. P. Doullut had built launches with his own hands when a young man, and dreamed of the time when he would have a yard capable of turning out ocean-going vessels. The Doullut & Williams Shipbuilding Company was organized April 25, 1918, with the following officers: M. P. Doullut, president; Paul Doullut, vice-president; W. Horace Williams, secretary-treasurer and general manager; L. H. Guerin, chief engineer; and James P. Ewin, assistant chief engineer. "I feel that New Orleans is on the eve of a very remarkable development" said Senator Ransdell of Louisiana in a telegram of congratulation, "and earnestly hope our people will continue to work together with energy and hearty accord until we have gone way over the top in shipbuilding and many other lines." The expression "over the top" had not become the pest that it and other war-time weeds of rhetoric have subsequently proven. That was a time when one could still refer to a "drive" without causing a gnashing of teeth. Picking the site at the Lake Pontchartrain end of the canal, Doullut & Williams Shipbuilding Company began to erect its shipyard. The plant buildings were erected upon tall piling. As the dredges excavated the material from the cut, they deposited it on the site of the shipyard and raised the elevation several feet, so the buildings were only the usual height above the ground. Both sides of the Canal, it should be added, have been similarly raised by excavation material. It was planned that the ships from the Doullut & Williams yard should be sent out into the world through Lake Pontchartrain, which empties into the Gulf of Mexico. There was ample water in the lake, without dredging, to accommodate unloaded ships of this size. But the fact that ships 400 or so feet long and drawing, when loaded to capacity, 27 feet, were to be built at New Orleans, emphasized the belief of those directing the work of the Industrial Canal that the plan on which they were working was too small. An 18-foot canal would not meet the growing needs of New Orleans. Accordingly the Dock Board instructed the engineering department to expand the plans. By June 11, 1918, the plans had been revised to give a 25-foot channel. This would accommodate all but the largest ships that come to New Orleans. The cost of such a lock and canal, George M. Wells estimated, would be $6,000,000, or $2,500,000 more than the estimate for the original canal. The Levee Board promptly raised its ante to $250,000 to guarantee the interest. When the Dock Board floated the first bond issue of $3,500,000 in February, at 95, it reserved the option to issue another $1,000,000 of bonds within thirty days, at the same rate. For $1,500,000 of the new issue, the same syndicate of banks offered 97-1/2, or two and a half points higher than for the first; but for the other million, they held the board to the original rate of 95. President Thompson reported to the Dock Board June 11 that he considered these "very satisfactory terms." He added: "We were able to secure these better prices and conditions because the bond market is in a somewhat better condition now than it was when we made the original contract." The contract was accepted on that date, and application made to the Capital Issues Committee for the necessary permission. This was given in due time, though there was considerable opposition. The opposition, said President Thompson, at the Dock Board meeting of February 26, 1919, reviewing the development of the canal plans, "was inspired by vicious and spectacular attacks of certain private interests hostile to the canal project and to the port of New Orleans." Railroads, whose right of way crossed the Canal, were the principal propagandists. They realized that the Dock Board could not be required to build their bridges over the waterway, and although the Thompson board financed the work at the time, they knew that sooner or later would come a day of reckoning. The Hudson Board has since then taken steps to collect several million dollars from these roads. But why build a canal almost large enough, only? Why build a 25-foot lock when ships drawing 30-feet of water come to New Orleans? A lock cannot be enlarged, once it is completed--and the tendency of the times is towards larger ships. Why not make a capacity facility while they were about it? [Illustration: LOCK SITE Driving Sheet Piling] [Illustration: LOCK SITE Dredges Entering] These were questions the Dock Board asked itself, and on June 29, 1918, it decided to build the lock with a 30-foot depth over the sill at extreme low water, and make the canal 300 feet wide at the top, and 150 feet wide at the bottom. To do this, would cost about $1,000,000 more, it was estimated by George M. Wells of the Goethals company--a sum which the Dock Board thought would be realized from the rental-revenues of Doullut & Williams and the Foundation Company, without increasing the second bond issue. This is the Canal that was finally built--nearly 70 per cent larger than the one that was begun and about 100 per cent larger than the one originally planned, when the newspapers and forward-looking told the people that the lack of such a canal had cost New Orleans millions of dollars in development. DIGGING THE DITCH. No rock-problem was encountered in dredging the canal. The cost was below what the engineers estimated it would be--less than thirty cents a cubic yard. But a novel situation did develop; a condition that would have sent the cost sky-rocketing if an Orleanian had not met the difficulty. Louisiana is what geologists call a region of subsidence. The gulf of Mexico formerly reached to where Cairo, Ill., now is. Washings from the land, during the slow-moving centuries, pushed the shoreline ever outward; the humus of decaying vegetation raised the ground surface still higher. This section of Louisiana, built by the silt of the Mississippi, was of course the most recent formation. Twenty thousand years ago, say the geologists, there were great forests where Louisiana now is. Among these mighty trees roamed the glyptodont; the 16-foot armadillo with a tail like the morning-star of the old crusaders, monstrously magnified; the giraffe camel; the titanothere; the Columbian elephant, about the size of a trolley car and with 15-foot tusks; the giant sloth which could look into a second-story window; here the saber-toothed tiger fought with the megatherium; mighty rhinoceroses sloshed their clumsy way, and huge and grotesque birds filled the air with their flappings. As the subsoil packed more solidly, this wilderness in time sunk beneath the waters. The Mississippi built up its sandbars again, storms shaped them above the waves, marsh grass raised the surface with its humus, and another forest grew. This, in turn, sunk. And so the process was repeated, time after time. At different depths below the surface of the ground the remains of these forests are found today, the wood perfectly preserved by the dampness. And through this tangled mass the dredges had to fight their way. It was a task too great for the ordinary type of 20 or 22-inch suction dredge, even with the strength of 1,000 horses behind it. When they met these giant stumps and trunks they just stopped. A. B. Wood, of the sewerage and water department, had already designed and patented a centrifugal pump impeller adapted to the handling of sewerage containing trash. Learning of this, W. J. White, superintendent of dredging on the Canal, asked him to design a special impeller, along similar lines, for the dredge Texas. Results from the invention were remarkable. During the thirty days immediately preceding the installation the dredge had suffered delays from clogged suction which totalled 130-3/4 hours. During the thirty days immediately succeeding installation the total of delays for the same reason was cut down to 71-1/2 hours. The average yardage was, for the earlier period, 152 an hour, of actual excavation; and for the later period, 445 an hour--an increase of almost 200 per cent. The situation had been met. This was the period when the cost of labor and material began to jump. Employers were bidding against each other for men, and the government's work practically fixed the price of supplies. George M. Wells, consulting engineer, in his report of December 9, 1918, to the Dock Board, summarized labor increases over the scale when the work was begun, as follows: Unskilled labor, 54%; pile driver men, 40%; machinists, 40%; blacksmiths, 40%; foremen and monthly, 15 to 40%--an average increase of 40%. Materials had advanced, he went on to show, as follows: Gravel, 72%; sand, 25%; cement, 10%; lumber (form), 70%; timber, 40%; piles, untreated, 40%; piles, treated, 25%. These increases, together with the expansion of the plans requiring a canal of maximum depth, instead of the pilot cut of fifteen feet, as originally planned; the insistence of the Levee Board that levees in the back areas must be raised to elevation 30; development of unforeseen and unforeseeable quicksand conditions in the various excavations; requirements of railroads for bridges of greater capacity and strength than needed; building of a power line to the Foundation Company's plant--not a Dock Board job, but one that the conditions required it should finance then; and other expenses, besides delaying the work, made another bond issue necessary to finish the job. At its meeting of February 26, 1919, President Thompson laid the matter before the board. It decided to issue $6,000,000 of bonds, for which the same syndicate of bankers that had taken the other two offered 96. Liberty bonds were then selling at a big discount, and this seemed the best terms on which the money could be secured. This gave a total issue of $12,000,000 to date, the interest on which amounted to $600,000 a year. The Levee Board raised its share of the "rental" to $550,000, to guarantee the interest; the Public Belt Railroad's $50,000 made the total complete. In the meantime ships were beginning to bulk large on the ways of the Foundation and the Doullut & Williams yards. The Foundation company launched its first, the Gauchy--a 4,200-ton non-sinkable steel ship, built for the French government--in September, 1919; and the Doullut & Williams company launched its first, the New Orleans, a steel vessel of 9,600 tons, the largest turned out south of Newport News, built for the Shipping Board, in January, 1920. These were followed by four sister vessels from the Foundation yard and seven from the Doullut & Williams plant. The former went to sea through Bayou Bienvenu and the latter through Lake Pontchartrain. The Doullut & Williams yard is a large one. Originally planning a mere assembling yard, the Foundation Company had subsequently developed the greatest steel fabricating plant in the South--so confident it was that New Orleans would carry through the project. And, too, the New Orleans Army Supply Base that Uncle Sam was building on the river end of the Industrial Canal was rapidly rising--the facility that was to double the port storage capacity of New Orleans when it was finally completed in June, 1919. The canal is 5-1/3 miles long. Between river and lock the canal prism will be 125 feet wide at the bottom and 275 feet at the top; between the lock and the lake, 150 feet wide at the bottom and 300 feet wide at the top. It is an excavation job of 10,000,000 cubic yards. Five hundred thousand flat cars would be required to carry that dirt--a train more than 4,000 miles long. By September, 1919, the canal had been entirely dredged, except for the 2,000-foot channel between the lock and river, which must be left until the last, to a width of about 150 feet and a depth of 26 feet. Since then, the labor has been concentrated upon the lock. But twenty-six feet will float a vessel carrying 6,000 bales of cotton. Full dimensions, however, will be developed, and the Canal, with a system of laterals and basins such as are found in Europe, will be an Inner Harbor capable of indefinite expansion. OVERWHELMING ENDORSEMENT BY NEW ORLEANS. When the Canal was about half finished it received the most tremendous endorsement by every interest of New Orleans in its history. The question was put squarely before the people: "Do you think it is a good thing, and you are willing to be taxed to put it across, and, if so, how much?" And the answer came without hesitation: "It is absolutely necessary to the industrial progress of the city. We must have the Canal at all costs, and are willing to be taxed any amount for it." On September 24, 1919, George M. Wells, consulting engineer, made a report to the Dock Board, showing that the last bond issue of $6,000,000 had been exhausted, and about $5,000,000 more was needed to finish the Canal. This was in the last days of the Thompson Board, and it took no action. The Hudson board entered upon its duties October 2. It comprised William O. Hudson, president; William A. Kernaghan, René F. Clerc, Albert Mackie, Thomas H. Roberts. Later, Mr. Roberts resigned and Hugh McCloskey took his place. All are sound business men, with the interests of the port at heart. They found, in the bank, only $2,067,845.37 to the Industrial Canal Account. After deducting the obligations already made there was left only $112,064.43 to continue the work. Without a public expression from New Orleans they were unwilling to incur the responsibility of issuing $5,000,000 more bonds. President Hudson called a series of meetings of the representative interests of the city to decide what was to be done. As the people of New Orleans had decided to begin the Canal in the first place, it was only right that they should determine whether the undertaking, costing five times as much as the original plan, should be carried through. The governor, the mayor, presidents of banks, committees of commercial exchanges, the president of the Public Belt Railroad, the president of the Levee Board, newspaper publishers, labor leaders and prominent business men were invited. Likewise, a general call was made to the community at large to express an opinion as to finishing the Canal. At the meeting of October 17 the city made its answer. President Hudson outlined the attitude of the Dock Board as follows: "The board has no feeling of prejudice against the completion of the Canal. We are in favor of it. We are anxious to complete it. It was fostered by the citizens of New Orleans. "The floating of the bond issue is a simple matter, if you men think we ought to do it; but where is the money for meeting the interest to come from? The $600,000 interest on bonds now outstanding is being paid, $550,000 by the Levee Board, and $50,000 by the Public Belt Railroad. The Public Belt's share is paid from its earnings; but the Levee Board's share is being paid by direct taxation on the citizens of New Orleans. Must we increase that tax? I personally won't object to any taxation as a citizen to pay my part towards financing the Canal." "I want to see the canal completed," said Governor Pleasant. "But it is up to the people of New Orleans to say whether they are willing to assume the added obligation." R. S. Hecht, president of the Hibernia Bank, and a recognized financial leader in New Orleans, then arose. "I feel," he said, "that all who have the future of New Orleans at heart must agree that we are here to discuss not whether the Canal is to be finished, but how. "Finished it must be, or our commercial future will be doomed for many years. If the Dock Board were to stop the work, it would forever kill its credit for any other bond issue that might be proposed for wharf development, new warehouses, or anything else. "The cost of the canal is a surprise to everybody. I was present when the cost was originally estimated at $3,500,000 with a leeway of $1,000,000. I said then, and I repeat now, that the canal could be financed if the people of New Orleans stood squarely behind it. "The cotton warehouse and the grain elevator cost a great deal more than the original estimates. So the Industrial Canal, though it is costing more than anticipated, because of the increased cost of material and labor and the increased size in the Canal, will, I feel sure, be justified by the development of the future. "Are we to be taxed for fifty years for our investment of $12,000,000 and get no return, or are we willing to pay a little bit more and get something worth while?" That expressed the sentiment of the meeting. [Illustration: BUILDING THE LOCK] "The people of New Orleans," said Hugh McCloskey, financier and dean of all Dock Board presidents, "have never failed to meet a crisis. It is the duty of the Dock Board to finish the Canal, no matter what the doubting Thomases may say." Similar expressions were made by Thomas Killeen, president of the Levee Board; Thomas Cunningham, of the Public Belt Railroad; D. D. Moore, editor of the Times-Picayune; James M. Thompson, publisher of the Item; B. C. Casanas, president of the Association of Commerce; L. M. Pool, president of the Marine Bank; J. E. Bouden, president of the Whitney-Central Bank; Bernard McCloskey, attorney; Frank B. Hayne, of the Cotton Exchange; Jefferson D. Hardin, of the Board of Trade; William V. Seeber, representative of the Ninth Ward; Marshall Ballard, editor of The Item. Others present, assenting by their silence, included John F. Clark, president, and E. S. Butler, member of the Cotton Exchange; W. Horace Williams, of Doullut & Williams Shipbuilding Company; E. M. Stafford, state senator; C. G. Rives of the Interstate Bank; S. T. DeMilt, president of the New Orleans Steamship Association; R. W. Dietrich of the Bienville Warehouse Corporation; Edgar B. Stern, Milton Boylan, W. H. Byrnes, J. C. Hamilton, and about thirty other representative business and professional men. Mayor Behrman, John T. Banville, president of the Brewery Workers' Union, and George W. Moore, president of the Building Trades Council, at a subsequent meeting, gave their endorsement. With only one dissenting voice, these meetings were unanimous that the Industrial Canal must be completed at all costs; that without it, the growth of the city would be seriously interrupted. The one protest was by the Southern Realty and Securities Company. It was made October 23 against the Levee Board's underwriting the interest on the new bond issue. On that date the Levee Board unanimously voted to guarantee these interest charges, amounting to $375,000 a year. This brings the total being paid by that body out of direct taxation to $925,000.00 a year. The other $50,000 is paid by the Public Belt Railroad. To provide a leeway against the engineer's estimates, the Dock Board made provision for a bond issue of $7,500,000, but actually issued only $5,000,000 worth. This was taken by the same syndicate of bankers that had taken the previous issues, but this time they paid par. That was a point on which President Hudson had insisted. The contract was accepted December 10, 1919. And the work went on, with every effort concentrated on economical construction. SIPHON AND BRIDGES. As an incident in the work of building the Industrial Canal, it was necessary to create a disappearing river. This is the famous siphon--the quadruple passage of concrete that will carry the city's drainage underneath the shipway. It is one of the largest structures of its kind in the country. A word about New Orleans' drainage problem. The city is the bowl of a dish, of which the levees against river and lake are the rim. There is no natural drainage. The rainfall is nearly five feet a year, concentrated at times, upon the thousand miles of streets, into cloudbursts of four inches an hour and ten inches in a day. In the boyhood of men now in their early thirties it was a regular thing for the city to be flooded after a heavy rain. To meet the situation, New Orleans has constructed the greatest drainage system in the world. There are six pumping stations on the east side of the river, connected with each other by canals, and with a discharge capacity of more than 10,000 cubic feet a second. The seven billion gallons of water that these pumps can move a day would fill a lake one mile square and thirty-five feet deep. Three of the canals empty into Lake Pontchartrain, the fourth, the Florida Walk Canal, into Bayou Bienvenu, which leads into Lake Borgne, an arm of Pontchartrain. Because of this drainage contamination, the lake shore front of New Orleans has been held back in its development. Yet it is an ideal site for a suburb--on a beautiful body of water, and just half a dozen miles from the business district. So the Sewerage and Water Board has been planning ultimately to turn the city's entire drainage into Bayou Bienvenu, a stream with swamps on both sides, running into a lake surrounded by marsh. The Industrial Canal crosses the Florida Walk drainage canal. This made it necessary to build the inverted siphon. A siphon, in the ordinary sense, is a bent tube, one section of which is longer than the other, through which a liquid flows by its own weight over an elevation to a lower level. But siphon here is an engineering term to describe a channel that goes under an obstruction--the canal--and returns the water to its former level. Like the famous rivers that drop into the earth and appear again miles further on, the Florida drainage canal approaches to within a hundred or so feet of the Industrial Canal, then dives forty feet underground, passes beneath the shipway, and comes to the surface on the other side, in front of the pumping station, which lifts it into Bayou Bienvenu. At first it was planned to build a comparatively small siphon, but while the plans were being drawn, New Orleans entered upon its tremendous development. The engineers threw away their blueprints and began over again. They designed one that is capable of handling the entire drainage of the city. And in April, 1920, it was finished--a work of steel and concrete and machinery, costing nearly three-quarters of a million dollars, and with a capacity of 2,000 cubic feet of water a second, 7,200,000 an hour, 172,800,000 a day. It was a work that presented many difficulties. First the Florida Walk canal had to be closed by two cofferdams. The space between was pumped out, the excavation was made, and the driving of foundation piling begun. Quicksands gave much trouble. They flowed into the cut, until they were stopped with sheet piling. The piles were from 30 to 60 feet in length and from three to five feet apart on centers. Forty-six feet below the ground surface (-26 Cairo datum) was laid the concrete floor of the siphon. The siphon is divided into four compartments. There are two storm chambers, measuring 10 by 13 feet each, one normal weather chamber measuring 4 by 10 feet, and one public utilities duct, measuring 6 by 10 feet. These are inside dimensions. The floor of the siphon is two feet thick; the roof, one foot nine inches. The whole structure is a solid piece of concrete and capable of standing a pressure of more than 2,000 pounds to the square foot. Its total length is 378 feet; the shipway passing over it is 105 feet wide and 30 feet deep. In the public utilities duct are carried the city's water pipes, cables, telephone and telegraph wires, and gas mains. The storm chambers will handle the rainfall of cloudbursts. In ordinary weather the water will be concentrated through the smaller chamber, in order to produce a strong flow and reduce the settlement of sediment to a minimum. Eight sluice gates, each 6 by 10 feet, open or close the water chambers. They are operated by hydraulic cylinders of the most approved type. For sending workmen inside the siphon to make repairs or clearing away an obstruction there are eight manholes. Four measure 6 by 13 feet, two 6 by 6 feet, and two 6 by 4 feet. As soon as the Florida Walk canal can be deepened and a few link-ups in the drainage system can be made, the entire drainage of New Orleans, in normal weather and during light storms, will, according to announcement by the Sewerage and Water Board, be sent through this outlet. During the occasional cloudbursts it will be necessary to send some of the drainage into the lake, but this will be rapidly flowing water and will sweep offshore. It means a great deal to the suburban development of the city. A year and a half the siphon was in the making. Preparations for the structure cost more than $250,000--excavation foundation, etc. The concrete alone cost $170,000. Machinery and the work of housing and installing it cost $60,000 more. Four bascule steel bridges now cross the Industrial Canal. They are the largest in the city. Three of them--at Florida Walk, for the Southern and Public Belt Railways; Gentilly, for the Louisville & Nashville; and on the lake front, for the Southern, weigh 1,600,000 pounds each--superstructure only. The fourth--at the lock--weighs 1,000,000 pounds. They are balanced by 800-ton concrete blocks and concrete adjustment blocks. Their extreme length is 160 feet; the moving leaf has a span of 117 feet. With a 30-foot right of way for railroad tracks, 11 feet for vehicles and trolley cars and four feet for pedestrians, they are designed to meet traffic conditions of a great and growing city. They will support 50-ton street cars or 15-ton road rollers--New Orleans has nothing as heavy as that now--and trains a great deal heavier than are now coming to the city. No bridge in the South will support as heavy loads. The tensile strength of the steel of which the bridges are constructed is from 55,000 to 85,000 pounds to the square inch, and they will bear a wind load of 20 pounds to the square inch of exposed surface. They are operated by two 75-horse power electric motors, 440 volts, 60-cycle, 3-phase current, which is stepped down from 2,200 volts by means of transformers. In addition, there is a 36-horse power gasoline engine, to be used if the electrical equipment is out of order. To open or close the bridges will require a minute and a half. THE REMARKABLE LOCK. Not only is the lock of the Industrial Canal one of the largest in the United States, but its construction solved a soil problem that was thought impossible. That of the Panama Canal is simple in comparison. The design is unique in many respects. The lock is a monument to the power of Man over the forces of Nature, and to the progress of a community that will not say die. Because of the great variation in the level of the river at low and high water--a matter of twenty feet--it was necessary to make the excavation, for building the lock, about fifty feet deep. In solid soil this would be a simple matter. But this ground has been made by the gradual deposit of Mississippi River silt upon what was originally the sandy bed of the ocean, and through these deposits run strata of water-bearing sand, or quicksand. This flows into a cut and causes the banks to cave and slide into the excavation. Underneath there is a pressure of marsh gas, which, with the pressure of the collapsing banks, squeezes the deeper layers of quicksand upwards, creating boils and blowing up the bottom. New Orleans has had plenty of experiences with these flowing sands in its shallow sewerage excavations. How, then, expect to make an excavation fifty feet deep? asked the doubting Thomases. It couldn't be done. The quicksands would flow in too fast. The dredges would drain the surrounding subsoil, but that wouldn't get beyond a certain depth. Furthermore, what assurance was there that the soil that far down would supply sufficient friction to hold the piles necessary to sustain the enormous weight of the lock and the ships passing through it? Undaunted by these croakings, the engineers, from test borings, calculated the sliding and flowing character of the soil, and estimated the various pressures that would have to be counteracted, balanced this with the holding power of pine and steel and concrete, evolved a plan, and began an excavation of a hole 350 feet wide by 1,500 feet long, gradually sloping the cut (1 to 4 ratio) to a center where the lock, 1,020 by 150 feet, outside dimensions, was to be built. [Illustration: INNER HARBOR--NAVIGATION CANAL Lock and Vicinity] The gentle slope of the cut was to prevent slides. It had been ascertained that the first stratum of quicksand began twenty-eight feet below the ground surface (-3 Cairo datum) and was three feet thick; the second stratum, forty-eight feet below the surface (-23 Cairo datum) and ten feet thick. Coarser sand extended eleven feet below this, from -33 Cairo datum. The second stratum of flowing sand began just below where the lock floor had to be laid. The third layer was 80 feet below the surface (-55 Cairo datum); the tips of the piling would just miss it. Excavation began in November, 1918. While the dredges were at work a wooden sheet piling cofferdam was driven completely around the lock, and about 125 feet from the edge of the bank, to cut off the first quicksand stratum. About 150 feet further in, when the excavation was well advanced, a second ring of sheet piling was driven, to cut off the second stratum, which carried a static pressure of 55 feet and was just a foot or so below where the floor of the lock would be. It was not thought necessary to cut off the third stratum. The excavation was made in the wet. When it was finished the dredges moved back into the Canal, the entrance closed, and the work of unwatering the lock site began. This was in April, 1919. There had never been such a deep cut made in this section. Consequently, the character of the soil, while it could be estimated, could not be known absolutely. And the exact pressure of the gas could not be known. The sands proved to be more liquid and the gas pressure stronger than anticipated. Quicksands ran through the sheet piling as through a sieve. The walls of the excavation began to slough and cave. The gas pressure became alarming when the weight of earth and water was taken off; sand boils began to develop at the bottom; the floor of the cut was blowing up. The fate of the Industrial Canal hung in the scale. To meet the situation the engineers pumped a great volume of water into the excavation. Its weight counterbalanced the earth pressure of the side and the gas pressure of the bottom. Then another ring of sheet piling was driven inside the other two. This one was of steel, and the walls were braced apart by wooden beams ten inches square and fifteen feet apart in both directions. This is one of the largest cofferdams of steel ever driven. As an added precaution against the danger of a blowout by the third stratum of quicksand, which had a static head of 75 feet, 130 ten-inch artesian wells were driven inside the steel cofferdam. Fifty-six similar wells were driven between the steel and the wooden cofferdams to dry out the second stratum of quicksand, as much as possible, and lessen its flowing character. In November, 1919, the work of unwatering the lock site again began. Only one foot every other day was taken off. Engineers watched every timber. It was not until January 4, 1920, that the unwatering was complete. The plan had worked. Only in one place had there been any movement--a section of the wooden sheet piling about 300 feet long bulged forward a maximum distance of three inches, when the bracing caught and stopped it. Then began the work of driving the 24,000 piles on which the lock was to be floated. They are 60 feet long and their tips are 100 feet below the surface of the ground. In March, 1920, the work of laying the concrete began. The work was done in 15-foot sections, for only a few of the braces could be moved at one time. When it was finished in April, 1921, the lock was in one piece, a solid mass of steel and stone, 1,020 feet long, 150 feet wide, and 68 feet high, weighing, with its gates and machinery, 225,000 tons, and filled with water, 350,000 tons. The concrete floor of the lock is 9 to 12 feet thick, the walls 13 feet wide at the bottom, decreasing to a two foot width at the top. Six thousand tons of reinforcing steel were used in the construction, and 125,000 barrels of cement. There are 90,000 cubic yards of concrete in the structure. Two and a half million feet of lumber were used in building the forms. Usable dimensions of the lock are 640 feet long, 75 feet wide, and 30 feet (at minimum low water of the river) deep. The top of the lock is 20 feet above the natural ground surface and 6 feet above the highest stage of the Mississippi River on record. To the top the ground will be sloped on a 150-foot series of terraces. This will brace the walls against the pressure of water within the monolith. It will be developed to a beautiful park. Heavy anchor-columns of concrete will hold the walls against the pressure of these artificial hills when the lock is empty. Traffic crosses the canal here by a steel bascule bridge 65 feet wide, with two railroad and two street car tracks, two vehicle roadways, and two ways for pedestrians. Concrete viaducts lead to the bridge. Gas and water mains, sewer pipes and telephone, telegraph and electric wires pass under the lock in conduits cast in the living concrete. Water is admitted into and drained from the lock by culverts cast in the base. These are 8 by 10 feet, narrowing at the opening to 8 by 8 feet, and closed by 8 sluice gates, each operated by a 52-horsepower electric motor. It will be possible to fill or empty the lock in ten minutes. There are five sets of gates to the lock. They are built of steel plates and rolled shapes, four and a half feet thick and weighing 200 tons each. And there is an emergency dam weighing 720 tons, which in case of necessity can be used as a gate. Four pairs of the gates are of 55-foot size; one of 42-foot. Each gate is operated by a 52-horsepower electric motor. When open, the gates fit flush into the walls of the locks. In the emergency dam is the refinement of precaution--designed as it was to save the city from overflow in the remote event of the lock gates failing to work during high water, and to insure the uninterrupted operation of the lock in normal times, if the gates should be sprung by a ship, or otherwise put out of commission. This dam consists of eight girders or sections, 80 feet long, 3 feet wide and 6 feet high. They weigh 90 tons each. They are kept on a platform near the river end of the lock. Nearby is the crane with a 300-horsepower motor, that picks up these girders and drops them into the slots in the walls of the lock. To set this emergency dam is the work of an hour. A ship passing through the lock will not proceed under her own power. There are six capstans, two at each end of the lock and two at the middle, each operated by a 52-horsepower electric motor, and capable of developing a pull of 35,000 pounds, which will work the vessels through. The lock complete, counting the bridge and approaches, cost $7,500,000. One and a half million of this is for machinery, and $56,000 for the approaches. Henry Goldmark, the New York engineer who designed the gates of the Panama Canal and the New Orleans Industrial Canal, in a letter of March 24, 1921, to the engineering department of the Dock Board, comments as follows on the remarkable lock: "I was much impressed by the uniformly high grade of construction of the lock, the systematic and energetic way in which the work was being carried on, and especially by the admirable spirit of team work, shown by the employees of the Dock Board, of different grades, as well as the contractors, superintendents and foremen. "The desire to get the best possible results in all the details, at the least cost, was manifest throughout. "The unique method used for carrying on the very difficult and risky work of excavation has attracted much professional attention in all parts of the country. Its successful completion is very creditable to all concerned, in the inception and carrying out of the method used. "The concrete work gives the impression of lightness, as well as strength, as though every yard of concrete was doing its special share of the work without overstraining, which is, of course, the characteristic of well-designed reinforced masonry. "The outer surfaces are particularly smooth and well finished, more so than in any work I have recently seen. "The erection of the gates, valves, operating machinery and the protective dam, has kept up closely with the concrete work, so that no delays need be apprehended at the close of the construction period. "The shop and field work in the lock gates is excellent. The rivet holes match well and the rivet heads appear to be tight and well formed. The gate leaves seem very straight and true." The lock was designed by George M. Wells of the George W. Goethals Company, assisted by R. O. Comer, designing engineer of the Dock Board, and approved by General Goethals. The methods employed to unwater the lock were devised by Mr. Wells. J. Devereux O'Reilly, chief engineer of the Dock Board, to November, 1919, had charge of the details of installing the unwatering and safety devices. He was succeeded by General Arséne Perrilliat, who supervised the final unwatering process. Upon his death in October, 1920, he was succeeded by J. F. Coleman & Company, in charge of the engineering department, and H. M. Gallagher, chief engineer, under whom work is being brought to a conclusion. From first to last, Tiley S. McChesney, assistant secretary and treasurer of the Dock Board, rendered intelligent and invaluable service, gathering together and holding the threads of the enterprise, and attending promptly to the multitude of details connected with the prosecution of the work. The lock was formally dedicated May 2, 1921--a ceremony that was the feature of the Mississippi Valley Association's convention in New Orleans. With the dredging of the channel between the river and the lock, a work that should be finished before January, 1922, ships will be able to pass from the Mississippi into Lake Pontchartrain. Then New Orleans can plan its next great development. [Illustration: CROSS SECTION OF LOCK] [Illustration: CROSS SECTION OF SIPHON] NEW CHANNEL TO THE GULF. George M. Wells, George R. Goethals, son of the General, Colonel E. J. Dent, U.S. district engineer at New Orleans, and other engineers who have studied the problem, say that the dredging of a channel from the Industrial Canal to the gulf through Lake Pontchartrain, or the marshes, is feasible, comparatively cheap, and maintenance would be simple. This would shorten the distance from New Orleans to the sea by about 50 miles, and would be a vast saving for ships. It is one of the objects towards which the Hudson Dock Board is working. It is Uncle Sam's recognized duty to develop and maintain harbors and channels to the sea. Distance is obviously an important factor; furthermore, the proposed new outlet would be an important link in the Intracoastal Canal, connecting with the Warrior River section of Alabama, which the government is developing between the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts. A bill was introduced in the Senate in 1920 by Senator Ransdell of Louisiana, providing for the development of the proposed channel; it was not pressed because the canal was far from completed. However, every effort will be made by the Dock Board from now on to have Uncle Sam take hold. Colonel Dent has for a number of months been studying the feasible routes. He, by the way, is thoroughly convinced of the value of the Industrial Canal to the development of New Orleans, and the commerce of the nation, and has so expressed himself in public. The Pontchartrain route has been laid off, by engineers, beginning at the Canal, paralleling the south shore of the Lake Pontchartrain to the south draw of the Southern Railway bridge, thence to the Rigolets to Cat Island Pass, from there to Cat Island Channel and so to the deep water of the Gulf, a total distance of 75 miles. Soundings and surface probings have been taken at frequent intervals over the entire route. These have shown the engineers the following: Three-quarters of a mile from the south shore of the lake, and as far as the railroad drawbridge, a hard bottom is found. The material is principally packed sand, rather fine, with a small amount of clay, and occasionally some broken shells. Beyond this distance from the shore, the bottom is softer, consisting of mud mixed with sand. From the bridge over the remainder of the route, the bottom, with the exception of a few sand pockets, is soft--a blue mud with a large percentage of sand. This soft material has so much tenacity, however, that current and wave wash, which tend to fill up artificially dredged channels, would affect only the surface. The government is conducting large dredging operations in Mobile Bay, Gulfport Channel, Atchafalaya Bay and the Houston Ship Channel. An outline of the results there will show how feasible the dredging of the Pontchartrain Channel would be, and how much cheaper in comparison. The channel connecting Mobile Bay with the Gulf of Mexico has a bottom very soft for the most part, and with a small percentage of sand. Towards the outer end, the material is black mud, about equal in consistency to the softest material found in the Pontchartrain route. A sounding pole with a 4-inch disc on the end can be easily pushed three or four feet into the mud and pulled out again. Wave and current action cause the channel to shoal at the rate of 78,000 to 132,000 cubic yards per mile per year, depending on the softness of the bottom and the depth. Where the highest rate obtains, the surrounding material consists of soft mud, without a trace of sand. Experience shows that where there is a fair percentage of sand in the material adjacent to the channel bed, the shoaling is lessened. In general, the material along the Pontchartrain route contains a greater percentage of sand and is far more tenacious than that along the Mobile Bay Channel. Furthermore, the Pontchartrain route is not exposed to such strong cross currents. The Gulfport Channel is dredged through very soft material, a grayish-blue mud of oozy consistency, into which the sounding pole penetrates six feet with very little exertion. On top, a small amount of sand is found, but practically none in the lower stratum. The material is considerably softer than any encountered on the Pontchartrain route, except for one small stretch. Yet the shoaling is not great. Where the shoaling is heaviest, between the end of the pier and Beacon 10, only about 700,000 cubic yards a mile has to be dredged out every year to maintain the channel. From Beacon 10 out, the average annual maintenance is less than 200,000 cubic yards a mile. Except for the four-mile stretch west of the inner entrance to the Cat Island Channel, the bottom, on the Pontchartrain route, is harder than that of the Gulfport Channel. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the maintenance of the Pontchartrain Channel would not average as high as the outer portion of the Gulfport Channel. The Atchafalaya Bay Ship Channel, extending from the mouth of the Atchafalaya River across the shoal waters of Atchafalaya Bay, to about the 20-foot contour of the Gulf, a distance of fifteen miles, is through a material of slushy mud, with occasional thin pockets of sand. The shoaling runs from 540,000 to 1,680,000 cubic yards a mile a year. The highest rate is obtained in shallow water. Except in the stretch mentioned, the material on the Pontchartrain route is not as soft as on the Atchafalaya, nor are the depths as shoal, nor is there the exposure to cross currents. In the Houston Ship Channel, the material is composed of soft mud with a small amount of sand. A two-mile stretch through Red Fish Reef is practically self-maintaining. For the remainder of the channel, during the six years from 1915 to 1920, a total excavation of 13,574,000 cubic yards was necessary to maintain the depth. This is equivalent to 100,000 cubic yards a mile a year. In summary, then: 1. The Lake Pontchartrain route is practically unexposed to cross currents, as is the case with the Mobile Bay, Gulfport, Atchafalaya, and, to a certain extent, the outer portion of the Houston Ship Channels. 2. The material along and on the sides of the Pontchartrain route is, with the exception of a small stretch, more tenacious, and contains, in general, a greater proportion of sand than in the case of the neighboring channels mentioned. The channel could therefore be more easily maintained. Engineers estimate that a channel with a 300-foot bottom would be needed. On the south shore of the lake, the side slopes should be on the 1 to 3 ratio, with provision for a 1 to 5 ratio at the end of five years. Dumped on shore, the material would reclaim considerable frontage, and eliminate the re-deposit of this material in the channel. Through the remainder of the route, the original excavation should be made with side slopes on the 1 to 5 ratio, with provision made for a 1 to 10 ratio in five years. The dredging of the 75 miles of the Pontchartrain Channel would amount to 97,200,000 cubic yards, it is estimated by engineers. The cost would be around $10,000,000. The annual maintenance, during the first five years, would amount to 8,880,000 cubic yards--an estimate based on a comparison with the other channels into the Gulf, and the character of the material to be excavated. This estimate is considered large--but even at that, it is only 118,400 cubic yards a mile a year, and the cost would be about $750,000, according to Colonel Dent. After five years, it would be less. Another proposed route, investigated by Colonel Dent, is through Lake Borgne. A canal some miles in length, through the marsh, would connect the lake with the Industrial Canal. This route has considerable maintenance advantages over the Pontchartrain route. The character of the bottom in Borgne is more or less the same as in Pontchartrain. Sooner or later, one of these channels will be built by the government. That it has not already been begun is due to the fact that the Canal has not yet been completed, and the expected development has not taken place. But there is no doubt that it will. [Illustration: TYPICAL BRIDGE ON CANAL] [Illustration: EMERGENCY DAM CRANE] WHY GOVERNMENT SHOULD OPERATE CANAL. It is the function of the state to provide port facilities in the form of docks, piers, warehouses, grain elevators, mechanical equipment, etc. But it is the duty of the national government to improve harbors, dredge streams, dig canals for navigation and irrigation, erect levees to protect the back country, and build locks and dams when needed. These are the premises from which the Hudson Dock Board reasons that the cost of construction and maintenance of the New Orleans Navigation Canal and Inner Harbor should be assumed by Uncle Sam. It will leave no stone unturned to have him assume the obligation. The Navigation Canal is essentially a harbor improvement. It enables practically unlimited industrial development and commercial interchange. It is an important link in the Intracoastal Canal system which the government is developing to provide an inland waterway from Boston, Mass. to Brownsville, Tex., and, with the dredging of a channel through Lake Pontchartrain to the Gulf, a problem which U.S. engineers have been studying for some time and an undertaking which they have found feasible, it will put the nation's second port about fifty miles closer to the sea. It has considerable military value. Its purpose is, therefore, national; the local interests are secondary. It is no new principle, this obligation of the government. That duty has been recognized by Congress since the United States was. Any rivers and harbors bill will show great and useful expenditure for waterways improvement. The Panama Canal, built by the government, is the greatest example. Coming closer home, there is south pass at the mouth of the Mississippi. A bar, with a nine-foot depth of water, blocked the commerce of New Orleans. Under the rivers and harbors act of 1875, Captain James B. Eads was paid $8,000,000 for building the famous jetties to provide a 26-foot channel. Since then, the channel has been deepened to 33 feet. In more recent years, the government began to improve southwest pass, the westernmost mouth of the Mississippi. A nine-foot bar was there, too. To increase the depth to 35 feet, the government spent, up to 1919, about $15,000,000, and is still spending. "Just as the purpose of the improvements of these channels was to bridge the distance from deep water to deep water" says Arthur McGuirk, special counsel of the Dock Board, in a report of February 23, 1921, to the Board, "so is the purpose of the Navigation Canal to bridge the distance from the deep water of the river to the proposed deep water channel of the lake." In the annual report of the chief of engineers, U.S.A., for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1919, are listed the following waterways improvements and canal developments being made by the Government: "Operating and care of canals, $3,596,566.20. "Cape Cod canal, purchase authorized, river and harbors act, August 8, 1917, cost not exceeding $10,000,000, and enlargement $5,000,000. "Jamaica Bay channel, 500 feet width, 10 feet depth, to be further increased to 1,500 feet width entrance channel and 1,000 feet interior channel, maximum depth of 30 feet, length of channel 12 miles. Approved estimate of cost to United States not to exceed $7,430,000. River and harbors act of June 25, 1910. House document No. 1488, 60th Congress. "Ambrose channel, New York harbor, appropriation new work and maintenance, $4,924,530.88, year ending June 30, 1919. "Bay Ridge and Red Hook channels, $4,471,100. "Locks and dams on Coosa River, Alabama-Georgia, $1,700,918.21. "Channel connecting Mobile Bay and Mississippi Sound, act of June 13, 1902, original project, for construction and maintenance total cost $7,809,812.42. "Black Warrior river, 17 locks, Mobile to Sanders' Ferry, 443 miles. Total to date, $10,101,295.54. Indefinite appropriation. "Sabine Pass, act of June 19, 1906 and prior, channels, turning basins and jetties, March 2, 1907, and previously, total appropriations, $1,875,506.78. "Trinity River, Galveston, north, 37 miles locks and dams. Act of June 13, 1902, house document 409, 56th congress. Estimate cost complete canalization of river, revised 1916, in addition to amounts expended prior to rivers and harbors act of July, 1916, in round numbers $13,500,000. Estimated annual cost of maintenance, $280,000. "Houston to Galveston ship canal, act of July 25, 1912, and July 27, 1916. Cost, $3,850,000. Annual maintenance, $325,000. "Rock Island Rapids (Ill.) and LeClaire canal, rock excavations, etc., act of March 2, 1907, dams, 3 locks, etc., to June 30, $31,180,085.62 and $130,158.03 for 1 year maintenance. "Keokuk, Iowa (formerly Des Moines Rapids canal), old project (act of June 23, 1866), $4,574,950.00. "Muscle Shoals Canal (Tennessee River), 36.6 miles, depth 5 feet, $4,743,484.50. Exclusive of cost of nitrate plant. "Locks and dams on Ohio River, act of March 3, 1879, to act of March 2, 1907, including purchase of Louisville and Portland canal, $17,657,273.78. "Estimated cost of new work, widening Louisville and Portland canal and changes in dams, $63,731,488. Annual maintenance covering only lock forces and cost of repairs and renewals, $810,000. Act of June 25, 1920, house document 492, 65th congress, first session. Also act of March 4, 1915, house document 1695, 64th congress, second session. "Ship channel connecting waters of great lakes, including St. Mary's river (Sault Sainte Marie locks), St. Clair and Detroit rivers, locks and dams, total appropriations to June 30, 1919, $26,020,369.68. Estimate new work, $24,085. "St. Clair river, connecting Lakes St. Clair and Erie, shoalest part was 12-1/2 to 15 feet. Improved at expense of $13,252,254.00. Estimated cost of completion, $2,720,000. "Niagara river, $15,785,713.07. "Los Angeles and Long Beach harbor, $4,492,809.80. "Seattle, Lake Washington ship canal, in city of Seattle, from Puget Sound to lake; original project, act of August 18, 1894. Double lock and fixed dam. Length about 8 miles. Total appropriation to date, $3,345,500.00." These are only some of the larger projects. Of course there are a great number of such works, all over the country, constructed and maintained by the United States, sometimes alone, and again by co-operation with local authorities. New Orleans was founded because of the strategic value of the location, both from a commercial and a military standpoint. The power that holds New Orleans commands the Mississippi Valley--a fact which the British recognized in 1812 when they tried to capture it. Likewise, when Farragut captured New Orleans, he broke the backbone of the Confederacy. Mr. McGuirk, in the report to which reference has already been made, discusses the military importance of the Industrial Canal as follows: "A ship canal, connecting the river and the lake at New Orleans will be a Panama or a Kiel canal, in miniature, and double in effectiveness the naval forces defending the valley, as they may be moved to and fro in the canal from the river to the lake. On this line of defense heavy artillery on mobile mounts can be utilized, in addition to heavy ships of the line. That is to say, just as light-draft monitors, and even floats carrying high-powered rifles were used effectively on the Belgian coast; on the Piave river in Italy, and on the Tigris in Mesopotamia, so may they be used in the defense of the valley, on any canal connecting the Mississippi river and Lake Pontchartrain. Changes are constantly occurring in the details of work of defense due to development of armament, munitions and transport. The never-ending development of range and caliber has assumed vast importance, particularly with reference to the effect on the protection of cities from bombardment. Naval guns are now capable of hurling projectiles to distances of over 50,000 yards, 28 to 30 miles. For the protection of the valley we should have at New Orleans armament mounted on floating platforms which will hold the enemy beyond the point where his shells may not reach their objective, and in this operation the canal, affording means of rapid transport, will render invaluable and essential service." A country's ports are its watergates. Their local importance is comparatively small. They are important or not according to whether they are on trade routes, and easily accessible. An infinitesimal part of the trade that flows through New Orleans originates or terminates there. The back country gets the bulk of the business. The development of the harbor is for the service of the interior. It is essentially national. From every point of view, therefore, it is the duty of the national government to take over the Navigation Canal and release the monies of the state so they may be devoted to the improvement of the waterway with wharves and other works in aid of the nation's commerce. [Illustration: S. S. NEW ORLEANS First Ship Launched by Doullut & Williams Shipbuilding Co.] [Illustration: S. S. GAUCHY First Ship Launched on Canal] ECONOMIC ASPECT OF CANAL. Tied to the Mississippi Valley by nearly 14,000 miles of navigable waterways, and the largest port on the gulf coast and the most centrally situated with respect to the Latin-American and Oriental trade, New Orleans is naturally a market of deposit. The development of the river service, in which the government set the pace in 1918, is restoring the north and south flow of commerce, after a generation of forced haul east and west, along the lines of greatest resistance; and New Orleans has become the nation's second port. Its import and export business in 1920 amounted to a billion dollars. Ninety per cent of the nation's wealth is produced in the Valley, of which New Orleans is the maritime capital. It is the source of supply of wheat, corn, sugar, lumber, meat, iron, coal, cotton oil, agricultural implements, and many other products. It is a market for the products of Latin-America and the Orient. With the co-ordination of river, rail and maritime facilities, and sufficient space for development, it is inevitable that New Orleans should become a mighty manufacturing district. Such enterprises as coke ovens, coal by-product plants, flour mills, iron furnaces, industrial chemical works, iron and steel rolling mills, shipbuilding and repair plants, automobile factories and assembling plants, soap works, packing plants, lumber yards, building material plants and yards, warehouses of all kinds, etc., would be encouraged to establish here if given the proper facilities, and the Industrial Canal is the answer to this need, for under the laws of Louisiana private industries can not acquire or lease property on the river front. Even before the completion of the Canal, the dream has been partly realized--with the establishment of two large shipyards on the Canal, which otherwise would have gone somewhere else, and the building of the army supply base on the same waterway, largely due to the enterprise of the port. As Colonel E. J. Dent, U.S. district engineer, said before the members' council of the Association of Commerce, February 17, 1921, the Industrial Canal will be the means of removing the handicaps on New Orleans' foreign trade. "I hold no brief for the Industrial Canal," he continued, "but speaking as one who has no interest in it but who has studied the question deeply, I will say that five years from now, if you develop the Industrial Canal as it should be developed, you will be wondering how on earth you ever got along without it." Before the constitutional convention of Louisiana, on April 4, 1921, he elaborated this thought as follows: "The Industrial Canal will furnish to New Orleans her greatest need. It should be possible to build docks there where the entire cargo for a ship may be assembled. Under present conditions in the river it is often necessary for a ship to go to three or four docks to get a complete cargo. "Last year there passed through the port of New Orleans 11,000,000 tons of freight valued at $1,100,000,000. This required 1,000 loaded freight cars a day passing over the docks, fifteen solid trainloads of freight each day. The inbound freight was about 5,000,000 tons and the outbound about 6,000,000. This is extraordinarily well balanced for any port in the United States. This would mean about 5,000 steamers of an average capacity of 2,000 tons. "The proper place to assemble a cargo is on the docks. Last year the Dock Board allowed but seven days for assembling the cargo for a ship--only seven days for assembling 250 carloads of stuff. Then last year the Dock Board would not assign a ship a berth until it was within the jetties. These are some of the difficulties. "What New Orleans needs is 50 to 100 per cent more facilities for her port. Last summer the port of New Orleans was congested, but she held her own because other ports were congested. But that may not occur again. If you want to hold your own you must improve your facilities." Wharves can be built a great deal cheaper on the fixed-level canal, with its stable banks. And that is the only place specialized industries can secure water frontage. Sooner or later the government will adopt the free port system, by which other countries have pushed their foreign trade to such heights. Free ports have nothing to do with the tariff question. They are simply zones established in which imports may be stored, re-packed, manufactured and then exported without the payment of duties in the first place, duties for the refund of which the present law makes provision, but only after vexatious delays and expensive red tape. Precautions are taken to prevent smuggling. In the preliminary investigations and recommendations made by the Department of Commerce, New York, San Francisco and New Orleans have been designated as the first free ports that should be established. With the ample space it offers for expansion, the Industrial Canal is the logical location for the free zone. Counting the $15,000,000 contract of the Doullut & Williams Shipyard, the $5,000,000 contract of the Foundation Company Shipyard, the $13,000,000 army supply base, the Industrial Canal has already brought $33,000,000 of development to New Orleans, 60 per cent more than the cost of the undertaking. More than half of this was for wages and material purchased in New Orleans. The state has gained hundreds of thousands of dollars in taxes. About half the money spent on the Industrial Canal was wages; and helped to increase the population, force business to a new height, raise the value of real estate, and make New Orleans the financial stronghold of the South. What indirect bearing on bringing scores of other industries to New Orleans, which did not require a location on the waterway, the building of the Industrial Canal has had, there is no way of ascertaining. Since the work was begun the Dock Board has received inquiries from a hundred or so large enterprises regarding the cost of a site on the canal. That they have not established there is due to the fact that the Canal has not yet been completed, and the Dock Board has announced no policy. It is now working on that question with representatives of the Association of Commerce, Joint Traffic Bureau, Clearing House Association, Cotton Exchange, Board of Trade, and Steamship Association. There is no use trying to guess at what the policy will be. It is too big a problem, and must be worked out very carefully, with reference to a confusing tangle of cross-interests. Two principles have already been categorically laid down by President Hudson and endorsed by the Dock Board at an open meeting of April 5, 1921, with the commercial and industrial interests of the city, planning for the policy of the Canal: First, that the development of the Canal shall not be at the expense of the river. Wharf development will be pushed on the river to meet the legitimate commercial demands of the port. No one is to be forced on the Canal. That would hurt the port. It is not thought that such forced development would be necessary, and the Canal will be kept open for the specialized industries that can best use the co-ordination of the river, rail and maritime facilities. Second, that the control of the property along the Canal, owned by the Dock Board, will not go out of the hands of the Board. There will be long-term leases--up to ninety-nine years, but no outright sale. Furthermore, the private land on the other side of the Dock Board's property will not be allowed to be developed at the expense of the state's interests. So the frontage on the Canal will be developed before there is any extensive construction of lateral basins and slips. What will be the rate charged for a site? Will it be based on the actual cost of the Canal and its maintenance? Or will the state consider it a business investment like a road or street, and charge the property owners thereon less than the cost of construction, collecting the difference in the general progress? That, too, is a question which calls for considerable study before it can be answered. With the Industrial Canal open, sites available on long leases to business enterprise, and with our tax laws relating to the processes of industry and commerce revised and made more favorable, New Orleans will enter a period of expansion and development on a scale hardly yet dreamed of by her most far-visioned citizens, with enlarged profit and opportunity for all her people. New taxable wealth will be created rapidly. New needs for taxable property will arise. The tax burden on all will be distributed more widely and when contrasted with the earning power of such property will become less and less of a burden. This will be so because the water frontage through which the Canal is being created for the attraction of many enterprises which cannot locate on the river front, is all within the limits of the city of New Orleans. With this Canal in operation, New Orleans will possess to the fullest degree the three great systems of port operation: Public ownership and operation of the river harbor facilities; public ownership of the land and private operation of facilities on the Industrial Canal; and private ownership of the land and private operation of the facilities on the new channel to the sea. No other port in the country has the capacity for this trinity of port systems. No other port possesses such a hinterland as is embraced within the Mississippi Valley, nor so extensive and so complete a system of easy-grade railroads and navigable waterways penetrating its hinterland. No other port holds so strategic a position in the path of the new trade routes connecting the region of greatest productivity with the new markets of greatest promise in Latin-America and the Orient. [Illustration: LOCK GATE There are Ten Like This] CONSTRUCTION COSTS AND CONTRACTORS. Everything is relative. Looking at the total, some may think that the cost of the Industrial Canal is large. So it is--compared with the cost of an irrigation ditch through a 20-acre farm. But comparing the cost with the wealth it is invested to produce--has already begun to produce--it dwindles to a mere percentage. And a comparison of construction costs on the Industrial Canal with similar work done elsewhere during the same time is very much in favor of the former. Witness the following figures shown in the books of the engineering department of the Dock Board: Dredging, including the canal prism and the excavation of the sites of the bridge foundations, siphon and lock, averaged .2784 cents a cubic yard. The highest cost was in the lock section, from which 609,302 cubic yards were excavated at an average cost of .3796 cents a cubic yard. On the siphon and Florida Walk bridge section, including two other deep cuts, the 814,919 cubic yards excavated cost an average of .2607 cents a cubic yard. On the Louisville & Nashville bridge section, the 1,023,466 cubic yards excavated cost an average of .2363 cents a cubic yard. From there to the lake, 1,673,787 cubic yards, the average cost was .2411 cents. Dredging costs were below the original estimates when labor and supplies were 50 per cent cheaper. The 90,000 cubic yards of concrete in the lock cost an average of $22.50 a cubic yard. This includes cost of material, mixing, building forms, pouring and stripping forms. Mixing and pouring, from the time the material was handled from the storehouse or pile, averaged $1.20 a cubic yard. It would be hard to find cheaper concrete on a work of similar magnitude anywhere, say the engineers. On the siphon the concrete work cost more, because it was a subterranean job, with elaborate shaping. The price there was $35 a cubic yard, in place, including material and form work. To drive the 17,000 bearing piles and 7,000 traveling piles on which the lock is floated, cost an average of 15 cents a running foot. This does not include the cost of the piling. Construction steel cost .12 cents a pound, and erection around 4 cents. These were standard prices. The lock gates, weighing 5,285,000 pounds, cost $845,600, in place. This does not include opening and closing machinery. Three of the bascule bridges crossing the Canal, weighing 1,600,000 pounds each, cost $250,000 each, erected. The fourth bridge, near the lock, weighing 1,000,000 pounds, cost $200,000, erected. This is for superstructure only--it does not include the foundation. The emergency dam bridge, weighing 350,373 pounds, and its 108,256 pounds of turning machinery, cost $96,728, in place. Hoisting machinery cost $40,000 more. The eight girders of the emergency dam, weighing 90 tons each, at $240 a ton, cost $172,800. Machinery for working the ten lock gates, the eight filling gates, and the six capstans--twenty-four 52-horse power electric motors--cost $21,479, f.o.b. New Orleans. The plant for unwatering the lock, consisting of one pump with a capacity of 15,000 gallons a minute, and two with a capacity of 250 gallons each, cost, erected, $11,000. Total mechanical equipment used on the Industrial Canal weighs 14,500 tons. Its cost, including power-house, electrical connections, etc., is $1,516,000. Plant and equipment for building the Canal, including locomotives, cranes, piledrivers, dredges, tools, etc., cost $781,232. Depreciation, up to February, 1921, is set at $266,874, leaving a balance of $514,358, carried as assets. Much of this has already been sold, and more will be disposed of. Following are the firms that executed contracts on the Industrial Canal: OUTSIDE NEW ORLEANS. Lock gates and emergency dam girders: McClintic-Marshall Construction Company, Pittsburg, Pa.; designed by Goldmark & Harris Company, New York. Filling gates: Coffin Valve Company, Indian Orchard, Mass. Miscellaneous valve equipment: Ludlow Valve Company, Troy, N.Y. Capstans: American Engineering Company, Philadelphia, Pa. Mooring posts: Shipbuilding Products Company, New York, N.Y. Miter gate moving machines: Fawcus Machine Works, Pittsburg, Pa. Motors, control boards and miscellaneous electrical equipment: General Electric Company, Schenectady, N.Y. Bridge crane and bascule bridges: Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Steelton, Pa. Former designed by Goldmark & Harris Company, New York, N.Y.; latter, by Strauss Bascule Bridge Company, Chicago, Ill. Steel sheet piling: Lackawanna Steel Company, Buffalo, New York. Hoists and cranes: Orton & Steinbrenner, Huntington, Ind.; American Hoist and Derrick Company, St. Paul, Minn. Conveyor equipment: Webster Company, Tiffany, Ohio; Barker-Greene Company, Aurora, Ill. Woodworking machinery: Fay & Egan Company, Cincinnati, Ohio. Pipe: U.S. Cast Iron Pipe Company, Birmingham, Ala. Lumber and piling: Hammond Lumber Company, Hammond, La.; Great Southern Lumber Company, Bogalusa, La. Dredges: Bowers Southern Dredging Company, Galveston, Tex.; Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company, Mobile, Ala. IN NEW ORLEANS. Cinder and earth fill: Thomas M. Johnson. Levee work: Hercules Construction Company; Hampton Reynolds. Sand and gravel: Jahncke Service, Inc.; D. V. Johnston Company. Cement: Atlas Portland Cement Company, the Michel Lumber and Brick Company being local agents. Lumber and piling: Salmen Brick and Lumber Company; W. W. Carre Company, Ltd. Coal: Kirkpatrick Coal Company; Tennessee Coal, Iron and R.R. Company. Reinforcing steel and supplies: Tennessee Coal, Iron and R.R. Company; Ole K. Olsen. Rail and track accessories: A. Marx & Sons. Concrete mixers: Fairbanks Company. Repairs and castings: Dibert, Bancroft & Ross; Joubert & Goslin Machinery and Foundry Company; Stern Foundry and Machinery Company. OTHER PORT FACILITIES. "New Orleans," says Dr. Roy S. MacElwee in his book on Port and Terminal Facilities, a subject on which he is considered an authority, "is the most advanced port in America in respect to scientific policy." The Shipping Board echoed the compliment in its report of its port and harbor facilities commission of April, 1919, when it said: "New Orleans ranks high among the ports of the United States for volume of business, and presents a very successful example of the public ownership and operation of port facilities. It is one of the best equipped and co-ordinated ports of the country." New Orleans is the principal fresh water-ocean harbor in the United States. Landlocked and protected from storms, it is the safest harbor on the Gulf Coast. Almost unlimited is the number of vessels that can be accommodated at anchor. Alongside the wharves the water is from thirty to seventy feet deep. The government maintains a 33-foot channel at the mouth of the river. The "port of New Orleans" takes in about 21 miles of this harbor on both sides of the river. This gives a river frontage of 41.4 miles, which is under the jurisdiction of the Dock Board, an agency of the state. The Board has, to date, improved seven miles of the east bank of the river with wharves, steel sheds, cotton warehouses, a grain elevator and a coal-handling plant of most modern type, together with other facilities for loading and unloading. Authority has been granted to issue $6,500,000 in bonds for increasing these facilities. Wharves, elevators and warehouses built by railroads and industrial plants on both sides of the river bring up the total improved portion of the port to 45,000 linear feet, capable of berthing ninety vessels 500 feet long. These facilities are co-ordinated by the only municipally owned and operated belt railroad in the United States, which saves the shipper much money. More than sixty steamship lines connect the port with the world markets; the government barge line, a number of steamboat lines, and twelve railroad lines connect it with the producing and consuming sections of the United States. [Illustration: BULL WHEEL Part of Operating Machinery for Lock Gates] Now nearing completion is the Public Coal Handling Plant. Built by the Dock Board to develop the business in cargo coal, it is costing more than $1,000,000.00, and will have a capacity of 25,000 tons. It is of the belt-conveyor type. The plant will be able to: 1. Unload coal from railway cars into a storage pile; 2. Unload coal from cars into steamers or barges; 3. Load coal from storage pile into steamers or barges; 4. Unload coal from barges into steamers and storage pile; 5. Load coal from barges or storage pile into cars. At the 750-foot wharf the plant can take care of three ships at one time, with a maximum loading capacity of 800 to 1,000 tons an hour. Other coaling facilities at the port are furnished by: Illinois Central Railroad: Tipple with capacity of 300 tons an hour; New Orleans Coal Company: Two tipples, capacity 150 and 350 tons an hour; floating collier to coal ships while freight is being taken aboard at the wharf, capacity 175 tons an hour; collier, capacity 150 tons an hour. Alabama and New Orleans Transportation Company: Storage plant with loading towers on Lake Borgne canal, just below the city; American Sugar Refining Company: Coal plant, capacity, 70 tons an hour, for receiving coal from barges and delivering it to boiler house; Monongahela River Coal and Coke Company: Floating collier. Fuel oil facilities for bunkering purposes are furnished by: Gulf Refining Company: Storage capacity, 100,000 barrels; bunkering capacity, 800 barrels an hour; Texas Oil Company: Storage capacity, 150,000 barrels; bunkering capacity, 1,500 barrels an hour; Mexican Petroleum Corporation: Bunkering capacity, 1,500 barrels an hour; Sinclair Refining Company: Storage capacity, 250,000 barrels; bunkering capacity, 2,500 barrels an hour; Standard Oil Company: Storage capacity, 110,336 barrels; bunkering capacity, 1,000 barrels an hour. In the Jahncke Dry Dock and Ship Repair Company, New Orleans has the largest ship repair plant south of Newport News. The plant is on the Mississippi river, adjacent to the Industrial Canal. It has a 1,500-foot wharf and three dry docks, of 6,000, 8,000 and 10,000 tons capacity, respectively. These can be joined for lifting the very large ships. It is equipped with the latest and most powerful machinery, and has been a strong factor in developing the port. The Johnson Iron Works and Shipbuilding Company likewise has facilities for wood repairing, caulking, painting and scraping of vessels, as well as iron work. It has three docks: one 234 feet long, one 334 feet long, and a small one for lifting barges and small river tugs. At the United States Naval Yard is a dock of 15,000 tons capacity. This is placed at the service of commercial vessels when private docks are not available. The Public Cotton Warehouse and Public Grain Elevator are among the most modern facilities in the country. Both plants are of reinforced concrete throughout, insuring a low insurance rate. The cotton warehouse comprises five units, with a total storage capacity at one time of 320,000 bales, and an annual handling capacity of 2,000,000. High density presses compress this cotton to 34 pounds per cubic foot, saving the exporter 20 per cent on steamship freight rates. The insurance rate on storage cotton is 24 cents per $100 a year. Cotton is handled by Dock Board employees licensed by the New Orleans Cotton Exchange under rules and regulations laid down by the department of agriculture. Warehouse receipts may be discounted at the banks. Cotton can be handled cheaper here than at any other warehouse in the country. Storage capacity of the Public Grain Elevator is 2,622,000 bushels. This is about 25 per cent of the grain elevator storage capacity of the port, but the Public Elevator handles 60 per cent of the business--proving its efficiency. Its unloading capacity is 60,000 bushels a day from barges or ships, and 200,000 bushels from cars. Loading capacity into ships is 100,000 bushels an hour--to one or four vessels, simultaneously. Fireproof and equipped with a modern dust-collecting system, this facility is considered one of the best in the country. Other grain elevators at New Orleans are operated by: Southern Railway: capacity, 375,000 bushels; Illinois Central Railroad two elevators, capacity, 2,500,000 bushels; Trans-Mississippi Terminal Railroad Company: two elevators, capacity, 1,350,000 bushels. Wharves owned and controlled by the Dock Board measure 28,872 linear feet in length, with an area of 4,230,894 square feet. Twenty of these thirty-four wharves are covered with steel sheds. Wharves operated by the railroads on both sides of the river increase the port facilities as follows: Southern Railway: Two concrete and steel covered docks, one a two-story structure; one is 150 by 1,300 feet, with a floor space of 195,000 square feet; one is 150 by 1,680 feet on the lower floor, and 120 by 1,680 on the upper, with a combined area of 453,000 square feet floor space. Illinois Central Railroad: covered wharf, 130-150 by 4,739 feet. Morgan's Louisiana and Texas Railroad and Steamship Company: wharf space, 112,000 square feet; covered space, 117,200 square feet. Trans-Mississippi Terminal Railroad Company: Wharf No. 1, three berths, 281,904 square feet; No. 2, one berth, 94,350 square feet; No. 3, one berth, 100,725 square feet--most of it covered; oil wharf, 15,000 square feet. The New Orleans Army Supply Base has a two-story wharf 2,000 feet long by 140 feet wide. The lower floor of the wharf is leased by the Dock Board. Back of it are the three warehouses, each 140 by 600 feet, and six stories in height. Seven industrial plants have loading and unloading facilities on the river. The Dock Board does not lease or part with the control of these, and controls the following charges: harbor fees, dockage, sheddage, wharfage, etc. Open storage on river front contiguous to wharves totals 1,169,900 square feet. There is a great deal of potential open storage space away from the wharves and along railroad tracks, which could be reached by switches. For the storage of coffee, alcohol, sisal, sugar and general commodities, private warehouses offer a floor space of 2,000,000 square feet. Railroads serving New Orleans are: The Public Belt, Illinois Central, Yazoo & Mississippi Valley, Gulf Coast Lines, Louisiana Railway & Navigation Company, Louisville & Nashville, Louisiana Southern, Missouri-Pacific, Texas & Pacific, New Orleans & Lower Coast, Morgan's Louisiana & Texas Railroad and Steamship Company, (Southern Pacific) Southern Railway and New Orleans & Great Northern. Storage track capacity of New Orleans for export traffic totals 15,156 cars. Track facilities alongside the wharves will accommodate 600 cars. New Orleans can handle, at the grain elevators and wharves, 3,000 cars a day. Wharves are served exclusively by the Public Belt Railroad. The Industrial Canal will be similarly served. The Public Belt Railroad assumes the obligations of a common carrier, operating under appropriate traffic rules and regulations. The switching charge is $7.00 a car, regardless of the distance. On uncompressed cotton and linters, the charge is $4.50. The government barge line connects New Orleans with the Warrior River section of Alabama and the Upper Mississippi Valley, including a great deal of inland territory to which river and rail differential rates apply, as far as St. Louis. It is operating a fleet of 2,000-ton steel covered barges and 1,800 horsepower towboats. There is a weekly service. Rates are 20 per cent cheaper than rail rates. The port is supplied with some of the most modern freight handling machinery. Harbor dues and other expenses are low. The water supply, for drinking purposes and boilers, meets the strongest tests. How advantageously situated is New Orleans will be seen from the following comparison of distances: [Illustration: SHIP LOCK on the INNER HARBOR NAVIGATION CANAL at the PORT OF NEW ORLEANS THE LOCK COMPLETED] COMPARISON OF DISTANCES BY AND BETWEEN NEW ORLEANS AND NEW YORK AND PRINCIPAL CITIES. (Distances in statute miles, furnished by War Department.) New York New Orleans ---------------------------------------- Atlanta 846 498 Baltimore 188 1,184 Birmingham 1,043 348 Boston 235 1,607 Buffalo 442 1,275 Charleston 739 776 Chattanooga 846 498 Chicago 912 912 Cincinnati 781 836 Cleveland 584 1,092 Dallas 1,642 515 Denver 1,932 1,356 Detroit 693 1,100 Duluth 1,390 1,340 El Paso 2,310 1,195 Galveston 1,782 410 Indianapolis 827 888 Kansas City 1,335 867 Little Rock 1,290 487 Louisville 867 749 Memphis 1,156 396 Minneapolis 1,332 1,285 Mobile 1,231 141 Norfolk 347 1,093 Oklahoma City 1,643 856 Omaha 1,402 1,070 Pittsburgh 444 1,142 Philadelphia 91 1,281 Port Townsend 3,199 2,979 Portland, Oregon 3,204 2,746 Salt Lake City 2,442 1,928 San Antonio 1,943 571 San Francisco 3,191 2,482 Savannah 845 661 Seattle 3,151 2,931 St. Louis 1,058 701 Toledo 705 1,040 Washington, D.C. 228 1,144 COMPARISON OF DISTANCES BY WATER ROUTES BETWEEN NEW ORLEANS AND NEW YORK TO PRINCIPAL PORTS OF THE WORLD. (Distances in nautical miles, supplied by Hydrographic Office, Navy Department; land routes in statute miles supplied by War Department.) New York New Orleans --------------------------------------------------------- Antwerp 3,325 4,853 Bombay-- Via Suez 8,120 9,536 Via Cape of Good Hope 11,250 11,848 Buenos Ayres 5,868 6,318 Callao-- Via Panama 3,392 2,764 Via Tehauntepec 4,246 2,991 Cape Town 6,851 7,374 Colon (eastern end of Panama Canal) 1,981 1,380 Havana 1,227 597 Hong Kong-- Via Panama 11,431 10,830 [a] Via rail to San Francisco 9,277 8,568 Honolulu-- Via Panama 6,686 6,085 Via rail to San Francisco 5,288 4,579 Liverpool 3,053 4,553 London 3,233 4,507 Manila-- Via Panama 11,546 10,993 [a] Yokohama and San Francisco 9,480 8,771 [a] Yokohama and Port Townsend 9,192 8,972 Melbourne-- [a] Via San Francisco 10,231 9,522 Via Panama 10,028 9,424 Via Tehauntepec 9,852 8,604 Via Suez Canal 12,981 14,303 Mexico City-- By land and water 2,399 1,172 By land 2,898 1,526 New Orleans-- Land 1,372 Water 1,741 Nome, Alaska-- [a] Via San Francisco 5,896 5,187 [a] Via Port Townsend 5,555 5,335 Via Panama 8,010 7,410 Panama (western end Canal)-- Via Canal and Colon 2,028 1,427 Pernambuco, Brazil 3,696 3,969 Rio de Janeiro 4,778 5,218 San Juan, P.R. 1,428 1,539 Singapore-- Via Yokohama and Panama 13,104 12,503 Via Suez 10,170 11,560 San Francisco 3,191 2,482 Via Tehauntepec 4,415 3,191 Via Panama 5,305 4,704 Tehauntepec-- Eastern end of railroad 2,036 812 Valparaiso-- Via Panama 4,637 4,035 Yokohama-- Via Honolulu and Tehauntepec 9,243 7,995 Via Honolulu and Panama 10,093 9,492 Via Panama 9,869 9,268 --------------------------------------------------------- [a] By land and water. [b] By land. 
47435	----	BRITISH CANALS [Illustration: AQUEDUCT AT PONTCYSYLLTE (IN THE DISTANCE). (Constructed by Telford to carry Ellesmere Canal over River Dee. Opened 1803. Cost £47,000. Length, 1007 feet.) [_Frontispiece._ ] BRITISH CANALS: IS THEIR RESUSCITATION PRACTICABLE? BY EDWIN A. PRATT AUTHOR OF "RAILWAYS AND THEIR RATES," "THE ORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURE," "THE TRANSITION IN AGRICULTURE," ETC. LONDON JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W. 1906 PREFACE The appointment of a Royal Commission on Canals and Waterways, which first sat to take evidence on March 21, 1906, is an event that should lead to an exhaustive and most useful enquiry into a question which has been much discussed of late years, but on which, as I hope to show, considerable misapprehension in regard to actual facts and conditions has hitherto existed. Theoretically, there is much to be said in favour of canal restoration, and the advocates thereof have not been backward in the vigorous and frequent ventilation of their ideas. Practically, there are other all-important considerations which ought not to be overlooked, though as to these the British Public have hitherto heard very little. As a matter of detail, also, it is desirable to see whether the theory that the decline of our canals is due to their having been "captured" and "strangled" by the railway companies--a theory which many people seem to believe in as implicitly as they do, say, in the Multiplication Table--is really capable of proof, or whether that decline is not, rather, to be attributed to wholly different causes. In view of the increased public interest in the general question, it has been suggested to me that the Appendix on "The British Canal Problem" in my book on "Railways and their Rates," published in the Spring of 1905, should now be issued separately; but I have thought it better to deal with the subject afresh, and at somewhat greater length, in the present work. This I now offer to the world in the hope that, even if the conclusions at which I have arrived are not accepted, due weight will nevertheless be given to the important--if not (as I trust I may add) the interesting--series of facts, concerning the past and present of canals alike at home, on the Continent, and in the United States, which should still represent, I think, a not unacceptable contribution to the present controversy. EDWIN A. PRATT. London, _April 1906_. CONTENTS CHAP. PAGE I. INTRODUCTORY 1 II. EARLY DAYS 12 III. RAILWAYS TO THE RESCUE 23 IV. RAILWAY-CONTROLLED CANALS 32 V. THE BIRMINGHAM CANAL AND ITS STORY 57 VI. THE TRANSITION IN TRADE 74 VII. CONTINENTAL CONDITIONS 93 VIII. WATERWAYS IN THE UNITED STATES 104 IX. ENGLISH CONDITIONS 119 X. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 142 APPENDIX--THE DECLINE IN FREIGHT TRAFFIC ON THE MISSISSIPPI 151 INDEX 157 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS HALF-TONE ILLUSTRATIONS AQUEDUCT AT PONTCYSYLLTE (in the distance) _Frontispiece_ WHAT CANAL WIDENING WOULD MEAN: COWLEY TUNNEL AND EMBANKMENTS _To face page_ 32 LOCKS ON THE KENNET AND AVON CANAL AT DEVIZES " " 42 WAREHOUSES AND HYDRAULIC CRANES AT ELLESMERE PORT " " 48 WHAT CANAL WIDENING WOULD MEAN: SHROPSHIRE UNION CANAL AT CHESTER " " 70 "FROM PIT TO PORT": PROSPECT PIT, WIGAN " " 82 THE SHIPPING OF COAL: HYDRAULIC TIP ON G.W.R., SWANSEA " " 88 A CARGO BOAT ON THE MISSISSIPPI " " 110 SUCCESSFUL RIVALS OF MISSISSIPPI CARGO BOATS " " 114 WATER SUPPLY FOR CANALS: BELVIDE RESERVOIR, STAFFORDSHIRE " " 128 MAPS AND DIAGRAMS INDEPENDENT CANALS AND INLAND NAVIGATIONS " " 54 CANALS AND RAILWAYS BETWEEN WOLVERHAMPTON AND BIRMINGHAM " " 56 SOME TYPICAL BRITISH CANALS " " 98 BRITISH CANALS CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY The movement in favour of resuscitating, if not also of reconstructing, the British canal system, in conjunction with such improvement as may be possible in our natural waterways, is a matter that concerns various interests, and gives rise to a number of more or less complicated problems. It appeals in the most direct form to the British trader, from the point of view of the possibility of enabling him to secure cheaper transit for his goods. Every one must sympathise with him in that desire, and there is no need whatever for me to stay here to repeat the oft-expressed general reflections as to the important part which cheap transit necessarily plays in the development of trade and commerce. But when from the general one passes to the particular, and begins to consider how these transit questions apply directly to canal revival, one comes at once to a certain element of insincerity in the agitation which has arisen. There is no reason whatever for doubt that, whereas one section of the traders favouring canal revival would themselves directly benefit therefrom, there is a much larger section who have joined in the movement, not because they have the slightest idea of re-organising their own businesses on a water-transport basis, but simply because they think the existence of improved canals will be a means of compelling the railway companies to grant reductions of their own rates below such point as they now find it necessary to maintain. Individuals of this type, though admitting they would not use the canals themselves, or very little, would have us believe that there are enough of _other_ traders who would patronise them to make them pay. In any case, if only sufficient pressure could be brought to bear on the railway companies to force them to reduce their rates and charges, they would be prepared to regard with perfect equanimity the unremunerative outlay on the canals of a large sum of public money, and be quite indifferent as to who might have to bear the loss so long as they gained what they wanted for themselves. The subject is, also, one that appeals to engineers. As originally constructed, our British canals included some of the greatest engineering triumphs of their day, and the reconstruction either of these or even of the ordinary canals (especially where the differences of level are exceptionally great), would afford much interesting work for engineers--and, also, to come to commonplace details, would put into circulation a certain number of millions of pounds sterling which might lead some of those engineers, at least, to take a still keener interest in the general situation. There is absolutely no doubt that, from an engineering standpoint, reconstruction, however costly, would present no unsurmountable technical difficulties; but I must confess that when engineers, looking at the problem exclusively from their own point of view, apart from strictly economic and practical considerations, advise canal revival as a means of improving British trade, I am reminded of the famous remark of Sganerelle, in Molière's "L'Amour Médecin"--"Vous êtes orfévre, M. Josse." The subject strongly appeals, also, to a very large number of patriotic persons who, though having no personal or professional interests to serve, are rightly impressed with the need for everything that is in any way practicable being done to maintain our national welfare, and who may be inclined to assume, from the entirely inadequate facts which, up to the present, have been laid before them as to the real nature and possibilities of our canal system, that great results would follow from a generous expenditure of money on canal resuscitation here, following on the example already set in Continental countries. It is in the highest degree desirable that persons of this class should be enabled to form a clear and definite opinion on the subject in all its bearings, and especially from points of view that may not hitherto have been presented for their consideration. Then the question is one of very practical interest indeed to the British taxpayer. It seems to be generally assumed by the advocates of canal revival that it is no use depending on private enterprise. England is not yet impoverished, and there is plenty of money still available for investment where a modest return on it can be assured. But capitalists, large or small, are not apparently disposed to risk their own money in the resuscitation of English canals. Their expectation evidently is that the scheme would not pay. In the absence, therefore, of any willingness on the part of shrewd capitalists--ever on the look-out for profitable investments--to touch the business, it is proposed that either the State or the local authorities should take up the matter, and carry it through at the risk, more or less, either of taxpayers or ratepayers. The Association of Chambers of Commerce, for instance, adopted, by a large majority, the following resolution at its annual meeting, in London, in February 1905:-- "This Association recommends that the improvement and extension of the canal system of the United Kingdom should be carried out by means of a public trust, and, if necessary, in combination with local or district public trusts, and aided by a Government guarantee, and that the Executive Council be requested to take all reasonable measures to secure early legislation upon the subject." Then Sir John T. Brunner has strongly supported a nationalisation policy. In a letter to _The Times_ he once wrote: "I submit to you that we might begin with the nationalisation of our canals--some for the most part sadly antiquated--and bring them up to one modern standard gauge, such as the French gauge." Another party favours municipalisation and the creation of public trusts, a Bill with the latter object in view being promoted in the Session of 1905, though it fell through owing to an informality in procedure. It would be idle to say that a scheme of canal nationalisation, or even of public trusts with "Government guarantee" (whatever the precise meaning of that term may be) involving millions of public money, could be carried through _without_ affecting the British taxpayer. It is equally idle to say that if only the canal system were taken in hand by the local authorities they would make such a success of it that there would be absolutely no danger of the ratepayers being called upon to make good any deficiency. The experiences that Metropolitan ratepayers, at least, have had as the result of County Council management of the Thames steamboat service would not predispose them to any feeling of confidence in the control of the canal system of the country by local authorities. At the Manchester meeting of the Association of Chambers of Commerce, in September 1904, Colonel F. N. Tannett Walker (Leeds) said, during the course of a debate on the canal question: "Personally, he was not against big trusts run by local authorities. He knew no more business-like concern in the world than the Mersey Harbour Board, which was a credit to the country as showing what business men, not working for their own selfish profits, but for the good of the community, could do for an undertaking. He would be glad to see the Mersey Boards scattered all over the country." But, even accepting the principle of canal municipalisation, what prospect would there be of Colonel Walker's aspiration being realised? The Mersey Harbour Board is an exceptional body, not necessarily capable of widespread reproduction on the same lines of efficiency. Against what is done in Liverpool may be put, in the case of London, the above-mentioned waste of public money in connection with the control of the Thames steamboat service by the London County Council. If the municipalised canals were to be worked on the same system, or any approach thereto, as these municipalised steamboats, it would be a bad look-out for the ratepayers of the country, whatever benefit might be gained by a small section of the traders. Then one must remember that the canals, say, from the Midlands to one of the ports, run through various rural districts which would have no interest in the through traffic carried, but might be required, nevertheless, to take a share in the cost and responsibility of keeping their sections of the municipalised waterways in an efficient condition, or in helping to provide an adequate water-supply. It does not follow that such districts--even if they were willing to go to the expense or the trouble involved--would be able to provide representatives on the managing body who would in any way compare, in regard to business capacity, with the members of the Mersey Harbour Board, even if they did so in respect to public spirit, and the sinking of their local interests and prejudices to promote the welfare of manufacturers, say, in Birmingham, and shippers in Liverpool, for neither of whom they felt any direct concern. Under the best possible conditions as regards municipalisation, it is still impossible to assume that a business so full of complications as the transport services of the country, calling for technical or expert knowledge of the most pronounced type, could be efficiently controlled by individuals who would be essentially amateurs at the business--and amateurs they would still be even if assisted by members of Chambers of Commerce who, however competent as merchants and manufacturers, would not necessarily be thoroughly versed in all these traffic problems. The result could not fail to be disastrous. I come, at this point, in connection with the possible liability of ratepayers, to just one matter of detail that might be disposed of here. It is certainly one that seems to be worth considering. Assume, for the sake of argument, that, in accordance with the plans now being projected, (1) public trusts were formed by the local authorities for the purpose of acquiring and operating the canals; (2) that these trusts secured possession--on some fair system of compensation--of the canals now owned or controlled by railway companies; (3) that they sought to work the canals in more or less direct competition with the railways; (4) that, after spending large sums of money in improvements, they found it impossible to make the canals pay, or to avoid heavy losses thereon; and (5) that these losses had to be made good by the ratepayers. I am merely assuming that all this might happen, not that it necessarily would. But, admitting that it did, would the railway companies, as ratepayers, be called upon to contribute their share towards making good the losses which had been sustained by the local authorities in carrying on a direct competition with them? Such a policy as this would be unjust, not alone to the railway shareholders, but also to those traders who had continued to use the railway lines, since it is obvious that the heavier the burdens imposed on the railway companies in the shape of local rates (which already form such substantial items in their "working expenses"), the less will the companies concerned be in a position to grant the concessions they might otherwise be willing to make. Besides, apart from monetary considerations, the principle of the thing would be intolerably unfair, and, if only to avoid an injustice, it would surely be enacted that any possible increase in local rates, due to the failure of particular schemes of canal municipalisation, should fall exclusively on the traders and the general public who were to have been benefited, and in no way on the railway companies against whom the commercially unsuccessful competition had been waged. This proposition will, I am sure, appeal to that instinct of justice and fair play which every Englishman is (perhaps not always rightly), assumed to possess. But what would happen if it were duly carried out, as it ought to be? Well, in the Chapter on "Taxation of Railways" in my book on "Railways and their Rates," I gave one list showing that in a total of eighty-two parishes a certain British railway company paid an average of 60·25 per cent. of the local rates; while another table showed that in sixteen specified parishes the proportion of local rates paid by the same railway company ranged from 66·9 per cent. to 86·1 per cent. of the total, although in twelve parishes out of the sixteen the company had not even a railway station in the place. But if, in all such parishes as these, the railway companies were very properly excused from having to make good the losses incurred by their municipalised-canal competitors (in addition to such losses as they might have already suffered in meeting the competition), then the full weight of the burden would fall upon that smaller--and, in some cases, that very small--proportion of the general body of ratepayers in the locality concerned. The above is just a little consideration, _en passant_, which might be borne in mind by others than those who look at the subject only from a trader's or an engineer's point of view. It will help, also, to strengthen my contention that any ill-advised, or, at least, unsuccessful municipalisation of the canal system of the country might have serious consequences for the general body of the community, who, in the circumstances, would do well to "look before they leap." But, independently of commercial, engineering, rating and other considerations, there are important matters of principle to be considered. Great Britain is almost the only country in the world where the railway system has been constructed without State or municipal aid--financial or material--of any kind whatever. The canals were built by "private enterprise," and the railways which followed were constructed on the same basis. This was recognised as the national policy, and private investors were allowed to put their money into British railways, throughout successive decades, in the belief and expectation that the same principle would be continued. In other countries the State has (1) provided the funds for constructing or buying up the general railway system; (2) guaranteed payment of interest; or (3) has granted land or made other concessions, as a means of assisting the enterprise. Not only has the State refrained from adopting any such course here, and allowed private investors to bear the full financial risk, but it has imposed on British railways requirements which may certainly have led to their being the best constructed and the most complete of any in the world, but which have, also, combined with the extortions of landowners in the first instance, heavy expenditure on Parliamentary proceedings, etc., to render their construction per mile more costly than those of any other system of railways in the world; while to-day local taxation is being levied upon them at the rate of £5,000,000 per annum, with an annual increment of £250,000. This heavy expenditure, and these increasingly heavy demands, can only be met out of the rates and charges imposed on those who use the railways; and one of the greatest grievances advanced against the railways, and leading to the agitation for canal revival, is that these rates and charges are higher in Great Britain than in various other countries, where the railways have cost less to build, where State funds have been freely drawn on, and where the State lines may be required to contribute nothing to local taxation. The remedy proposed, however, is not that anything should be done to reduce the burdens imposed on our own railways, so as to place them at least in the position of being able to make further concessions to traders, but that the State should now itself start in the business, in competition, more or less, with the railway companies, in order to provide the traders--if it can--with something _cheaper_ in the way of transport! Whatever view may be taken of the reasonableness and justice of such a procedure as this, it would, undoubtedly, represent a complete change in national policy, and one that should not be entered upon with undue haste. The logical sequel, for instance, of nationalisation of the canals would be nationalisation of the railways, since it would hardly do for the State to own the one and not the other. Then, of course, the nationalisation of all our ports would have to follow, as the further logical sequel of the State ownership of the means of communication with them, and the consequent suppression of competition. From a Socialist standpoint, the successive steps here mentioned would certainly be approved; but, even if the financial difficulty could be met, the country is hardly ready for all these things at present. Is it ready, even in principle, for either the nationalisation or the municipalisation of canals alone? And, if ready in principle, if ready to employ public funds to compete with representatives of the private enterprise it has hitherto encouraged, is it still certain that, when millions of pounds sterling have been spent on the revival of our canals, the actual results will in any way justify the heavy expenditure? Are not the physical conditions of our country such that canal construction here presents exceptional drawbacks, and that canal navigation must always be exceptionally slow? Are not both physical and geographical conditions in Great Britain altogether unlike those of most of the Continental countries of whose waterways so much is heard? Are not our commercial conditions equally dissimilar? Is not the comparative neglect of our canals due less to structural or other defects than to complete changes in the whole basis of trading operations in this country--changes that would prevent any general discarding of the quick transit of small and frequent supplies by train, in favour of the delayed delivery of large quantities at longer intervals by water, however much the canals were improved? These are merely some of the questions and considerations that arise in connection with this most complicated of problems, and it is with the view of enabling the public to appreciate more fully the real nature of the situation, and to gain a clearer knowledge of the facts on which a right solution must be based, that I venture to lay before them the pages that follow. CHAPTER II EARLY DAYS It seems to be customary with writers on the subject of canals and waterways to begin with the Egyptians, to detail the achievements of the Chinese, to record the doings of the Greeks, and then to pass on to the Romans, before even beginning their account of what has been done in Great Britain. Here, however, I propose to leave alone all this ancient history, which, to my mind, has no more to do with existing conditions in our own country than the system of inland navigation adopted by Noah, or the character of the canals which are supposed to exist in the planet of Mars. For the purposes of the present work it will suffice if I go no further back than what I would call the "pack-horse period" in the development of transport in England. This was the period immediately preceding the introduction of artificial canals, which had their rise in this country about 1760-70. It preceded, also, the advent of John Loudon McAdam, that great reformer of our roads, whose name has been immortalised in the verb "to macadamise." Born in 1756, it was not until the early days of the nineteenth century that McAdam really started on his beneficent mission, and even then the high-roads of England--and especially of Scotland--were, as a rule, deplorably bad, "being at once loose, rough, and perishable, expensive, tedious and dangerous to travel on, and very costly to repair." Pending those improvements which McAdam brought about, adapting them to the better use of stage-coaches and carriers' waggons, the few roads already existing were practically available--as regards the transport of merchandise--for pack-horses only. Even coal was then carried by pack-horse, the cost working out at about 2s. 6d. per mile for as much as a horse could carry. It was from these conditions that canals saved the country--long, of course, before the locomotive came into vogue. As it happened, too, it was this very question of coal transport that led to their earliest development. There is quite an element of romance in the story. Francis Egerton, third and last Duke of Bridgewater (born 1736), had an unfortunate love affair in London when he reached the age of twenty-three, and, apparently in disgust with the world, he retired to his Lancashire property, where he found solace to his wounded feelings by devoting himself to the development of the Worsley coal mines. As a boy he had been so feeble-minded that the doubt arose whether he would be capable of managing his own affairs. As a young man disappointed in love, he applied himself to business in a manner so eminently practical that he deservedly became famous as a pioneer of improved transport. He saw that if only the cost of carriage could be reduced, a most valuable market for coal from his Worsley mines could be opened up in Manchester. It is true that, in this particular instance, the pack-horse had been supplemented by the Mersey and Irwell Navigation, established as the result of Parliamentary powers obtained in 1733. This navigation was conducted almost entirely by natural waterways, but it had many drawbacks and inconveniences, while the freight for general merchandise between Liverpool and Manchester by this route came to 12s. per ton. The Duke's new scheme was one for the construction of an artificial waterway which could be carried over the Irwell at Barton by means of an aqueduct. This idea he got from the aqueduct on the Languedoc Canal, in the south of France. But the Duke required a practical man to help him, and such a man he found in James Brindley. Born in 1716, Brindley was the son of a small farmer in Derbyshire--a dissolute sort of fellow, who neglected his children, did little or no work, and devoted his chief energies to the then popular sport of bull-baiting. In the circumstances James Brindley's school-teaching was wholly neglected. He could no more have passed an examination in the Sixth Standard than he could have flown over the Irwell with some of his ducal patron's coals. "He remained to the last illiterate, hardly able to write, and quite unable to spell. He did most of his work in his head, without written calculations or drawings, and when he had a puzzling bit of work he would go to bed, and think it out." From the point of view of present day Board School inspectors, and of the worthy magistrates who, with varied moral reflections, remorselessly enforce the principles of compulsory education, such an individual ought to have come to a bad end. But he didn't. He became, instead, "the father of inland navigation." James Brindley had served his apprenticeship to a millwright, or engineer; he had started a little business as a repairer of old machinery and a maker of new; and he had in various ways given proof of his possession of mechanical skill. The Duke--evidently a reader of men--saw in him the possibility of better things, took him over, and appointed him his right-hand man in constructing the proposed canal. After much active opposition from the proprietors of the Mersey and Irwell Navigation, and also from various landowners and others, the Duke got his first Act, to which the Royal assent was given in 1762, and the work was begun. It presented many difficulties, for the canal had to be carried over streams and bogs, and through tunnels costly to make, and the time came when the Duke's financial resources were almost exhausted. Brindley's wages were not extravagant. They amounted, in fact, to £1 a week--substantially less than the minimum wage that would be paid to-day to a municipal road-sweeper. But the costs of construction were heavy, and the landowners had unduly big ideas of the value of the land compulsorily acquired from them, so that the Duke's steward sometimes had to ride about among the tenantry and borrow a few pounds from one and another in order to pay the week's wages. When the Worsley section had been completed, and had become remunerative, the Duke pledged it to Messrs Child, the London bankers, for £25,000, and with the money thus raised he pushed on with the remainder of the canal, seeing it finally extended to Liverpool in 1772. Altogether he expended on his own canals no less than £220,000; but he lived to derive from them a revenue of £80,000 a year. The Duke of Bridgewater's schemes gave a great impetus to canal construction in Great Britain, though it was only natural that a good deal of opposition should be raised, as well. About the year 1765 numerous pamphlets were published to show the danger and impolicy of canals. Turnpike trustees were afraid the canals would divert traffic from the roads. Owners of pack-horses fancied that ruin stared them in the face. Thereupon the turnpike trustees and the pack-horse owners sought the further support of the agricultural interests, representing that, when the demand for pack-horses fell off, there would be less need for hay and oats, and the welfare of British agriculture would be prejudiced. So the farmers joined in, and the three parties combined in an effort to arouse the country. Canals, it was said, would involve a great waste of land; they would destroy the breed of draught horses; they would produce noxious or humid vapours; they would encourage pilfering; they would injure old mines and works by allowing of new ones being opened; and they would destroy the coasting trade, and, consequently, "the nursery for seamen." By arguments such as these the opposition actually checked for some years the carrying out of several important undertakings, including the Trent and Mersey Navigation. But, when once the movement had fairly started, it made rapid progress. James Brindley's energy, down to the time of his death in 1772, was especially indomitable. Having ensured the success of the Bridgewater Canal, he turned his attention to a scheme for linking up the four ports of Liverpool, Hull, Bristol, and London by a system of main waterways, connected by branch canals with leading industrial centres off the chief lines of route. Other projects followed, as it was seen that the earlier ventures were yielding substantial profits, and in 1790 a canal mania began. In 1792 no fewer than eighteen new canals were promoted. In 1793 and 1794 the number of canal and navigation Acts passed was forty-five, increasing to eighty-one the total number which had been obtained since 1790. So great was the public anxiety to invest in canals that new ones were projected on all hands, and, though many of them were of a useful type, others were purely speculative, were doomed to failure from the start, and occasioned serious losses to thousands of investors. In certain instances existing canals were granted the right to levy tolls upon new-comers, as compensation for prospective loss of traffic--even when the new canals were to be 4 or 5 miles away--fresh schemes being actually undertaken on this basis. The canals that paid at all paid well, and the good they conferred on the country in the days of their prosperity is undeniable. Failing, at that time, more efficient means of transport, they played a most important rôle in developing the trade, industries, and commerce of our country at a period especially favourable to national advancement. For half a century, in fact, the canals had everything their own way. They had a monopoly of the transport business--except as regards road traffic--and in various instances they helped their proprietors to make huge profits. But great changes were impending, and these were brought about, at last, with the advent of the locomotive. The general situation at this period is well shown by the following extracts from an article on "Canals and Rail-roads," published in the _Quarterly Review_ of March 1825:-- "It is true that we, who, in this age, are accustomed to roll along our hard and even roads at the rate of 8 or 9 miles an hour, can hardly imagine the inconveniences which beset our great-grandfathers when they had to undertake a journey--forcing their way through deep miry lanes; fording swollen rivers; obliged to halt for days together when 'the waters were out'; and then crawling along at a pace of 2 or 3 miles an hour, in constant fear of being set down fast in some deep quagmire, of being overturned, breaking down, or swept away by a sudden inundation. "Such was the travelling condition of our ancestors, until the several turnpike Acts effected a gradual and most favourable change, not only in the state of the roads, but the whole appearance of the country; by increasing the facility of communication, and the transport of many weighty and bulky articles which, before that period, no effort could move from one part of the country to another. The pack-horse was now yoked to the waggon, and stage coaches and post-chaises usurped the place of saddle-horses. Imperfectly as most of these turnpike roads were constructed, and greatly as their repairs were neglected, they were still a prodigious improvement; yet, for the conveyance of heavy merchandise the progress of waggons was slow and their capacity limited. This defect was at length remedied by the opening of canals, an improvement which became, with regard to turnpike roads and waggons, what these had been to deep lanes and pack-horses.[1] But we may apply to projectors the observation of Sheridan, 'Give these fellows a good thing and they never know when to have done with it,' for so vehement became the rage for canal-making that, in a few years, the whole surface of the country was intersected by these inland navigations, and frequently in parts of the island where there was little or no traffic to be conveyed. The consequence was, that a large proportion of them scarcely paid an interest of one per cent., and many nothing at all; while others, judiciously conducted over populous, commercial, and manufacturing districts, have not only amply remunerated the parties concerned, but have contributed in no small degree to the wealth and prosperity of the nation. "Yet these expensive establishments for facilitating the conveyance of the commercial, manufacturing and agricultural products of the country to their several destinations, excellent and useful as all must acknowledge them to be, are now likely, in their turn, to give way to the old invention of Rail-roads. Nothing now is heard of but rail-roads; the daily papers teem with notices of new lines of them in every direction, and pamphlets and paragraphs are thrown before the public eye, recommending nothing short of making them general throughout the kingdom. Yet, till within these few months past, this old invention, in use a full century before canals, has been suffered, with few exceptions, to act the part only of an auxiliary to canals, in the conveyance of goods to and from the wharfs, and of iron, coals, limestone, and other products of the mines to the nearest place of shipment.... "The powers of the steam-engine, and a growing conviction that our present modes of conveyance, excellent as they are, both require and admit of great improvements, are, no doubt, among the chief reasons that have set the current of speculation in this particular direction." Dealing with the question of "vested rights," the article warns "the projectors of the intended railroads ... of the necessity of being prepared to meet the most strenuous opposition from the canal proprietors," and proceeds:-- "But, we are free to confess, it does not appear to us that the canal proprietors have the least ground for complaining of a grievance. They embarked their property in what they conceived to be a good speculation, which in some cases was realised far beyond their most sanguine hopes; in others, failed beyond their most desponding calculations. If those that have succeeded should be able to maintain a competition with rail-ways by lowering their charges; what they thus lose will be a fair and unimpeachable gain to the public, and a moderate and just profit will still remain to them; while the others would do well to transfer their interests from a bad concern into one whose superiority must be thus established. Indeed, we understand that this has already been proposed to a very considerable extent, and that the level beds of certain unproductive canals have been offered for the reception of rail-ways. "There is, however, another ground upon which, in many instances, we have no doubt, the opposition of the canal proprietors may be properly met--we mean, and we state it distinctly, the unquestionable fact, that our trade and manufactures have suffered considerably by the disproportionate rates of charge upon canal conveyance. The immense tonnage of coal, iron, and earthenware, Mr Cumming tells us,[2] 'have enabled one of the canals, passing through these districts (near Birmingham), to pay an annual dividend to the proprietary of £140 upon an original share of £140, and as such has enhanced the value of each share from £140 to £3,200; and another canal in the same district, to pay an annual dividend of £160 upon the original share of £200, and the shares themselves have reached the value of £4,600 each.' "Nor are these solitary instances. Mr Sandars informs us[3] that, of the only two canals which unite Liverpool with Manchester, the thirty-nine original proprietors of one of them, the Old Quay,[4] have been paid for every other year, for nearly half a century, the _total amount of their investment_; and that a share in this canal, which cost only £70, has recently been sold for £1,250; and that, with regard to the other, the late Duke of Bridgewater's, there is good reason to believe that the net income has, for the last twenty years, averaged nearly £100,000 per annum!" In regard, however, to the supersession of canals in general by railways, the writer of the article says:-- "We are not the advocates for visionary projects that interfere with useful establishments; we scout the idea of a _general_ rail-road as altogether impracticable.... "As to those persons who speculate on making rail-ways general throughout the kingdom, and superseding all the canals, all the waggons, mail and stage-coaches, post-chaises, and, in short, every other mode of conveyance by land and water, we deem them and their visionary schemes unworthy of notice." CHAPTER III RAILWAYS TO THE RESCUE It is not a little curious to find that, whereas the proposed resuscitation of canals is now being actively supported in various quarters as a means of effecting increased competition with the railways, the railway system itself originally had a most cordial welcome from the traders of this country as a means of relieving them from what had become the intolerable monopoly of the canals and waterways! It will have been seen that in the article published in the _Quarterly Review_ of March 1825, from which I gave extracts in the last Chapter, reference was made to a "Letter on the Subject of the Projected Rail-road between Liverpool and Manchester," by Mr Joseph Sandars, and published that same year. I have looked up the original "Letter," and found in it some instructive reading. Mr Sandars showed that although, under the Act of Parliament obtained by the Duke of Bridgewater, the tolls to be charged on his canal between Liverpool and Manchester were not to exceed 2s. 6d. per ton, his trustees had, by various exactions, increased them to 5s. 2d. per ton on all goods carried along the canal. They had also got possession of all the available land and warehouses along the canal banks at Manchester, thus monopolising the accommodation, or nearly so, and forcing the traders to keep to the trustees, and not patronise independent carriers. It was, Mr Sandars declared, "the most oppressive and unjust monopoly known to the trade of this country--a monopoly which there is every reason to believe compels the public to pay, in one shape or another, £100,000 more per annum than they ought to pay." The Bridgewater trustees and the proprietors of the Mersey and Irwell Navigation were, he continued, "deaf to all remonstrances, to all entreaties"; they were "actuated solely by a spirit of monopoly and extension," and "the only remedy the public has left is to go to Parliament and ask for a new line of conveyance." But this new line, he said, would have to be a railway. It could not take the form of another canal, as the two existing routes had absorbed all the available water-supply. In discussing the advantages of a railway over a canal, Mr Sandars continued:-- "It is computed that goods could be carried for considerably less than is now charged, and for one-half of what has been charged, and that they would be conveyed in one-sixth of the time. Canals in summer are often short of water, and in winter are obstructed by frost; a Railway would not have to encounter these impediments." Mr Sandars further wrote:-- "The distance between Liverpool and Manchester, by the three lines of Water conveyance, is upwards of 50 miles--by a Rail-road it would only be 33. Goods conveyed by the Duke and Old Quay [Mersey and Irwell Navigation] are exposed to storms, the delays from adverse winds, and the risk of damage, during a passage of 18 miles in the tide-way of the Mersey. For days together it frequently happens that when the wind blows very strong, either south or north, their vessels cannot move against it. It is very true that when the winds and tides are favourable they can occasionally effect a passage in fourteen hours; but the average is certainly thirty. However, notwithstanding all the accommodation they can offer, the delays are such that the spinners and dealers are frequently obliged to cart cotton on the public high-road, a distance of 36 miles, for which they pay four times the price which would be charged by a Rail-road, and they are three times as long in getting it to hand. The same observation applies to manufactured goods which are sent by land-carriage daily, and for which the rate paid is five times that which they would be subject to by the Rail-road. This enormous sacrifice is made for two reasons--sometimes because conveyance by water cannot be promptly obtained, but more frequently because speed and certainty as to delivery are of the first importance. Packages of goods sent from Manchester, for immediate shipment at Liverpool, often pay two or three pounds per ton; and yet there are those who assert that the difference of a few hours in speed can be no object. The merchants know better." In the same year that Mr Sandars issued his "Letter," the merchants of the port of Liverpool addressed a memorial to the Mayor and Common Council of the borough, praying them to support the scheme for the building of a railway, and stating:-- "The merchants of this port have for a long time past experienced very great difficulties and obstructions in the prosecution of their business, in consequence of the high charges on the freight of goods between this town and Manchester, and of the frequent impossibility of obtaining vessels for days together." It is clear from all this that, however great the benefit which canal transport had conferred, as compared with prior conditions, the canal companies had abused their monopoly in order to secure what were often enormous profits; that the canals themselves, apart from the excessive tolls and charges imposed, failed entirely to meet the requirements of traders; and that the most effective means of obtaining relief was looked for in the provision of railways. The value to which canal shares had risen at this time is well shown by the following figures, which I take from the _Gentleman's Magazine_ for December, 1824:-- +-------------------------------+----------------------+--------+ | Canal. | Shares. | Price. | +-------------------------------+----------------------+--------+ | | £ _s._ _d._ | £ | |Trent and Mersey | 75 0 0 | 2,200 | |Loughborough |197 0 0 | 4,600 | |Coventry | 44 0 0 (and bonus) | 1,300 | |Oxford (short shares) | 32 0 0 " " | 850 | |Grand Junction | 10 0 0 " " | 290 | |Old Union | 4 0 0 | 103 | |Neath | 15 0 0 | 400 | |Swansea | 11 0 0 | 250 | |Monmouthshire | 10 0 0 | 245 | |Brecknock and Abergavenny | 8 0 0 | 175 | |Staffordshire & Worcestershire | 40 0 0 | 960 | |Birmingham | 12 10 0 | 350 | |Worcester and Birmingham | 1 10 0 | 56 | |Shropshire | 8 0 0 | 175 | |Ellesmere | 3 10 0 | 102 | |Rochdale | 4 0 0 | 140 | |Barnsley | 12 0 0 | 330 | |Lancaster | 1 0 0 | 45 | |Kennet and Avon | 1 0 0 | 29 | +-------------------------------+----------------------+--------+ These substantial values, and the large dividends that led to them, were due in part, no doubt, to the general improvement in trade which the canals had helped most materially to effect; but they had been greatly swollen by the merciless way in which the traders of those days were exploited by the representatives of the canal interest. As bearing on this point, I might interrupt the course of my narrative to say that in the House of Commons on May 17, 1836, Mr Morrison, member for Ipswich, made a speech in which, as reported by Hansard, he expressed himself "clearly of opinion" that "Parliament should, when it established companies for the formation of canals, railroads, or such like undertakings, invariably reserve to itself the power to make such periodical revisions of the rates and charges as it may, under the then circumstances, deem expedient"; and he proposed a resolution to this effect. He was moved to adopt this course in view of past experiences in connection with the canals, and a desire that there should be no repetition of them in regard to the railways then being very generally promoted. In the course of his speech he said:-- "The history of existing canals, waterways, etc., affords abundant evidence of the evils to which I have been averting. An original share in the Loughborough Canal, for example, which cost £142, 17s. is now selling at about £1,250, and yields a dividend of £90 or £100 a year. The fourth part of a Trent and Mersey Canal share, or £50 of the company's stock, is now fetching £600, and yields a dividend of about £30 a year. And there are various other canals in nearly the same situation." At the close of the debate which followed, Mr Morrison withdrew his resolution, owing to the announcement that the matter to which he had called attention would be dealt with in a Bill then being framed. It is none the less interesting thus to find that Parliamentary revisions of railway rates were, in the first instance, directly inspired by the extortions practised on the traders by canal companies in the interest of dividends far in excess of any that the railway companies have themselves attempted to pay. Reverting to the story of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway--the projection of which, as Mr Sandars' "Letter" shows, represented a revolt against "the exorbitant and unjust charges of the water-carriers"--the Bill promoted in its favour was opposed so vigorously by the canal and other interests that £70,000 was spent in the Parliamentary proceedings in getting it through. But it was carried in 1826, and the new line, opened in 1830, was so great a success that it soon began to inspire many similar projects in other directions, while with its opening the building of fresh canals for ordinary inland navigation (as distinct from ship canals) practically ceased. There is not the slightest doubt that, but for the extreme dissatisfaction of the trading interests in regard alike to the heavy charges and to the shortcomings of the canal system, the Liverpool and Manchester Railway--that precursor of the "railway mania"--would not have been actually constructed until at least several years later. But there were other directions, also, in which the revolt against the then existing conditions was to bring about important developments. In the pack-horse period the collieries of Nottinghamshire and Leicestershire respectively supplied local needs only, the cost of transport by road making it practically impossible to send coal out of the county in which it was raised. With the advent of canals the coal could be taken longer distances, and the canals themselves gained so much from the business that at one time shares in the Loughborough Canal, on which £142 had been paid, rose, as already shown, to £4,600, and were looked upon as being as safe as Consols. But the collapse of a canal from the Leicestershire coal-fields to the town of Leicester placed the coalowners of that county at a disadvantage, and this they overcame, in 1832, by opening the Leicester and Swinnington line of railway. Thereupon the disadvantage was thrown upon the Nottinghamshire coalowners, who could no longer compete with Leicestershire. In fact, the immediate outlook before them was that they would be excluded from their chief markets, that their collieries might have to be closed, and that the mining population would be thrown out of employment. In their dilemma they appealed to the canal companies, and asked for such a reduction in rates as would enable them to meet the new situation; but the canal companies--wedded to their big dividends--would make only such concessions as were thought by the other side to be totally inadequate. Following on this the Nottinghamshire coalowners met in the parlour of a village inn at Eastwood, in the autumn of 1832, and formally declared that "there remained no other plan for their adoption than to attempt to lay a railway from their collieries to the town of Leicester." The proposal was confirmed by a subsequent meeting, which resolved that "a railway from Pinxton to Leicester is essential to the interests of the coal-trade of this district." Communications were opened with George Stephenson, the services of his son Robert were secured, the "Midland Counties Railway" was duly constructed, and the final outcome of the action thus taken--as the direct result of the attitude of the canal companies--is to be seen in the splendid system known to-day as the Midland Railway. Once more, I might refer to Mr Charles H. Grinling's "History of the Great Northern Railway," in which, speaking of early conditions, he says:-- "During the winter of 1843-44 a strong desire arose among the landowners and farmers of the eastern counties to secure some of the benefits which other districts were enjoying from the new method of locomotion. One great want of this part of England was that of cheaper fuel, for though there were collieries open at this time in Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire, and Derbyshire, the nearest pits with which the eastern counties had practicable transport communication were those of South Yorkshire and Durham, and this was of so circuitous a character that even in places situated on navigable rivers, unserved by a canal, the price of coal often rose as high as 40s. or even 50s. a ton. In remoter places, to which it had to be carted 10, 20, or even 30 miles along bad cross-roads, coal even for house-firing was a positive luxury, quite unattainable by the poorer classes. Moreover, in the most severe weather, when the canals were frozen, the whole system of supply became paralysed, and even the wealthy had not seldom to retreat shivering to bed for lack of fuel." In this particular instance it was George Hudson, the "Railway King," who was approached, and the first lines were laid of what is now the Great Northern Railway. So it happened that, when the new form of transport came into vogue, in succession to the canals, it was essentially a case of "Railways to the Rescue." CHAPTER IV RAILWAY-CONTROLLED CANALS Both canals and railways were, in their early days, made according to local conditions, and were intended to serve local purposes. In the case of the former the design and dimensions of the canal boat used were influenced by the depth and nature of the estuary or river along which it might require to proceed, and the size of the lock (affecting, again, the size of the boat) might vary according to whether the lock was constructed on a low level, where there was ample water, or on a high level, where economy in the use of water had to be practised. Uniformity under these varying conditions would certainly have been difficult to secure, and, in effect, it was not attempted. The original designers of the canals, in days when the trade of the country was far less than it is now and the general trading conditions very different, probably knew better what they were about than their critics of to-day give them credit for. They realised more completely than most of those critics do what were the limitations of canal construction in a country of hills and dales, and especially in rugged and mountainous districts. They cut their coat, as it were, according to their cloth, and sought to meet the actual needs of the day rather than anticipate the requirements of futurity. From their point of view this was the simplest solution of the problem. [Illustration: WHAT CANAL WIDENING WOULD MEAN. (Cowley Tunnel and Embankments, on Shropshire Union Route between Wolverhampton and the Mersey.) [_To face page 32._ ] But, though the canals thus made suited local conditions, they became unavailable for through traffic, except in boats sufficiently small to pass the smallest lock or the narrowest and shallowest canal _en route_. Then the lack of uniformity in construction was accompanied by a lack of unity in management. Each and every through route was divided among, as a rule, from four to eight or ten different navigations, and a boat-owner making the journey had to deal separately with each. The railway companies soon began to rid themselves of their own local limitations. A "Railway Clearing House" was set up in 1847, in the interests of through traffic; groups of small undertakings amalgamated into "great" companies; facilities of a kind unknown before were made available, while the whole system of railway operation was simplified for traders and travellers. The canal companies, however, made no attempt to follow the example thus set. They were certainly in a more difficult position than the railways. They might have amalgamated, and they might have established a Canal Clearing House. These would have been comparatively easy things to do. But any satisfactory linking up of the various canal systems throughout the country would have meant virtual reconstruction, and this may well have been thought a serious proposition in regard, especially, to canals built at a considerable elevation above the sea level, where the water supply was limited, and where, for that reason, some of the smallest locks were to be found. To say the least of it, such a work meant a very large outlay, and at that time practically all the capital available for investment in transport was being absorbed by new railways. These, again, had secured the public confidence which the canals were losing. As Mr Sandars said in his "Letter":-- "Canals have done well for the country, just as high roads and pack-horses had done before canals were established; but the country has now presented to it cheaper and more expeditious means of conveyance, and the attempt to prevent its adoption is utterly hopeless." All that the canal companies did, in the first instance, was to attempt the very thing which Mr Sandars considered "utterly hopeless." They adopted a policy of blind and narrow-minded hostility. They seemed to think that, if they only fought them vigorously enough, they could drive the railways off the field; and fight them they did, at every possible point. In those days many of the canal companies were still wealthy concerns, and what their opposition might mean has been already shown in the case of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway. The newcomers had thus to concentrate their efforts and meet the opposition as best they could. For a time the canal companies clung obstinately to their high tolls and charges, in the hope that they would still be able to pay their big dividends. But, when the superiority of the railways over the waterways became more and more manifest, and when the canal companies saw greater and still greater quantities of traffic being diverted from them by their opponents, in fair competition, they realised the situation at last, and brought down their tolls with a rush. The reductions made were so substantial that they would have been thought incredible a few years previously. In the result, benefits were gained by all classes of traders, for those who still patronised the canals were charged much more reasonable tolls than they had ever paid before. But even the adoption of this belated policy by the canal companies did not help them very much. The diversion of the stream of traffic to the railways had become too pronounced to be checked by even the most substantial of reductions in canal charges. With the increasing industrial and commercial development of the country it was seen that the new means of transport offered advantages of even greater weight than cost of transport, namely, speed and certainty of delivery. For the average trader it was essentially a case of time meaning money. The canal companies might now reduce their tolls so much that, instead of being substantially in excess of the railway rates, as they were at first, they would fall considerably below; but they still could not offer those other all-important advantages. As the canal companies found that the struggle was, indeed, "utterly hopeless," some of them adopted new lines of policy. Either they proposed to build railways themselves, or they tried to dispose of their canal property to the newcomers. In some instances the route of a canal, no longer of much value, was really wanted for the route of a proposed railway, and an arrangement was easily made. In others, where the railway promoters did not wish to buy, opposition to their schemes was offered by the canal companies with the idea of forcing them either so to do, or, alternatively, to make such terms with them as would be to the advantage of the canal shareholders. The tendency in this direction is shown by the extract already given from the _Quarterly Review_; and I may repeat here the passage in which the writer suggested that some of the canal companies "would do well to transfer their interests from a bad concern into one whose superiority must be thus established," and added: "Indeed, we understand that this has already been proposed to a very considerable extent, and that the level beds of certain unproductive canals have been offered for the reception of rail-ways." This was as early as 1825. Later on the tendency became still more pronounced as pressure was put on the railway companies, or as promoters, in days when plenty of money was available for railway schemes, thought the easiest way to overcome actual or prospective opposition was to buy it off by making the best terms they could. So far, in fact, was the principle recognised that in 1845 Parliament expressly sanctioned the control of canals by railway companies, whether by amalgamation, lease, purchase, or guarantee, and a considerable amount of canal mileage thus came into the possession, or under the control, of railway companies, especially in the years 1845, 1846, and 1847. This sanction was practically repealed by the Railway and Traffic Acts of 1873 and 1888. By that time about one-third of the existing canals had been either voluntarily acquired by, or forced upon, the railway companies. It is obvious, however, that the responsibility for what was done rests with Parliament itself, and that in many cases, probably, the railway companies, instead of being arch-conspirators, anxious to spend their money in killing off moribund competitors, who were generally considered to be on the point of dying a natural death, were, at times, victims of the situation, being practically driven into purchases or guarantees which, had they been perfectly free agents, they might not have cared to touch. The general position was, perhaps, very fairly indicated by the late Sir James Allport, at one time General Manager of the Midland Railway Company, in the evidence he gave before the Select Committee on Canals in 1883. "I doubt (he said) if Parliament ever, at that time of day, came to any deliberate decision as to the advisability or otherwise of railways possessing canals; but I presume that they did not do so without the fullest evidence before them, and no doubt canal companies were very anxious to get rid of their property to railways, and they opposed their Bills, and, in the desire to obtain their Bills, railway companies purchased their canals. That, I think, would be found to be the fact, if it were possible to trace them out in every case. I do not believe that the London and North-Western would have bought the Birmingham Canal but for this circumstance. I have no doubt that the Birmingham Canal, when the Stour Valley line was projected, felt that their property was jeopardised, and that it was then that the arrangement was made by which the London and North-Western Railway Company guaranteed them 4 per cent." The bargains thus effected, either voluntarily or otherwise (and mostly otherwise), were not necessarily to the advantage of the railway companies, who might often have done better for themselves if they had fought out the fight at the time with their antagonists, and left the canal companies to their fate, instead of taking over waterways which have been more or less of a loss to them ever since. Considering the condition into which many of the canals had already drifted, or were then drifting, there is very little room for doubt what their fate would have been if the railway companies had left them severely alone. Indeed, there are various canals whose continued operation to-day, in spite of the losses on their wholly unremunerative traffic, is due exclusively to the fact that they are owned or controlled by railway companies. Independent proprietors, looking to them for dividends, and not under any statutory obligations (as the railway companies are) to keep them going, would long ago have abandoned such canals entirely, and allowed them to be numbered among the derelicts. As bearing on the facts here narrated, I might mention that, in the course of a discussion at the Institution of Civil Engineers, in November 1905, on a paper read by Mr John Arthur Saner, "Waterways in Great Britain" (reported in the official "Proceedings" of the Institution), Mr James Inglis, General Manager of the Great Western Railway Company, said that "his company owned about 216 miles of canal, not a mile of which had been acquired voluntarily. Many of those canals had been forced on the railway as the price of securing Acts, and some had been obtained by negotiations with the canal companies. The others had been acquired in incidental ways, arising from the fact that the traffic had absolutely disappeared." Mr Inglis further told the story of the Kennet and Avon Canal, which his company maintain at a loss of about £4,000 per annum. The canal, it seems, was constructed in 1794 at a cost of £1,000,000, and at one time paid 5 per cent. The traffic fell off steadily with the extension of the railway system, and in 1846 the canal company, seeing their position was hopeless, applied to Parliament for powers to construct a railway parallel with the canal. Sanction was refused, though the company were authorised to act as common carriers. In 1851 the canal owners approached the Great Western Railway Company, and told them of their intention to seek again for powers to build an opposition railway. The upshot of the matter was that the railway company took over the canal, and agreed to pay the canal company £7,773 a year. This they have done, with a loss to themselves ever since. The rates charged on the canal were successively reduced by the Board of Trade (on appeal being made to that body) to 1-1/4d., then to 1d., and finally 1/2d. per ton-mile; but there had never been a sign, Mr Inglis added, that the reduction had any effect in attracting additional traffic.[5] To ascertain for myself some further details as to the past and present of the Kennet and Avon Navigation, I paid a visit of inspection to the canal in the neighbourhood of Bath, where it enters the River Avon, and also at Devizes, where I saw the remarkable series of locks by means of which the canal reaches the town of Devizes, at an elevation of 425 feet above sea level. In conversation, too, with various authorities, including Mr H. J. Saunders, the Canals Engineer of the Great Western Railway Company, I obtained some interesting facts which throw light on the reasons for the falling off of the traffic along the canal. Dealing with this last mentioned point first, I learned that much of the former prosperity of the Kennet and Avon Navigation was due to a substantial business then done in the transport of coal from a considerable colliery district in Somersetshire, comprising the Radstock, Camerton, Dunkerton, and Timsbury collieries. This coal was first put on the Somerset Coal Canal, which connected with the Kennet and Avon at Dundas--a point between Bath and Bradford-on-Avon--and, on reaching this junction, it was taken either to towns directly served by the Kennet and Avon (including Bath, Bristol, Bradford, Trowbridge, Devizes, Kintbury, Hungerford, Newbury and Reading) or, leaving the Kennet and Avon at Semmington, it passed over the Wilts and Berks Canal to various places as far as Abingdon. In proportion, however, as the railways developed their superiority as an agent for the effective distribution of coal, the traffic by canal declined more and more, until at last it became non-existent. Of the three canals affected, the Somerset Coal Canal, owned by an independent company, was abandoned, by authority of Parliament, two years ago; the Wilts and Berks, also owned by an independent company, is practically derelict, and the one that to-day survives and is in good working order is the Kennet and Avon, owned by a railway company. Another branch of local traffic that has left the Kennet and Avon Canal for the railway is represented by the familiar freestone, of which large quantities are despatched from the Bath district. The stone goes away in blocks averaging 5 tons in weight, and ranging up to 10 tons, and at first sight it would appear to be a commodity specially adapted for transport by water. But once more the greater facilities afforded by the railway have led to an almost complete neglect of the canal. Even where the quarries are immediately alongside the waterway (though this is not always the case) horses must be employed to get the blocks down to the canal boat; whereas the blocks can be put straight on to the railway trucks on the sidings which go right into the quarry, no horses being then required. In calculating, therefore, the difference between the canal rate and the railway rate, the purchase and maintenance of horses at the points of embarkation must be added to the former. Then the stone could travel only a certain distance by water, and further cost might have to be incurred in cartage, if not in transferring it from boat to railway truck, after all, for transport to final destination; whereas, once put on a railway truck at the quarry, it could be taken thence, without further trouble, to any town in Great Britain where it was wanted. In this way, again, the Kennet and Avon (except in the case of consignments to Bristol) has practically lost a once important source of revenue. A certain amount of foreign timber still goes by water from Avonmouth or Bristol to the neighbourhood of Pewsey, and some English-grown timber is taken from Devizes and other points on the canal to Bristol, Reading, and intermediate places; grain is carried from Reading to mills within convenient reach of the canal, and there is also a small traffic in mineral oils and general merchandise, including groceries for shopkeepers in towns along the canal route; but, whereas, in former days a grocer would order 30 tons of sugar from Bristol to be delivered to him by boat at one time, he now orders by post, telegraph, or telephone, very much smaller quantities as he wants them, and these smaller quantities are consigned mainly by train, so that there is less for the canal to carry, even where the sugar still goes by water at all. Speaking generally, the actual traffic on the Kennet and Avon at the western end would not exceed more than about three or four boats a day, and on the higher levels at the eastern end it would not average one a day. Yet, after walking for some miles along the canal banks at two of its most important points, it was obvious to me that the decline in the traffic could not be attributable to any shortcomings in the canal itself. Not only does the Kennet and Avon deserve to rank as one of the best maintained of any canal in the country, but it still affords all reasonable facilities for such traffic as is available, or seems likely to be offered. Instead of being neglected by the Great Western Railway Company, it is kept in a state of efficiency that could not well be improved upon short of a complete reconstruction, at a very great cost, in the hope of getting an altogether problematical increase of patronage in respect to classes of traffic different from what was contemplated when the canal was originally built. [Illustration: LOCKS ON THE KENNET AND AVON CANAL AT DEVIZES. (A difference in level of 239 feet in 2-1/2 miles is overcome by 29 locks. Of these, 17 immediately follow one another in direct line, "pounds" being provided to ensure sufficiency of reserve water to work boats through.) _Photo by Chivers, Devizes._] [_To face page 42._ ] Within the last year or two the railway company have spent £3,000 or £4,000 on the pumping machinery. The main water supply is derived from a reservoir, about 9 acres in extent, at Crofton, this reservoir being fed partly by two rivulets (which dry up in the summer) and partly by its own springs; and extensive pumping machinery is provided for raising to the summit level the water that passes from the reservoir into the canal at a lower level, the height the water is thus raised being 40 feet. There is also a pumping station at Claverton, near Bath, which raises water from the river Avon. Thanks to these provisions, on no occasion has there been more than a partial stoppage of the canal owing to a lack of water, though in seasons of drought it is necessary to reduce the loading of the boats. The final ascent to the Devizes level is accomplished by means of twenty-nine locks in a distance of 2-1/2 miles. Of these twenty-nine there are seventeen which immediately follow one another in a direct line, and here it has been necessary to supplement the locks with "pounds" to ensure a sufficiency of reserve water to work the boats through. No one who walks alongside these locks can fail to be impressed alike by the boldness of the original constructors of the canal and by the thoroughness with which they did their work. The walls of the locks are from 3 to 6 feet in thickness, and they seem to have been built to last for all eternity. The same remark applies to the constructed works in general on this canal. For a boat to pass through the twenty-nine locks takes on an average about three hours. The 39-1/2 miles from Bristol to Devizes require at least two full days. Considerable expenditure is also incurred on the canal in dredging work; though here special difficulties are experienced, inasmuch as the geological formation of the bed of the canal between Bath and Bradford-on-Avon renders steam dredging inadvisable, so that the more expensive and less expeditious system of "dragging" has to be relied on instead. Altogether it costs the Great Western Railway Company about £1 to earn each 10s. they receive from the canal; and whether or not, considering present day conditions of trade and transport, and the changes that have taken place therein, they would get their money back if they spent still more on the canal, is, to say the least of it, extremely problematical. One fact absolutely certain is that the canal is already capable of carrying a much greater amount of traffic than is actually forthcoming, and that the absence of such traffic is not due to any neglect of the waterway by its present owners. Indeed, I had the positive assurance of Mr Saunders that, in his capacity as Canals Engineer to the Great Western, he had never yet been refused by his Company any expenditure he had recommended as necessary for the efficient maintenance of the canals under his charge. "I believe," he added, "that any money required to be spent for this purpose would be readily granted. I already have power to do anything I consider advisable to keep the canals in proper order; and I say without hesitation that all the canals belonging to the Great Western Railway Company are well maintained, and in no way starved. The decline in the traffic is due to obvious causes which would still remain, no matter what improvements one might seek to carry out." The story told above may be supplemented by the following extract from the report of the Great Western Railway Company for the half-year ending December 1905, showing expenses and receipts in connection with the various canals controlled by that company:-- GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY CANALS, for half-year ending 31st December 1905. Canal. To Canal Expenses. By Canal Traffic. Bridgwater and Taunton £1,991 2 8 £664 8 9 Grand Western 197 7 1 119 10 10 Kennet and Avon 5,604 0 9 2,034 18 8 Monmouthshire 1,557 3 3 886 16 8 Stourbridge Extension 450 19 4 765 7 1 Stratford-upon-Avon 1,349 11 3 724 1 4 Swansea 1,643 15 7 1,386 14 9 -------------- -------------- £12,793 19 11 £6,581 18 1 -------------- -------------- The capital expenditure on these different canals, to the same date, was as follows:-- Brecon £61,217 19 0 Bridgwater and Taunton 73,989 12 4 Grand Western 30,629 8 7 Kennet and Avon 209,509 19 3 Stourbridge Extension 49,436 15 0 Stratford-on-Avon 172,538 9 7 Swansea 148,711 17 6 -------------- Total, £746,034 1 3 --------------- These figures give point to the further remark made by Mr Inglis at the meeting of the Institution of Civil Engineers when he said, "It was not to be imagined that the railway companies would willingly have all their canal property lying idle; they would be only too glad if they could see how to use the canals so as to obtain a profit, or even to reduce the loss." On the same occasion, Mr A. Ross, who also took part in the debate, said he had had charge of a number of railway-owned canals at different times, and he was of opinion there was no foundation for the allegation that railway-owned canals were not properly maintained. His first experience of this kind was with the Sankey Brook and St Helens Canal, one of wide gauge, carrying a first-class traffic, connecting the two great chemical manufacturing towns of St Helens and Widnes, and opening into the Mersey. Early in the seventies the canal became practically a wreck, owing to the mortar on the walls having been destroyed by the chemicals in the water which the manufactories had drained into the canal. In addition, there was an overflow into the Sankey Brook, and in times of flood the water flowed over the meadows, and thousands of acres were rendered barren. Mr Ross continued (I quote from the official report):-- "The London and North-Western Railway Company, who owned the canal, went to great expense in litigation, and obtained an injunction against the manufacturers, and in the result they had to purchase all the meadows outright, as the quickest way of settling the question of compensation. The company rebuilt all the walls and some of the locks. If that canal had not been supported by a powerful corporation like the London and North-Western Railway, it must inevitably have been in ruins now. The next canal he had to do with, the Manchester and Bury Canal, belonging to the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, was almost as unfortunate. The coal workings underneath the canal absolutely wrecked it, compelling the railway company to spend many thousands of pounds in law suits and on restoring the works, and he believed that no independent canal could have survived the expense. Other canals he had had to do with were the Peak Forest, the Macclesfield and the Chesterfield canals, and the Sheffield and South Yorkshire Navigation, which belonged to the old Manchester Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway. Those canals were maintained in good order, although the traffic was certainly not large." On the strength of these personal experiences Mr Ross thought that "if a company came forward which was willing to give reasonable compensation, the railway companies would not be difficult to deal with." The "Shropshire Union" is a railway-controlled canal with an especially instructive history. This system has a total mileage of just over 200 miles. It extends from Wolverhampton to Ellesmere Port on the river Mersey, passing through Market Drayton, Nantwich and Chester, with branches to Shrewsbury, Newtown (Montgomeryshire), Llangollen, and Middlewich (Cheshire). Some sections of the canal were made as far back as 1770, and others as recently as 1840. At one time it was owned by a number of different companies, but by a process of gradual amalgamation, most of these were absorbed by the Ellesmere and Chester Canal Company. In 1846 this company obtained Acts of Parliament which authorised them to change their name to that of "The Shropshire Union Railways and Canal Company," and gave them power to construct three lines of railway: (1) from the Chester and Crewe Branch of the Grand Junction Railway at Calveley to Wolverhampton; (2) from Shrewsbury to Stafford, with a branch to Stone; and (3) from Newtown (Montgomeryshire) to Crewe. Not only do we get here a striking instance of the tendency shown by canal companies to start railways on their own account, but in each one of the three Acts authorising the lines mentioned I find it provided that "it shall be lawful for the Chester and Holyhead Railway Company and the Manchester and Birmingham Railway Company, or either of them, to subscribe towards the undertaking, and hold shares in the Shropshire Union Railways and Canal Company." Experience soon showed that the Shropshire Union had undertaken more than it could accomplish. In 1847 the company obtained a fresh Act of Parliament, this time to authorise a lease of the undertakings of the Shropshire Union Railways and Canal Company to the London and North-Western Railway Company. The Act set forth that the capital of the Shropshire Union Company was £482,924, represented by shares on which all the calls had been paid, and that the indebtedness on mortgages, bonds and other securities amounted to £814,207. Under these adverse conditions, "it has been agreed," the Act goes on to say, "between the Shropshire Union Railways and Canal Company and the London and North-Western Railway Company, with a view to the economical and convenient working" of the three railways authorised, "that a lease in perpetuity of the undertaking of the Shropshire Union Railways and Canal Company should be granted to the London and North-Western Railway Company, and accepted by them, at a rent which shall be equal to ... half the rate per cent. per annum of the dividend which shall from time to time be payable on the capital stock of the London and North-Western Railway Company." [Illustration: WAREHOUSES AND HYDRAULIC CRANES AT ELLESMERE PORT. [_To face page 48._ ] We have in this another example of the way in which a railway company has saved a canal system from extinction, while under the control of the London and North-Western the Shropshire Union Canal is still undoubtedly one of the best maintained of any in the country. There may be sections of it, especially in out-lying parts, where the traffic is comparatively small, but a considerable business is still done in the conveyance of sea-borne grain from the Mersey to the Chester district, or in that of tinplates, iron, and manufactured articles from the Black Country to the Mersey for shipment. For traffic such as this the canal already offers every reasonable facility. The Shropshire Union is also a large carrier of goods to and from the Potteries district, in conjunction with the Trent and Mersey. So little has the canal been "strangled," or even neglected, by the London and North-Western Railway Company that, in addition to maintaining its general efficiency, the expenditure incurred by that company of late years for the development of Ellesmere Port--the point where the Shropshire Union Canal enters the Manchester Ship Canal--amounts to several hundred thousand pounds, this money having been spent mainly in the interest of the traffic along the Shropshire Union Canal. Deep-water quay walls of considerable length have been built; warehouses for general merchandise, with an excellent system of hydraulic cranes, have been provided; a large grain depôt, fully equipped with grain elevators and other appliances, has been constructed at a cost of £80,000 to facilitate, more especially, the considerable grain transport by canal that is done between the River Mersey and the Chester district; and at the present time the dock area is being enlarged, chiefly for the purpose of accommodating deeper barges, drawing about 7 feet of water. Another fact I might mention in regard to the Shropshire Union Canal is in connection with mechanical haulage. Elaborate theories, worked out on paper, as to the difference in cost between rail transport and water transport, may be completely upset where the water transport is to be conducted, not on a river or on a canal crossing a perfectly level plain, but along a canal which is raised, by means of locks, several hundred feet on one side of a ridge, or of some elevated table-land, and must be brought down in the same way on the other side. So, again, the value of what might otherwise be a useful system of mechanical haulage may be completely marred owing to the existence of innumerable locks. This conclusion is the outcome of a series of practical experiments conducted on the Shropshire Union Canal at a time when the theorists were still working out their calculations on paper. The experiments in question were directed to ascertaining whether economy could be effected by making up strings of narrow canal boats, and having them drawn by a tug worked by steam or other motive power, instead of employing man and horse for each boat. The plan answered admirably until the locks were reached. There the steam-tug was, temporarily, no longer of any service. It was necessary to keep a horse at every lock, or flight of locks, to get the boats through, so that, apart from the tedious delays (the boats that passed first having to wait for the last-comers before the procession could start again), the increased expense at the locks nullified any saving gained from the mechanical haulage. As a further illustration--drawn this time from Scotland--of the relations of railway companies to canals, I take the case of the Forth and Clyde Navigation, controlled by the Caledonian Railway Company. This navigation really consists of two sections--the Forth and Clyde Navigation, and the Monkland Navigation. The former, authorised in 1768, and opened in 1790, commences at Grangemouth on the Firth of Forth, crosses the country by Falkirk and Kirkintilloch, and terminates at Bowling on the Clyde. It has thirty-nine locks, and at one point has been constructed through 3 miles of hard rock. The original depth of 8 feet was increased to 10 feet in 1814. In addition to the canal proper, the navigation included the harbours of Grangemouth and Bowling, and also the Grangemouth Branch Railway, and the Drumpeller Branch Railway, near Coatbridge. The Monkland Canal, also opened in 1790, was built from Glasgow _viâ_ Coatbridge to Woodhall in Lanarkshire, mainly for the transport of coal from the Lanarkshire coal-fields to Glasgow and elsewhere. Here the depth was 6 feet. The undertakings of the Forth and Clyde and the Monkland Navigations were amalgamated in 1846. Prior to 1865, the Caledonian Railway did not extend further north than Greenhill, about 5 miles south of Falkirk, where it joined the Scottish Central Railway. This undertaking was absorbed by the Caledonian in 1865, and the Caledonian system was thus extended as far north as Perth and Dundee. The further absorption of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway Company, in 1866, led to the extension of the Caledonian system to Aberdeen. At this time the Caledonian Railway Company owned no port or harbour in Scotland, except the small and rather shallow tidal harbour of South Alloa. Having got possession of the railway lines in Central Scotland, they thought it necessary to obtain control of some port on the east coast, in the interests of traffic to or from the Continent, and especially to facilitate the shipment to the Continent of coal from the Lanarkshire coal-fields, chiefly served by them. The port of Grangemouth being adapted to their requirements, they entered into negotiations with the proprietors of the Forth and Clyde Navigation, who were also proprietors of the harbour of Grangemouth, and acquired the whole undertaking in 1867, guaranteeing to the original company a dividend of 6-1/4 per cent. Since their acquisition of the canal, the Caledonian Railway Company have spent large sums annually in maintaining it in a state of efficiency, and its general condition to-day is better than when it was taken over. Much of the traffic handled is brought into or sent out from Grangemouth, and here the Caledonian Railway Company have more than doubled the accommodation, with the result that the imports and exports have enormously increased. All the same, there has been a steady decrease in the actual canal traffic, due to various causes, such as (_a_) the exhaustion of several of the coal-fields in the Monkland district; (_b_) the extension of railways; and (_c_) changes in the sources from which certain classes of traffic formerly carried on the canal are derived. In regard to the coal-fields, the closing of pits adjoining the canal has been followed by the opening of others at such a distance from the canal that it was cheaper to consign by rail. In the matter of railway extensions, when the Caledonian took over the canal in 1867, there were practically no railways in the district through which it runs, and the coal and other traffic had, perforce, to go by water. But, year by year, a complete network of railways was spread through the district by independent railway companies, notwithstanding the efforts made by the Caledonian to protect the interests of the canal-efforts that led, in some instances, to Parliament refusing assent to the proposed lines. Those that were constructed (over a dozen lines and branches altogether), were almost all absorbed by the North British Railway Company, who are strong competitors with the Caledonian Railway Company, and have naturally done all they could to get traffic for the lines in question. This, of course, has been at the expense of the canal and to the detriment of the Caledonian Railway Company, who, in view of their having guaranteed a dividend to the original proprietors, would prefer that the traffic in question should remain on the canal instead of being diverted to an opposition line of railway. Other traffic which formerly went by canal, and is now carried on the Caledonian Railway, is of a character that would certainly go by canal no longer, and for this the Caledonian and the North British Companies compete. The third factor in the decline of the canal relates to the general consideration that, during the last thirty or forty years, important works have no longer been necessarily built alongside canal banks, but have been constructed wherever convenient, and connected with the railways by branch lines or private sidings, expense of cartage to or from the canal dock or basin thus being saved. On the Forth and Clyde Canal a good deal of coal is still carried, but mainly to adjoining works. Coal is also shipped in vessels on the canal for transport to the West Highlands and Islands, where the railways cannot compete; but even here there is an increasing tendency for the coal to be bought in Glasgow (to which port it is carried by rail), so that the shippers can have a wider range of markets when purchasing. Further changes affecting the Forth and Clyde Canal are illustrated by the fact that whereas, at one time, large quantities of grain were brought into Grangemouth from Russian and other Continental ports, transhipped into lighters, and sent to Glasgow by canal, the grain now received at Glasgow comes mainly from America by direct steamer. That the Caledonian Railway Company have done their duty towards the Forth and Clyde Canal is beyond all reasonable doubt. It is true that they are not themselves carriers on the canal. They are only toll-takers. Their business has been to maintain the canal in efficient condition, and allow any trader who wishes to make use of it so to do, on paying the tolls. This they have done, and, if the traders have not availed themselves of their opportunities, it must naturally have been for adequate reasons, and especially because of changes in the course of the country's business which it is impossible for a railway company to control, even where, as in this particular case, they are directly interested in seeing the receipts from tolls attain to as high a figure as practicable. I reserve for another chapter a study of the Birmingham Canal system, which, again, is "railway controlled"; but I may say here that I think the facts already given show it is most unfair to suggest, as is constantly being done in the Press and elsewhere, that the railway companies bought up canals--"of malice aforethought," as it were--for the express purpose of killing such competition as they represented--a form of competition in which, as we have seen, public confidence had already practically disappeared. One of the witnesses at the canal enquiry in 1883 even went so far as to assert: "The railway companies have been enabled, in some cases by means of very questionable legality, to obtain command of 1,717 miles of canal, so adroitly selected as to strangle the whole of the inland water traffic, which has thus been forced upon the railways, to the great interruption of their legitimate and lucrative trade." The assertions here made are constantly being reproduced in one form or another by newspaper writers, public speakers, and others, who have gone to no trouble to investigate the facts for themselves, who have never read, or, if they have read, have disregarded, the important evidence of Sir James Allport, at the same enquiry, in reference to the London coal trade (I shall revert to this subject later on), and who probably have either not seen a map of British canals and waterways at all, or else have failed to notice the routes that still remain independent, and are in no way controlled by railway companies. [Illustration: INDEPENDENT CANALS AND INLAND NAVIGATIONS IN ENGLAND Which are not controlled by railway companies] 1. River Ouse Navigation (Yorkshire). 2. River Wharfe Navigation. 3. Aire and Calder Navigation. 4. Market Weighton Navigation. 5. Driffield Navigation. 6. Beverley Beck Navigation. 7. Leven Navigation. 8. Leeds and Liverpool Canal. 9. Manchester Ship Canal. 10. Bridgewater portion of Manchester Ship Canal. 11. Rochdale Canal. 12. Calder and Hebble Navigation. 13. Weaver Navigation. 14. Idle Navigation. 15. Trent Navigation Co. 16. Aucholme Navigation. 17. Caistor Canal. 18. Louth Canal (Lincolnshire). 19. Derby Canal. 20. Nutbrook Canal. 21. Erewash Canal. 22. Loughborough Navigation. 23. Leicester Navigation. 24. Leicestershire Union Canal. 25. Witham Navigation. 26. Witham Navigation. 27. Glen Navigation. 28. Welland Navigation. 29. Nen Navigation. 30. Wisbech Canal. 31. Nar Navigation. 32. Ouse and Tributaries (Bedfordshire). 33. North Walsham Canal. 34. Bure Navigation. 35. Blyth Navigation. 36. Ipswich and Stowmarket Navigation. 37. Stour Navigation. 38. Colne Navigation. 39. Chelmer and Blackwater Navigation. 40. Roding Navigation. 41. Stort Navigation. 42. Lea Navigation. 43. Grand Junction Canal. 44. Grand Union Canal. 45. Oxford Canal. 46. Coventry Canal. 47. Warwick and Napton Canal. 48. Warwick and Birmingham Canal. 49. Birmingham and Warwick Junction Canal. 30. Worcester and Birmingham Canal. 51. Stafford and Worcester Canal. 52. Severn (Lower) Navigation. 53. Gloucester and Berkeley Ship Canal. 54. Lower Avon Navigation. 55. Stroudwater Canal. 56. Wye Navigation. 57. Axe Navigation. 58. Parrett Navigation. 59. Tone Navigation. 60. Wilts and Berks Canal. 61. Thames Navigation. 62. London and Hampshire Canal. 63. Wey Navigation. 64. Medway Navigation. 65. Canterbury Navigation. 66. Ouse Navigation (Sussex). 67. Adur Navigation. 68. Arun and Wey Canal. 69. Portsmouth and Arunder Canal. 70. Itchen Navigation. [To face page 54. I give, facing p. 54, a sketch which shows the nature and extent of these particular waterways, and the reader will see from it that they include entirely free and independent communication (_a_) between Birmingham and the Thames; (_b_) from the coal-fields of the Midlands and the North to London; and (_c_) between the west and east coasts, _viâ_ Liverpool, Leeds, and Goole. To say, therefore, in these circumstances, that "the whole of the inland water traffic" has been strangled by the railway companies because the canals or sections of which they "obtained command" were "so adroitly selected," is simply to say what is not true. The point here raised is not one that merely concerns the integrity of the railway companies--though in common justice to them it is only right that the truth should be made known. It really affects the whole question at issue, because, so long as public opinion is concentrated more or less on this strangulation fiction, due attention will not be given to the real causes for the decay of the canals, and undue importance will be attached to the suggestions freely made that if only the one-third of the canal mileage owned or controlled by the railway companies could be got out of their hands, the revival schemes would have a fair chance of success. Certain it is, therefore, as the map I give shows beyond all possible doubt, that the causes for the failure of the British canal system must be sought for elsewhere than in the fact of a partial railway-ownership or control. Some of these alternative causes I propose to discuss in the Chapters that follow my story of the Birmingham Canal, for which (inasmuch as Birmingham and district, by reason of their commercial importance and geographical position, have first claim to consideration in any scheme of canal resuscitation) I would beg the special attention of the reader. CHAPTER V THE BIRMINGHAM CANAL AND ITS STORY What is known as the "Birmingham Canal" is really a perfect network of waterways in and around Birmingham and South Staffordshire, representing a total length of about 160 miles, exclusive of some hundreds of private sidings in connection with different works in the district. [Illustration: Map of the Canals & Railways between WOLVERHAMPTON & BIRMINGHAM [_To face page 56._ ] The system was originally constructed by four different canal companies under Acts of Parliament passed between 1768 and 1818. These companies subsequently amalgamated and formed the Birmingham Canal Navigation, known later on as the Birmingham Canal Company. From March 1816 to March 1818 the company paid £36 per annum per share on 1,000 shares, and in the following year the amount paid on the same number of shares rose to £40 per annum. In 1823 £24 per annum per share was paid on 2,000 shares, in 1838 £9 to £16 on 8,000, in 1844 £8 on 8,800, and from May 1845 to December 1846 £4 per annum per share on 17,600 shares. The year 1845 was a time of great activity in railway promotion, and the Birmingham Canal Company, who already had a canal between that town and Wolverhampton, proposed to supplement it by a railway through the Stour Valley, using for the purpose a certain amount of spare land which they already owned. A similar proposal, however, in respect to a line of railway to take practically the same route between Birmingham and Wolverhampton, was brought forward by an independent company, who seem to have had the support of the London and Birmingham Railway Company; and in the result it was arranged among the different parties concerned (1) that the Birmingham Canal Company should not proceed with their scheme, but that they and the London and Birmingham Railway Company should each subscribe a fourth part of the capital for the construction of the line projected by the independent Birmingham, Wolverhampton, and Stour Valley Railway Company; and (2) that the London and Birmingham Railway Company should, subject to certain terms and conditions, guarantee the future dividend of the Canal Company, whenever the net income was insufficient to produce a dividend of £4 per share on the capital, the Canal Company thus being insured against loss resulting from competition. The building of the Stour Valley Line between Birmingham and Wolverhampton, with a branch to Dudley, was sanctioned by an Act of 1846, which further authorised the Birmingham Canal Company and the London and Birmingham Railway Company to contribute each one quarter of the necessary capital. The canal company raised their quarter, amounting to £190,087, by means of mortgages. In return for their guarantee of the canal company's dividend, the London and Birmingham Railway Company obtained certain rights and privileges in regard to the working of the canal. These were authorised by the London and Birmingham Railway and Birmingham Canal Arrangement Act, 1846, which empowered the two companies each to appoint five persons as a committee of management of the Birmingham Canal Company. Those members of the committee chosen by the London and Birmingham Railway Company were to have the same powers, etc., as the members elected by the canal company; but the canal company were restricted from expending, without the consent of the railway company, "any sum which shall exceed the sum of five hundred pounds in the formation of any new canal, or extension, or branch canal or otherwise, for the purpose of any single work to be hereafter undertaken by the same company"; nor, without consent of the railway company, could the canal company make any alterations in the tolls, rates, or dues charged. In the event of differences of opinion arising between the two sections of the committee of management, the final decision was to be given by the railway representatives in such year or years as the railway company was called upon to make good a deficiency in the dividends, and by the canal representatives when no such demand had been made upon the railway company. In other words the canal company retained the deciding vote so long as they could pay their way, and in any case they could spend up to £500 on any single work without asking the consent of the railway company. In course of time the Stour Valley Line, as well as the London and Birmingham Company, became part of the system of the London and North-Western Railway Company, which thus took over the responsibilities and obligations, in regard to the waterways, already assumed; while the mortgages issued by the Birmingham Canal Company, when they undertook to raise one-fourth of the capital for the Stour Valley Railway, were exchanged for £126,725 of ordinary stock in the London and North-Western Railway. The Birmingham Canal Company was able down to 1873 (except only in one year, 1868, when it required £835 from the London and North-Western Company) to pay its dividend of £4 per annum on each share, without calling on the railway company to make good a deficiency. In 1874, however, there was a substantial shortage of revenue, and since that time the London and North-Western Railway Company, under the agreement already mentioned, have had to pay considerable sums to the canal company, as the following table shows:-- Year 1874 £10,528 18 0 1875 nil. 1876 4,796 10 9 1877 361 7 9 1878 11,370 5 7 1879 20,225 0 5 1880 13,534 19 6 1881 15,028 9 3 1882 6,826 7 1 1883 8,879 4 7 1884 14,196 7 9 1885 25,460 19 10 1886 35,169 9 6 1887 31,491 14 1 1888 15,350 10 11 1889 5,341 19 3 1890 22,069 9 8 1891 17,626 2 3 1892 29,508 4 2 1893 31,618 19 4 1894 27,935 8 9 1895 39,065 15 2 1896 22,994 0 10 1897 10,186 19 7 1898 10,286 13 3 1899 18,470 18 1 1900 34,075 19 6 1901 62,644 2 8 1902 27,645 2 3 1903 34,047 4 6 1904 37,832 5 8 1905 39,860 13 0 The sum total of these figures is £685,265, 2s. 11d. It will have been seen, from the facts already narrated, that for a period of over twenty years from the date of the agreement the canal company continued to earn their own dividend without requiring any assistance from the railway company. Meantime, however, various local, in addition to general, causes had been in operation tending to affect the prosperity of the canals. The decline of the pig-iron industry in the Black Country had set in, while though the conversion of manufactured iron into plates, implements, etc., largely took its place, the raw materials came more and more from districts not served by the canals, and the finished goods were carried mainly by the railways then rapidly spreading through the district, affording facilities in the way of sidings to a considerable number of manufacturers whose works were not on the canal route. Then the local iron ore deposits were either worked out or ceased to be remunerative, in view of the competition of other districts, again facilitated by the railways; and the extension of the Bessemer process of steel-making also affected the Staffordshire iron industry. These changes were quite sufficient in themselves to account for the increasing unprofitableness of the canals, without any need for suggestions of hostility towards them on the part of the railways. In point of fact, the extension of the railways and the provision of "railway basins" brought the canals a certain amount of traffic they might not otherwise have got. It was, indeed, due less to an actual decrease in the tonnage than to a decrease in the distance carried that the amount received in tolls fell off, that the traffic ceased to be remunerative, and that the deficiencies arose which, under their statutory obligations, the London and North-Western Railway Company had to meet. The more that the traffic actually left the canals, the greater was the deficiency which, as shown by the figures I have given, the railway company had to make good.[6] The condition of the canals in 1874, when the responsibilities assumed by the London and North-Western Railway Company began to fall more heavily upon them, left a good deal to be desired, and the railway company found themselves faced with the necessity of finding money for improvements which eventually represented a very heavy expenditure, apart altogether from the making up of a guaranteed dividend. They proceeded, all the same, to acquit themselves of these responsibilities, and it is no exaggeration to say that, during the thirty years which have since elapsed, they have spent enormous sums in improving the canals, and in maintaining them in what--adverse critics notwithstanding--is their present high state of efficiency, considering the peculiarities of their position. One of the greatest difficulties in the situation was in regard to water supply. At Birmingham, portions of the canal are 453 feet above ordnance datum; Wolverhampton, Wednesfield, Tipton, Dudley, and Oldbury are higher still, for their elevation is 473 feet, while Walsall, Darlaston, and Wednesbury are at a height of 408 feet. On high-lands like these there are naturally no powerful streams, and such is the lack of local water supplies that, as every one knows, the city of Birmingham has recently had to go as far as Wales in order to obtain sufficient water to meet the needs of its citizens. In these circumstances special efforts had to be made to obtain water for the canals in the district, and to ensure a due regard for economy in its use. The canals have, in fact, had to depend to a certain extent on water pumped from the bottom of coal pits in the Black Country, and stored in reservoirs on the top levels; the water, also, temporarily lost each time a canal boat passed through one of the many locks in the district being pumped back to the top to be used over again. To this end pumping machinery had already been provided by the old canal companies, but the London and North-Western Railway Company, on taking over the virtual direction of the canals for which they were financially responsible, substituted new and improved plant, and added various new pumping stations. Thanks to the changes thus effected--at, I need hardly say, very considerable cost--the average amount of water now pumped from lower to higher levels, during an average year, is 25,000,000 gallons per day, equal to 1,000 locks of water. On occasions the actual quantity dealt with is 50,000,000 gallons per day, while the total capacity of the present pumping machinery is equal to about 102,000,000 gallons, or 4,080 locks, per day. There is absolutely no doubt that, but for the special provisions made for an additional water supply, the Birmingham Canal would have had to cease operations altogether in the summer of 1905--probably for two months--because of the shortage of water. The reservoirs on the top level were practically empty, and it was solely owing to the company acquiring new sources of supply, involving a very substantial expenditure indeed, that the canal system was kept going at all. A canal company with no large financial resources would inevitably have broken down under the strain. Then the London and North-Western Company are actively engaged in substituting new pumping machinery--representing "all the latest improvements"--for old, the special aim, here, being the securing of a reduction of more than 50 per cent. over the former cost of pumping. An expenditure of from £15,000 to £16,000 was, for example, incurred by them so recently as 1905 at the Ocker Hill pumping station. In this way the railway company are seeking both to maintain the efficiency of the canal and to reduce the heavy annual demands made upon them in respect to the general cost of operation and shareholders' dividend. For reasons which will be indicated later on, it is impossible to improve the Black Country canals on any large scale; but, in addition to what I have already related, the London and North-Western Railway Company are constantly spending money on small improvements, such as dredging, widening waterway under-bridges, taking off corners, and putting in side walls in place of slopes, so as to give more space for the boats. In the latter respect many miles have been so treated, to the distinct betterment of the canal. All this heavy outlay by the railway company, carried on for a series of years, is now beginning to tell, to the advantage alike of the traders and of the canal as a property, and if any scheme of State or municipal purchase were decided on by the country the various substantial items mentioned would naturally have to be taken into account in making terms. Another feature of the Birmingham Canal system is that it passes to a considerable extent through the mining districts of the Black Country. This means, in the first place, that wherever important works have been constructed, as in the case of tunnels, (and the system passes through a number of tunnels, three of these being 3,172 yards, 3,027 yards, and 3,785 yards respectively in length) the mineral rights underneath have to be bought up in order to avoid subsidences. In one instance the railway company paid no less than £28,500 for the mining rights underneath a short length (754 yards) of a canal tunnel. In other words, this £28,500 was practically buried in the ground, not in order to work the minerals, but with a view to maintain a secure foundation for the canal. Altogether the expenditure of the company in this one direction, and for this one special purpose alone, in the Black Country district, must amount by this time to some hundreds of thousands of pounds. Actual subsidences represent a great source of trouble. There are some parts of the Birmingham Canal where the waterway was originally constructed on a level with the adjoining ground, but, as more and more coal has been taken from the mines underneath, and especially as more and more of the ribs of coal originally left to support the roof have been removed, the land has subsided from time to time, rendering necessary the raising of the canal. So far has this gone that to-day the canal, at certain of these points, instead of being on a level with the adjoining ground, is on an embankment 30 feet above. Drops of from 10 to 20 feet are of frequent occurrence, even with narrow canals, and the cost involved in repairs and restoration is enormous, as the reader may well suppose, considering that the total length of the Birmingham Canal subject to subsidences from mining is about 90 miles. I come next to the point as to the comparative narrowness of the Birmingham Canal system and the small capacity of the locks--conditions, as we are rightly told, which tell against the possibility of through, or even local, traffic in a larger type of boat. Such conditions as these are generally presented as one of the main reasons why the control should be transferred to the State, to municipalities, or to public trusts, who, it is assumed, would soon get rid of them. The reader must have fully realised by this time that the original size of the waterways and locks on the Birmingham Canal was determined by the question of water supply. But any extensive scheme of widening would involve much beyond the securing of more water. During the decades the Birmingham Canal has been in existence important works of all kinds have been built alongside its banks, not only in and around Birmingham itself, but all through the Black Country. There are parts of the canal where almost continuous lines of such works on each side of the canal, flush up to the banks or towing path, are to be seen for miles together. Any general widening, therefore, even of the main waterways, would involve such a buying up, reconstruction of, or interference with extremely valuable properties that the expenditure involved--in the interests of a problematical saving in canal tolls--would be alike prodigious and prohibitive. There is the less reason for incurring such expenditure when we consider the special purposes which the canals of the district already serve, and, I may even say, efficiently serve. The total traffic passing over the Birmingham Canal system amounts to about 8,000,000 tons per annum,[7] and of this a considerable proportion is collected for eventual transport by rail. Every few miles along the canal in the Black Country there is a "railway-basin" put in either by the London and North-Western Railway Company, who have had the privilege of finding the money to keep the canal going since 1874, or by the Great Western or the Midland Railway Companies. Here, again, very considerable expenditure has been incurred by the railway companies in the provision alike of wharves, cranes, sheds, etc., and of branch railways connecting with the main lines of the company concerned. From these railway-basins narrow boats are sent out to works all over the district to collect iron, hardware, tinplates, bricks, tiles, manufactured articles, and general merchandise, and bring them in for loading into the railway trucks alongside. So complete is the network of canals, with their hundreds of small "special" branches, that for many of the local works their only means of communication with the railway is by water, and the consignments are simply conveyed to the railway by canal boat, instead of, as elsewhere, by collecting van or road lorry. The number of these railway-basins--the cost of which is distinctly substantial--is constantly being increased, for the traffic through them grows almost from day to day. The Great Western Railway Company, for example, have already several large transhipping basins on the canals of the Black Country. They have one at Wolverhampton, and another at Tipton, only 5 miles away; yet they have now decided to construct still another, about half-way between the two. The matter is thus referred to in the _Great Western Railway Magazine_ for March, 1906:-- "The Directors have approved a scheme for an extensive depôt adjoining the Birmingham Canal at Bilston, the site being advantageously central in the town. It will comprise a canal basin and transfer shed, sidings for over one hundred and twenty waggons, and a loop for made-up trains. A large share of the traffic of the district, mainly raw material and manufactured articles of the iron trade, will doubtless be secured as a result of this important step--the railway and canal mutually serving each other as feeders." The reader will see from this how the tendency, even on canals that survive, is for the length of haul to become shorter and shorter, so that the receipts of the canal company from tolls may decline even where there is no actual decrease in the weight of the traffic handled. In the event of State or municipal purchase being resorted to, the expenditure on all these costly basins and the works connected therewith would have to be taken into consideration, equally with the pumping machinery and general improvements, and, also, the purchase of mining rights, already spoken of; but I fail to see what more either Government or County Council control could, in the circumstances, do for the Birmingham system than is being done already. Far more for the purposes of maintenance has been spent on the canal by the London and North-Western Railway Company than had been so spent by the canal company itself; and, although a considerable amount of traffic arising in the district does find its way down to the Mersey, the purpose served by the canal is, and must necessarily be, mainly a local one. That Birmingham should become a sort of half-way stage on a continuous line of widened canals across country from the Thames to the Mersey is one of the most impracticable of dreams. Even if there were not the question of the prodigious cost that widenings of the Birmingham Canal would involve, there would remain the equally fatal drawback of the elevation of Birmingham and Wolverhampton above sea level. In constructing a broad cross-country canal, linking up the two rivers in question, it would be absolutely necessary to avoid alike Birmingham and the whole of the Black Country. That city and district, therefore, would gain no direct advantage from such a through route. They would have to be content to send down their commodities in the existing small boats to a lower level, and there, in order to reach the Mersey, connect with either the Shropshire Union Canal or the Trent and Mersey. One of these two waterways would certainly have to be selected for a widened through route to the Mersey. Assume that the former were decided upon, and that, to meet the present-day agitation, the State, or some Trust backed by State or local funds, bought up the Shropshire Union, and resolved upon a substantial widening of this particular waterway, so as to admit of a larger type of boat and the various other improvements now projected. In this case the _crux_ of the situation (apart from Birmingham and Black Country conditions), would be the city of Chester. For a distance of 1-1/2 miles the Shropshire Union Canal passes through the very heart of Chester. Right alongside the canal one sees successively very large flour mills or lead works, big warehouses, a school, streets which border it for some distance, masses of houses, and, also, the old city walls. At one point the existing canal makes a bend that is equal almost to a right angle. Here there would have to be a substantial clearance if boats much larger than those now in use were to get round so ugly a corner in safety. This bend, too, is just where the canal goes underneath the main lines of the London and North-Western and the Great Western Railways, the gradients of which would certainly have to be altered if it were desired to employ larger boats. [Illustration: WHAT CANAL WIDENING WOULD MEAN. (The Shropshire Union Canal at the Northgate, Chester, looking East.) [_To face page 70._ ] The widening of the Shropshire Union Canal at Chester would, in effect, necessitate a wholesale destruction of, or interference with, valuable property (even if the city walls were spared), and an expenditure of hundreds of thousands of pounds. Such a thing is clearly not to be thought of. The city of Chester would have to be avoided by the through route from the Midlands to the Mersey, just as the canals of Birmingham and the Black Country would have to be avoided in a through route from the Thames. If the Shropshire Union were still kept to, a new branch canal would have to be constructed from Waverton to connect again with the Shropshire Union at a point half-way between Chester and Ellesmere Port, leaving Chester in a neglected bend on the south. On this point as to the possibility of enlarging the Shropshire Union Canal, I should like to quote the following from some remarks made by Mr G. R. Jebb, engineer to the Shropshire Union Railways and Canal Company, in the discussion on Mr Saner's paper at the Institution of Civil Engineers:-- "As to the suggestion that the railway companies did not consider it possible to make successful commercial use of their canals in conjunction with their lines, and that the London and North-Western Railway Company might have improved the main line of the Shropshire Union Canal between Ellesmere Port and Wolverhampton, and thus have relieved their already overburdened line, as a matter of fact about twenty years ago he went carefully into the question of enlarging that particular length of canal, which formed the main line between the Midlands and the sea. He drew up estimates and plans for wide canals, of different cross sections, one of which was almost identical with the cross section proposed by Mr Saner. After very careful consideration with a disposition to improve the canal if possible, it was found that the cost of the necessary works would be too heavy. Bridges of wide span and larger headway--entailing approaches which could not be constructed without destroying valuable property on either side--new locks and hydraulic lifts would be required, and a transhipping depôt would have been necessary where each of the narrow canals joined. The company were satisfied, and he himself was satisfied, that no reasonable return for that expenditure could be expected, and therefore the work was not proceeded with.... He was satisfied that whoever found the money for canal improvements would get no fair return for it." The adoption of the alternative route, _viâ_ the Trent and Mersey, would involve (1) locking-up to and down a considerable summit, and (2) a continuous series of widenings (except along the Weaver Canal), the cost of which, especially in the towns of Stoke, Etruria, Middlewich, and Northwich, would attain to proportions altogether prohibitive. The conclusion at which I arrive in regard to the Birmingham Canal system is that it cannot be directly included in any scheme of cross-country waterways from river to river; that by reason alike of elevation, water supply, and the existence of a vast amount of valuable property immediately alongside, any general widening of the present system of canals in the district is altogether impracticable; that, within the scope of their unavoidable limitations, those particular canals already afford every reasonable facility to the real requirements of the local traders; that, instead of their having been "strangled" by the railways, they have been kept alive and in operation solely and entirely because of the heavy expenditure upon them by the London and North-Western Railway Company, following on conditions which must inevitably have led to collapse (with serious disadvantages to the traders dependent on them for transport) if the control had remained with an independent but impoverished canal company; and that very little, if anything, more--with due regard both for what is practical, and for the avoidance of any waste of public money--could be done than is already being done, even if State or municipal authorities made the costly experiment of trying what they could do for them with their own 'prentice hands. CHAPTER VI THE TRANSITION IN TRADE Of the various causes which have operated to bring about the comparative decay of the British canal system (for, as already shown, there are sections that still retain a certain amount of vitality), the most important are to be found in the great changes that have taken place in the general conditions of trade, manufacture and commerce. The tendency in almost every branch of business to-day is for the trader to have small, or comparatively small, stocks of any particular commodity, which he can replenish speedily at frequent intervals as occasion requires. The advantages are obvious. A smaller amount of capital is locked up in any one article; a larger variety of goods can be dealt in; less accommodation is required for storage; and men with limited means can enter on businesses which otherwise could be undertaken only by individuals or companies possessed of considerable resources. If a draper or a grocer at Plymouth finds one afternoon that he has run short of a particular article, he need only telegraph to the wholesale house with which he deals in London, and a fresh supply will be delivered to him the following morning. A trader in London who wanted something from Dublin, and telegraphed for it one day, would expect as a matter of course to have it the next. What, again, would a London shopkeeper be likely to say if, wanting to replenish his limited stock with some Birmingham goods, he was informed by the manufacturer:--"We are in receipt of your esteemed order, and are sending the goods on by canal. You may hope to get them in about a week"? With a little wider margin in the matter of delivery, the same principle applies to those trading in, or requiring, raw materials--coal, steel, ironstone, bricks, and so on. Merchants, manufacturers, and builders are no more anxious than the average shopkeeper to keep on hand stocks unnecessarily large, and to have so much money lying idle. They calculate the length of time that will be required to get in more supplies when likely to be wanted, and they work their business accordingly. From this point of view the railway is far superior to the canal in two respects, at least. First, there is the question of speed. The value of this factor was well recognised so far back as 1825, when, as I have told on page 25, Mr Sandars related how speed and certainty of delivery were regarded as "of the first importance," and constituted one of the leading reasons for the desired introduction of railways. But speed and certainty of delivery become absolutely essential when the margin in regard to supplies on hand is habitually kept to a working minimum. The saving in freight effected as between, on the one hand, waiting at least several days, if not a full week, for goods by canal boat, and, on the other, receiving them the following day by train, may be more than swallowed up by the loss of profit or the loss of business in consequence of the delay. If the railway transport be a little more costly than the canal transport, the difference should be fully counterbalanced by the possibility of a more rapid turnover, as well as the other advantages of which I have spoken. In cases, again, where it is not a matter of quickly replenishing stocks but of effecting prompt delivery even of bulky goods, time may be all-important. This fact is well illustrated in a contribution, from Birmingham, published in the "Engineering Supplement" of _The Times_ of February 14, 1906, in which it was said:-- "Makers of wheels, tires, axles, springs, and similar parts are busy. Of late the South African colonies have been larger buyers, while India and the Far Eastern markets, including China and Japan, South America, and some other shipping markets are providing very good and valuable indents. In all cases, it is especially remarked, very early execution of contracts and urgent delivery is impressed by buyers. The leading firms have learned a good deal of late from German, American, Belgian, and other foreign competitors in the matter of rapid output. By the improvement of plant, the laying down of new and costly machine tools, and by other advances in methods of production, delivery is now made of contracts of heavy tonnage within periods which not so long ago would have been deemed by these same producers quite impossible. In no branch of the engineering trades is this expedition more apparent than in the constructional engineering department, such as bridges, roofs, etc., also in steam boiler work." Now where, in cases such as these, "urgent delivery is impressed by buyers," and the utmost energy is probably being enforced on the workers, is it likely that even the heavy goods so made would be sent down to the port by the tediously slow process of canal boat, taking, perhaps, as many days as even a goods train would take hours? Alternatively, would the manufacturers run the risk of delaying urgent work by having the raw materials delivered by canal boat in order to effect a small saving on cost of transport? Certainty of delivery might again be seriously affected in the case of canal transport by delays arising either from scarcity of water during dry seasons, or from frost in winter. The entire stoppage of a canal system, from one or other of these causes, for weeks together, especially on high levels, is no unusual occurrence, and the inconvenience which would then result to traders who depended on the canals is self-evident. In Holland, where most of the goods traffic goes by the canals that spread as a perfect network throughout the whole country, and link up each town with every other town, the advent of a severe frost means that the whole body of traffic is suddenly thrown on the railways, which then have more to get through than they can manage. Here the problem arises: If waterways take traffic from the railways during the greater part of the year, should the railways still be expected to keep on hand sufficient rolling stock, etc., not only for their normal conditions, but to meet all the demands made upon them during such periods as their competitors cannot operate? There is an idea in some quarters that stoppage from frost need not be feared in this country because, under an improved system of waterways, measures would be taken to keep the ice on the canals constantly broken up. But even with this arrangement there comes a time, during a prolonged frost, when the quantity of broken ice in the canal is so great that navigation is stopped unless the ice itself is removed from the water. Frost must, therefore, still be reckoned with as a serious factor among the possibilities of delay in canal transport. Secondly, there is the question of quantities. For the average trader the railway truck is a much more convenient unit than the canal boat. It takes just such amount as he may want to send or receive. For some commodities the minimum load for which the lowest railway rate is quoted is as little as 2 tons; but many a railway truck has been run through to destination with a solitary consignment of not more than half-a-ton. On the other hand, a vast proportion of the consignments by rail are essentially of the "small" type. From the goods depôt at Curzon Street, Birmingham, a total of 1,615 tons dealt with, over a certain period, represented 6,110 consignments and 51,114 packages, the average weight per consignment being 5 cwts. 1 qr. 4 lbs., and the average weight per package, 2 qrs. 14 lbs. At the Liverpool goods depôts of the London and North-Western Railway, a total weight of 3,895 tons handled consisted of 5,049 consignments and 79,513 packages, the average weight per consignment being 15 cwts. 1 qr. 20 lbs., and the average weight per package 3 qrs. 26 lbs. From the depôt at Broad Street, London, 906 tons represented 6,201 consignments and 23,067 packages, with an average weight per consignment of 2 cwts. 3 qrs. 19 lbs., and per package, 3 qrs. 4 lbs.; and so on with other important centres of traffic. There is little room for doubt that a substantial proportion of these consignments and packages consisted partly of goods required by traders either to replenish their stocks, or, as in the case of tailors and dressmakers, to enable them to execute particular orders; and partly of commodities purchased from traders, and on their way to the customers. In regard to the latter class of goods, it is a matter of common knowledge that there has been an increasing tendency of late years to eliminate the middleman, and establish direct trading between producer and consumer. Just as the small shopkeeper will purchase from the manufacturer, and avoid the wholesale dealer, so, also, there are individual householders and others who eliminate even the shopkeeper, and deal direct with advertising manufacturers willing to supply to them the same quantities as could be obtained from a retail trader. For trades and businesses conducted on these lines, the railway--taking and delivering promptly consignments great or small, penetrating to every part of the country, and supplemented by its own commodious warehouses, in which goods can be stored as desired by the trader pending delivery or shipment--is a far more convenient mode of transport than the canal boat; and to the railway the perfect revolution that has been brought about in the general trade of this country is mainly due. Business has been simplified, subdivided, and brought within the reach of "small" men to an extent that, but for the railway, would have been impossible; and it is difficult to imagine that traders in general will forego all these advantages now, and revert once more to the canal boat, merely for the sake of a saving in freight which, in the long run, might be no saving at all. Here it may be replied by my critics that there is no idea of reviving canals in the interests of the general trader, and that all that is sought is to provide a cheaper form of transport for those heavier or bulkier minerals or commodities which, it is said, can be carried better and more economically by water than by rail. Now this argument implies the admission that canal resuscitation, on a national basis, or at the risk more or less of the community, is to be effected, not for the general trader, but for certain special classes of traders. As a matter of fact, however, such canal traffic as exists to-day is by no means limited to heavy or bulky articles. In their earlier days canal companies simply provided a water-road, as it were, along which goods could be taken by other persons on payment of certain tolls. To enable them to meet better the competition of the railways, Parliament granted to the canal companies, in 1846, the right to become common carriers as well, and, though only a very small proportion of them took advantage of this concession, those that did are indebted in part to the transport of general merchandise for such degree of prosperity as they have retained. The separate firms of canal carriers ("by-traders") have adopted a like policy, and, notwithstanding the changes in trade of which I have spoken, a good deal of general merchandise does go by canal to or from places that happen to be situated in the immediate vicinity of the waterways. It is extremely probable that if some of the canals which have survived had depended entirely on the transport of heavy or bulky commodities, their financial condition to-day would have been even worse than it really is. But let us look somewhat more closely into this theory that canals are better adapted than railways for the transport of minerals or heavy merchandise, calling for the payment of a low freight. At the first glance such a commodity as coal would claim special attention from this point of view; yet here one soon learns that not only have the railways secured the great bulk of this traffic in fair and open competition with the canals, but there is no probability of the latter taking it away from them again to any appreciable extent. Some interesting facts in this connection were mentioned by the late Sir James Allport in the evidence he gave before the Select Committee on Canals in 1883. Not a yard, he said, of the series of waterways between London and Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, part of Staffordshire, Warwickshire and Leicestershire--counties which included some of the best coal districts in England for supplying the metropolis--was owned by railway companies, yet the amount of coal carried by canal to London had steadily declined, while that by rail had enormously increased. To prove this assertion, he took the year 1852 as one when there was practically no competition on the part of the railways with the canals for the transport of coal, and he compared therewith the year 1882, giving for each the total amount of coal received by canal and railway respectively, as follows:-- 1852 1882 Received by canal 33,000 tons 7,900 tons " " railway 317,000 " 6,546,000 " The figures quoted by Sir James Allport were taken from the official returns in respect to the dues formerly levied by the City of London and the late Metropolitan Board of Works on all coal coming within the Metropolitan Police Area, representing a total of 700 square miles; though at an earlier period the district in which the dues were enforced was that included in a 20-mile radius. The dues were abolished in 1889, and since then the statistics in question have no longer been compiled. But the returns for 1889 show that the imports of coal, by railway and by canal respectively, into the Metropolitan Police Area for that year were as follows:-- BY RAILWAY Tons. Cwts. Midland 2,647,554 0 London and North-Western 1,735,067 13 Great Northern 1,360,205 0 Great Eastern 1,077,504 13 Great Western 940,829 0 London and South-Western 81,311 2 South-Eastern 27,776 18 ------------------ Total by Railway 7,870,248 6 ------------------ BY CANAL Grand Junction 12,601 15 ---------------------- Difference 7,857,646 11 ---------------------- If, therefore, the independent canal companies, having a waterway from the colliery district of the Midlands and the North through to London (without, as already stated, any section thereof being controlled by railway companies), had improved their canals, and doubled, trebled, or even quadrupled the quantity of coal they carried in 1889, their total would still have been insignificant as compared with the quantity conveyed by rail. [Illustration: "FROM PIT TO PORT." (Prospect Pit, Wigan Coal and Iron Company. Raised to the surface, the coal is emptied on to a mechanical shaker, which grades it into various sizes--lumps, cobbles, nuts, and slack. These sizes then each pass along a picking belt--so that impurities can be removed--and fall into the railway trucks placed at the end ready to receive them. The coal can thus be taken direct from the mouth of the pit to any port or town in Great Britain.) [_To face page 82._ ] The reasons for this transition in the London coal trade (and the same general principle applies elsewhere) can be readily stated. They are to be found in the facilities conferred by the railway companies, and the great changes that, as the direct result thereof, have taken place in the coal trade itself. Not only are most of the collieries in communication with the railways, but the coal waggons are generally so arranged alongside the mouth of each pit that the coal, as raised, can be tipped into them direct from the screens. Coal trains, thus made up, are next brought to certain sidings in the neighbourhood of London, where the waggons await the orders of the coal merchants to whom they have been consigned. At Willesden, for example, there is special accommodation for 2,000 coal waggons, and the sidings are generally full. Liberal provision of a like character has also been made in London by the Midland, the Great Northern, and other railway companies in touch with the colliery districts. An intimation as to the arrival of the consignments is sent by the railway company to the coal merchant, who, in London, is allowed three "free" days at these coal sidings in which to give instructions where the coal is to be sent. After three days he is charged the very modest sum of 6d. per day per truck. Assuming that the coal merchant gives directions, either within the three days or later, for a dozen trucks, containing particular qualities of coal, to be sent to different parts of London, north, south, east and west, those dozen trucks will have to be picked out from the one or two thousand on the sidings, shunted, and coupled on to trains going through to the stated destination. This represents in itself a considerable amount of work, and special staffs have to be kept on duty for the purpose. Then, at no fewer than one hundred and thirty-five railway stations in London and the suburbs thereof, the railway companies have provided coal depôts on such vacant land as may be available close to the local sidings, and here a certain amount of space is allotted to the use of coal merchants. For this accommodation no charge whatever is made in London, though a small rent has to be paid in the provinces. The London coal merchant gets so many feet, or yards, allotted to him on the railway property; he puts up a board with his name, or that of his firm; he stores on the said space the coal for which he has no immediate sale; and he sends his men there to fetch from day to day just such quantities as he wants in order to execute the orders received. With free accommodation such as this at half a dozen, or even a score, of suburban railway stations, all that the coal merchant of to-day requires in addition is a diminutive little office immediately adjoining each railway station, where orders can be received, and whence instructions can be sent. Not only, also, do the railway companies provide him with a local coal depôt which serves his every purpose, but, after allowing him three "free" days on the great coal sidings, to which the waggons first come, they give him, on the local sidings, another seven "free" days in which to arrange his business. He thus gets ten clear days altogether, before any charge is made for demurrage, and, if then he is still awaiting orders, he has only to have the coal removed from the trucks on to the depôt, or "wharf" as it is technically called, so escaping any payment beyond the ordinary railway rate, in which all these privileges and advantages are included. If canal transport were substituted for rail transport, the coal would first have to be taken from the mouth of the pit to the canal, and, inasmuch as comparatively few collieries (except in certain districts) have canals immediately adjoining, the coal would have to go by rail to the canal, unless the expense were incurred of cutting a branch of the canal to the colliery--a much more costly business, especially where locks are necessary, than laying a railway siding. At the canal the coal would be tipped from the railway truck into the canal boat,[8] which would take it to the canal terminus, or to some wharf or basin on the canal banks. There the coal would be thrown up from the boat into the wharf (in itself a more laborious and more expensive operation than that of shovelling it down, or into sacks on the same level, from a railway waggon), and from the wharf it would have to be carted, perhaps several miles, to final destination. Under this arrangement the coal would receive much more handling--and each handling means so much additional slack and depreciation in value; a week would have to be allowed for a journey now possible in a day; the coal dealers would have to provide their own depôts and pay more for cartage, and they would have to order particular kinds of coal by the boat load instead of by the waggon load. This last necessity would alone suffice to render the scheme abortive. Some years ago when there was so much discussion as to the use of a larger size of railway waggon, efforts were made to induce the coal interests to adopt this policy. But the 8-ton truck was so convenient a unit, and suited so well the essentially retail nature of the coal trade to-day, that as a rule the coal merchants would have nothing to do with trucks even of 15 or 20 tons. Much less, therefore, would they be inclined to favour barge loads of 200 or 250 tons. Exceptions might be made in the case of gas works, or of factories already situated alongside the banks of canals which have direct communication with collieries. In the Black Country considerable quantities of coal thus go by canal from the collieries to the many local ironworks, etc., which, as I have shown, are still actively served by the Birmingham Canal system. But these exceptions can hardly be offered as an adequate reason for the nationalisation of British canals. The general conditions, and especially the nature of the coal trade transition, will be better realised from some figures mentioned by the chairman of the London and North-Western Railway Company, Lord Stalbridge, at the half-yearly meeting in February 1903. Notwithstanding the heavy coal traffic--in the aggregate--the average consignment of coal, he showed, on the London and North-Western Railway is only 17-1/2 tons, and over 80 per cent. of the total quantity carried represents consignments of less than 20 tons, the actual weights ranging from lots of 2 tons 14 cwts. to close upon 1,000 tons for shipment. "But," the reader may say, "if coal is taken in 1,000-ton lots to a port for shipment, surely canal transport could be resorted to here!" This course is adopted on the Aire and Calder Navigation, which is very favourably situated, and goes over almost perfectly level ground. The average conditions of coal shipment in the United Kingdom are, however, much better met by the special facilities which rail transport offers. Of the way in which coal is loaded into railway trucks direct from the colliery screens I have already spoken; but, in respect to steam coal, it should be added that anthracite is sold in about twelve different sizes, and that one colliery will make three or four of these sizes, each dropped into separate trucks under the aforesaid screens. The output of an anthracite colliery would be from 200 to 300 tons a day, in the three or four sizes, as stated, this total being equal to from 20 to 30 truck-loads. An order received by a coal factor for 2,000 or 3,000 tons of a particular size would, therefore, have to be made up with coal from a number of different collieries. The coal, however, is not actually sold at the collieries. It is sent down to the port, and there it stands about for weeks, and sometimes for months, awaiting sale or the arrival of vessels. It must necessarily be on the spot, so that orders can be executed with the utmost expedition, and delays to shipping avoided. Consequently it is necessary that ample accommodation should be provided at the port for what may be described as the coal-in-waiting. At Newport, for example, where about 4,000,000 tons of coal are shipped in the course of the year (independently of "bunkers,") there are 50 miles of coal sidings, capable of accommodating from 40,000 to 50,000 tons of coal sent there for shipment. A record number of loaded coal trucks actually on these sidings at any one time is 3,716. The daily average is 2,800. Now assume that the coal for shipment from Newport had been brought there by canal boat. To begin with, it would have been first loaded, by means of the colliery screens, into railway trucks, taken in these to the canal, and then tipped into the boats. This would mean further breakage, and, in the case of steam coal especially, a depreciation in value. But suppose that the coal had duly arrived at the port in the canal boats, where would it be stored for those weeks and months to await sale or vessels? Space for miles of sidings on land can easily be found; but the water area in a canal or dock in which barges can wait is limited, and, in the case of Newport at least, it would hardly be equal to the equivalent of 3,000 truck-loads of coal. There comes next the important matter of detail as to the way in which coal brought to a port is to be shipped. Nothing could be simpler and more expeditious than the practice generally adopted in the case of rail-borne coal. When a given quantity of coal is to be despatched, the vessel is brought alongside a hydraulic coal-tip, such as that shown in the illustration facing this page, and the loaded coal trucks are placed in succession underneath the tip. Raised one by one to the level of the shoot, the trucks are there inclined to such an angle that the entire contents fall on to the shoot, and thence into the hold of the ship. Brought to the horizontal again, the empty truck passes on to a viaduct, down which it goes, by gravitation, back to the sidings, the place it has vacated on the tip being at once taken by another loaded truck. [Illustration: THE SHIPPING OF COAL: HYDRAULIC TIP ON G.W.R., SWANSEA. (The loaded truck is hoisted to level of shoot, and is there inclined to necessary angle to "tip" the coal, which falls from shoot into hold of vessel. Empty truck passes by gravitation along viaduct, on left, to sidings.) [_To face page 88._ ] Substitute coal barges for coal trucks, and how will the loading then be accomplished? Under any possible circumstances it would take longer to put a series of canal barges alongside a vessel in the dock than to place a series of coal trucks under the tip on shore. Nor could the canal barge itself be raised to the level of a shoot, and have its contents tipped bodily into the collier. What was done in the South Wales district by one colliery some years ago was to load up a barge with iron tubs, or boxes, filled with coal, and placed in pairs from end to end. In dock one of these would be lifted out of the barge by a crane, and lowered into the hold, where the bottom would be knocked out, the emptied tub being then replaced in the barge by the crane, and the next one to it raised in turn. But, apart from the other considerations already presented, this system of shipment was found more costly than the direct tipping of railway trucks, and was consequently abandoned. Although, therefore, in theory coal would appear to be an ideal commodity for transport by canal, in actual practice it is found that rail transport is both more convenient and more economical, and certainly much better adapted to the exigences of present day trade in general, in the case alike of domestic coal and of coal for shipment. Whether or not the country would be warranted in going to a heavy expense for canal resuscitation for the special benefit of a limited number of traders having works or factories alongside canal banks is a wholly different question. I take next the case of raw cotton as another bulky commodity carried in substantial quantities. At one time it was the custom in the Lancashire spinning trade for considerable supplies to be bought in Liverpool, taken to destination by canal, and stored in the mills for use as required. A certain proportion is still handled in this way; but the Lancashire spinners who now store their cotton are extremely few in number, and represent the exception rather than the rule. It is found much more convenient to receive from Liverpool from day to day by rail the exact number of bales required to meet immediate wants. The order can be sent, if necessary, by post, telegraph, or telephone, and the cotton may be expected at the mill next day, or as desired. If barge-loads of cotton were received at one time, capital would at least have to be sunk in providing warehousing accommodation, and the spinner thinks he can make better use of his money. The day-by-day arrangement is thus both a convenience and a saving to the trader; though it has one disadvantage from a railway standpoint, for cotton consignments by rail are, as a rule, so small that there is difficulty in making up a "paying load" for particular destinations. As the further result of the agitation a few years ago for the use of a larger type of railway waggons, experiments have been made at Liverpool with large trucks for the conveyance especially of raw cotton. But, owing to the day-by-day policy of the spinners, it is no easy matter to make up a 20-ton truck of cotton for many of the places to which consignments are sent, and the shortage in the load represents so much dead weight. Consignments ordered forward by rail must, however, be despatched wholly, or at any rate in part, on day of receipt. Any keeping of them back, with the idea of thus making up a better load for the railway truck, would involve the risk of a complaint, if not of a claim, against the railway company, on the ground that the mill had had to stop work owing to delay in the arrival of the cotton. If the spinners would only adopt a two- or three-days-together policy, it would be a great advantage to the railways; but even this might involve the provision of storage accommodation at the mills, and they accordingly prefer the existing arrangement. What hope could there be, therefore, except under very special circumstances, that they would be willing to change their procedure, and receive their raw cotton in bulk by canal boat? Passing on to other heavy commodities carried in large quantities, such as bricks, stone, drain-pipes, manure, or road-making materials, it is found, in practice, that unless both the place whence these things are despatched and the place where they are actually wanted are close to a waterway, it is generally more convenient and more economical to send by rail. The railway truck is not only (once more) a better unit in regard to quantity, but, as in the case of domestic coal, it can go to any railway station, and can often be brought miles nearer to the actual destination than if the articles or materials in question are forwarded by water; while the addition to the canal toll of the cost of cartage at either end, or both, may swell the total to the full amount of the railway rate, or leave so small a margin that conveyance by rail, in view of the other advantages offered, is naturally preferred. Here we have further reasons why commodities that seem to be specially adapted for transport by canal so often go by rail instead. There are manufacturers, again, who, if executing a large shipping order, would rather consign the goods, as they are ready, to a railway warehouse at the port, there to await shipment, than occupy valuable space with them on their own premises. Assuming that it might be possible and of advantage to forward to destination by canal boat, they would still prefer to send off 25 or 30 tons at a time, in a narrow boat (and 25 to 30 tons would represent a big lot in most industries), rather than keep everything back (with the incidental result of blocking up the factory) until, in order to save a little on the freight, they could fill up a barge of 200 or 300 tons. So the moral of this part of my story is that, even if the canals of the country were thoroughly revived, and made available for large craft, there could not be any really great resort to them unless there were, also, brought about a change in the whole basis of our general trading conditions. CHAPTER VII CONTINENTAL CONDITIONS The larger proportion of the arguments advanced in the Press or in public in favour of a restoration of our own canal system is derived from the statements which are unceasingly being made as to what our neighbours on the Continent of Europe are doing. Almost every writer or speaker on the subject brings forward the same stock of facts and figures as to the large sums of money that are being expended on waterways in Continental countries; the contention advanced being, in effect, that because such and such things are done on the Continent of Europe, therefore they ought to be done here. In the "Engineering Supplement" of _The Times_, for instance--to give only one example out of many--there appeared early in 1906 two articles on "Belgian Canals and Waterways" by an engineering contributor who wrote, among other things, that, in view of "the well-directed efforts now being made with the object of effecting the regeneration of the British canal system, the study of Belgian canals and other navigable waterways possesses distinct interest"; and declared, in concluding his account thereof, that "if the necessary powers, money, and concentrated effort were available, there is little doubt that equally satisfactory results could be obtained in Great Britain." Is this really the case? Could we possibly hope to do all that can be done either in Belgium or in Continental countries generally, even if we had the said powers and money, and showed the same concentrated effort? For my part I do not think we could, and these are my reasons for thinking so:-- Taking geographical considerations first, a glance at the map of Europe will show that, apart from their national requirements, enterprises, and facilities, Germany, Belgium, and Holland are the gateways to vast expanses producing, or receiving, very large quantities of merchandise and raw materials, much of which is eminently suitable for water transport on long journeys that have absolutely no parallel in this country. In the case of Belgium, a good idea of the general position may be gained from some remarks made by the British Consul-General at Antwerp, Sir E. Cecil Hertslet, in a report ("Miscellaneous Series," 604) on "Canals and other Navigable Waterways of Belgium," issued by the Foreign Office in 1904. Referring to the position of Antwerp he wrote:-- "In order to form a clear idea of the great utility of the canal system of Belgium, it is from its heart, from the great port of Antwerp, as a centre, that the survey must be taken.... Antwerp holds a leading position among the great ports of the world, and this is due, not only to her splendid geographical situation at the centre of the ocean highways of commerce, but, also, and perhaps more particularly, to her practically unique position as a distributing centre for a large portion of North-Eastern Europe." Thus the canals and waterways of Belgium do not serve merely local, domestic, or national purposes, but represent the first or final links in a network of water communications by means of which merchandise can be taken to, or brought from, in bulk, "a large portion of North-Eastern Europe." Much of this traffic, again, can just as well pass through one Continental country, on its way to or from the coast, as through another. In fact, some of the most productive of German industrial centres are much nearer to Antwerp or Rotterdam than they are to Hamburg or Bremen. Hence the extremely keen rivalry between Continental countries having ports on the North Sea for the capture of these great volumes of trans-Continental traffic, and hence, also, their low transport rates, and, to a certain extent, their large expenditure on waterways. Comparing these with British conditions, we must bear in mind the fact that we dwell in a group of islands, and not in a country which forms part of a Continent. We have, therefore, no such transit traffic available for "through" barges as that which is handled on the Continent. Traffic originating in Liverpool, and destined say, for Austria, would not be put in a canal boat which would first go to Goole, or Hull, then cross the North Sea in the same boat to Holland or Belgium, and so on to its destination. Nor would traffic in bulk from the United States for the Continent--or even for any of our East Coast ports--be taken by boat across England. It would go round by sea. Traffic, again, originating in Birmingham, might be taken to a port by boat. But it would there require transhipment into an ocean-going vessel, just as the commodities received from abroad would have to be transferred to a canal boat--unless Birmingham could be converted into a sea-port. If Belgium and Holland, especially, had had no chance of getting more than local, as distinct from through or transit traffic--if, in other words, they had been islands like our own, with the same geographical limitations as ourselves, and with no trans-Continental traffic to handle, is there the slightest probability that they would have spent anything like the same amount of money on the development of their waterways as they have actually done? In the particular circumstances of their position they have acted wisely; but it does not necessarily follow that we, in wholly different circumstances, have acted foolishly in not following their example. It might further be noted, in this connection, that while in the case of Belgium all the waterways in, or leading into, the country converge to the one great port of Antwerp, in England we have great ports, competing more or less the one with the other, all round our coasts, and the conferring of special advantages on one by the State would probably be followed by like demands on the part of all the others. As for communication between our different ports, this is maintained so effectively by coasting vessels (the competition of which already powerfully influences railway rates) that heavy expenditure on canal improvement could hardly be justified on this account. However effectively the Thames might be joined to the Mersey, or the Humber to the Severn, by canal, the vast bulk of port-to-port traffic would probably still go by sea. Then there are great differences between the physical conditions of Great Britain and those parts of the Continent of Europe where the improvement of waterways has undergone the greatest expansion. Portions of Holland--as everybody knows--are below the level of the sea, and the remainder are not much above it. A large part of Belgium is flat; so is most of Northern Germany. In fact there is practically a level plain right away from the shores of the North Sea to the steppes of Russia. Canal construction in these conditions is a comparatively simple and a comparatively inexpensive matter; though where such conditions do not exist to the same extent--as in the south of Germany, for example--the building of canals becomes a very different problem. This fact is well recognised by Herr Franz Ulrich in his book on "Staffeltarife und Wasserstrassen," where he argues that the building of canals is practicable only in districts favoured by Nature, and that hilly and backward country is thus unavoidably handicapped. Much, again, of the work done on the Continent has been a matter either of linking up great rivers or of canalising these for navigation purposes. We have in England no such rivers as the Rhine, the Weser, the Elbe, and the Oder, but the very essence of the German scheme of waterways is to connect these and other rivers by canals, a through route by water being thus provided from the North Sea to the borders of Russia. Further south there is already a small canal, the Ludwigs Canal, connecting the Rhine and the Danube, and this canal--as distinct from those in the northern plains--certainly does rise to an elevation of 600 feet from the River Main to its summit level. A scheme has now been projected for establishing a better connection between the Rhine and the Danube by a ship canal following the route either of the Main or of the Neckar. In describing these two powerful streams Professor Meiklejohn says, in his "New Geography":-- "The two greatest rivers of Europe--greatest from almost every point of view--are the Danube and the Rhine. The Danube is the largest river in Europe in respect of its volume of water; it is the only large European river that flows due east; and it is therefore the great highway to the East for South Germany, for Austria, for Hungary, and for the younger nations in its valley. It flows through more lands, races, and languages than any other European river. The Rhine is the great water-highway for Western Europe; and it carries the traffic and the travellers of many countries and peoples. Both streams give life to the whole Continent; they join many countries and the most varied interests; while the streams of France exist only for France itself. The Danube runs parallel with the mighty ranges of the Alps; the Rhine saws its way through the secondary highlands which lie between the Alps and the Netherlands." The construction of this proposed link would give direct water communication between the North Sea and the Black Sea, a distance, as the crow flies, and not counting river windings, of about 1,300 miles. Such an achievement as this would put entirely in the shade even the present possible voyage, by canal and river, of 300 miles from Antwerp to Strasburg. What are our conditions in Great Britain, as against all these? In place of the "great lowland plain" in which most of the Continental canal work we hear so much about has been done, we possess an undulating country whose physical conditions are well indicated by the canal sections given opposite this page. Such differences of level as those that are there shown must be overcome by locks, lifts, or inclined planes, together with occasional tunnels or viaducts. In the result the construction of canals is necessarily much more costly in Great Britain than on the aforesaid "great lowland plain" of Continental Europe, and dimensions readily obtainable there become practically impossible here on account alike of the prohibitive cost of construction and the difficulties that would arise in respect to water supply. A canal connecting the Rhine, the Weser, and the Elbe, in Germany, is hardly likely to run short of water, and the same may be said of the canals in Holland, and of those in the lowlands of Belgium. This is a very different matter from having to pump water from low levels to high levels, to fill reservoirs for canal purposes, as must be done on the Birmingham and other canals, or from taking a fortnight to accomplish the journey from Hull to Nottingham as once happened owing to insufficiency of water. [Illustration: SOME TYPICAL BRITISH CANALS. [_To face page 98._ ] There is, also, that very important consideration, from a transport standpoint, of the "length of haul." Assuming, for the sake of argument (1) that the commercial conditions were the same in Great Britain as they are on the Continent; (2) that our country, also, consisted of a "great lowland plain"; and (3) that we, as well, had great natural waterways, like the Rhine, yielding an abundant water supply;--assuming all this, it would still be impossible, in the circumscribed dimensions of our isles, to get a "length of haul" in any way approaching the barge-journeys that are regularly made between, say, North Sea ports and various centres in Germany. The geographical differences in general between Great Britain and Continental countries were thus summed up by Mr W. H. Wheeler in the discussion on Mr Saner's paper at the Institution of Civil Engineers:-- "There really did not seem to be any justification for Government interference with the canals. England was in an entirely different situation from Continental countries. She was a sea-girt nation, with no less than eight first-class ports on a coast-line of 1,820 miles. Communication between these by coasting steamers was, therefore, easy, and could be accomplished in much less time and at less cost than by canal. There was no large manufacturing town in England that was more than about 80 miles in a direct line from a first-class seaport; and taking the country south of the Firth of Forth, there were only 42-1/2 square miles to each mile of coast. France, on the other hand, had only two first-class ports, one in the north and the other in the extreme south, over a coast-line of 1,360 miles. Its capital was 100 miles from the nearest seaport, and the towns in the centre of the country were 250 to 300 miles from either Havre or Marseilles. For every mile of coast-line there were 162 square miles of country. Belgium had one large seaport and only 50 miles of coast-line, with 227 square miles of country to every square mile. Germany had only two first-class ports, both situated on its northern coast; Frankfort and Berlin were distant from those ports about 250 miles, and for every mile of coast-line there were 231 square miles of country. The necessity of an extended system of inland waterways for the distribution of produce and materials was, therefore, far more important in those countries than it was in England." Passing from commercial and geographical to political conditions, we find that in Germany the State owns or controls alike railways and waterways. Prussia bought up most of the former, partly with the idea of safeguarding the protective policy of the country (endangered by the low rates charged on imports by independent railway companies), and partly in order that the Government could secure, in the profits on railway operation, a source of income independent of Parliamentary votes. So well has the latter aim been achieved that a contribution to the Exchequer of from £10,000,000 to £15,000,000 a year has been obtained, and, rather than allow this source of income to be checked by heavy expenditure, the Prussian Government have refrained from carrying out such widenings and improvements of their State system of railways as a British or an American railway company would certainly have adopted in like circumstances, and have left the traders to find relief in the waterways instead. The increased traffic the waterways of Germany are actually getting is mainly traffic which has either been diverted from the railways, or would have been handled by the railways in other countries in the natural course of their expansion. Whatever may be the case with the waterways, the railways of Prussia, especially, are comparatively unprogressive, and, instead of developing through traffic at competitive rates, they are reverting more and more to the original position of railways as feeders to the waterways. They get a short haul from place of origin to the waterway, and another short haul, perhaps, from waterway again to final destination; but the greater part of the journey is done by water. These conditions represent one very material factor in the substantial expansion of water-borne traffic in Germany--and most of that traffic, be it remembered, has been on great rivers rather than on artificial canals. The latter are certainly being increased in number, especially, as I have said, where they connect the rivers; and the Government are the more inclined that the waterways should be developed because then there will be less need for spending money on the railways, and for any interference with the "revenue-producing machine" which those railways represent. In France the railways owned and operated by the State are only a comparatively small section of the whole; but successive Governments have advanced immense sums for railway construction, and the State guarantees the dividends of the companies; while in France as in Germany railway rates are controlled absolutely by the State. In neither country is there free competition between rail and water transport. If there were, the railways would probably secure a much greater proportion of the traffic than they do. Still another consideration to be borne in mind is that although each country has spent great sums of money--at the cost of the general taxpayer--on the provision of canals or the improvement of waterways, no tolls are, with few exceptions, imposed on the traders. The canal charges include nothing but actual cost of carriage, whereas British railway rates may cover various other services, in addition, and have to be fixed on a scale that will allow of a great variety of charges and obligations being met. Not only, both in Germany and France, may the waterway be constructed and improved by the State, but the State also meets the annual expenditure on dredging, lighting, superintendence and the maintenance of inland harbours. Here we have further reasons for the growth of the water-borne traffic on the Continent. Where the State, as railway owner or railway subsidiser, spends money also on canals, it competes only, to a certain extent, with itself; but this would be a very different position from State-owned or State-supported canals in this country competing with privately-owned railways.[9] If then, as I maintain is the case, there is absolutely no basis for fair comparison between Continental and British conditions--whether commercial, geographical, or political--we are left to conclude that the question of reviving British canals must be judged and decided strictly from a British standpoint, and subject to the limitations of British policy, circumstances, and possibilities. CHAPTER VIII WATERWAYS IN THE UNITED STATES In some respects conditions in the United States compare with those of Continental Europe, for they suggest alike powerful streams, artificial canals constructed on (as a rule) flat or comparatively flat surfaces, and the possibilities of traffic in large quantities for transport over long distances before they can reach a seaport. In other respects the comparison is less with Continental than with British conditions, inasmuch as, for the last half century at least, the American railways have been free to compete with the waterways, and fair play has been given to the exercise of economic forces, with the result that, in the United States as in the United Kingdom, the railways have fully established their position as the factors in inland transport best suited to the varied requirements of trade and commerce of to-day, while the rivers and canals (I do not here deal with the Great Lakes, which represent an entirely different proposition) have played a rôle of steadily diminishing importance. The earliest canal built in the United States was that known as the Erie Canal. It was first projected in 1768, with the idea of establishing a through route by water between Lake Erie and the River Hudson at Albany, whence the boats or barges employed would be able to reach the port of New York. The Act for its construction was not passed, however, by the Provincial Legislature of the State of New York until 1817. The canal itself was opened for traffic in 1825. It had a total length from Cleveland to Albany of 364 miles, included therein being some notable engineering work in the way of aqueducts, etc. At the date in question there were four North Atlantic seaports, namely, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, all of about equal importance. Boston, however, had appeared likely to take the lead, by reason both of her comparatively dense population and of her substantial development of manufactures. Philadelphia was also then somewhat in advance of New York in trade and population. The effect of the Erie Canal, however, was to concentrate all the advantages, for the time being, on New York. Thanks to the canal, New York secured the domestic trade of a widespread territory in the middle west, while her rivals could not possess themselves of like facilities, because of the impracticability of constructing canals to cross the ranges of mountains separating them from the valley of the Mississippi and the basin of the Great Lakes--ranges broken only by the Hudson and the Mohawk valleys, of which the constructors of the Erie Canal had already taken advantage. So New York, with its splendid harbour, made great progress alike in trade, wealth, and population, completely outdistancing her rivals, and becoming, as a State, "the Empire State," and, as a city, "the financial and commercial centre of the Western Hemisphere." While, again, the Erie Canal was "one of the most efficient factors" in bringing about these results, it was also developing the north-west by giving an outlet to the commerce of the Great Lakes, and during the second quarter of the nineteenth century it represented what has been well described as "the most potent influence of American progress and civilisation." Not only did the traffic it carried increase from 1,250,000 tons, in 1837, to 3,000,000 tons in 1847, but it further inspired the building of canals in other sections of the United States. In course of time the artificial waterways of that country represented a total length of 5,000 miles. With the advent of the railways there came revolutionary changes which were by no means generally appreciated at first. The cost of the various canals had been defrayed mostly by the different States, and, though financial considerations had thus been more readily met, the policy pursued had committed the States concerned to the support of the canals against possible competition. When, therefore, "private enterprise" introduced railways, in which the doom of the canals was foreseen, there was a wild outburst of indignant protest. The money of the taxpayers, it was said, had been sunk in building the canals, and, if the welfare of these should be prejudiced by the railways, every taxpayer in the State would suffer. When it was seen that the railways had come to stay, the demand arose that, while passengers might travel by rail, the canals should have the exclusive right to convey merchandise. The question was even discussed by the Legislature of the State of New York, in 1857, whether the railways should not be prevented from carrying goods at all, or, alternatively, whether heavy taxes should not be imposed on goods traffic carried by rail in order to check the considerable tendency then being shown for merchandise to go by rail instead of by canal, irrespective of any difference in rates. The railway companies were further accused of conspiring to "break down those great public works upon which the State has spent forty years of labour," and so active was the campaign against them--while it lasted--that one New York paper wrote:--"The whole community is aroused as it never was before." Some of the laws which had been actually passed to protect the State-constructed canals against the railways were, however, repealed in 1851, and the agitation itself was not continued beyond 1857, from which year the railways had free scope and opportunity to show what they could do. The contest was vigorous and prolonged, but the railways steadily won. In the first instance the Erie Canal had a depth of 4 feet, and could be navigated only by 30-ton boats. In 1862 it was deepened to 7 feet, in order that boats of 240 tons, with a capacity of 8,000 tons of wheat, could pass, the cost of construction being thus increased from $7,000,000 to $50,000,000. Then, in 1882, all tolls were abolished, and the canal has since been maintained out of the State treasury. But how the traffic on the New York canals as a whole (including the Erie, the Oswego, the Champlain, etc.) has declined, in competition with the railroads, is well shown by the following table:--[10] +-------------+---------------------------+-------------------+ | Year. | Total Traffic on New York | Percentage on | | | Canals and Railroads. | Canals only. | +-------------+---------------------------+-------------------+ | | Tons. | Per cent. | | 1860 | 7,155,803 | 65 | | 1870 | 17,488,469 | 35 | | 1880 | 29,943,633 | 21 | | 1890 | 56,327,661 | 9.3 | | 1900 | 84,942,988 | 4.1 | | 1903 | 93,248,299 | 3.9 | +-------------+---------------------------+-------------------+ The falling off in the canal traffic has been greatest in just those heavy or bulky commodities that are generally assumed to be specially adapted for conveyance by water. Of the flour and grain, for instance, received at New York, less than 10 per cent. in 1899, and less than 8 per cent. in 1900, came by the Erie Canal. The experiences of the New York canals have been fully shared by other canals in other States. Of the sum total of 5,000 miles of canals constructed, 2,000 had been abandoned by 1890 on the ground that the traffic was insufficient to cover working expenses. Since then most of the remainder have shared the same fate, one of the last of the survivors, the Delaware and Hudson, being converted into a railway a year or two ago. In fact the only canals in the United States to-day, besides those in the State of New York, whose business is sufficiently regular to warrant the inclusion of their traffic in the monthly reports of the Government are the Chesapeake and Delaware (connecting Chesapeake and Delaware Bays, and having an annual traffic of about 700,000 tons, largely lumber); and the Chesapeake and Ohio (from Cumberland to Georgetown, owned by the State of Maryland, and transporting coal almost exclusively, the amount depending on the state of congestion of traffic on the railroads). It is New York that has been most affected by this decline in American canals. When the railways began to compete severely with the Erie Canal, New York's previous supremacy over rival ports in the Eastern States was seriously threatened. Philadelphia and Baltimore, and various smaller ports also, started to make tremendous advance. Then the Gulf ports--notably New Orleans and Galveston--were able to capture a good deal of ocean traffic that might otherwise have passed through New York. Not only do the railway lines to those ports have the advantage of easy grades, so that exceptionally heavy train-loads can be handled with ease, and not only is there no fear of snow or ice blocks in winter, but the improvements effected in the ports themselves--as I had the opportunity of seeing and judging, in the winter of 1902-3, during a visit to the United States--have made these southern ports still more formidable competitors of New York. While, therefore, the trade of the United States has undergone great expansion of late years, that proportion of it which passes through the port of New York has seriously declined. "In less than ten years," says a pamphlet on "The Canal System of New York State," issued by the Canal Improvement State Committee, City of New York, "Pennsylvania or some other State may be the Empire State, which title New York has held since the time of the Erie Canal." So a movement has been actively promoted in New York State for the resuscitation of the Erie and other canals there, with a view to assuring the continuance of New York's commercial supremacy, and giving her a better chance--if possible--of competing with rivals now flourishing at her expense. At first a ship canal between New York and Lake Erie was proposed; but this idea has been rejected as impracticable. Finally, the Legislature of the State of New York decided on spending $101,000,000 on enlarging the Erie and other canals in the State, so as to give them a depth of 12 feet, and allow of the passage of 1,000-ton barges, arrangements being also made for propulsion by electric or steam traction. In addition to this particular scheme, "there are," says Mr F. H. Dixon, Professor of Economics, Dartmouth College, in an address on "Competition between Water and Railway Transportation Lines in the United States," read by him before the St Louis Railway Club, and reported in the _Engineering News_ (New York) of March 22, 1906, "many other proposals for canals in different sections of the country, extending all the way from projects that have some economic justification to the crazy and impracticable schemes of visionaries." But the general position in regard to canal resuscitation in the United States does not seem to be very hopeful, judging from a statement made by Mr Carnegie--once an advocate of the proposed Pittsburg-Lake Erie Canal--before the Pittsburg Chamber of Commerce in 1898. "Such has been the progress of railway development," he said, "that if we had a canal to-day from Lake Erie through the Ohio Valley to Beaver, free of toll, we could not afford to put boats on it. It is cheaper to-day to transfer the ore to 50-ton cars, and bring it to our works at Pittsburg over our railway, than it would be to bring it by canal." Turning from artificial to natural waterways in the United States, I find the story of the Mississippi no less instructive. [Illustration: A CARGO BOAT ON THE MISSISSIPPI. [_To face page_ 110. ] This magnificent stream has, in itself, a length of 2,485 miles. But the Missouri is really only an upper prolongation of the same river under another name, and the total length of the two, from mouth to source, is 4,190 miles, of which the greater distance is navigable. The Mississippi and its various tributaries drain, altogether, an area of 1,240,000 square miles, or nearly one-third of the territory of the United States. If any great river in the world had a chance at all of holding its own against the railroads as a highway of traffic it should, surely, be the Mississippi, to which British theorists ought to be able to point as a powerful argument in support of their general proposition concerning the advantages of water over rail-transport. But the actual facts all point in the other direction. The earliest conditions of navigation on the Mississippi are well shown in the following extract from an article published in the _Quarterly Review_ of March 1830, under the heading, "Railroads and Locomotive Steam-carriages":-- "As an example of the difficulties of internal navigation, it may be mentioned that on the great river Mississippi, which flows at the rate of 5 or 6 miles an hour, it was the practice of a certain class of boatmen, who brought down the produce of the interior to New Orleans, to break up their boats, sell the timber, and afterwards return home slowly by land; and a voyage up the river from New Orleans to Pittsburg, a distance of about 2,000 miles, could hardly be accomplished, with the most laborious efforts, within a period of four months. But the uncertain and limited influence, both of the wind and the tide, is now superseded by a new agent, which in power far surpassing the raging torrent, is yet perfectly manageable, and acts with equal efficacy in any direction.... Steamboats of every description, and on the most approved models, ply on all the great rivers of the United States; the voyage from New Orleans to Pittsburg, which formerly occupied four months, is accomplished with ease in fifteen or twenty days, and at the rate of not less than 5 miles an hour." Since this article in the _Quarterly Review_ was published, enormous sums of money have been spent on the Mississippi--partly with a view to the prevention of floods, but partly, also, to improve the river for the purposes of navigation. Placed in charge of a Mississippi Commission and of the Chief of Engineers in the United States Army, the river has been systematically surveyed; special studies and reports have been drawn up on every possible aspect of its normal or abnormal conditions and circumstances; the largest river dredges in the world have been employed to ensure an adequate depth of the river bed; engineering works in general on the most complete scale have been carried out--in fact, nothing that science, skill, or money could accomplish has been left undone. The difficulties were certainly considerable. There has always been a tendency for the river bed to get choked up by the sediment the stream failed to carry on; the banks are weak; while the variation in water level is sometimes as much as 10 feet in a single month. None the less, the Mississippi played for a time as important a rôle in the west and the south as the Erie Canal played in the north. Steamboats on the western rivers increased in number from 20, in 1818, to 1,200, in 1848, and there was a like development in flat boat tonnage. With the expansion of the river traffic came a growth of large cities and towns alongside. Louisville increased in population from 4,000, in 1820, to 43,000, in 1850, and St Louis from 4,900 to 77,000 in the same period. With the arrival of the railroads began the decline of the river, though some years were to elapse before the decline was seriously felt. It was the absolute perfection of the railway system that eventually made its competition irresistible. The lines paralleled the river; they had, as I have said, easy grades; they responded to that consideration in regard to speedy delivery of consignments which is as pronounced in the United States as it is in Great Britain; they were as free from stoppages due to variations in water level as they were from stoppages on account of ice or snow; and they could be provided with branch lines as "feeders," going far inland, so that the trader did not have either to build his factory on the river bank or to pay cost of cartage between factory and river. The railway companies, again, were able to provide much more efficient terminal facilities, especially in the erection of large wharves, piers, and depôts which allow of the railway waggons coming right alongside the steamers. At Galveston I saw cargo being discharged from the ocean-going steamers by being placed on trucks which were raised from the vessel by endless moving-platforms to the level of the goods station, where stood, along parallel series of lines, the railway waggons which would take them direct to Chicago, San Francisco, or elsewhere. With facilities such as these no inland waterway can possibly compete. The railways, again, were able, in competition with the river, to reduce their charges to "what the traffic would bear," depending on a higher proportion of profit elsewhere. The steamboats could adopt no such policy as this, and the traders found that, by the time they had paid, not only the charges for actual river transport, but insurance and extra cartage, as well, they had paid as much as transport by rail would have cost, while getting a much slower and more inconvenient service. [Illustration: SUCCESSFUL RIVALS OF MISSISSIPPI CARGO BOATS. (1) Illinois Central Freight Train; 43 cars; 2,100 tons. (2) " " Banana Express, New Orleans to Chicago; 34 cars; 433 tons of bananas. [_To face page 114._ ] The final outcome of all these conditions is indicated by some remarks made by Mr Stuyvesant Fish, President of the Illinois Central Railroad Company (the chief railway competitors of the Mississippi steamboats), in the address he delivered as President of the Seventh Session of the International Railway Congress at Washington, in May 1905:-- "It is within my knowledge that twenty years ago there were annually carried by steamboats from Memphis to New Orleans over 100,000 bales of cotton, and that in almost every year since the railroads between Memphis and New Orleans passed under one management, not a single bale has been carried down the Mississippi River from Memphis by boat, and in no one year have 500 bales been thus carried; the reason being that, including the charges for marine and fire insurance, the rates by water are higher than by rail." To this statement Mr Fish added some figures which may be tabulated as follows:-- TONNAGE OF FREIGHT RECEIVED AT OR DESPATCHED FROM NEW ORLEANS. +----------------------------------------+-------------+-------------+ | | 1890 | 1900 | +----------------------------------------+-------------+-------------+ | By the Mississippi River (all sources) | 2,306,290 | 450,498 | | By rail | 3,557,742 | 6,852,064 | +----------------------------------------+-------------+-------------+ Decline of river traffic in ten years 1,855,792 tons Increase of rail " " " 3,294,322 " These figures bear striking testimony to the results that may be brought about in a country where railways are allowed a fair chance of competing with even the greatest of natural waterways--a chance, as I have said, denied them in Germany and France. Looking, too, at these figures, I understand better the significance of what I saw at Memphis, where a solitary Mississippi steamboat--one of the survivals of those huge floating warehouses now mostly rusting out their existence at New Orleans--was having her cargo discharged on the river banks by a few negroes, while the powerful locomotives of the Illinois Central were rushing along on the adjoining railway with the biggest train-loads it was possible for them to haul. On the general position in the United States I might quote the following from a communication with which I have been favoured by Mr Luis Jackson, an Englishman by birth, who, after an early training on British railways, went to the United States, created there the rôle of "industrial commissioner" in connection with American railways, and now fills that position on the Erie Railroad:-- "When I was in the West the question of water transportation down the Mississippi was frequently remarked upon. The Mississippi is navigable from St Paul to New Orleans. In the early days the towns along the Mississippi, especially those from St Paul to St Louis, depended upon, and had their growth through, the river traffic. It was a common remark among our railroad people that 'we could lick the river.' The traffic down the Mississippi, especially from St Paul to St Louis (I can only speak of the territory with which I am well acquainted) perceptibly declined in competition with the railroads, and the river towns have been revived by, and now depend more for their growth on, the railroads than on the river.... Figures do not prove anything. If the Erie Canal and the Mississippi River traffic had increased, doubled, trebled, or quadrupled in the past years, instead of actually dwindling by tonnage figures, it would prove nothing as against the tremendous tonnage hauled by the trunk line railroads. The Erie Railroad Company, New York to Chicago, last year carried 32,000,000 tons of revenue freights. It would take a pretty good canal to handle that amount of traffic; and the Erie is only one of many lines between New York and Chicago. "A canal, paralleling great railroads, to some extent injures them on through traffic. The tendency of all railroads is in the line of progress. As the tonnage increases the equipment becomes larger, and the general tendency of railroad rates is downwards; in other words, the public in the end gets from the railroad all that can be expected from a canal, and much more. The railroad can expand right and left, and reach industries by side tracks; with canals every manufacturer must locate on the banks of the canal. Canals for internal commerce, in my mind, are out of date; they belong to the 'slow.' Nor do I believe that the traffic management of canals by the State has the same conception of traffic measures which is adopted by the modern managers of railroads. "Canals affect rates on heavy commodities, and play a part mostly injurious, to my mind, to the proper development of railroads, especially on the Continent of Europe. They may do local business, but the railroad is the real handmaid of commerce." By way of concluding this brief sketch of American conditions, I cannot do better than adopt the final sentences in Professor Dixon's paper at the St Louis Railway Club to which I have already referred:-- "Two considerations should, above all others, be kept in mind in determination of the feasibility of any project: first, the very positive limitations to the efficiency of rivers and canals as transportation agencies because of their lack of flexibility and the natural disabilities under which they suffer; and secondly, that water transportation is not necessarily cheap simply because the Government constructs and maintains the channels. Nothing could be more delusive than the assertion so frequently made, which is found in the opening pages of the report of the New York Committee on Canals of 1899, that water transportation is inherently cheaper than rail transportation. Such an assertion is true only of ocean transportation, and possibly also of large bodies of water like the lakes, although this last is doubtful. "By all means let us have our waterways developed when such development is economically justifiable. What is justifiable must be a matter of judgment, and possibly to some extent of experimentation, but the burden of proof rests on its advocates. Such projects should be carried out by the localities interested and the burden should be borne by those who are to derive the benefit. Only in large undertakings of national concern should the General Government be called upon for aid. "But I protest most vigorously against the deluge of schemes poured in upon Congress at every session by reckless advocates who, disregarding altogether the cost of their crazy measures in the increased burden of general taxation, argue for the inherent cheapness of water transportation, and urge the construction at public expense of works whose traffic will never cover the cost of maintenance." CHAPTER IX ENGLISH CONDITIONS I have already spoken in Chapter VII. of some of the chief differences between Continental and English conditions, but I revert to the latter because it is essential that, before approving of any scheme of canal restoration here, the British public should thoroughly understand the nature of the task that would thus be undertaken. The sections of actual canal routes, given opposite page 98, will convey some idea of the difficulties which faced the original builders of our artificial waterways. The wonder is that, since water has not yet been induced to flow up-hill, canals were ever constructed over such surfaces at all. Most probably the majority of them would not have been attempted if railways had come into vogue half a century earlier than they did. Looking at these diagrams, one can imagine how the locomotive--which does not disdain hill-climbing, and can easily be provided with cuttings, bridges, viaducts, and tunnels--could follow the canal; but one can hardly imagine that in England, at least, the canal would have followed the railway. The whole proposition in regard to canal revival would be changed if only the surfaces in Great Britain were the same as they are, say, between Hamburg and Berlin, where in 230 miles of waterway there are only three locks. In this country there is an average of one lock for every 1-1/4 mile of navigation. The sum total of the locks on British canals is 2,377, each representing, on an average, a capitalised cost of £1,360. Instead of a "great central plain," as on the Continent of Europe, we have a "great central ridge," extending the greater length of England. In the 16 miles between Worcester and Tardebigge on the Worcester and Birmingham Canal, there are fifty-eight locks to be passed through by a canal boat going from the Severn to Birmingham. At Tardebigge there is a difference in level of about 250 feet in 3 miles or so. This is overcome by a "flight" of thirty locks, which a 25-ton boat may hope to get through in four hours. Between Huddersfield and Ashton, on the Huddersfield Narrow Canal, there are seventy-four locks in 20 miles; between Manchester and Sowerby Bridge, on the Rochdale Canal, there are ninety-two locks in 32 miles, to enable the boats to pass over an elevation 600 feet above sea level; and at Bingley, on the Leeds and Liverpool Canal, five "staircase" locks give a total lift of 59 feet 2 inches. Between London and Liverpool there are three canal routes, each passing through either ten or eleven separate navigations, and covering distances of from 244 to 267 miles. By one of these routes a boat has to pass through such series of locks as ninety in 100 miles on the Grand Junction Canal, between Paddington and Braunston; forty-three in 17 miles on the Birmingham Canal, between Birmingham and Aldersley; and forty-six in 66 miles on the Shropshire Union Canal, between Autherley and Ellesmere Port. Proceeding by an alternative route, the boat would pass through fifty-nine locks in 67 miles on the Trent and Mersey; while a third route would give two hundred and eighty-two locks in a total of 267 miles. The number of separate navigations is ten by Routes I. and II., and eleven by Route III. Between London and Hull there are two routes, one 282 miles with one hundred and sixty-four locks, and the other 305 miles with one hundred and forty-eight locks. On the journey from London to the Severn, a boat would pass through one hundred and thirty locks in 177 miles in going to the Avonmouth Docks (this total including one hundred and six locks in 86 miles between Reading and Hanham, on the Kennet and Avon Canal); and either one hundred and two locks in 191 miles, or two hundred and thirty in 219 miles, if the destination were Sharpness Docks. Between Liverpool and Hull there are one hundred and four locks in 187 miles by one route; one hundred and forty-nine in 159 miles by a second route; and one hundred and fifty-two in 149 miles by a third. In the case of a canal boat despatched from Birmingham, the position would be--to London, one hundred and fifty-five locks in 147 miles; to Liverpool (1) ninety-nine locks in 114 miles, (2) sixty-nine locks in 94 miles; to Hull, sixty-six locks in 164 miles; to the Severn, Sharpness Docks (1) sixty-one locks in 75 miles, (2) forty-nine locks in 89 miles. Early in 1906 a correspondent of _The Standard_ made an experimental canal journey from the Thames, at Brentford, to Birmingham, to test the qualities of a certain "suction-producer gas motor barge." The barge itself stood the test so well that the correspondent was able to declare:--"In the new power may be found a solution of the problem of canal traction." He arrived at this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that the motor barge was stopped at one of the locks by a drowned cat being caught between the barge and the incoming "butty" boat. The journey from London to Birmingham occupied, "roughly," six and a half days--a journey, that is, which London and North-Western express trains accomplish regularly in two hours. The 22-1/2 miles of the Warwick and Birmingham Canal, which has thirty-four locks, alone took ten hours and a half. From Birmingham the correspondent made other journeys in the same barge, covering, altogether, 370 miles. In that distance he passed through three hundred and twenty-seven locks, various summits "several hundred feet" in height being crossed by this means. At Anderton, on the Trent and Mersey Canal, there is a vertical hydraulic lift which raises or lowers two narrow boats 50 feet to enable them to pass between the canal and the River Mersey, the operation being done by means of troughs 75 feet by 14-1/2 feet. Inclined planes have also been made use of to avoid a multiplicity of locks. It is assumed that in the event of any general scheme of resuscitation being undertaken, the present flights of locks would, in many instances, be done away with, hydraulic lifts being substituted for them. Where this could be done it would certainly effect a saving in time, though the provision of a lift between series of locks would not save water, as this would still be required for the lock below. Hydraulic lifts, however, could not be used in mining districts, such as the Black Country, on account of possible subsidences. Where that drawback did not occur there would still be the question of expense. The cost of construction of the Anderton lift was £50,000, and the cost of maintenance is £500 a year. Would the traffic on a particular route be always equal to the outlay? In regard to inclined planes, it was proposed some eight or ten years ago to construct one on the Birmingham Canal in order to do away with a series of locks at a certain point and save one hour on the through journey. Plans were prepared, and a Bill was deposited in Parliament; but just at that time a Board of Trade enquiry into canal tolls and charges led to such reductions being enforced that there no longer appeared to be any security for a return on the proposed expenditure, and the Bill was withdrawn. In many instances the difference in level has been overcome by the construction of tunnels. There are in England and Wales no fewer than forty-five canal tunnels each upwards of 100 yards in length, and of these twelve are over 2,000 yards in length, namely, Standidge Tunnel, on the Huddersfield Narrow Canal, 5,456 yards; Sapperton, Thames and Severn, 3,808; Lappal, Birmingham Canal navigations, 3,785; Dudley, Birmingham Canal, 3,672; Norwood, Chesterfield Canal, 3,102; Butterley, Cromford, 3,063; Blisworth, Grand Junction, 3,056; Netherton, Birmingham Canal, 3,027; Harecastle (new), Trent and Mersey, 2,926; Harecastle (old), Trent and Mersey, 2,897; West Hill, Worcester and Birmingham, 2,750; and Braunston, Grand Junction, 2,042. The earliest of these tunnels were made so narrow (in the interests of economy) that no space was left for a towing path alongside, and the boats were passed through by the boatmen either pushing a pole or shaft against the roof or sides, and then walking from forward to aft of the boat, or else by the "legging" process in which they lay flat on their backs in the boat, and pushed with their feet against the sides of the tunnel. At one time even women engaged in work of this kind. Later tunnels were provided with towing paths, while in some of them steam tugs have been substituted for shafting and legging. Resort has also been had to aqueducts, and these represent some of the best work that British canal engineers have done. The first in England was the one built at Barton by James Brindley to carry the Bridgewater Canal over the Irwell. It was superseded by a swing aqueduct in 1893, to meet the requirements of the Manchester Ship Canal. But the finest examples are those presented by the aqueducts of Chirk and Pontcysyllte on the Ellesmere Canal in North Wales, now forming part of the Shropshire Union Canal. Each was the work of Telford, and the two have been aptly described as "among the boldest efforts of human invention of modern times." The Chirk aqueduct (710 feet long) carries the canal over the River Ceriog. It was completed in 1801 and cost £20,898. The Pontcysyllte aqueduct, of which a photograph is given as a frontispiece, carries the canal in a cast-iron trough a distance of 1,007 feet across the valley of the River Dee. It was opened for traffic in 1803, and involved an outlay of £47,000. Another canal aqueduct worthy of mention is that which was constructed by Rennie in 1796, at a cost of £48,000, to carry the Lancaster Canal over the River Lune. These facts must surely convince everyone who is in any way open to conviction of the enormous difference between canal construction as carried on in bygone days in Great Britain--involving as it did all these costly, elaborate, and even formidable engineering works--and the building of canals, or the canalisation of rivers, on the flat surfaces of Holland, Belgium, and Northern Germany. Reviewing--even thus inadequately--the work that had been already done, one ceases to wonder that, when the railways began to establish themselves in this country, the canal companies of that day regarded with despair the idea of practically doing the greater part of their work over again, in order to carry on an apparently hopeless struggle with a powerful competitor who had evidently come not only to stay but to win. It is not surprising, after all, that many of them thought it better to exploit the enemy by inducing or forcing him to buy them out! The average reader who may not hitherto have studied the question so completely as I am here seeking to do, will also begin by this time to understand what the resuscitation of the British canal system might involve in the way of expense. The initial purchase--presumably on fair and equitable terms--would in itself cost much more than is supposed even by the average expert. "Assuming," says one authority, Mr Thwaite, "that 3,500 miles of the canal system were purchasable at two-thirds of their original cost of construction, say £2,350 per mile of length, then the capital required would be £8,225,000." This looks very simple. But is the original cost of construction of canals passing through tunnels, over viaducts, and up and down elevations of from 400 to 600 feet, calculated here on the same basis as canals on the flat-lands? Is allowance made for costly pumping apparatus--such as that provided for the Birmingham Canal--for the docks and warehouses recently constructed at Ellesmere Port, and for other capital expenditure for improvements, or are these omitted from the calculation of so much "per mile of length"? Items of this kind might swell even "cost of construction" to larger proportions than those assumed by Mr Thwaite. That gentleman, also, evidently leaves out of account the very substantial sums paid by the present owners or controllers of canals for the mining rights underneath the waterways in districts such as Staffordshire or Lancashire. This last-mentioned point is one of considerable importance, though very few people seem to know that it enters into the canal question at all. When canals were originally constructed it was assumed that the companies were entitled to the land they had bought from the surface to the centre of the earth. But the law decided they could claim little more than a right of way, and that the original landowners might still work the minerals underneath. This was done, with the result that there were serious subsidences of the canals, involving both much loss of water and heavy expenditure in repairs. The stability of railways was also affected, but the position of the canals was much worse on account of the water. To maintain the efficiency of the canals (and of railways in addition) those responsible for them--whether independent companies or railway companies--have had to spend enormous sums of money in the said mining districts on buying up the right to work the minerals underneath. In some instances the landowner has given notice of his intention to work the minerals himself, and, although he may in reality have had no such intention, the canal company or the railway company have been compelled to come to terms with him, to prevent the possibility of the damage that might otherwise be done to the waterway. The very heavy expenditure thus incurred would hardly count as "cost of construction," and it would represent money sunk with no prospect of return. Yet, if the State takes over the canals, it will be absolutely bound to reckon with these mineral rights as well--if it wants to keep the canals intact after improving them--and, in so doing, it must allow for a considerably larger sum for initial outlay than is generally assumed. But the actual purchase of canals _and_ mineral rights would be only the beginning of the trouble. There would come next the question of increasing the capacity of the canals by widening, and what this might involve I have already shown. Then there are the innumerable locks by which the great differences in level are overcome. A large proportion of these would have to be reconstructed (unless lifts or inclined planes were provided instead) to admit either the larger type of boat of which one hears so much, or, alternatively, two or four of the existing narrow boats. Assuming this to be done, then, when a single narrow boat came up to each lock in the course of the journey it was making, either it would have to wait until one or three others arrived, or, alternatively, the water in a large capacity lock would be used for the passage of one small boat. The adoption of the former course would involve delay; and either would necessitate the provision of a much larger water supply, together with, for the highest levels, still more costly pumping machinery. The water problem would, indeed, speedily become one of the most serious in the whole situation--and that, too, not alone in regard to the extremely scanty supplies in the high levels. The whole question has been complicated, since canals were first built, by the growing needs of the community, towns large and small having tapped sources of water supply which otherwise might have been available for the canals. Even as these lines are being written, I see from _The Times_ of March 17, 1906, that, because the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Company are sinking a well on land of their own adjoining the railway near the Carshalton springs of the River Wandle, with a view to getting water for use in their Victoria Station in London, all the public authorities in that part of Surrey, together with the mill-owners and others interested in the River Wandle, are petitioning Parliament in support of a Bill to restrain them, although it is admitted that "the railway company do not appear to be exceeding their legal rights." This does not look as if there were too much water to spare for canal purposes in Great Britain; and yet so level-headed a journal as _The Economist_, in its issue of March 3, 1906, gravely tells us, in an article on "The New Canal Commission," that "the experience of Canada is worth studying." What possible comparison can there be, in regard to canals, between a land of lakes and great rivers and a country where a railway company may not even sink a well on their own property without causing all the local authorities in the neighbourhood to take alarm, and petition Parliament to stop them![11] [Illustration: WATER SUPPLY FOR CANALS. (Belvide Reservoir, Staffordshire, Shropshire Union Canal.) [_To face page 128._ ] On this question of water supply, I may add, Mr John Glass, manager of the Regents Canal, said at the meeting of the Institution of Civil Engineers in November 1905:-- "In his opinion Mr Saner had treated the water question, upon which the whole matter depended, in too airy a manner. Considering, for instance, the route to Birmingham, it would be seen that to reach Birmingham the waterway was carried over one summit of 400 feet, and another of 380 feet, descended 200 feet, and eventually arrived at Birmingham, which was about 350 feet above sea level. The proposed standard lock, with a small allowance for the usual leakage in filling, would consume about 50,000 cubic feet of water, and the two large crafts which Mr Saner proposed to accommodate in the lock[12] would carry together, he calculated, about 500 tons. Supposing it were possible to regulate the supply and demand so as to spread that traffic economically over the year, and to permit of twenty-five pairs of boats passing from Birmingham to the Thames, or in the opposite direction, on 300 days in the year, the empty boats going into the same locks as the laden boats, it would be necessary to provide 1,250,000 cubic feet of water daily, at altitudes of 300 to 400 feet; and in addition it would be necessary to have water-storage for at least 120 days in the year, which would amount to about 150,000,000 cubic feet. When it was remembered that the districts in which the summit-levels referred to were situated were ill-supplied with water, he thought it was quite impossible that anything like that quantity of water could be obtained for the purpose. Canal-managers found that the insufficiency of water in all districts supplied by canals increased every year, and the difficulty of acquiring proper water-storage became enhanced." Not only the ordinary waterway and the locks, but the tunnels and viaducts, also, might require widening. Then the adoption of some system of mechanical haulage is spoken of as indispensable. But a resort to tugs, however propelled, is in no way encouraged by the experiments made on the Shropshire Union, as told on p. 50. An overhead electrical installation, with power houses and electric lighting, so that navigation could go on at night, would be an especially costly undertaking. But the increased speed which it is hoped to gain from mechanical haulage on the level would also necessitate a general strengthening of the canal banks to avoid damage by the wash, and even then the possible speed would be limited by the breadth of the waterway. On this particular point I cannot do better than quote the following from an article on "Canals and Waterways" published in _The Field_ of March 10, 1906:-- "Among the arguments in favour of revival has been that of anticipated rapid steam traffic on such re-opened waterways. Any one who understands the elementary principles of building and propulsion of boats will realise that volume of water of itself fixes limits for speed of vessels in it. Any vessel of certain given proportions has its limit of speed (no matter what horse-power may be employed to move it) according to the relative limit (if any) of the volume of water in which it floats. Our canals are built to allow easy passage of the normal canal barge at an average of 3 to 3-1/2 miles an hour. A barge velocity of even 5 miles, still more of 6 or 7, would tend to wash banks, and so to wreck (to public danger) embankments where canals are carried higher than surrounding land. A canal does not lie in a valley from end to end like a river. It would require greater horse-power to tow one loaded barge 6 miles an hour on normal canal water than to tow a string of three or even four such craft hawsered 50 or more feet apart at the pace of 3-1/2 miles. The reason would be that the channel is not large enough to allow the wave of displacement forward to find its way aft past the advancing vessel, so as to maintain an approximate level of water astern to that ahead, unless either the channel is more than doubled or else the speed limited to something less than 4 miles. It therefore comes to this, that increased speed on our canals, to any tangible extent, does not seem to be attainable, even if all barges shall be screw steamers, unless the entire channel can be reconstructed to far greater depth and also width." What the actual cost of reconstruction would be--as distinct from cost of purchase--I will not myself undertake to estimate; and merely general statements, based on the most favourable sections of the canals, may be altogether misleading. Thus, a writer in the _Daily Chronicle_ of March 21, 1906, who has contributed to that journal a series of articles on the canal question, "from an expert point of view," says:-- "If the Aire and Calder navigation, which is much improved in recent years, be taken as a model, it has been calculated that £1,000,000 per 100 miles would fit the trunk system for traffic such as is dealt with on the Yorkshire navigation." How can the Aire and Calder possibly be taken as a model--from the point of view of calculating cost of improvements or reconstruction? Let the reader turn once more to the diagrams given opposite p. 98. He will see that the Aire and Calder is constructed on land that is almost flat, whereas the Rochdale section on the same trunk route between the Mersey and the Humber reaches an elevation of 600 feet. How can any just comparison be made between these two waterways? If the cost of "improving" a canal of the "model" type of the Aire and Calder be put at the rate of £1,000,000 per 100 miles, what would it come to in the case of the Rochdale Canal, the Tardebigge section of the Worcester and Birmingham Canal, or the series of independent canals between Birmingham and London? That is a practical question which I will leave--to the experts! Supposing, however, that the canals have been purchased, taken possession of, and duly improved (whatever the precise cost) by State, municipalities, or public trust, as the case may be. There will then be the almost exact equivalent of a house without furniture, or a factory without machinery. Before even the restored canals could be adapted to the requirements of trade and commerce there would have to be a very considerable expenditure, also, on warehouses, docks, appliances, and other indispensable adjuncts to mere haulage. After all the money that has been spent on the Manchester Ship Canal it is still found necessary to lay out a great deal more on warehouses which are absolutely essential to the full and complete development of the enterprise. The same principle would apply to any scheme of revived inland navigation. The goods depôts constructed by railway companies in all large towns and industrial centres have alone sufficed to bring about a complete revolution in trade and commerce since the days when canals were prosperous. There are many thousands of traders to-day who not only order comparatively small quantities of supplies at a time from the manufacturer, but leave even these quantities to be stored locally by the railway company, having delivered to them from day to day, or week by week, just as much as they can do with. A certain "free" period is allowed for warehousing, and, if they remove the goods during that period, they pay nothing to the railway company beyond the railway rate. After the free period a small "rent" is charged--a rent which, while representing no adequate return to the railway company for the heavy capital outlay in providing the depôts, is much less than it would cost the trader if he had to build store-rooms for himself, or pay for accommodation elsewhere. Other traders, as mentioned in the chapter on "The Transition in Trade," send goods to the railway warehouses as soon as they are ready, to wait there until an order is completed, and the whole consignment can be despatched; while others again, agents and commission men, carry on a considerable business from a small office, leaving all the handling of the commodities in which they deal to be done by the railway companies. In fact, the situation might be summed up by saying that, under the trading conditions of to-day, railway companies are not only common carriers, but general warehousemen in addition. If inland canals are to take over any part of the transport at present conducted by the railways, they will have to provide the traders with like facilities. So, in addition to buying up and reconstructing the canals; in addition to widenings, and alterations of the gradients of roads and railways passed under; and in addition to the maintenance of towing paths, locks, bridges, tunnels, aqueducts, culverts, weirs, sluices, cranes, wharves, docks, and quay walls, reservoirs, pumping machinery, and so on, there would still be all the subsidiary considerations in regard to warehousing, etc., which would arise when it became a question with the trader whether or not he should avail himself of the improved water transport thus placed at his disposal. For the purposes of reasonable argument I will assume that no really sensible person, knowing anything at all of actual facts and conditions, would attempt to revive the entire canal system of the country.[13] I have shown on p. 19, that even in the year 1825 it was recognised that some of the canals had been built by speculators simply as a means of abstracting money from the pockets of foolish investors, victims of the "canal mania," and that no useful purpose could be served by them even at a time when there were no competing railways. Yet to-day sentimental individuals who, in wandering about the country, come across some of these absolutely useless, though still, perhaps, picturesque survivals, write off to the newspapers to lament over "our neglected waterways," to cast the customary reflections on the railway companies, and to join their voice to the demand for immediate nationalisation or municipalisation, according to their individual leanings, and regardless of all considerations of cost or practicability. Derelicts of the type here referred to are not worth considering at all. It is a pity they were not drained and filled in long ago, and given, as it were, a decent burial, if only out of consideration for the feelings of sentimentalists. Much more deserving of study are those particular systems which either still carry a certain amount of traffic, or are situated on routes along which traffic might be reasonably expected to flow. But, taking even canals of this type, the reader must see from the considerations I have already presented that resuscitation would be a very costly business indeed. Estimates of which I have read in print range from £20,000,000 to £50,000,000; but even these omit various important items (mining rights, etc.), which would certainly have to be added, while the probability is that, however high the original estimate in regard to work of this kind, a good deal more would have to be expended before it was finished. The remarks I have here made are based on the supposition that all that is aimed at is such an improvement as would allow of the use of a larger type of canal boat than that now in vogue. But, obviously, the expenditure would be still heavier if there were any idea of adapting the canals to the use of barges similar in size to those employed on the waterways of Germany, or craft which, starting from an inland manufacturing town in the Midlands, could go on a coasting trip, or make a journey across to the Continent. Here the capital expenditure would be so great that the cost would be absolutely prohibitive. Whatever the precise number of millions the resuscitation scheme might cost, the inevitable question would present itself--How is the money to be raised? The answer thereto would be very simple if the entire expense were borne by the country--that is to say, thrown upon the taxpayers or ratepayers. The problem would then be solved at once. The great drawback to this solution is that most of the said taxpayers or ratepayers would probably object. Besides, there is the matter of detail I mentioned in the first Chapter: if the State or the municipalities buy up the canals on fair terms, including the canals owned or controlled by the railways, and, in operating them in competition with the railways, make heavy losses which must eventually fall on the taxpayers or ratepayers, then it would be only fair that the railway companies should be excused from such direct increase in taxation as might result from the said losses. In that case the burden would fall still more heavily on the general body of the tax or ratepayers, independently of the railway companies. It would fall, too, with especial severity on those traders who were themselves unable to make use of the canals, but might have to pay increased local rates in order that possible competitors located within convenient reach of the improved waterways could have cheaper transport. It might also happen that when the former class of traders, bound to keep to the railways, applied to the railway companies for some concession to themselves, the reply given would be--"What you suggest is fair and reasonable, and under ordinary circumstances we should be prepared to meet your wishes; but the falling off in our receipts, owing to the competition of State-aided canals, makes it impossible for us to grant any further reductions." An additional disadvantage would thus have to be met by the trader who kept to the railway, while his rival, using the canals, would practically enjoy the benefit of a State subsidy. The alternative to letting the country bear the burden would be to leave the resuscitated canal system to pay for itself. But is there any reasonable probability that it could? The essence of the present day movement is that the traders who would be enabled to use the canals under the improved conditions should have cheaper transport; but if the twenty, fifty, or any other number of millions sterling spent on the purchase and improvement of the canals, and on the provision of indispensable accessories thereto, are to be covered out of the tolls and charges imposed on those using the canals, there is every probability that (if the canals are to pay for themselves) the tolls and charges would have to be raised to such a figure that any existing difference between them and the present railway rates would disappear altogether. That difference is already very often slight enough, and it may be even less than appears to be the case, because the railway rate might include various services, apart from mere haulage--collection, delivery, warehousing, use of coal depôt, etc.--which are not covered by the canal tolls and charges, and the cost of which would have to be added thereto. A very small addition, therefore, to the canal tolls, in order to meet interest on heavy capital expenditure on purchase and reconstruction, would bring waterways and railways so far on a level in regard to rates that the railways, with the superior advantages they offer in many ways, would, inevitably, still get the preference. The revival movement, however, is based on the supposition that no increase in the canal tolls now charged would be necessary.[14] Canal transport, it is said, is already much higher in this country than it is on the Continent--and that may well be so, considering (1) that canals such as ours, with their numerous locks, etc., cost more to construct, operate and maintain than canals on the flat lands of Continental Europe; (2) that British canals are still supposed to maintain themselves; and (3) that canal traffic as well as railway traffic is assessed in the most merciless way for the purposes of local taxation. In the circumstances it is assumed that the canal traffic in England could not pay higher tolls and charges than those already imposed, and that the interest on the aforesaid millions, spent on purchase and improvements, would all be met out of the expanded traffic which the restored canals would attract. Again I may ask--Is there any reasonable probability of this? Bearing in mind the complete transition in trade of which I have already spoken--a transition which, on the one hand, has enormously increased the number of individual traders, and, on the other, has brought about a steady and continuous decrease in the weight of individual consignments--is there the slightest probability that the conditions of trade are going to be changed, and that merchants, manufacturers, and other traders will forego the express delivery of convenient quantities by rail, in order to effect a problematical saving (and especially problematical where extra cartage has to be done) on the tedious delivery of wholesale quantities by canal? Nothing short of a very large increase indeed in the water-borne traffic would enable the canals to meet the heavy expenditure foreshadowed, and, even if such increase were secured, the greater part of it would not be new traffic, but simply traffic diverted from the railways. More probably, however, the very large increase would not be secured, and no great diversion from the railways would take place. The paramount and ever-increasing importance attached by the vast majority of British traders to quick delivery (an importance so great that on some lines there are express goods trains capable of running from 40 to 60 miles an hour) will keep them to the greater efficiency of the railway as a carrier of goods; while, if a serious diversion of traffic were really threatened, the British railways would not be handicapped as those of France and Germany are in any resort to rates and charges which would allow of a fair competition with the waterways. In practice, therefore, the theory that the canals would become self-supporting, as soon as the aforesaid millions had been spent, must inevitably break down, with the result that the burden of the whole enterprise would then necessarily fall upon the community; and why the trader who consigns his goods by rail, or the professional man who has no goods to consign at all, should be taxed to allow of cheaper transport being conferred on the minority of persons or firms likely to use the canals even when resuscitated, is more than I can imagine, or than they, probably, will be able to realise. The whole position was very well described in some remarks made by Mr Harold Cox, M.P., in the course of a discussion at the Society of Arts in February 1906, on a paper read by Mr R. B. Buckley, on "The Navigable Waterways of India." "There was," he said, "a sort of feeling current at the present time in favour of spending large amounts of the taxpayer's money in order to provide waterways which the public did not want, or at any rate which the public did not want sufficiently to pay for them, which after all was the test. He noticed that everybody who advocated the construction of canals always wanted them constructed with the taxpayer's money, and always wanted them to be worked without a toll. Why should not the same principle be applied to railways also? A railway was even more useful to the public than a canal; therefore, construct it with the taxpayer's money, and allow everybody to use it free. It was always possible to get plenty of money subscribed with which to build a railway, but nobody would subscribe a penny towards the building of canals. An appeal was always made to the government. People had pointed to France and Germany, which spent large sums of money on their canals. In France that was done because the French Parliamentary system was such that it was to the interest of the electorate and the elected to spend the public money on local improvements or non-improvements.... He had been asked, Why make any roads? The difference between roads and canals was that on a canal a toll could be levied on the people who used it, but on a road that was absolutely impossible. Tolls on roads were found so inconvenient that they had to be given up. There was no practical inconvenience in collecting tolls on canals; and, therefore, the principle that was applied to everything else should apply to canals--namely, that those who wanted them should pay for them." CHAPTER X CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Taking into consideration all the facts and arguments here presented, I may summarise as follows the conclusions at which I have arrived:-- (1) That, alike from a geographical, physical, and economic point of view, there is no basis for fair comparison between British and Continental conditions; consequently our own position must be judged on its own merits or demerits. (2) That, owing to the great changes in British trade, manufacture, and commerce, giving rise to widespread and still increasing demands for speedy delivery of comparatively small consignments for a great number of traders of every possible type, canal transport in Great Britain is no longer suited to the general circumstances of the day. (3) That although a comparatively small number of traders, located in the immediate neighbourhood of the canals, might benefit from a canal-resuscitation scheme, the carrying out of such scheme at the risk, if not at the cost, of the taxpayers, would virtually amount to subsidising one section of the community to the pecuniary disadvantage of other sections. (4) That the nationalisation or the municipalisation of British canals would introduce a new principle inconsistent with the "private enterprise" hitherto recognised in the case of railways, in which such large sums have been sunk by investors, but with which State-aided canals would compete. (5) That, in view both of the physical conditions of our land (necessitating an extensive resort to locks, etc., to overcome great differences in level) and of the fact that many of the most important of the canals are now hemmed in by works, houses, or buildings, any general scheme of purchase and improvement, in regard even to main routes (apart from hopeless derelicts), would be extremely costly, and, in most instances, entirely outside the scope of practicability. (6) That such a scheme, involving an expenditure of many millions, could not fail to affect our national finances. (7) That there is no ground for expecting so large an outlay could be recouped by increased receipts from the canals, and that the cost would thus inevitably fall upon the community. (8) That the allegation as to the chief canals of the country, or sections thereof, having been "captured" and "strangled" by the railway companies, in the interests of their own traffic, is entirely unsupported by evidence, the facts being, rather, that in most cases the canals were more or less forced upon the railway companies, who have spent money liberally on such of them as offered reasonable prospect of traffic, and, in that way, have kept alive and in active working condition canals that would inevitably have been added to the number of derelicts had they remained in the hands of canal companies possessed of inadequate capital for the purposes of their efficient maintenance. (9) That certain of these canals (as, for example, the Birmingham and the Shropshire Union Canals) are still offering to traders all reasonable facilities within the limitations of their surroundings and physical possibilities; and that if such canals were required to bear the expense of extremely costly widenings, of lock reconstruction, of increased water supply, and of general improvements, the tolls and charges would have to be raised to such a point that the use of the canals would become prohibitive even to those local traders who now fully appreciate the convenience they still afford. (10) That, in effect, whatever may be done in the case of navigable rivers, any scheme which aimed at a general resuscitation of canals in this country, at the risk, if not at the expense, of the community, is altogether impracticable; and that, inasmuch as the only desire of the traders, in this connection, is to secure cheaper transport, it is desirable to see whether the same results could not be more effectively, more generally, and more economically obtained in other directions. Following up this last conclusion, I beg to recommend:-- (_a_) The desirability of increasing the usefulness of the railway system, which can go anywhere, serve everybody, and carry and deliver consignments, great and small, with that promptness and despatch which are all-important to the welfare of the vast majority of industries and enterprises, as conducted under the trading conditions of to-day. This usefulness, some of the traders allege, is marred by rates and charges which they consider unduly heavy, especially in the case of certain commodities calling for exceptionally low freight, and canal transport is now asked for by them, as against rail transport, just as the traders of 1825 wanted the railways as a relief from the waterways. The rates and charges, say the railway companies, are not unreasonable in themselves, considering all the circumstances of the case and the nature of the various services represented, while the actual amount thereof is due, to a certain extent, not so much to any seeking on the part of the companies to pay dividends of abnormal proportions, akin to those of the canal companies of old (the average railway dividend to-day, on over one thousand millions of actual capital, being only about 3-1/2 per cent.), but to a combination of causes which have increased unduly capital outlay and working expenses, only to be met out of the rates, fares, and charges that are imposed on traders and travellers. Among these causes may be mentioned the heavy price the companies have had to pay for their land; the cost of Parliamentary proceedings; various requirements imposed by Parliament or by Government departments; and the heavy burden of the contribution that railway companies make to local rates. (See p. 10.) These various conditions must necessarily influence the rates and charges to be paid by traders. Some of them--such as cost of land--belong to the past; others--like the payments for local taxation--still continue, and tend to increase rather than decrease. In any case, the power of the railway companies to concede to the traders cheaper transport is obviously handicapped. But if, to obtain such cheaper transport, the country is prepared to risk (at least) from £20,000,000 to £50,000,000 on a scheme of canal reconstruction which, as I have shown, is of doubtful utility and practicability, would it not be much more sensible, and much more economical, if the weight of the obligations now cast upon railways were reduced, thus enabling the companies to make concessions in the interests of traders in general, and especially in the interests of those consigning goods to ports for shipment abroad, for whose benefit the canal revival is more particularly sought? (_b_) My second recommendation is addressed to the general trader. His policy of ordering frequent small consignments to meet immediate requirements, and of having, in very many instances, practically no warehouse or store-rooms except the railway goods depôts, is one that suits him admirably. It enables him either to spend less capital or else to distribute his capital over a larger area. He is also spared expense in regard to the provision of warehouse accommodation of his own. But to the railway companies the general adoption of this policy has meant greater difficulty in the making up of "paying loads." To suit the exigencies of present-day trade, they have reduced their _minima_ to as low, for some commodities, as 2-ton lots, and it is assumed by many of the traders that all they need do is to work up to such _minima_. But a 2-ton lot for even an 8-ton waggon is hardly a paying load. Still less is a 10-cwt. consignment a paying load for a similarly sized waggon. Where, however, no other consignments for the same point are available, the waggon goes through all the same. In Continental countries consignments would be kept back, if necessary, for a certain number of days, in order that the "paying load" might be made up. But in Great Britain the average trader relies absolutely on prompt delivery, however small the consignment, or whatever the amount of "working expenses" incurred by the railway in handling it. If, however, the trader would show a little more consideration for the railway companies--whom he expects to display so much consideration for him--he might often arrange to send or to receive his consignments in such quantities (at less frequent intervals, perhaps) as would offer better loading for the railway waggons, with a consequent decrease of working expenses, and a corresponding increase in the ability of the railway company to make better terms with him in other directions. Much has been done of late years by the railway companies to effect various economies in operation, and excellent results have been secured, especially through the organisation of transhipping centres for goods traffic, and through reductions in train mileage; but still more could be done, in the way of keeping down working expenses and improving the position of the companies in regard to concessions to traders, if the traders themselves would co-operate more with the railways to avoid the disadvantages of unremunerative "light-loading." (_c_) My third and last recommendation is to the agriculturists. I have seen repeated assertions to the effect that improved canals would be of great advantage to the British farmer; and in this connection it may interest the reader if I reproduce the following extract from the pamphlet, issued in 1824, by Mr T. G. Cumming, under the title of "Illustrations of the Origin and Progress of Rail and Tram Roads and Steam Carriages," as already mentioned on p. 21:-- "To the farming interests the advantages of a rail-way will soon become strikingly manifest; for, even where the facilities of a canal can be embraced, it presents but a slow yet expensive mode of conveyance; a whole day will be consumed in accomplishing a distance of 20 miles, whilst by the rail-way conveyance, goods will be carried the same distance in three or four hours, and perhaps to no class of the community is this increased speed of more consideration and value than to the farmer, who has occasion to bring his fruit, garden stuff, and poultry to market, and still more so to such as are in the habit of supplying those great and populous towns with milk and butter, whilst with all these additional advantages afforded by a rail-way, the expense of conveyance will be found considerably cheaper than by canal. "Notwithstanding the vast importance to the farmer of having the produce of his farm conveyed in a cheap and expeditious manner to market, it is almost equally essential to him to have a cheap conveyance for manure from a large town to a distant farm; and here the advantages to be derived from a rail-way are abundantly apparent, for by a single loco-motive engine, 50 tons of manure may be conveyed, at a comparatively trifling expense, to any farm within the line of the road. In the article of lime, also, which is one of the first importance to the farmer, there can be no question but the facilities afforded by a rail-way will be the means of diminishing the expense in a very material degree." If railways were desirable in 1824 in the interests of agriculture, they must be still more so in 1906, and the reversion now to the canal transport of former days would be a curious commentary on the views entertained at the earlier date. As regards perishables, consigned for sale on markets, growers obviously now want the quickest transport they can secure, and special fruit and vegetable trains are run daily in the summer season for their accommodation. The trader in the North who ordered some strawberries from Kent, and got word that they were being sent on by canal, would probably use language not fit for even a fruit and vegetable market to hear. As for non-perishable commodities, consigned to or by agriculturists, the railway is a much better distributer than the canal, and, unless a particular farm were alongside a canal, the extra cost of cartage therefrom might more than outweigh any saving in freight. If greater facilities than the ordinary railway are needed by agriculturists, they will be met far better by light railways, or by railway road-motors of the kind adopted first by the North-Eastern Railway Company at Brandsby, than by any possible extension of canals. These road-motors, operated between lines of railway and recognised depôts at centres some distance therefrom, are calculated to confer on agriculturists a degree of practical advantage, in the matter of cheaper transport, limited only by the present unfortunate inability of many country roads to bear so heavy a traffic, and the equally unfortunate inability of the local residents to bear the expense of adapting the roads thereto. If, instead of spending a large sum of money on reconstructing canals, the Government devoted some of it to grants to County Councils for the reconstruction of rural highways, they would do far more good for agriculture, at least. As for cheaper rail transport for agricultural commodities in general, I have said so much elsewhere as to how these results can be obtained by means of combination that I need not enlarge on that branch of the subject now, further than to commend it to the attention of the British farmer, to whom combination in its various phases will afford a much more substantial advantage than any possible resort to inland navigation. These are the alternatives I offer to proposals which I feel bound to regard as more or less quixotic, and I leave the reader to decide whether, in view of the actualities of the situation, as set forth in the present volume, they are not much more practical than the schemes of canal reconstruction for which public favour is now being sought. APPENDIX THE DECLINE IN FREIGHT TRAFFIC ON THE MISSISSIPPI Whilst this book is passing through the Press, I have received from Mr Stuyvesant Fish, President of the Illinois Central Railroad Company--whom I asked to favour me with some additional details respecting the decline in freight traffic on the Mississippi River--the following interesting notes, drawn up by Mr T. J. Hudson, General Traffic Manager of the Illinois Central:-- The traffic on the Mississippi River was established and built up under totally different conditions from those now obtaining, and when the only other means of travel and transportation was on horseback and by waggon, methods not suitable in view of the great distances and the general impassibility of the country. In those days the principal source of supply was St Louis--and points reached through St Louis--for grain, grain products, etc., excepting that vehicles, machinery, and iron were brought down the Ohio River from Pittsburg and Cincinnati by boat to Cairo, and trans-shipped there, or to Memphis, and trans-shipped or re-distributed from that place. The distributing points on the Lower Mississippi River were Memphis, Vicksburg, Natchez, Bayou Sara, Baton Rouge and New Orleans. Goods were shipped to these points and re-shipped from there over small railroads to short distances, and also hauled by waggon and re-shipped on boats plying in local trade on the Mississippi River and tributary streams. For example, there were Boat Lines making small landing points above and below Memphis, and above and below Vicksburg; also Boat Lines plying the Yazoo and Tallahatchie Rivers on the east, and the White, Arkansas and Red Rivers on the west, etc. All the goods shipped by steamboat were hauled by waggon or dray to the steamboat landing, and, when discharged by the boats at destination, were again hauled by waggon from the landing to the stores and warehouses, even in those cases in which re-shipment was made from points like Memphis, Vicksburg, etc. When re-shipped by river, the goods were again hauled to the steamboat landing, and, when reaching the local landing or point of final consumption, after being discharged on the bank, were again hauled by waggon or dray, perhaps for considerable distances into the interior. While the cost of water transportation is primarily low, the frequent handling and re-handling made this mode of transportation more or less expensive, and in some instances quite costly. River transportation again is slow, taking longer time in transit. The frequent handlings, further, were damaging and destructive to the packages in the case of many kinds of goods. Transportation on the rivers was also at times interrupted or delayed from one cause or another, such as high water or low water, and the service was, in consequence, more or less irregular, thus requiring dealers to carry large stocks on which the insurance and interest was a considerable item of expense. With the development of the railroads through the country, not only was competition brought into play to the distributing points along the river, such as Memphis, Vicksburg, etc., from St Louis, Cincinnati, and Pittsburg, but also from other initial sources of supply which were not located on rivers, but were enabled by reason of the establishment of rail transportation to consign direct; whereas under the old conditions it was necessary for them to consign to some river point and trans-ship. What was still more important and effective in accomplishing the results since brought about was the material benefit conferred by the railroads on most of the communities situated back from the river. These communities had previously been obliged to send their consignments perhaps many miles by road to some point on the river, whence the commodities were carried to some other point, there to be taken by waggon or dray to the place of consumption--another journey of many miles, perhaps, by road. Progress was slow, and in some instances almost impossible, while only small boats could be hauled. Then the construction of railroads led to the development of important distributing points in the interior, such as Jackson, (Tennessee), and Jackson, (Mississippi), not to mention many others. Goods loaded into railroad cars on tracks alongside the mills, factories and warehouses could be unloaded at destination into warehouses and stores which also had their tracks alongside. By this means drayage was eliminated, and the packages could be delivered in clean condition. Neither of these conditions was possible where steamboat transportation was employed. Interior points are now enabled to buy direct, either in large or small quantities, from initial sources of supply, and without the delay and expense incident to shipment to river-distributing points, and trans-shipment by rail or steamboat or hauling by waggon. Rail transportation is also more frequent, regular, rapid and reliable; not to mention again the convenience which is referred to above. The transportation by river of package-freight, such as flour, meal, meat, canned goods, dry goods, and other commodities, has been almost entirely superseded by rail transportation, except in regard to short-haul local landings, where the river is more convenient, and the railroad may not be available. There is some south-bound shipment of wire, nails, and other iron goods from the Pittsburg district to distributing points like Memphis and New Orleans, but in these cases the consignments are exclusively in barge-load lots. The only other commodity to which these conditions apply is coal. This is taken direct from the mines in the Pittsburg district, and dropped into barges on the Monongahela River; and these are floated down the river, during periods of high water, in fleets of from fifty to several hundred barges at a time. There is no movement of grain in barges from St Louis to New Orleans, as was the case a great many years ago. The grain for export _viâ_ New Orleans is now largely moved direct in cars from the country elevators to the elevators at New Orleans, from which latter the grain is loaded direct into ships. There is, also, some movement north-bound in barges of lumber and logs from mills and forests not accessible to railroads, but very little movement of these or other commodities from points that are served by railroad rails. Lumber to be shipped on the river must be moved in barge-load quantities, and taken to places like St Louis, where it has to be hauled from the barge to lumber yards, and then loaded on railroad cars, if it is going to the interior, where a considerable proportion of the quantity handled will be wanted. Mills reached by railroad tracks can, and do, load in car-load quantities, and ship to the final point of use, without the delay incident to river transportation, and the expense involved by transfer or re-shipment. It is not to be inferred from the foregoing that all the distributing points along the river have dried up since the development of rail transportation. In fact, the contrary is the case, because the railroads have opened up larger territories to these distributing points, and in regard to many kinds of goods these river points have become, in a way, initial sources of supply as well as of manufacture. Memphis, for example, has grain brought to its elevators direct from the farms, the same as St Louis, and can and does ship on short notice to the many towns and communities in the territory surrounding. There are, also, flour and meal mills, iron foundries, waggon and furniture factories, etc., at Memphis, and at other places. Many of the points, however, which were once simply landings for interior towns and communities have now become comparatively insignificant. To sum up in a few words, I should say that the railroads have overcome the steamboat competition on the Mississippi River, not only by affording fair and reasonable rates, but also because rail transportation is more frequent, rapid, reliable, and convenient, and is, on the whole, much cheaper. FOOTNOTES: [1] That canals also played their part in the transport of passengers a hundred years ago is shown by the following items of news, which I take from _The Times_ of 1806:-- Friday, _December_ 19, 1806. "The first division of the troops that are to proceed by the Paddington Canal for Liverpool, and thence by transports for Dublin, will leave Paddington to-day, and will be followed by others to-morrow and Sunday. By this mode of conveyance the men will be only seven days in reaching Liverpool, and with comparatively little fatigue, as it would take them above fourteen days to march that distance. Relays of fresh horses for the canal boats have been ordered to be in readiness at all the stages." Monday, _December_ 22, 1806. "Saturday the 8th Regiment embarked at the Paddington Canal for Liverpool, in a number of barges, each containing 60 men. This regiment consists of 950 men. The 7th Regiment embarked at the same time in eighteen barges: they are all to proceed to Liverpool. The Dukes of York and Sussex witnessed the embarkation. The remainder of the brigade was to follow yesterday, and Friday next another and very considerable embarkation will follow." [2] Illustrations of the Origin and Progress of Rail and Tram Roads, and Steam Carriages, or Locomotive Engines. By T. G. Cumming, Surveyor, Denbigh, 1824. [3] A Letter on the subject of the projected Rail-road between Liverpool and Manchester, pointing out the necessity for its adoption, and the manifest advantages it offers to the public; with an exposure of the exorbitant and unjust charges of the Water-Carriers. By Joseph Sandars, Esq., Liverpool, 1825. [4] Mersey and Irwell Navigation. [5] Another of the speakers, Mr Gordon C. Thomas, engineer to the Grand Junction Canal Company, said that "notwithstanding the generous expenditure on maintenance, and the large sums recently spent upon improvements, the through traffic on the Grand Junction was only one-half of what it was fifty years ago, and now the through traffic was in many cases unable to pay as high a rate as the local traffic." [6] In the evidence he gave before the Royal Commission on Canals and Waterways on 21st March 1906, Sir Herbert Jekyll, Assistant Secretary to the Board of Trade, said (as reported in _The Times_ of 22nd March):--"One remarkable feature was noticeable--that, although the tonnage carried rather increased than diminished between 1838 and 1848, the receipts fell off enormously, pointing to the conclusion that the railway competition had brought about a large reduction in canal companies charges. It was also noteworthy that on many canals the decrease in receipts had continued out of all proportion to the decrease, if any, in the tonnage carried." [7] In Mr Saner's paper the Birmingham Canal navigations are classed among the "Independently-Owned Canals," and Mr Saner says:--"There are 1,138 miles owned by railway companies, which convey only 6,009,820 tons per annum, and produce a net profit of only £40 per mile of navigation. This," he adds, "appears to afford clear proof that the railways do not attempt to make the most of the canals under their control." But when the Birmingham Canal, with its 8,000,000 tons of traffic a year, is transferred (as it ought to be) from the independently-owned to the railway-controlled canals, entirely different figures are shown. [8] The fact that coal tipped into a canal boat would have a longer drop than coal falling from the colliery screen into railway waggons is important because of the greater damage done to the coal, and the consequent decrease in value. [9] Fuller information respecting traffic conditions in Continental countries will be found in my book on "Railways and Their Rates." [10] The figures for the years 1860 to 1890 are taken from the "Report of the Committee on Canals of New York State," 1900, General Francis V. Greene, chairman; and those for 1900 and 1903 from the "Annual Report of Superintendent of Public Works, New York State," 1903. [11] "The St Lawrence River and the Great Lakes whose waters flow through it into the Atlantic form a continuous waterway extending from the Fond du Lac, at the head of Lake Superior, to the Straits of Belle Isle, a distance of 2,384 miles.... Emptying into the St Lawrence ... are the Ottawa and Richlieu Rivers, the former bringing it into communication with the immense timber forests of Ontario, and the latter connecting it with Lake Champion in the United States. These rivers were the thoroughfares in peace and the base lines in war for the Indian tribes long before the white man appeared in the Western Hemisphere.... The early colonists found them the convenient and almost the only channels of intercourse among themselves and with the home country.... The St Lawrence was navigable for sea-going vessels as far as Montreal, but between Montreal and the foot of Lake Ontario there was a succession of rapids separated by navigable reaches.... The head of navigation on the Ottawa River is the city of Ottawa.... Between this city and the mouth of the river there are several impassable rapids. The Richlieu was also so much obstructed at various points as to be unavailable for navigation.... The canal system of Canada ... has been established to overcome these obstructions by artificial channels at various points to render freely navigable the national routes of transportation."--_"Highways of Commerce," issued by the Bureau of Statistics, Department of State, Washington._ [12] The use of a larger type of canal boat is generally regarded as an essential part of the resuscitation scheme. But of the narrow boats now in active service in the canals of the United Kingdom there are from 10,000 to 11,000. What is to be done with these? If they are scrap-heaped, and fresh boats substituted, we increase still further the sum total of the outlay the scheme will involve. [13] At the Society of Arts' Conference on Canals, in 1888, Mr L. F. Vernon-Harcourt said:--"The statistics show that great caution must be exercised in the selection of canal routes for improvement, if they are to prove a commercial success, and that the scope for such schemes is strictly limited. Any attempt at a general revival and improvement of the canal system throughout England cannot prove financially successful, as local canals, through thinly populated agricultural districts, could not compete with railways. These routes alone should be selected for enlargement of waterway which lead direct from the sea to large and increasing towns like the proposed canal from the Bristol Channel to Birmingham, or which, like the Aire and Calder Navigation and the Leeds and Liverpool Canal, are suitably set for the conveyance of coal and general bulky goods to populous districts. One or two through routes to London from manufacturing centres, or from coal-mining districts, might have a prospect of success, provided the existing canals along the route could be acquired at a small cost, and the necessary improvement works were not heavy." [14] There are even those who argue that the resuscitated canals should be toll free. INDEX Agriculture and canals, 16, 147-150 Aire and Calder Navigation, 86, 132, 135 Allport, Sir James, 37, 81 Aqueducts, 124 Association of Chambers of Commerce, 4, 5 Barnsley Canal, 26 Belgium, waterways in, 93-96, 97 Birmingham Canal, 26, 37, 57-73, 120, 125 Boats, size of, 32, 69, 130 Brecknock and Abergavenny Canal, 26 Brecon Canal, 45 Bridgewater Canal, 13-15, 21, 23-24, 124 Bridgewater, Duke of, 13-15, 23 Bridgwater and Taunton Canal, 45 Brindley, James, 14-15, 16, 124 Brunner, Sir John T., 4 Buckley, Mr R. B., 141 Caledonian Railway Company, 50-54 Canada, waterways in, 128-129 Canals, earliest, in England, 13-22; canal mania, 16; passenger traffic, 18-19; shares and dividends, 21, 26, 27; tolls and charges, 23-25, 27-30; handicapped, 33; attitude towards railways, 34-38; Kennet and Avon, 38-45; Shropshire Union, 47-50; Forth and Clyde, 50-54; "strangulation" theory, 54-55; Birmingham Canal, 57-73; coal traffic, 84-89; canals and waterways on the Continent, 93-103; in the United States, 104-118; in England, 119-141; in Canada, 128-129; conclusions and recommendations, 142-150 Capitalists, attitude of, 3 Carnegie, Mr, 110 Chesapeake and Delaware Canal, 109 Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, 109 Chesterfield Canal, 46, 123 Child, Messrs, 15 Coal, 13, 21, 29-30, 40, 51-53, 81-89 Consignments, sizes of, 78 Continental conditions, 11, 93-103, 139, 140, 141 Cost of reconstruction, 132-136 Cotton, raw, 89-91 Coventry Canal, 26 Cox, M.P., Mr Harold, 140 Cromford Canal, 123 Cumming, Mr T. G., 21, 147-148 Dixon, Professor F. H., 110, 117 Dredging, 43 Electrical installations, 130 Ellesmere Canal, 26, 47, 124 Engineers and canal question, 2 Erie Canal, the, 105-111, 116 Fish, Mr Stuyvesant, 114-115 Forth and Clyde Navigation, 50-54 France, waterways in, 100, 102 Frost on canals, 24, 30, 77 _Gentleman's Magazine_, 26 Geographical conditions, 11, 94-96, 98-100 Germany, waterways in, 94, 97, 100-102 Glass, Mr John, 129 Government guarantee, 4 Grand Junction Canal, 26, 39, 120, 123 Grand Western Canal, 45 Great Northern Railway, 31, 83 Great Western Railway Company, 38-45, 67, 68, 70 Grinling, Mr C. H., 30 Hertslet, Sir E. Cecil, 94 Holland, waterways in, 77, 94, 96 Huddersfield Narrow Canal, 120, 123 Hudson, George, 30 Inglis, Mr J. C., 38-39, 45 Jackson, Mr Luis, 115-117 Jebb, Mr G. R., 71 Jekyll, Sir Herbert, 62 Kennet and Avon Canal, 26, 38-45, 121 Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, 46 Lancaster Canal, 26, 124 Languedoc Canal, 14 Leeds and Liverpool Canal, 120, 135 Leicester and Swinnington Railway, 29 Lift at Anderton, 122-123 Liverpool and Manchester Railway, 21, 23-26, 28 Liverpool merchants, petition from, 25-26 Local taxation, 9-10, 139, 145-146 Locks, 32, 33, 43, 50, 66, 120-121, 127 London and North-Western Railway Company, 37, 46, 48-49, 59-71 London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Company, 128 London County Council, 5 Loughborough Canal, 26, 27, 29 Macclesfield Canal, 46 Manchester and Bury Canal, 46 Manchester Ship Canal, 133 McAdam, J. L., 12-13 Mechanical haulage, 49-50, 121-122, 130-131 Meiklejohn, Professor, 97 Mersey and Irwell Navigation, 13, 15, 21, 24 Mersey Harbour Board, 5 Midland Railway, 30, 37, 67, 83 Mining operations and canals, 46, 65-66, 126-127 Mississippi, the, 111-117 Monmouthshire Canal, 26, 45 Morrison, Mr, 27-28 Manchester, Sheffield and Lincoln Railway Company (Great Central), 46 Municipalisation schemes, 4-8, 135 Nationalisation of canals, 4, 10, 135 Neath Canal, 26 North British Railway, 53 North-Eastern Railway, 149 Old Union Canal, 26 Oxford Canal, 26 Packhorse period, the, 12, 16, 18 Paddington Canal, 18-19 Physical conditions, 11, 96-99, 119 Political conditions, 100-102 Principle, questions of, 9-11 Private enterprise, 9, 106, 142 Profits on canals, 15, 16, 21, 26, 27 Public trusts, 4-6 Pumping machinery, 42-43, 63 _Quarterly Review_, 17-22, 111 Railways, position of companies as ratepayers, 7-8; cost of railway construction and operation, 9-10; effect on railway rates, 10; advent of, 17-22; Liverpool and Manchester Railway, 21, 25, 28; Leicester and Swinnington Railway, 29; Midland Railway, 30; Great Northern Railway, 31; attitude of canal companies towards, 35-38; control of canals, 38-56, 57-73; railways in Germany, 100-102; in France, 102; recommendations, 145-146 Ratepayers, liability of, 7-8, 137 Rates, regulation of, on railways and canals, 27-28 Regents Canal, 129 Rennie, 124 Road-motors, 149 Rochdale Canal, 26, 120, 132 Ross, Mr A., 45-47 Royal Commission on Canals and Waterways, 62 Sandars, Mr Joseph, 21, 23-25, 34, 75 Saner, Mr J. A., 38, 67, 129 Sankey Brook and St Helen's Canal, 46 Saunders, Mr H. J., 39, 44 Select Committee on Canals (1883), 37 Sheffield and South Yorkshire Navigation, 46 Shropshire Union Canal, 47-50, 69-72, 120 Somerset Coal Canal, 40 Speed, 122, 131 Staffordshire and Worcestershire Canal, 26 Stalbridge, Lord, 86 Stephenson, George, 30 Stephenson, Robert, 30 Stourbridge Extension Canal, 45 "Strangulation" theory, 55, 143 Stratford-upon-Avon Canal, 45 Swansea Canal, 26, 45 Taxpayers, how affected, 3, 5, 137 Telford, 124 Thames and Severn Canal, 123 Thames steamboat service, 5 Thomas, Mr G. C., 39 Thwaite, Mr, 125 Trade, changes in, 11, 40-42, 52-54, 61, 74-92, 133-134 Traders, advice to, 146-147 Trent and Mersey Navigation, 16, 26, 27, 49, 69, 72, 122, 123 Troops, transport of, by canal, 18-19 Tunnels, canal, 123 Ulrich, Herr Franz, 97 United States, waterways in, 104-118 Vernon-Harcourt, Mr L. F., 135 Walker, Colonel, F. N. T., 5 Water-supply for canals, 24, 32, 33, 42-43, 62-64, 66, 77, 99, 127-130 Wheeler, Mr W. H., 99 Widenings, 66, 70, 71 Wilts and Berks Canal, 40 Worcester and Birmingham Canal, 26, 120, 123, 132 WORKS BY EDWIN A. PRATT THE TRANSITION IN AGRICULTURE _Crown 8vo. 350 pp. Illustrations and Plans. 5s. net._ "A book of great value to all interested in farming. Discusses, as correctly as possible, the hopeful development of subsidiary branches of agriculture, the prospects of co-operation, and the principles on which small holdings may be increased."--_The Outlook._ THE ORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURE _Cheaper and Enlarged Edition. Paper covers. 1s. net._ "The first impression produced on the mind of the thoughtful reader by a perusal of Mr Pratt's book is that, in one form or another, agricultural co-operation is inevitable.... 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Should become _the_ standard work of reference upon the subject."--_The Standard._ MUNICIPAL TRADE THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES RESULTING FROM THE SUBSTITUTION OF REPRESENTATIVE BODIES FOR PRIVATE PROPRIETORS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL UNDERTAKINGS By Major LEONARD DARWIN Author of "Bimetallism." _Demy 8vo. 12s. net._ "This work should be carefully studied, for there cannot be a better guide to the understanding and solution of a difficult problem."--_Local Government Chronicle._ MODERN TARIFF HISTORY SHOWING THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF TARIFFS IN GERMANY FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES By PERCY ASHLEY, M.A. Lecturer at the London School of Economics in the University of London With an Introduction by the Rt. Hon. R. B. HALDANE, LL.D., K.C., M.P. _Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d. net._ "... A careful, fair, and accurate review of the modern fiscal history of three countries."--_Times._ LOCAL AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENT A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ENGLAND, FRANCE, PRUSSIA, AND THE UNITED STATES By PERCY ASHLEY, M.A. THE BRITISH TRADE YEAR-BOOK COVERING THE 25 YEARS 1880-1904, AND SHOWING THE COURSE OF TRADE By JOHN HOLT SCHOOLING _With 191 tables, each containing several sections of British or of International Trade. 46 Diagrams and various abstract Tables. 10s. 6d. net._ This is the ONLY BOOK that shows the COURSE OF TRADE. "We believe, after careful examination, that Mr Schooling has dealt in a strictly honest and impartial fashion with the material at his disposal. Readers of the book cannot fail to get much insight into the course of trade from Mr Schooling's clear-sighted methods."--_Times._ THE PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF TAXATION By G. ARMITAGE SMITH Principal of Birkbeck College. _Crown 8vo. 5s._ CHAPTER I.--The Grounds and Nature of Public Expenditure. II.--Sources of Imperial Revenue, and Theories of Taxation. III.--Principles of Taxation. IV.--Direct Taxation--Taxes on Property and Income. V.--Indirect Taxation--Taxes on Commodities and Acts. VI.--Incidence of Taxation. VII.--National Debts. VIII.--Some other Revenue Systems. IX.--Local Taxation. THE RAILWAYS AND THE TRADERS A SKETCH OF THE RAILWAY RATES QUESTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE By W. M. ACWORTH, M.A. (Oxon.), And of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. _New Impression. Crown 8vo. In Paper Covers. 1s. net._ London: JOHN MURRAY, Albemarle Street, W. PRINTED AT THE EDINBURGH PRESS, 9 AND 11 YOUNG STREET * * * * * TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES Minor punctuation and printer errors repaired. Italic text is denoted by _underscores_ 
47351	----	PILOTS OF THE REPUBLIC THE ROMANCE OF THE PIONEER PROMOTER IN THE MIDDLE WEST _UNIFORM WITH THIS VOLUME_ THE GLORY SEEKERS: The Romance of Would-be Founders of Empire in the Early Days of the Great Southwest. By WILLIAM HORACE BROWN. With sixteen portraits, and illustrative initials to chapters. 12mo. $1.50 _net_ A. C. McCLURG & CO., CHICAGO [Illustration: ZEISBERGER PREACHING TO THE INDIANS] PILOTS OF THE REPUBLIC THE ROMANCE OF THE PIONEER PROMOTER IN THE MIDDLE WEST BY ARCHER BUTLER HULBERT _Author of "Historic Highways of America," "Washington and the West," etc._ WITH SIXTEEN PORTRAITS, AND ILLUSTRATIVE INITIALS BY WALTER J. ENRIGHT [Illustration] CHICAGO A. C. McCLURG & CO. 1906 COPYRIGHT A. C. MCCLURG & CO. 1906 Published October 29, 1906 THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, CAMBRIDGE, U. S. A. To CHARLES G. DAWES, Esq. THIS VOLUME IS INSCRIBED IN TOKEN OF THE AUTHOR'S APPRECIATION OF A MODERN PROMOTER WHOSE IDEALS AND CHIVALRY TAKE RANK WITH THOSE OF THE OLDEN TIME PREFACE The student of European history is not surprised to find that individuals stand out prominently in every activity that occupied man's attention; that even though there be under consideration great popular movements, such as the Crusades or the Reformation or French Revolution, attention centres around significant personalities. In the day of monarchies and despotisms, individual initiative very naturally led the way in outlining policies, selecting lieutenants, finding ways and means. It is singular to what a great extent this is true in the history of democratic America, preëminently the land where the people have ruled and where the usurper of power has had, comparatively, no opportunity whatever. And yet it is not too much to say that the history of our nation may be suggested in a skeleton way by a mere list of names, as, for instance, the history of the fourteenth century in Europe might easily be sketched. While we are proud to proclaim that America has given all men an equal opportunity, that the most humble may rise to the proudest position known among us, it yet remains singular that in this land where the popular voice has ruled as nowhere else almost every national movement or phase of development may be signified by the name of one man. This comes with appealing force to one who has attempted to make a catalogue of the men who have in a personal sense _led_ the Star of Empire across this continent; men who have, in a way, pooled issues with their country in the mutual hope of personal advantage and national advance. It then becomes plain to the investigator, if he never realized it before, that, at times, the nation has waited, even halted in its progress, for a single man, or a set of men, to plan what may have seemed an entirely selfish adventure and which yet has proved to be a great national advantage. In certain instances there was a clear and fair understanding between such promoters and the reigning administration, looking toward mutual benefit. At times the movement was in direct defiance of law and order, with a resulting effect of immeasurable moment for good. Again, there may have been no thought of national welfare or extension; personal gain and success may have been the only end; and the resultant may have been a powerful national stimulus. Perhaps the most remarkable feature that appears on an examination of American history along these lines (compared, for instance, with that of European powers) is that comparatively few leaders of military campaigns are to be classed among promoters who advanced national ends in conjunction with personal ambitions. In the Old World numberless provinces came into the possession of military favorites after successful campaigns. In the many expeditions to the westward of the Alleghanies in America what commanders turned their attention later to the regions subdued? Forbes, the conqueror of Fort Duquesne, never saw the Ohio Valley again; Bouquet, the other hero, with Gladwin, of Pontiac's Rebellion, never returned to the Muskingum, nor did Gladwin come back to Detroit; Lewis, the victor at Point Pleasant, led no colony to the Ohio again; "Mad Anthony" Wayne never had other than military interest in the beautiful Maumee Valley, where, in the cyclone's path, he crushed the dream of a powerful Indian confederacy lying on the flanks of the new Republic. To a singular degree the leaders of the military vanguard across the continent had really little to do personally with the actual social movement that made the wilderness blossom as the rose. True, bounty lands were given to commanders and men in many instances, as in the case of Washington and George Rogers Clark; but it was the occupation of such tracts by the rank and file of the armies that actually made for advancement and national growth, and in perhaps only one case was the movement appreciably accelerated by the course of action pursued in a civil way by those who had been the leaders of a former military expansion. How are we to explain the interesting fact that none of the generals who led into the West the armies that won it for America are to be found at the head, for instance, of the land companies that later attempted to open the West to the flood-tide of immigration? Did they know too well the herculean toils that such work demanded? Why should General Rufus Putnam, General Moses Cleaveland, General Benjamin Tupper, General Samuel Holden Parsons, Colonel Abraham Whipple,--famous leader of the night attack on the _Gaspee_ in the pre-Revolutionary days,--Judge John Cleve Symmes, Colonel Richard Henderson, lead companies of men to settle in the region which Andrew Lewis, Arthur St. Clair, Joseph Harmar, Anthony Wayne, and William Henry Harrison had learned so well? Of course more than one reason, or one train of reasons, exist for these facts; but it is not to be denied that those best acquainted with the existing facts, those having the clearest knowledge of the trials, dangers, and risks, both as regards health and finances, were not in any degree prominent in the later social movements. Many, of course, were soldiers by profession, and itched not in the least for opportunity to increase their possessions by investment and speculation in a hazardous undertaking. But, had there been certain assurance of success, these men, or some of them, would, without doubt, have found ways and means of taking a part. Had one attempt proven successful, an impetus would have been given to other like speculations; yet one will look in vain for a really profitable outcome to any undertaking described in these studies. The judgment of those best posted, therefore, was fully justified. But at the same time the American nation was greatly in the debt of the men who made these poor investments; and, in one way or another, it came about that no great hardship resulted. This was no secret when these propositions were under consideration, and the men interested were influenced not a little by the fact that their adventure would result in benefit to the cause of national advance. There was a kind of patriotism then shown that is to be remembered by all who care to think of the steps taken by a weak, hopeful Republic; in some ways the same body politic is still weak, and vastly in need of a patriotism not less warm than that shown in those early days of wonderment and anxiety. The reader of the succeeding pages may conceive that the author has not taken up each study in the same method, and judged the performances of each so-called "Pilot" by the same rule and standard. In the present instance the writer has considered that such treatment would be highly incongruous, there being almost nothing in common between the various exploits here reviewed, save only those that were incidental and adventitious. Each chapter may seem an independent study, related to that one following only through the general title that covers them all; this, in the author's opinion, is better far than to attempt to emphasize a likeness, or over-color apparent resemblances, until each event may seem a natural sequence from a former. A babe's steps are seldom alike; one is long and inaccurate, another short and sure, with many a misstep and tumble, and the whole a characterless procedure bespeaking only weakness and lack both of confidence and knowledge. Such, in a measure, was the progress of young America in the early days of her national existence. A. B. H. MARIETTA COLLEGE, MARIETTA, OHIO, May 31, 1906. CONTENTS CHAPTER I PAGE INTRODUCTORY: THE BROTHER OF THE SWORD 19 CHAPTER II WASHINGTON: THE PROMOTER OF WESTERN INVESTMENTS 37 CHAPTER III RICHARD HENDERSON: THE FOUNDER OF TRANSYLVANIA 81 CHAPTER IV RUFUS PUTNAM: THE FATHER OF OHIO 103 CHAPTER V DAVID ZEISBERGER: HERO OF "THE MEADOW OF LIGHT" 129 CHAPTER VI GEORGE ROGERS CLARK: FOUNDER OF LOUISVILLE 149 CHAPTER VII HENRY CLAY: PROMOTER OF THE FIRST AMERICAN HIGHWAY 179 CHAPTER VIII MORRIS AND CLINTON: FATHERS OF THE ERIE CANAL 207 CHAPTER IX THOMAS AND MERCER: RIVAL PROMOTERS OF CANAL AND RAILWAY 233 CHAPTER X LEWIS AND CLARK: EXPLORERS OF LOUISIANA 257 CHAPTER XI ASTOR: THE PROMOTER OF ASTORIA 279 CHAPTER XII MARCUS WHITMAN: THE HERO OF OREGON 299 CHAPTER XIII THE CAPTAINS OF "THE AMERICAN SYSTEM" 339 INDEX 363 LIST OF PORTRAITS PAGE ZEISBERGER Preaching to the Indians at Coshocton, Ohio, in 1773 _Frontispiece_ DANIEL BOONE 30 GEORGE WASHINGTON 68 RUFUS PUTNAM, Leader of the Founders of Marietta, Ohio 106 REV. MANASSEH CUTLER, Ohio Pioneer 113 JOHN HECKEWELDER, Missionary to the Indians 142 REV. DAVID JONES, Companion of George Rogers Clark 165 HENRY CLAY, Statesman and Abolitionist 184 ALBERT GALLATIN, Promoter of the Cumberland Road 190 GENERAL ARTHUR ST. CLAIR, Appointed Governor of Ohio by Congress 205 GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, Promoter of the Erie Canal 212 DE WITT CLINTON, Friend of the Erie Canal Project 230 MERIWETHER LEWIS, of the Lewis and Clark Expedition 262 WILLIAM CLARK, of the Lewis and Clark Expedition 274 JOHN JACOB ASTOR, Founder of Astoria 288 PRESIDENT JAMES K. POLK 344 CHAPTER I _The Part played in American History by the Pioneer's Axe.--Several Classes of Leaders in the Conquest of the Wilderness.--Patriotism even in those that were Self-seeking.--The Achievements of Cleaveland, Henderson, Putnam, Morris, and Astor, respectively.--Feebleness of the Republic in its Infancy.--Its need of Money.--The Pioneers were of all Races.--Other Leaders besides these Captains of Expansion accused of Self-seeking.--Washington as the Father of the West.--His great Acquisitions of Land.--His Influence on other Land-seekers.--Results of Richard Henderson's Advance into Kentucky.--Zeisberger's Attempt to form a Settlement of Christian Indians thwarted by the Revolution.--Rufus Putnam as a Soldier and a Pioneer.--As Leader of the Ohio Company of Associates, he makes a Settlement Northwest of the Ohio.--Three Avenues of Westward Migration: Henry Clay's Cumberland Road; the Erie Canal; the Baltimore and Ohio Railway.--These Avenues not laid between Cities, but into the Western Wilderness._ INTRODUCTORY: THE BROTHER OF THE SWORD [Illustration] THERE is some ground for the objection that is raised against allowing the history of America to remain a mere record of battles and campaigns. The sword had its part to play, a glorious part and picturesque, but the pioneer's axe chanted a truer tune than ever musket crooned or sabre sang. And with reference to the history of our Central West, for instance, it were a gross impartiality to remember the multicolored fascinating story of its preliminary conquest to the exclusion of the marvellous sequel--a great free people leaping into a wilderness and compelling it, in one short century, to blossom as the rose. To any one who seriously considers the magic awakening of that portion of the American Nation dwelling between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi, there must sooner or later come the overpowering realization that the humble woodsman's broadaxe--that famous "Brother of the Sword"--has a story that is, after all, as fascinating and romantic as any story ever told. Lo, 'tis myself I sing, Feller of oak and ash! Brother am I to the Sword, Red-edged slayer of men! Side by side we have hewn Paths for the pioneer From sea to sun-smitten sea. It must be remembered that the sword made many conquests in this West, while the broadaxe made but one. France, and then England, possessed the West, but could not hold it, for the vital reason that this brother of the sword did not march in unison with those armies. In fact, both France and England attempted to keep the axe-bearing, home-building people back in order that the furs and the treasure yielded by the forests might not be withheld. But when the sword of a free people came across the Alleghanies the axe of the pioneer came with it, and a miracle was wrought in a century's time beside which the Seven Wonders of the Old World must forever seem commonplace. Of the men who led this army of real conquerors of the West to the scenes of their labors there were many. Some were leaders because of the inspiration they gave to others, some were leaders because they in person showed the way, enduring the toil, the privation, the pestilence, and the fate of pioneers. In whatever class these men may be placed, they were in reality patriots and heroes, even though at the time they were accused of seeking private gain and private fortune. But through the perspective of the years it seems clear that whatever may have been their private ends,--good, bad, or indifferent,--they were extremely important factors in the progress of their age. Whether seeking lands as a private speculation, or founding land companies or transportation companies in conjunction with others, they turned a waiting people's genius in a new direction and gave force and point to a social movement that was of more than epoch-making importance. Whether it was a Cleaveland founding a Western Reserve on the Great Lakes, a Henderson establishing a Transylvania in Kentucky, a Putnam building a new New England on the Ohio River, a Morris advocating an Erie Canal, or an Astor founding an Astoria on the Pacific Sea, the personal ambition and hope of gain, so prominent at the time, does not now stand preëminent; in this day we see what the efforts of these men meant to a country whose destiny they almost seemed unwittingly to hold in their hands. It will ever be difficult to realize what a critical moment it was when, for a brief space of time, only Providence could tell whether the young American Republic was equal to the tremendous task of proving that it could live by growing. The wisest men who watched its cradle wondered if that babe, seemingly of premature birth, would live. But that was not the vital question; the vital question was, Could it grow? The infant Republic possessed a mere strip of land on the seaboard; the unanswerable argument of its enemies was that a weakling of such insignificant proportions, surrounded by the territories of England and Spain, could not live unless it could do more than merely exist; after winning (by default) a war for liberty, it must now fight and win or lose a war of extermination. And where were the millions of money, the men, and the arms to come from that should prevent final annihilation? The long war had prostrated the people; the land had been overrun with armies, farms despoiled, trade ruined, cities turned into barracks, money values utterly dissipated. Just here it was that the mighty miracle was wrought; a strange army began to rendezvous, and it was armed with that weapon which was to make a conquest the sword could never have made. It was the army of pioneers with axes on their shoulders. So spontaneously did it form and move away, so commonplace was every humble detail of its organization and progress, so quietly was its conquest made, so few were its prophets and historians, that it has taken a century for us to realize its wonder and its marvel. America here and now gave the one proof of life--growth. Not from one point in particular, but from every point, the ranks of this humble army were filled; not one sect or race gave those rough and shaggy regiments their men, but every sect and every racial stock. That army had its leaders, though they wore only the uncouth regimentals of the rank and file. It is of certain of these Pilots of the Republic that these pages treat,--men who were moved by what were very generally called selfish motives in their days. Yet against what human motive may not the accusation of self-interest be cast? It has been hurled against almost every earnest man since Christ was crucified in ignominy nineteen centuries ago. Scan the list of men herein treated, and you will not find a single promoter of the Central West who was not accused of harboring an ulterior motive, if not of downright perfidy. Some of the best of these leaders of the expansion movement were most bitterly maligned; the heroic missionaries who forgot every consideration of health, comfort, worldly prosperity, home, and friends were sometimes decried as plotting ambassadors of scheming knaves. The pure and upright Washington, looking westward with clearer eye and surer faith than any of his generation, was besmirched by the accusations of hypocritical self-aggrandizement. Yet he must stand first and foremost in the category of men who influenced and gave efficiency to that vital westward movement. This man, as will be shown, was more truly the "Father of the West" than he ever was "Father of his Country." A decade before the Revolution was precipitated in sturdy Massachusetts, he had become fascinated with the commercial possibilities of the trans-Alleghany empire. He explored the Ohio and Great Kanawha rivers, and conceived what the future would bring forth; he took up large tracts of lands. Before he died he owned many patents to land in what is now New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, Kentucky, Maryland, and Florida, as well as his home farms along the Potomac. He had a keen business sense, and demanded his full rights; he forcibly ousted from his lands men who knowingly usurped them; and all through the years he was accused of using his preponderating influence to further selfish plans; he was called a land-shark and a robber. It is interesting to know that his own private conclusion was that his investments had not paid; his words were that they had resulted more "in vexation than profit." And when he spoke those words he was master of between twenty and thirty thousand of the most fertile acres in the Ohio River basin. Yet Washington had marvellously influenced the nation's destiny by these "unprofitable" investments. The very position he occupied and which he was accused of misusing had powerfully stimulated the army that was carrying the broadaxe westward. In countless ways this man had given circulation to ideas that were inspiring and hopeful, and just so far as he believed he had failed as a private speculator, he had in reality triumphed mightily as the leading exponent of a growing Republic which was called upon to prove that it could grow. Richard Henderson stands out prominently as an honest leader of this army of conquerors. We can never read without a thrill the sentence in that letter of Daniel Boone's to Henderson in which the bold woodsman pleads the necessity of Henderson's hastening into Kentucky in 1775. All that Kentucky was and all that it did during the Revolution seems to have hung suspended on the advance of Richard Henderson's party through Cumberland Gap in that eventful April; and those words of the guide and trail-blazer, Boone, imploring that there be no delay, and emphasizing the stimulating effect that Henderson's advance would have on the various parties of explorers, have a ring of destiny in them. True, Virginia and North Carolina both repudiated Henderson's Indian purchase, and the promoter of historic Transylvania was decried and defamed; but his advance into the valley of the Kentucky gave an inspiration to the scattered parties of vagrant prospectors that resulted in making a permanent settlement in that key-stone State of the West, which was of untold advantage to the nation at large. And later Virginia and North Carolina made good the loss the founder of Transylvania had suffered because of their earlier repudiation. In Washington and Henderson we have two important factors in the advance of the pioneer army into the old Southwest--the region between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi south of the Ohio River. [Illustration: DANIEL BOONE] Turning to the rich empire lying north of that river, a chapter belongs to that resolute herald of religious and social betterment, David Zeisberger, who led his faithful Moravians from Pennsylvania to found an ideal settlement in central Ohio. The marvellous story of the indomitable Catholic missionaries in America has been receiving something of its share of attention by the reading world, a story so noble and inspiring that it is one of the precious heritages of the past; that of the equally noble Protestant missionaries in the Middle and Far West has not yet received its due. The Moravian Brethren received the first acre of land ever legally owned by white men in Ohio. Here, in "the Meadow of Light" on the Tuscarawas River, Zeisberger and his noble comrade, John Heckewelder, attempted to found a civilized colony of Christian Indians. But for the Revolution, he would doubtless have succeeded. The story of his temporary success is of great romantic interest and of moment especially by way of comparison. A legal right to land was secured by this migrating colony of Indians under the leadership of white missionaries; it was to be, to all intents and purposes, a white man's settlement, and agriculture was to be the colony's means of support. Laws and rules of conduct were formulated, and for five interesting years a great degree of success attended the effort. Then came war, despoliation, and a thrilling period of wandering. But never was the fact of legal ownership ignored; when the United States first enacted laws for the disposal of land in the Northwest Territory it excepted the district "formerly" allotted to the Moravian Brethren. Again, the history of the Middle West contains no sturdier or sweeter character than Rufus Putnam, the head of the Ohio Company of Associates who made the first settlement in the Northwest Territory at Marietta. As evidence of what he was in time of danger, his long record in the old French War, the Revolution, and the Indian War in the West is open to all men; what he was in days of peace--how he was the mainstay of his fellow officers in their attempt to obtain their dues from Congress, how he cheered westward that little company which he led in person, how for two decades he was the unselfish friend of hundreds of this struggling army of pioneers--is a story great and noble. As we shall see, General Washington, in a secret document never intended for other eyes than his own, describes Putnam as little known outside of a definite circle of friends. If this militated against his being appointed commander-in-chief of the American armies (for which honor General "Mad" Anthony Wayne was named), it made the man the more beloved and helpful. Not seeking in convivial ways the friendship of the notables of his time, Rufus Putnam went about the commonplace affairs of his conscientious life, doing good; yet in the most critical hour in the history of the Northwest it was to Putnam that Washington turned in confidence and hope. In the formation of the Ohio Company, in the emigration from New England, in the hard experiences of hewing out homes and clearings on the Ohio, and in the humble, wearing vicissitudes of life on the tumultuous frontier, the resolution, tact, and patient charity of this plain hero made him one of the great men in the annals of our western land. This Ohio Company of Associates made the first settlement in the territory northwest of the River Ohio, from which were created the five great States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. In the actual peopling of that region no one man, perhaps, exerted the influence of Rufus Putnam; and though, as a company, the Associates never were able to keep their contract with the Government, the great value of the movement led by Putnam was recognized, as Virginia and North Carolina recognized Henderson's influence to the southward, and Congress agreed to an easy settlement. The empire of the Ohio Basin being thrown open to the world by the armies of pioneers inspired by Washington and led by such men as Henderson and Putnam, a great factor in its occupation were the men who succeeded Washington in carrying out his plan for opening avenues of immigration. Three great routes to the West, and their projectors, call for notice in this phase of our study. The rise of Henry Clay's famous National Road running from Cumberland, Maryland, almost to St. Louis was a potent factor in the awakening of the West. It was the one great American highway; it took millions of men and wealth into the West, and, more than any material object, "served to cement and save the Union." Three canals were factors in this great social movement, especially the Erie Canal, which was conceived by the inspiration of Morris and achieved by the patient genius of Clinton. As a promoter of the West, Thomas, father of our first railway, must be accounted of utmost importance. Is it not of interest that the famed Cumberland Road was not built to connect two large Eastern cities, or a seaport or river with a city? It was built from the East into the Western wilderness--from a town but little known to an indefinite destination where the towns were hardly yet named. Its promoters were men of faith in the West, hopeful of its prosperity and anxious as to its loyalty. Now the same was singularly true of our first three great canals, the Erie, the Chesapeake and Ohio, and the Pennsylvania. These were not built as avenues of commerce between great Eastern cities, but rather from the East to the awakening West, to the infant hamlets of Buffalo and Pittsburg. And, still more remarkable, our first railways were not laid out between large Eastern cities, but from the East into that same country of the setting sun where the forests were still spreading and little villages were here and there springing up. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was distinctly promoted in the hope that Baltimore might retain the trade of the West which the canals then building seemed to be likely to take from her. It was their faith in the West that inspired all these men to the tasks they severally conceived and enthusiastically completed. It would hardly be possible to emphasize sufficiently the part played in the history of early America by this supremely momentous intuition of the westward advance of the Republic, the divine logic of that advance, and its immeasurable consequences. CHAPTER II _Washington's Prescience of the Increased Value of Land in the West.--Diary of his Tour in the Basin of the Ohio.--His Plans for the Commercial Development of the West.--His Character as manifested in his Letters, Diaries, and Memoranda.--His Military Advancement by the Influence of Lord Fairfax.--He serves at Fort Necessity, "The Bloody Ford," and Fort Duquesne.--Marriage and Settlement at Mount Vernon.--His Device for taking up more Land than the Law allowed to one Man.--Washington not connected with any of the great Land Companies.--His Efforts to secure for his Soldiers the Bounty-land promised them.--His sixth Journey to view his own Purchases.--The Amount of his Landed Property.--His Leniency toward Poor Tenants.--The Intensity of his Business Energy.--The Present Value of his Lands.--His Dissatisfaction with the Results of his Land Speculations.--His Plan of American Internal Improvements.--The Treaty that secured to Virginia the Territory South of the Ohio.--Washington's Personal Inspection of the Basins of the Ohio and Potomac.--He becomes President of the Potomac Company.--A Waterway secured from the Ohio to the Potomac.--The National Road from Cumberland, Md., to Wheeling on the Ohio._ WASHINGTON: THE PROMOTER OF WESTERN INVESTMENTS [Illustration] WHAT story of personal endeavor that had a part in building up a new nation on this continent can appeal more strongly to us of the Middle West than that of George Washington's shrewd faith which led him first to invest heavily in Western lands and signally champion that region as a field for exploitation? Indeed the record of that man's prescience in realizing what the West would become, how it would be quickly populated, and how rapidly its acres would increase in value, is one of the most remarkable single facts in his history. It is only because Washington became well known to a continent and a world as the leader of a people to freedom, that it has been easy to forget what a great man he still would have been had there been no Revolution and no Independence Day. How well known, for instance, is it that Washington was surveying lands on the Great Kanawha and Ohio rivers only four years before he received that remarkable ovation on his way to take command of the Continental Army under the Cambridge Elm? And how much attention has been given to Washington's tour into the Ohio Basin the very next year after the Revolutionary War to attempt to mark out a commercial route between the Virginia tide-water rivers and the Great Lakes by way of the Ohio and its tributaries? Yet the diary of that trip is not only the longest single literary production we have in our first President's handwriting, but on examination it is found to be almost a State paper, pointing out with wonderful sagacity the line of national expansion and hinting more plainly than any other document, not excepting the famous Ordinance, of the greatness of the Republic that was to be. Washington was possibly the richest man in America, and half his wealth lay west of the Alleghanies; it has not seemed to be easy to remember that this statesman had a better knowledge of the West than any man of equal position and that he spent a large portion of his ripest years in planning minutely for the commercial development of a territory then far less known to the common people of the country than Alaska is to us of to-day. To few men's private affairs has a nation had more open access than we have had to George Washington's. His journals, diaries, letters, and memoranda have been published broadcast, and the curious may learn, if they choose, the number of kerchiefs the young surveyor sent to his washerwoman long before his name was known outside his own county, or what the butter bill was for a given month at the Executive Mansion during the administration of our first President. Many men noted for their strength of personality and their patriotism have suffered some loss of character when their private affairs have been subjected to a rigid examination. Not so with Washington. It is a current legend in the neighborhood where he resided that he was exceedingly close-handed. This is not borne out in a study of his land speculations. Here is one of the interesting phases of the story of his business life, his generosity and his thoughtfulness for the poor who crowded upon his far-away choice lands. Beyond this the study is of importance because it touches the most romantic phase of Western history, the mad struggle of those who participated in that great burst of immigration across the Alleghanies just before and just after the Revolutionary War. The hand of Providence cannot be more clearly seen in any human life than in Washington's when he was turned from the sea and sent into the Alleghanies to survey on the south branch of the Potomac for Lord Fairfax, in 1748; it seemed unimportant, perhaps, at the moment whether the youth should follow his brother under Admiral Vernon or plunge into the forests along the Potomac. But had his mother's wish not been obeyed our West would have lost a champion among a thousand. As it was, Washington, in the last two years of the first half of the eighteenth century, began to study the forests, the mountains, and the rivers in the rear of the colonies. The mighty silences thrilled the young heart, the vastness of the stretching wilderness made him sober and thoughtful. He came in touch with great problems at an early and impressionable age, and they became at once life-problems with him. The perils and hardships of frontier life, the perplexing questions of lines and boundaries, of tomahawk and squatter claims, the woodland arts that are now more than lost, the ways and means of life and travel in the borderland, the customs of the Indians and their conceptions of right and wrong, all these and more were the problems this tall boy was fortunately made to face as the first step toward a life of unparalleled activity and sacrifice. The influence of Lord Fairfax, whom he served faithfully, now soon brought about Washington's appointment as one of four adjutant-generals of Virginia. In rapid order he pushed to the front. In 1753 his governor sent him on the memorable journey to the French forts near Lake Erie, and in the following year he led the Virginia regiment and fought and lost the Fort Necessity campaign. The next year he marched with Braddock to the "Bloody Ford" of the Monongahela. For three years after this terrible defeat Washington was busy defending the Virginia frontier, and in 1758 he went to the final conquest of Fort Duquesne with the dying but victorious Forbes. Having married Martha Custis, the young colonel now settled down at Mount Vernon, and his diary of 1760 shows how closely he applied himself to the management of his splendid estate. But the forests in and beyond the Alleghanies, which he had visited on five occasions before he was twenty-six years of age, were closely identified with his plans, and it is not surprising that as early as 1767 we find the young man writing a hasty letter concerning Western investments to William Crawford, a comrade-in-arms in the campaign of 1758, who lived near the spot where Braddock's old road crossed the Youghiogheny River. From this letter, written September 21, 1767, it is clear that Washington had determined to make heavy investments. "My plan is to secure a good deal of land," he wrote. He desired land in Pennsylvania as near Pittsburg as possible; if the law did not allow one man to take up several thousand acres, Crawford was requested to make more than one entry, the total to aggregate the desired amount. As to quality, Washington was to the point. "It will be easy for you to conceive that ordinary or even middling lands would never answer my purpose or expectation; ... a tract to please me must be rich ... and, if possible, level." As to location, he was not concerned: "For my own part, I should have no objection to a grant of land upon the Ohio, a good way below Pittsburg, but would first willingly secure some valuable tracts nearer at hand." Washington correctly estimated the purpose and effectiveness of the King's proclamation of 1763. This proclamation, at the close of Pontiac's rebellion, declared that no land should be settled beyond the heads of the Atlantic waters. In the same letter he said: "I can never look upon that proclamation in any other light (but I say this between ourselves) than as a temporary expedient to quiet the minds of the Indians.... Any person, therefore, who neglects the present opportunity of hunting out good lands, and in some measure marking and distinguishing them for his own, in order to keep others from settling them, will never regain it." Washington was first and foremost in the field and intended to make the most of his opportunities. He wrote: "If the scheme I am now proposing to you were known, it might give alarm to others, and by putting them upon a plan of the same nature, before we could lay a proper foundation for success ourselves, set the different interests clashing, and, probably, in the end overturn the whole. All this may be avoided by a silent management, and the operation carried on by you under the guise of hunting game." Crawford accordingly took tracts for Washington near his own lands on the Youghiogheny, costing "from a halfpenny to a penny an acre." Note that at this early day (1767), almost all the land between the Youghiogheny and Monongahela rivers--the country through which Braddock's Road ran--was already taken up. A large tract on Chartier's Creek was secured by Crawford for his friend. Within five years Washington had come into the additional possession of the historic tract of two hundred and thirty-seven acres known as Great Meadows,--whereon he had fought his first battle and signed the first and only capitulation of his life,--and the splendid river-lands known to-day as "Washington's Bottoms," on the Ohio near Wheeling and Parkersburg, West Virginia, and below. It is a very interesting fact that Washington did not belong to any of the great land companies which, one after another, sought to gain and hold great tracts of land, except the Mississippi Company which did not materialize. His brothers were members of the Ohio Company which in 1749 secured a grant of two hundred thousand acres between the Monongahela and Kanawha rivers. The company was never able to people and hold its territory, and the proprietors each lost heavily. It is a little strange that Washington had nothing to do with Walpole's Grant, the Transylvania Company, or the later Ohio, Scioto, and Symmes companies. What might be considered an exception to this rule was the body of men (among whom Washington was a generous, fearless leader) which sought to secure for the Virginia soldiers of the Fort Necessity campaign the bounty-land promised them by Governor Dinwiddie in 1754. Year after year, for twenty years, Washington was continually besieged by the soldiers he led West in 1754 or their relatives, who implored his aid in securing the grant of land promised, and there is no more interesting phase of his life during these years than his patient persistence in compelling Virginia to make good her solemn pledge. To impatient and impertinent men such as Colonel Mercer he wrote scathing rebukes; to helpless widows and aged veterans he sent kind messages of hope and cheer. The trouble was that everybody was claiming the land beyond the Alleghanies; the Ohio Company was fighting for its rights until the London agent questionably formed a merger with the Walpole Grant speculators. This company had claimed all the land between the Monongahela and the Kanawha. Washington, accordingly, had attempted to secure the two hundred thousand acres for his Fort Necessity comrades on the western shore of the Kanawha. In 1770 he made his sixth western journey in order to view his own purchases and make a beginning in the business of securing the soldiers' lands. He left Mount Vernon October 5 and reached William Crawford's, on the Youghiogheny, on the thirteenth. On the sixteenth Washington visited his sixteen-hundred acre tract near by and was pleased with it. On the third of November he blazed four trees on the Ohio, near the mouth of the Great Kanawha. He wrote: "At the beginning of the bottom above the junction of the rivers, and at the mouth of a branch on the east side, I marked two maples, an elm, and hoop-wood tree, as a corner of the soldiers' land (if we can get it), intending to take all the bottom from hence to the rapids in the Great Bend into one survey. I also marked at the mouth of another run lower down on the west side, at the lower end of the long bottom, an ash and hoop-wood for the beginning of another of the soldiers' surveys, to extend up so as to include all the bottom in a body on the west side." From this time on Crawford was busy surveying for Washington, either privately or in behalf of the soldiers' lands, until the outbreak of Dunmore's War in 1774. For these bounty-land surveys, Washington was particularly attentive, writing Crawford frequently "in behalf of the whole officers and soldiers, and beg of you to be attentive to it, as I think our interest is deeply concerned in the event of your dispatch." When Walpole's Grant was confirmed by King George, Washington greatly feared the loss of the lands promised to himself and his comrades of 1754. His own share was five thousand acres, and he had purchased an equal amount from others who, becoming hopeless, offered their claims for sale. This grant was bounded on the west by the old war-path which ran from the mouth of the Scioto River to Cumberland Gap. Accordingly, in September, 1773, Washington wrote Crawford to go down the Ohio below the Scioto. Washington did not know then that the purchasers of Walpole's Grant had agreed to set apart two hundred thousand acres for the heroes of 1754. It is significant that he was particular to avoid all occasion for conflicting claims; he originally wanted the soldiers' surveys to be made beyond the Ohio Company's Grant; later beyond the Walpole Grant. And while war and other causes put a disastrous end to the work of the promoters of all the various land companies with which Washington had nothing to do, the soldiers' lands were saved to them, and all received their shares. Washington also retained his private lands surveyed by Crawford, and owned most of them in 1799, when he died. In 1784, Washington had patents for thirty thousand acres and surveys for ten thousand more. Briefly, his possessions may be described as ten thousand acres on the south bank of the Ohio between Wheeling and Point Pleasant, West Virginia, and twenty thousand acres in the Great Kanawha Valley, beginning three miles above its mouth, "on the right and left of the river, and bounded thereby forty-eight miles and a half." Washington's ethics and his enterprise with reference to his Western speculations were both admirable, but we can only hint of them here. He was strict with himself and with others, but he knew how to be lenient when leniency would not harm the recipient. To his later agent, Thomas Freeman (Crawford was captured and put to death by the Indians in 1782), he wrote in 1785: "Where acts of Providence interfere to disable a tenant, I would be lenient in the exaction of rent, but when the cases are otherwise, I will not be put off; because it is on these my own expenditures depend, and because an accumulation of undischarged rents is a real injury to the tenant." While his agents were ordered to use all legal precautions against allowing his lands to be usurped by others, Washington was particular that needy people, stopping temporarily, should not be driven off; and he was exceedingly anxious from first to last that no lands should be taken up for him that were anywise claimed by others. It is a fact that Washington had few disputes in a day when disputes over lands and boundaries were as common as sunrise and sunset. No landholder in the West had so little trouble in proportion to the amount of land owned. The intensity of Washington's business energy is not shown more plainly than by his enterprise in finding and exploiting novelties. One day he was studying the question of rotation of crops; the next found him laboring all day with his blacksmith fashioning a newfangled plough. The next day he spent, perhaps, in studying a plan of a new machine invented in Europe to haul trees bodily out of the ground, an invention which meant something to a man who owned thirty thousand acres of primeval forest. He ordered his London agent to send on one of these machines regardless of cost, if they were really able to do the feats claimed. Again he was writing Tilghman at Philadelphia concerning the possibility and advisability of importing palatines from Europe, with which to settle his Western farms. Now he was examining veins of coal along the Youghiogheny and experimenting with it, or studying the location of salt-springs and the manufacture of salt, which in the West was twice dearer than flour. A whole essay could be devoted to Washington's interest in mineral springs at Saratoga, Rome, New York, and in the West, and to his plan outlined to the president of the Continental Congress to have the United States retain possession of all lands lying immediately about them. We do not know who built the first grist-mill west of the Alleghanies, but it is doubtful if there was another save Washington's at Perryopolis, Fayette County, Pennsylvania, before the Revolutionary War. "I assure you," wrote Crawford, "it is the best mill I ever saw anywhere, although I think one of a less value would have done as well." It is the boast of Ohioans that the millstones for the first mill in the old Northwest were "packed" over the mountains from Connecticut. Washington might have boasted, a score of years earlier, that he had found his millstones right in the Alleghanies, and they were "equal to English burr," according to his millwright. The mill which is still in operation on Washington's Run is on the original site of the one built by him in 1775. Portions of the original structure remain in the present mill, and it is known far and wide by the old name. The water-power, which is no longer relied upon except during wet seasons, still follows the same mill-race used in Revolutionary days, and the reconstructed dam is on the old site. The improvements on Washington's plantation here, overseer's house, slave quarters, etc., were situated near Plant No. 2 of the Washington Coal and Coke Company. It is known that Washington became interested in the coal outcropping here, but it is safe to say that he little dreamed that the land he purchased with that lying contiguous to it would within a century be valued at twenty million dollars. In view of the enormous value of this territory, it is exceedingly interesting to know that Washington was its first owner, and that he found coal there nearly a century and a half ago. In 1784 Washington issued a circular offering his Western lands to rent: "These lands may be had on three tenures: First, until January, 1790, and no longer. Second, until January, 1795, renewable every ten years for ever. Third, for nine hundred and ninety-nine years." The conditions included clearing five new acres every year for each hundred leased and the erection of buildings within the time of lease. The staple commodity was to be medium of exchange. The seventh condition is interesting: "These conditions &c. being common to the leases of three different tenures, the rent of the first, will be Four Pounds per annum, for every hundred acres contained in the lease, and proportionably for a greater or lesser quantity; of the second, One Shilling for every acre contained in the lease until the year 1795, One Shilling and Sixpence for the like quantity afterwards till the year 1815, and the like increase per acre for every ten years, until the rent amounts to and shall have remained at Five Shillings for the ten years next ensuing, after which it is to increase Threepence per acre every ten years for ever; of the Third, Two Shillings for every acre therein contained, at which it will stand for nine hundred and ninety-nine years, the term for which it is granted." Five years before his death Washington resolved to dispose of his Western lands. The investments had not been so profitable as he had hoped. As early as June 16, 1794, he wrote Presley Neville: "From the experience of many years, I have found distant property in land more pregnant of perplexities than profit. I have therefore resolved to sell all I hold on the Western waters, if I can obtain the prices which I conceive their quality, their situation, and other advantages would authorize me to expect." A circular advertising his Western lands was issued in Philadelphia, dated February 1, 1796. It described 32,317 acres in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Kentucky for sale; the terms were one-fourth payment down, and the remainder to be paid in five years with interest "annually and punctually paid." With this story of Washington's acquaintance with the West and his speculations there in mind, it is now possible to take up, knowingly, the great result to which they led--the first grand plan of American internal improvements, of which Washington was the father. As early as 1754, Washington, then just come of age, made a detailed study of the Potomac River, and described in a memorandum all the difficulties and obstructions to be overcome in rendering that river navigable from tide-water to Fort Cumberland (Cumberland, Maryland). At the time of Washington's entrance into the House of Burgesses in 1760, the matter of a way of communication between the colonies and the territory then conquered from France beyond the Alleghanies was perhaps uppermost in his mind, but various circumstances compelled a postponement of all such plans, particularly the outrageous proclamation of 1763, which was intended to repress the Western movement. By 1770 conditions were changed. In 1768 the Treaty of Fort Stanwix had nominally secured to Virginia all the territory south of the Ohio River, the very land from which the proclamation of 1763 excluded her. On July 20 of this year, Washington wrote to Thomas Johnson, the first State Governor of Maryland, suggesting that the project of opening the Potomac River be "recommended to the public notice upon a more enlarged plan [_i. e._, including a portage to the Ohio Basin] and as a means of becoming the channel of conveyance of the extensive and valuable trade of a rising empire." Johnson had written Washington concerning the navigation of the Potomac; in this reply Washington prophesied the failure of any plan to improve the Potomac that did not include a plan to make it an avenue of communication between the East and the West. He also prophesied that, if this were not done, Pennsylvania or New York would improve the opportunity of getting into commercial touch with that "rising empire" beyond the Alleghanies, "a tract of country which," he wrote, "is unfolding to our view, the advantages of which are too great, and too obvious, I should think, to become the subject of serious debate, but which, through ill-timed parsimony and supineness, may be wrested from us and conducted through other channels, such as the Susquehanna." These words of Washington's had a significance contained in no others uttered in that day, hinting of a greater America of which few besides this man were dreaming. They sounded through the years foretelling the wonder of our time, the making of the empire of the Mississippi Basin. Far back in his youth, this man had sounded the same note of alarm and enthusiasm: "A pusillanimous behavior now will ill suit the times," he cried to Governor Dinwiddie just after Braddock's defeat, when a red tide of pillage and murder was setting over the mountains upon Virginia and Pennsylvania. During the fifteen years now past Washington had visited the West, and understood its promise and its needs, and now the binding of the East and the West became at once his dearest dream. Believing the time had come Washington, in 1774, brought before the Virginia House of Burgesses a grand plan of communication which called for the improvement of the Potomac and the building of a connection from that river to one of the southwest tributaries of the Ohio. Only the outbreak of the Revolution could have thwarted the measure; in those opening hours of war it was forgotten, and it was not thought of again until peace was declared seven years later. We know something of Washington's life in those years--his ceaseless application to details, his total abandonment of the life he had learned to know and love on the Mount Vernon farms, the thousand perplexities, cares, and trials which he met so patiently and nobly. But in those days of stress and hardship the cherished plan of youth and manhood could not be forgotten. Even before peace was declared, Washington left his camp at Newburg, and at great personal risk made a tour though the Mohawk Valley, examining the portages between the Mohawk and Wood Creek, at Rome, New York, and between Lake Otsego and the Mohawk at Canajoharie. These routes by the Susquehanna and Mohawk to the Lakes were the rival routes of the James and Potomac westward, and Washington was greatly interested in them. He was no narrow partisan. Returning from this trip, he wrote the Chevalier de Chastellux from Princeton, October 12, 1783: "Prompted by these actual observations, I could not help taking a more extensive view of the vast inland navigation of these United States and could not but be struck with the immense extent and importance of it, and with the goodness of that Providence which has dealt its favors to us with so profuse a hand. Would to God we may have wisdom enough to improve them! I shall not rest contented till I have explored the western country, and traversed those lines, or great part of them, which have given bounds to a new empire." There is something splendid suggested by these words. Though he knew, perhaps better than any man, the pitiful condition of the country, there is here no note of despair, but rather a cry of enthusiasm. The leader of the armies was now to become a leader of a people, and at the outset his eye is uplifted and his faith great. With prophetic genius his face, at the close of his exhausting struggle, is turned toward the West. It is certain that Washington could not have known what a tremendous influence the new West was to have in the perplexing after hours of that critical period of our history. Perhaps he judged better what it would be partly for the reason that its very existence had furnished a moral support to him in times of darkness and despair; he always remembered those valleys and open meadows where the battles of his boyhood had been fought, and the tradition that he would have led the Continental army thither in case of final defeat may not be unfounded. Whether he knew aught of the wholesome part the West was to play in our national development or not, two things are very clear to-day: the West, and the opportunity to occupy it, were the "main chance" of the spent colonies at the end of that war; and if Washington had known all that we know at this day, he certainly could not have done much more than he did to bring about the welding and cementing of the East and the West, which now meant to each other more than ever before. He again utters practically the old cry of his youth: "A pusillanimous behavior now will ill suit the times." And the emphasis is on the "now." It is not surprising, therefore, to find that Washington, soon after reaching Mount Vernon, at the close of the war, determined on another western journey. The ostensible reason for the trip was to look after his lands, but from the journal of the traveller it is easy to see that the important result of the trip was a personal inspection of the means of communication between the various branches of the Ohio and the Potomac, which so nearly interlock in southwestern Pennsylvania and northeastern West Virginia. It must be remembered that in that day river navigation was considered the most practical form of transportation. All the rivers of Virginia, great and small, were the highways of the tobacco industry; the rivers of any colony were placed high in an inventory of the colony's wealth, not only because they implied fertility, but because they were the great avenues of trade. The first important sign of commercial awakening in the interior of the colonies was the improvement of the navigable rivers and the highways. In less than thirty-three days Washington travelled nearly seven hundred miles on horseback in what is now Pennsylvania and West Virginia.[1] That he did not confine his explorations to the travelled ways is evident from his itinerary through narrow, briery paths, and his remaining for at least one night upon a Virginian hillside, where he slept, as in earlier years, beside a camp-fire and covered only by his cloak. His original intention was to go to the Great Kanawha, where much of his most valuable land lay, and after transacting his business, to return by way of the New River into Virginia. But it will be remembered that after the Revolutionary War closed in the East, the bloodiest of battles were yet to be fought in the West; and even in 1784, such was the condition of affairs on the frontier, it did not seem safe for Washington to go down the Ohio. He turned, therefore, to the rough lands at the head of the Monongahela, in the region of Morgantown, West Virginia, and examined carefully all evidence that could be secured touching the practicability of opening a great trunk line of communication between East and West by way of the Potomac and Monongahela rivers. The navigation of the headwaters of the two streams was the subject of special inquiry, and then, in turn, the most practicable route for a portage or a canal between them. From any point of view this hard, dangerous tour of exploration must be considered most significant. Washington had led his ragged armies to victory, England had been fought completely to a standstill, and the victor had returned safely to the peace and quiet of his Mount Vernon farms amid the applause of two continents. And then, in a few weeks, we find the same man with a single attendant beating his way through the tangled trails in hilly West Virginia, inspecting for himself and making diligent inquiry from all he met concerning the practicability of the navigation of the upper Monongahela and the upper Potomac. Russia can point to Peter's laboring in the Holland shipyards with no more pride than that with which we can point to Washington pushing his tired horse through the wilderness about Dunkard's Bottom on the Cheat River in 1784. If through the knowledge and determination of Peter the Russian Empire became strong, then as truly from the clear-visioned inspiration of Washington came the first attempts to bind our East and West into one--a union on which depended the very life of the American Republic. Here and now we find this man firmly believing truths and theories which became the adopted beliefs of a whole nation but a few years later. [Illustration: GEORGE WASHINGTON] Returning to Mount Vernon, Washington immediately penned one of the most interesting and important letters written in America during his day and generation,--"that classic, Washington's Letter to Benjamin Harrison, 1784," as it is styled in the "Old South Leaflets." In this letter he voices passionately his plea for binding a fragmentary nation together by the ties of interstate communion and commerce. His plan included the improvement of the Potomac and one of the heads of the Monongahela, and building a solid portage highway between these waterways. His chief argument was that Virginia ought to be the first in the field to secure the trade of the West; with keener foresight than any other man of his day, Washington saw that the trans-Alleghany empire would be filled with people "faster than any other ever was, or any one would imagine." Not one of all the prophecies uttered during the infancy of our Republic was more marvellously fulfilled. The various means by which this was accomplished changed more rapidly than any one could have supposed, but every change brought to pass more quickly that very marvel which he had foretold to a wondering people only half awake to its greater duty. His final argument was prophetically powerful: he had done what he could to lead his people to freedom from proprietaries and lords of trade. How free now would they be? He wrote: "No well informed Mind need be told, that the flanks and rear of the United territory are possessed by other powers, and formidable ones too--nor how necessary it is to apply the cement of interest to bind all parts of it together, by one indissoluble bond--particularly the middle states with the Country immediately back of them--for what ties let me ask, should we have upon those people; and how entirely unconnected sho{d} we be with them if the Spaniards on their right or great Britain on their left, instead of throwing stumbling blocks in their way as they now do, should invite their trade and seek alliances with them?--What, when they get strength, which will be sooner than is generally imagined (from the emigration of Foreigners who can have no predeliction for us, as well as from the removal of our own Citizens) may be the consequence of their having formed such connections and alliances, requires no uncommon foresight to predict. "The Western Settlers--from my own observation--stand as it were on a pivet--the touch of a feather would almost incline them any way--they looked down the Mississippi until the Spaniards (very impolitically I think for themselves) threw difficulties in the way, and for no other reason that I can conceive than because they glided gently down the stream, without considering perhaps the tedeousness of the voyage back, & the time necessary to perform it in;--and because they have no other means of coming to us but by a long land transportation & unimproved Roads. "A combination of circumstances make the present conjuncture more favorable than any other to fix the trade of the Western Country to our Markets.--The jealous & untoward disposition of the Spaniards on one side, and the private views of some individuals coinciding with the policy of the Court of G. Britain on the other, to retain the posts of Oswego, Niagara, Detroit &c{a} (which tho' done under the letter of the treaty is certainly an infraction of the Spirit of it, & injurious to the Union) may be improved to the greatest advantage by this State if she would open her arms, & embrace the means which are necessary to establish it--The way is plain, & the expense, comparitively speaking deserves not a thought, so great would be the prize--The Western Inhabitants would do their part towards accomplishing it,--weak, as they now are, they would, I am persuaded meet us half way rather than be _driven_ into the arms of, or be in any wise dependent upon, foreigners; the consequences of which would be, a separation, or a War.-- "The way to avoid both, happily for us, is easy, and dictated by our clearest interest.--It is to open a wide door, and make a smooth way for the Produce of that Country to pass to our Markets before the trade may get into another channel--this, in my judgment, would dry up the other Sources; or if any part should flow down the Mississippi, from the Falls of the Ohio, in Vessels which may be built--fitted for Sea--& sold with their Cargoes, the proceeds I have no manner of doubt, will return this way; & that it is better to prevent an evil than to rectify a mistake none can deny--commercial, connections, of all others, are most difficult to dissolve--if we wanted proof of this, look to the avidity with which we are renewing, after a _total_ suspension of eight years, our correspondence with Great Britain;--So, if we are supine, and suffer without a struggle the Settlers of the Western Country to form commercial connections with the Spaniards, Britons, or with any of the States in the Union we shall find it a difficult matter to dissolve them altho' a better communication should, thereafter, be presented to them--time only could effect it; such is the force of habit!-- "Rumseys discovery of working Boats against stream, by mechanical powers principally, may not only be considered as a fortunate invention for these States in general but as one of those circumstances which have combined to render the present epoche favorable above all others for securing (if we are disposed to avail ourselves of them) a large portion of the produce of the Western Settlements, and of the Fur and Peltry of the Lakes, also.--the importation of which alone, if there were no political considerations in the way, is immense.-- "It may be said, perhaps, that as the most direct Routs from the Lakes to the Navigation of Potomack are through the State of Pennsylvania;--and the inter{t} of that State opposed to the extension of the Waters of Monongahela, that a communication cannot be had either by the Yohiogany or Cheat River;--but herein I differ.--an application to this purpose would, in my opinion, place the Legislature of that Commonwealth in a very delicate situation.--That it would not be pleasing I can readily conceive, but that they would refuse their assent, I am by no means clear in.--There is, in that State, at least one hundred thousand Souls West of the Laurel hill, who are groaning under the inconveniences of a long land transportation.--They are wishing, indeed looking, for the extension of inland Navigation; and if this can not be made easy for them to Philadelphia--at any rate it must be lengthy--they will seek a Mart elsewhere; and none is so convenient as that which offers itself through Yohiogany or Cheat River.--the certain consequences therefore of an attempt to restrain the extension of the Navigation of these Rivers, (so consonant with the interest of these people) or to impose any extra: duties upon the exports, or imports, to, or from another State, would be a separation of the Western Settlers from the old & more interior government; towards which there is not wanting a disposition at this moment in the former." Thus the old dream of the youth is brought forward again by the thoughtful, sober man; these words echo the spirit of Washington's whole attitude toward the West--its wealth of buried riches, its commercial possibilities, its swarming colonies of indomitable pioneers. Here was the first step toward solving that second most serious problem that faced the young nation: How can the great West be held and made to strengthen the Union? France and England had owned and lost it. Could the new master, this infant Republic, "one nation to-day, thirteen to-morrow," do better? Ay, but England and France had no seer or adviser so wise as this man. This letter from Washington to Harrison was our nation's pioneer call to the vastly better days (poor as they now seem) of improved river navigation, the first splendid economic advance that heralded the day of the canal and the national highway. For fifty years, until President Jackson vetoed the Maysville Road Bill, the impetus of this appeal, made in 1784, was of vital force in forming our national economic policies. This letter has frequently been pointed to as the inspiring influence which finally gave birth to the Erie Canal and the Cumberland National Road. The immediate result of this agitation was the formation of the celebrated Potomac Company under joint resolutions passed by Virginia and Maryland. Washington was at once elected to the presidency of this company, an office he filled until his election to the presidency of the United States five years later (1789). The plan of the Potomac Company was to improve the navigation of the Potomac to the most advantageous point on its headwaters and build a twenty-mile portage road to Dunkard's Bottom on the Cheat River. With the improvement of the Cheat and Monongahela rivers, a waterway, with a twenty-mile portage, was secured from the Ohio to tide-water on the Potomac. Washington's plan, however, did not stop here. This proposed line of communication was not to stop at the Ohio, but the northern tributaries of that river were to be explored and rendered navigable, and portage roads were to be built between them and the interlocking streams which flowed into the Great Lakes. With the improvement of these waterways, in their turn, a complete trunk line of communication was thus established from the Lakes to the sea. Washington spent no little time in endeavoring to secure the best possible information concerning the nature of the northern tributaries of the Ohio, the Beaver, the Muskingum, the Scioto, and the Miami, and of the lake streams, the Grand, the Cuyahoga, the Sandusky, and the Maumee. It was because of such conceptions as these that all the portage paths of the territory northwest of the Ohio River were declared by the famous Ordinance of 1787, "common highways forever free." The Potomac Company fared no better than the other early companies which attempted to improve the lesser waterways of America before the method of slackwater navigation was discovered. It made, however, the pioneer effort in a cause which meant more to its age than we can readily imagine to-day, and in time it built the great and successful Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, as the early attempts to render the Mohawk River navigable were the first chapters in the history of the famed Erie Canal. These efforts of Washington's constitute likewise the first chapter of the building of our one great national road. This highway, begun in 1811, and completed to the Ohio River in 1818, was practically the portage path which was so important a link in Washington's comprehensive plan. Its starting point was Cumberland, Maryland, on the Potomac, and it led to Brownsville, Pennsylvania, on the Monongahela, and Wheeling on the Ohio. All of these points were famous ports in the days when that first burst of immigration swept over the Alleghanies. Washington's plan for a bond of union between East and West was also the first chapter of the story of throwing the first railway across the Alleghanies. "I consider this among the most important acts of my life," said Charles Carroll, of Carrollton, when with the stroke of a pen he laid the first foundation for the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, "second only to my signing the Declaration of Independence, if even it be second to that." Washington's dream of an empire of united States bound together by a "chain of federal union" was enlarged and modified by the changing needs of a nation, but in its vital essence it was never altered. "It would seem," wrote the late Herbert B. Adams, "as though, in one way or another, all lines of our public policy lead back to Washington, as all roads lead to Rome." And yet, after all, I believe there are other words which sound a note that should never die in the ears of his people, and those are his own youthful words, "A pusillanimous behavior now will ill suit the times." It is not easy to pass this subject without referring to Washington's remarkably wise foresight with reference to the West and national growth which his experience with that part of the country gave him. True, he made some miscalculations, as when he expressed the opinion that New York would not improve her great route to the West (Mohawk River route) until the British had given up their hold on the Great Lakes; he however pointed to that route as one of the most important in America and hardly expected more from it than has been realized. In all phases of the awakening of the West--the Mississippi question, the organization of the Northwest Territory, the formulating of the Ordinance of 1787 ("the legal outcome of Maryland's successful policy in advocating National Sovereignty over the Western Lands"), the ceding of lands to the National Government, the handling of the Indian problem--Washington's influence and knowledge were of paramount usefulness. Take these instances of his prescience as yet unmentioned: he suggested, in connection with the Potomac improvement, the policy of exploration and surveys which our government has steadily adhered to since that day; the Lewis and Clark expedition was a result of this policy advocated first by Washington. Again, note Washington's singularly wise opinion on the separation of Kentucky from Virginia. Writing to Jefferson in 1785, he affirms that the general opinion in his part of Virginia is unfavorable to the separation. "I have uniformly given it as mine," he wrote, "to meet them upon their own ground, draw the best line, and make the best terms we can, and part good friends." And again, it is to the point to notice Washington's far-seeing view of the progress and enterprise of the West in relation to commerce. Who before him ever had the temerity to suggest that ships would descend the Ohio River and sail for foreign ports?[2] Yet he said this in 1784 and had the audacity to add that, if so, the return route of the proceeds of all sales thus resulting would be over the Alleghany routes, which prophecy was fulfilled to the very letter. FOOTNOTES: [1] Washington's diary of this journey is printed in full in Hulbert, "Washington and the West," 27-105. [2] Hulbert, "Washington and the West," 195-6. CHAPTER III _After Examination Henderson is licensed to practise Law.--Defeat of the Shawnees by the Virginians who claimed the Land south of the Ohio.--The Attention of Settlers directed to the Land beyond the Alleghanies.--Henderson resolves to form a Transylvania Company and colonize Ken-ta-kee.--Buys from the Cherokees twenty million Acres for ten thousand Pounds Sterling, March, 1775.--Bands of Earlier Kentucky Settlers, fleeing from the Indians, meet Henderson's Colonists.--His Advance, led by Daniel Boone, attacked by Indians.--Henderson appeals in vain to the Fugitives to return with him.--Arrival of the Colonists at the Site of Boonesborough.--Henderson's Anxiety regarding Virginia's Attitude toward his Purchase.--The Governor of Virginia sends a Force which overthrows the Colony.--Actual Settlers on the Purchase permitted to remain in Title.--Grants of Land made to the Company by Virginia and North Carolina in Return for their Outlay.--The Moral Effect of this Proof that the West could be successfully colonized._ RICHARD HENDERSON: THE FOUNDER OF TRANSYLVANIA [Illustration] IN early days in North Carolina, the young man who desired to practise law was compelled to get a certificate from the Chief Justice of the colony and to present this to the Governor; the latter examined the candidate, and, becoming satisfied as to his attainments, granted him a license. Almost a century and a half ago a youth presented himself to the Governor of that colony with the proper credentials and asked that he be examined for admission to the bar. His name, he affirmed, was Richard Henderson. His father, Samuel Henderson, had moved from Virginia in 1745, Richard's tenth year, and was now Sheriff of Granville County. Richard had assisted his father "in the business of the sherifftry," and, with a few books, had picked up his knowledge of law. All this the Governor of North Carolina learned with indifference, we can imagine, as he looked the broad-shouldered lad up and down. It may be that North Carolina had now a surplus of pettifoggers; at any rate the Governor was not granting licenses with a free hand to-day. The youth was not voluble, though his firm square jaw denoted both sturdiness and determination; perhaps he was somewhat abashed, as he well may have been, in the presence of the chief executive of the colony. "How long have you read law?" asked the Governor. "A twelve-month," answered the lad. "And what books have you read?" We can fancy there was the tinge of a sneer in these words. Henderson named his books. If the sneer was hidden until now, it instantly appeared as the young applicant was bluntly told that it was nonsense for him to appear for an examination after such a short period of study of such a limited number of books. The firm jaws were clinched and the gray eyes snapped as the rebuke was administered. Despite his homely exterior and unpolished address the boy was already enough of a jurist to love justice and fair play; if silent under many circumstances, he could speak when the time demanded speech. "Sir," he replied,--and it can be believed there was a ring to the words,--"I am an applicant for examination: it is your duty to examine me; if I am found worthy, I should be granted a license, and if not, I should be refused one, not before." We can be sure that the Governor bristled up at hearing his duty outlined to him from the lips of a country boy; and it is no less probable that as he began an examination it was wholly with the intention of demoralizing utterly the spirit of the youth who had spoken so boldly. The answers did not come so rapidly, probably, as the questions were asked, nor were they formulated with equal nicety; but the substance was there, of sufficient quantity and sturdy quality, and in short order the Governor, who was a gentleman, found himself admiring the cool, discerning lad who had the confidence of his convictions. The license was granted and with it a bountiful degree of honest praise. Young Henderson immediately began the practice of law and was increasingly successful; before the outbreak of the Revolution he was judge on the bench of the Superior Court of North Carolina. As early as 1774 North Carolina was convulsed in the Revolutionary contest, and in that year the Colonial government was abolished there. The student will search in vain to find the earliest motive which led Judge Henderson to turn his eyes to the westward at this juncture. Yet since he had come of age he had witnessed important events: the French and Indian War had been fought and won; Pontiac's rebellion had been put down; the famous treaty of Fort Stanwix, which gave Virginia all the territory between the Ohio and Tennessee rivers, had been signed; and now in 1774, when North Carolina was in the throes of revolution, Governor Dunmore of Virginia and General Andrew Lewis defeated the savage Shawnees who had attempted to challenge Virginia's right to the land south of the Ohio. The stories of the first explorers of the hinterland beyond the Alleghanies--Walker, Gist, Washington, and Boone--were now attracting more attention as people began to believe that the Indians could, after all, be made to keep their treaty pledges. As the Revolutionary fires raged in North Carolina, many turned their eyes to the fresh green lands beyond the mountains of which the "Long Hunters" and Boone had told. Were those dreams true? Was there a pleasant land beyond dark Powell's Valley and darker Cumberland Gap where the British would cease from troubling, and honest men, as well as criminals and debtors, would be at rest? The hope in one man's breast became a conviction, and the conviction a firm purpose. Judge Henderson resolved to form a Transylvania Company, secure a large tract of land, and lead a colony into the sweet meadows of Ken-ta-kee. It is not known when or how Judge Henderson learned that the Cherokees would sell a portion of their Western hunting grounds. It may have been only a borderland rumor; perhaps it came directly from the wigwams of the Indians at the mouth of a "Long Hunter," possibly a Boone or a Harrod. Somehow it did come, and Henderson resolved immediately to make a stupendous purchase and follow it up with a remarkable emigration. It will be proper to add at once that there is as little probability that the Cherokees had a legal right to sell as that Henderson had to buy; but neither party stood on technicalities. Virginia's sweeping claims, made good by daring politics at the treaty of Fort Stanwix, covered all the territory between the Ohio and the Tennessee. A Virginian law forbade the private purchase of land from the Indians, though Virginia herself had acquired it by flagrantly evading the plain meaning of the King's proclamation of 1763 in making such a purchase from the Six Nations. And the claim of the Six Nations to possession of the Old Southwest was less substantial than that of the Cherokees who still hunted there. Passing, then, these technicalities as lightly as Virginia and Henderson did (a common failing in the rough old days when this region was but a moaning forest), let us look quickly to the West. Henderson's plan was admirably laid. He at once took into his service the cool and trusty Daniel Boone. The latter was posted off to that most distant of borderland communities, the Watauga Settlement, to arrange a meeting between the officers of the Transylvania Company and the chiefs of the Cherokees. And here, at the famed Sycamore Shoals on this Watauga tributary of the Tennessee, on the 17th of March, 1775, Richard Henderson signed the treaty of Fort Watauga. His business associates were Judge John Williams, Leonard Henley Bullock, James Hogg, Nathaniel Thomas, David Hart, John Luttrell, and William Johnstone. But even the well-informed Boone could not make all things move smoothly, and there were delays ere the vast tract of twenty million acres lying south of the Kentucky River was satisfactorily secured. The Cherokee chieftain, Oconostota, opposed the treaty, and the stipulation named, ten thousand pounds sterling in goods; he made, it is said, one of the "most eloquent orations that ever fell from red man's lips," against Boone and Henderson. At the close the quiet promoter, who "could be silent in English and two Indian languages," met the Indian orator apart and alone. No one ever knew what passed between them, but the treaty of Fort Watauga was duly signed. All was ready now for the advance movement, and Henderson immediately employed Daniel Boone to move forward to mark the path to the Kentucky River, where the settlement was to be made. Felix Walker was one of the band of woodsmen assembled by Boone to assist in this task of marking out for white men the Indian path through Cumberland Gap. "Colonel Boone ... was to be our pilot," Walker records, "through the wilderness, to the promised land." Kentucky was a promised land; it was promised by the Cherokees, and none knew better than the savage Shawnees that Cherokee promises were worth no more than their own. In 1773 and 1774 numbers of the half-civilized pioneers had been pressing into Kentucky, and in the latter year cabins had been raised in many quarters. Whether or not there was any sign of genuine permanency in these beginnings, Dunmore's War, which broke out in 1774, put everything at hazard; the Kentucky movement was seemingly destroyed for the time being. For this reason it is that the Henderson purchase at Fort Watauga in March, 1775, was of as precious moment and providential timeliness as perhaps any other single private enterprise in our early history. As will be seen, the Ohio Company played a most important role in the history of the West in 1787, by making possible the famous Ordinance; but the filling of Kentucky in 1775 was more important at that hour than any other social movement at any other hour in Western history. For Henderson "meant business": this was not a get-rich-quick scheme that he was foisting upon others. He came to Watauga in the expectation of proceeding onward to the farlying land he would buy--a man willing to make great personal as well as financial risk in a venture more chimerical in its day than the incorporation of an airship freight line would be to-day. And by the twentieth of March, Henderson was ready to push westward, along that winding line of wounded trees, up hill and down valley, to the Gap and beyond into the wilderness which lay between the Cumberland Mountains and the meadow lands of Kentucky. Leaving Fort Watauga March 20, the party, chief of which were Henderson, Hart, and Luttrell, reached Captain Joseph Martin's station in Powell's Valley on the thirtieth. Of the experiences of these men, recounted so interestingly in Henderson's little yellow diary, nothing is so significant as the parties of pioneers which they soon began to meet retreating from Kentucky. The first of these hurrying bands of fugitives was encountered as early as April 7, and between that date and April 19 at least seventy-six fugitives from the "dark and bloody ground" met and passed Henderson's little colony of forty. Lewis's victory of the Summer before had embittered the savages beyond all words; and now, as the Spring of 1775 dawned in the lonely mountain valleys, these first adventurers into Kentucky were hurrying eastward. And this dread of Indian hostility was not a chimera; even as Boone's party was hacking its route to the Kentucky River, it was ambushed in camp by an Indian horde, which assailed it when night was darkest, just before dawn; one man was killed and two were wounded, one of them fatally. Now it was that Boone sent Henderson those thrilling words which can be understood only when we realize that the Indian marauders were driving out of Kentucky the entire van which came there and began settling in 1774. "My advice to you, Sir," wrote Boone from that bloody battleground on the trail, "is to come or send as soon as possible. Your company is desired greatly, for the people are very uneasy, but are willing to stay and venture their lives with you, and now is the time to frustrate the intentions of the Indians, and keep the country whilst we are in it. If we give way to them now, it will ever be the case." There is, unfortunately, no portrait of Richard Henderson in existence; if one picture by some magic art could be secured, those who are proudest of his memory could surely prefer no scene to this: a man a little above average height, broad of shoulders but not fleshy, clad in the rough garb of the typical pioneer, standing in Boone's trail on a ragged spur of the gray-grained Cumberlands, pleading with a pale-faced, disheartened Kentucky pioneer, to turn about, join his company, and return to the Kentucky River. For this was the mission of his life--to give heart to that precious movement into Kentucky at this critical first hour of her history. A beginning had been made, but it was on the point of being swept from its feet. The Transylvania Company, led with courage and confidence by Boone and Henderson, ignored the fears of fugitives and triumphed splendidly in the face of every known and many unknown fears. At noon of Saturday, April 8, Henderson and his followers were toiling up the ascent into Cumberland Gap. On this day a returning party as large as Henderson's was encountered. "Met about 40 persons returning from the Cantuckey," wrote Henderson in his diary. "On Acct. of the Late Murder by the Indians, could prevail one [on] one only to return. Memo. Several Virginians who were with us returned." On the twelfth another company of fugitives was met on Richmond Creek; William Calk, one of Henderson's party, jotted this down in his journal: "There we met another Company going back [to Virginia]; they tell such News Abram and Drake is afraid to go aney further." This "Abram" was Abraham Hanks, uncle of Nancy Hanks, the mother of Abraham Lincoln. But pushing bravely on, Henderson and his daring associates reached the site of the new Boonesborough (Fort Boone, Henderson called it) on the twentieth of April. From this it is well to date the founding of a genuine settlement in Kentucky, one day after the rattle of that running fire of muskets at Lexington and Concord which rang around the world. In an indefinite sense, there were settlements in Kentucky before this; but no promoter-friend of Kentucky ever coaxed back over the Cumberland Mountains any of the founders of Boonesborough! True, Boonesborough itself did not exist permanently; but not because the land was deserted. Boonesborough was not on the direct line from Cumberland Gap to the "Falls of the Ohio" (Louisville), and did not play the part in later Kentucky history that Harrodsburg and Crab Orchard did. It was, however, the first important fortified Kentucky station, and its builders, chief of whom was Richard Henderson, received their heroic inspiration from no persons or parties in existence in Kentucky when they came thither. Henderson's determination to hold the ground gained is seen in the following letter written in July, 1775, to Captain Martin, in Powell's Valley, who had just given the Indians a bloody check: "... Your spirited conduct gives me great pleasure. Keep your men in heart if possible; now is your time, the Indians must not drive us." A touch of the loneliness of Judge Henderson's situation is sensed in another letter to Martin: "I long much to hear from you," he writes from the banks of the far-away Kentucky, "pray write me at large, how the matter goes with you in the valley, as well as what passes in Virginia." Little wonder he was anxious concerning Virginia's attitude toward his purchase and the bold advance of his party of colonizers, from which several Virginians had deserted. There could be no doubt of Virginia's opinion of these North Carolinians who had taught that colony what could be done in the West by brave, determined men. Henderson's purchase was annulled, and Henderson and his compatriots were described as vagabond interlopers, in a governor's anathema. Before this was known, Henderson issued a regular call for a meeting of the colonists to take the initial steps of forming a State government. But all that Henderson planned is not to our purpose here. A rush of Virginians through the doorway in Cumberland Gap, which Boone and Henderson had opened, swept the inchoate state of Transylvania from record and almost from memory. The Transylvania Company never survived the Virginia governor's proclamation, North Carolina joining Virginia in repudiating the private purchase. Actual settlers on Henderson's purchase, however, were permitted to remain in title; and, in return for the money expended by Henderson and his associates, Virginia granted his company two hundred thousand acres of land in the vicinity of Henderson, Kentucky; and North Carolina granted an equal amount in Carter's Valley near the Cumberland Mountains. In each case the actual acreage was about double that mentioned in the grant. But this appropriation of nearly a million acres to the Henderson Company cannot be viewed at this day as other than a payment for great value received. From any standpoint Richard Henderson's brave advance into Kentucky, in April, 1775, must be considered one of the most heroic displays of that typical American spirit of comprehensive aggrandizement of which so much is heard to-day. Its great value may be guessed from the moral effect of the founding of Fort Boone at the critical hour when the Revolutionary flames, so long burning in secret, burst forth to enlighten the world. It meant much to the East that Henderson and Boone should prove that a settlement on the lower Ohio Basin could be made and maintained; it meant everything to the infant West that Kentucky should so soon begin to fill with men, women, and children. The debt of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois to Kentucky can never be paid and probably never will be appropriately recognized. The lands north of the Ohio were freed from savage dominion largely by the raiding Kentuckians. It is certain that the most spectacular campaign in Western history, Clark's conquest of Illinois, would never have taken place in 1778 if Henderson and Boone had not placed the possibility of successful Kentucky immigration beyond a reasonable doubt in 1775. Judge Henderson returned to North Carolina upon the failure of the Transylvania Company, no doubt depressed and disappointed. The later allotment of land to the Transylvania Company by Virginia and North Carolina in part annulled the severe early defamatory charges of the Virginia governor. He lived to a peaceful old age, and lies buried near his old colonial mansion near Williamstown, North Carolina. Boonesborough is well remembered as Boone's Fort; but it is unjust to forget that Boone was acting in the employ of Richard Henderson, the founder of Transylvania. CHAPTER IV _A Movement among the Colonies to seize the Unoccupied Land Northwest of the Ohio.--Putnam's Hardy Training in Boyhood.--His Training in the Old French War.--His Achievements in the Revolutionary War.--He and Many Soldiers petition Congress for Western Land, as promised at the Beginning of the War.--The Ohio Company of Associates, by its Agent, Mr. Cutler, persuades Congress to pass the Ordinance of 1787.--March of the Founders of Ohio from Ipswich, Mass., to the Site of West Newton, Pa.--Putnam prepares to descend the Youghiogheny, Monongahela, and Ohio to Fort Harmar.--Fears of the Travellers that the Indians driven from Kentucky would attack them.--The Party found Marietta at the Mouth of the Muskingum.--Inauguration of the Governor of the Territory.--Contrast between Conditions, North of the Ohio and South of it.--Other Settlements on the Ohio in the Eighteenth Century.--Putnam's Beautiful Character.--Washington's Opinion of him._ RUFUS PUTNAM: THE FATHER OF OHIO [Illustration] OVER the beginning of great movements, whether social or political, there often hangs a cloud of obscurity. No event of equal importance in our history is more clear than the founding and first settlement of the territory northwest of the Ohio River, from which the five imperial commonwealths of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin sprang. It occurred at that crucial moment when Washington was calling upon Virginia, and all the colonies, to seize the West and the hope it offered, when the West was another name for opportunity to the spent colonies at the close of the Revolutionary struggle. [Illustration: RUFUS PUTNAM _Leader of the Founders of Marietta, Ohio_] The hero of the movement, General Rufus Putnam, was one of those plain, sturdy, noble men whom it is a delight to honor. He was born at Sutton, Massachusetts, April 9, 1738, and was thus six years younger than Washington, who always honored him. With little education, save that gained from a few books bought with pennies earned by blacking boots and running errands for guests at his illiterate stepfather's inn, he became a self-made man of the best type,--the man who seizes every advantage from book and friend to reach a high plane and scan a wider horizon. The Old French War was the training school for the Revolutionary conflict; and here, with Gates and Mercer and Washington and St. Clair and Wayne and Gladwin and Gibson, Rufus Putnam learned to love his country as only those can who have been willing to risk and wreck their all in her behalf. Then came the Revolution. In the first act of the glorious yet pitiful drama Rufus Putnam stands out conspicuously; for "we take no leaf from the pure chaplet of Washington's fame," affirmed Senator Hoar, of Massachusetts, "when we say that the success of the first great military operation of the Revolution was due to Rufus Putnam." The story is of intrinsic interest. On a winter's evening in 1776, Rufus Putnam was invited to dine at the headquarters of the Commander-in-chief in the camp before Boston. After the dinner party had broken up, Washington detained him with questions concerning the proper policy to be pursued with reference to the future plan of campaign. As is well known, Washington favored an entrenchment on Dorchester Heights which would bring on a second Bunker Hill with a fair chance of victory, rather than the alternative of marching upon the city across the ice-bound waters. But the frozen state of the ground was a serious handicap in any entrenchment plan at that moment. Putnam was asked in short how the equivalent of entrenchments could be erected; the solving of the question meant the deliverance of Massachusetts from the burden of British occupation. This son of the State was equal to the moment, and his own simple account of the means adopted is exceptionally interesting: "I left headquarters in company with another gentleman, and on our way came by General Heath's. I had no thoughts of calling until I came against his door, and then I said, 'Let us call on General Heath,' to which he agreed. I had no other motive but to pay my respects to the general. While there, I cast my eye on a book which lay on the table, lettered on the back 'Müller's Field Engineer.' I immediately requested the general to lend it to me. He denied me. I repeated my request. He again refused, and told me he never lent his books. I then told him that he must recollect that he was one who, at Roxbury, in a measure compelled me to undertake a business which, at the time, I confessed I never had read a word about, and that he must let me have the book. After some more excuses on his part and close pressing on mine I obtained the loan of it." "In looking at the table of contents," writes Senator Hoar, "his eye was caught by the word 'chandelier,' a new word to him. He read carefully the description and soon had his plan ready. The chandeliers were made of stout timbers, ten feet long, into which were framed posts, five feet high and five feet apart, placed on the ground in parallel lines and the open spaces filled in with bundles of fascines, strongly picketed together, thus forming a movable parapet of wood instead of earth, as heretofore done. The men were immediately set to work in the adjacent apple orchard and woodlands, cutting and bundling up the fascines and carrying them with the chandeliers on to the ground selected for the work. They were put in their place in a single night. "When the sun went down on Boston on the 4th of March, Washington was at Cambridge, and Dorchester Heights were as nature or the husbandman had left them in the autumn. When Sir William Howe rubbed his eyes on the morning of the 5th, he saw through the heavy mists, the entrenchments, on which, he said, the rebels had done more work in a night than his whole army would have done in a month. He wrote to Lord Dartmouth that it must have been the employment of at least twelve thousand men. His own effective force, including seamen, was but about eleven thousand. Washington had but fourteen thousand fit for duty. 'Some of our officers,' said the 'Annual Register,'--I suppose Edmund Burke was the writer,--'acknowledged that the expedition with which these works were thrown up, with their sudden and unexpected appearance, recalled to their minds the wonderful stories of enchantment and invisible agency which are so frequent in the Eastern Romances.' Howe was a man of spirit. He took the prompt resolution to attempt to dislodge the Americans the next night before their works were made impregnable. Earl Percy, who had learned something of Yankee quality at Bunker Hill and Lexington, was to command the assault. But the Power that dispersed the Armada, baffled all the plans of the British general. There came 'a dreadful storm at night,' which made it impossible to cross the bay until the American works were perfected. The Americans, under Israel Putnam, marched into Boston, drums beating and colors flying. The veteran British army, aided by a strong naval force, soldier and sailor, Englishman and Tory, sick and well, bag and baggage, got out of Boston before the strategy of Washington, the engineering of Putnam, and the courage of the despised and untried yeomen, from whose leaders they withheld the usual titles of military respect. 'It resembled,' said Burke, 'more the emigration of a nation than the breaking up of a camp.'" His later solid achievements during the war made him, in Washington's estimation, the best engineer in the army, whether French or American, and "to be a great engineer with only such advantages of education as Rufus Putnam enjoyed, is to be a man of consummate genius." A sober, brave man of genius was required to lead to a successful issue the great work to which Rufus Putnam was now providentially called. The vast territory between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi came into the possession of the United States at the close of the Revolution. Then it was made possible for Congress to grant the bounty-lands promised to soldiers at the beginning of the war, and likewise to redeem its worthless script in Western lands. This a grateful government was willing to do, but the question was vast and difficult. If occupied, the territory must be governed. Few more serious problems faced the young Republic. The question was practically solved by two men, Rufus Putnam and that noble clergyman, Manasseh Cutler, pastor of the Congregational church at Ipswich, Massachusetts. Through Putnam, a large body of officers and men had petitioned Congress urgently for Western land: "Ten years ago you promised bounties in lands," was Putnam's appeal now to Congress through General Washington; "we have faithfully performed our duty, as history will record. We come to you now and ask that, in redemption of your promise, you give us homes in that Western wilderness. We will hew down the forests, and therein erect temples to the living God, raise and educate our children to serve and love and honor the nation for which their fathers fought, cultivate farms, build towns and cities, and make that wilderness the pride and glory of the nation." The Ohio Company of Associates was organized at the Bunch of Grapes Tavern, in Boston, March 1, 1786, by the election of Rufus Putnam, chairman, and Winthrop Sargent, secretary. As the agent of this organization, Dr. Cutler hastened to New York, while the famous Ordinance of 1787 was pending. This instrument had been before Congress for three years, but was passed within twelve days after this hero-preacher and skilled diplomat came to New York. The Ordinance organized, from lands ceded to the general government by the several States, the magnificent tract known as the Territory Northwest of the River Ohio. The delay had been caused by the hazard of erecting a great Territory, to be protected at heavy expense, without having it occupied by a considerable number of worthy citizens. The Ohio Company of Associates had offered to take a million and a half acres. This was unsatisfactory to the delegates in Congress. It was a mere clearing in all that vast tract stretching from the Alleghany to the Wisconsin. Dr. Cutler hastened to New York to reconcile the parties interested. [Illustration: REV. MANASSEH CUTLER _Ohio Pioneer_] The situation was prophetically unique. The Northwest Territory could not be organized safely without the very band of colonizers which Cutler represented and of which Putnam was the leader. On the other hand, the Ohio Company could not secure Western land without being assured that it was to be an integral part of the country for which they had fought. Putnam's appeal read: "All we ask is that it shall be consecrated to us and our children forever, with the blessing of that Declaration which, proclaimed to the world and sustained by our arms, established as self-evident that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that to secure these ends, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just power from the consent of the governed." Thus the famed Ordinance and the Ohio Company's purchase went hand in hand; each was impossible without the other. In order to realize the hope of his clients on the one hand, and satisfy the demands of the delegates in Congress on the other, Dr. Cutler added to the grant of the Ohio Company an additional one of three and a half million acres for a Scioto Company. Thus, by a stupendous speculation (so unhappy in its result, though compromising in no way the Ohio Company or its agents), and by shrewdly, though without dissimulation, making known his determination to buy land privately from one of the individual States if Congress would not now come to terms, Dr. Cutler won a signal victory. The Ordinance of 1787 was passed, corrected to the very letter of his own amendments, and the United States entered into the largest private contract it had ever made. With the passing of the Ordinance and the signing of the indented agreement for the Ohio Company by Cutler and Sargent on the 27th of October of that most memorable year in our documentary annals, a new era of Western history dawned. Up to that moment, there had been only illegal settlements between the Ohio River and the Great Lakes--Zeisberger's Moravians on the Tuscarawas. On numerous occasions troops had been sent from Pittsburg (Fort Pitt) to drive away from the northern side of the Ohio settlers who had squatted on the Seven Ranges, which Congress had caused to be surveyed westward from the Pennsylvania line. It being difficult to reach these squatters from Pittsburg, Fort Harmar was erected at the mouth of the Muskingum, in 1785, where troops were kept to drive off intruders, protect the surveyors, and keep the Indians in awe. The Ohio Company's purchase extended from the seventh through the seventeenth range, running northward far enough to include the necessary amount of territory. It was natural, then, that the capital of the new colony should be located at the mouth of the Muskingum, under the guns of the fort. The New Englanders who formed the Ohio Company were not less determined in their venture than were the North Carolinians who formed the Transylvania Company thirteen years before; and, though the founders of Marietta, Ohio, ran no such risk (it has been said) as did the founders of Boonesborough, Kentucky, we of to-day can have no just appreciation of the toil and the wearing years which these founders of the Old Northwest now faced. Yet danger and fear were no novelty to them. How fitting it was that these men, who first entered the portals of the Northwest, bearing in their hands the precious Ordinance and guided by the very star of empire, should have been in part the heroes of the two wars which saved this land from its enemies. One cannot look unmoved upon that body of travellers who met at daybreak, December 6, 1787, before Dr. Cutler's home at Ipswich, to receive his blessing before starting. Theirs was no idle ambition. No Moravian, no Jesuit with beads and rosary, ever faced the Western wilderness with a fairer purpose. In Kentucky, the Virginians had gained, and were holding with powerful grasp, the fair lands of _Ken-ta-kee_; elsewhere the Black Forest loomed dark and foreboding. Could the New Englanders do equally well? Their earnestness was a prophecy of their great success. In December the first party of carpenters and boat-builders, under Major Hatfield White, started on the westward journey, and in January 1788 the remainder of the brave vanguard, under Colonel Ebenezer Sproat and General Rufus Putnam, followed. These were the forty-eight "Founders of Ohio." The rigors of a northern winter made the long journey over Forbes's, or the Pennsylvania Road, a most exhaustive experience. This road through Lancaster, Carlisle, Shippensburg, and Bedford was from this time forward a connecting link between New England and Ohio. It was a rough gorge of a road ploughed deep by the heavy wheels of many an army wagon. Near Bedford, Pennsylvania, the road forked; the northern fork ran on to Pittsburg; the southern, struck off southwestwardly to the Youghiogheny River and the lower Ohio. This branch the New England caravan followed to Sumrill's Ferry on the Youghiogheny, the present West Newton, Pennsylvania. Here Putnam planned to build a rude flotilla and descend the Youghiogheny, Monongahela, and Ohio to Fort Harmar. The severe winter prevented immediate building of this fleet, but by April all was in readiness. The main boat was a covered galley, forty-five feet long, which was most appropriately named the "Adventure Galley." The heavy baggage was carried on a flat boat and a large canoe. Of the men who formed Putnam's company what more can be said--or what less--than what Senator Hoar has left in his eloquent centennial oration at Marietta in 1888? "The stately figures of illustrious warriors and statesmen, the forms of sweet and comely matrons, living and real as if you had seen them yesterday, rise before you now. Varnum, than whom a courtlier figure never entered the presence of a queen,--soldier, statesman, scholar, orator,--whom Thomas Paine, no mean judge, who had heard the greatest English orators in the greatest days of English eloquence, declared the most eloquent man he had ever heard speak; Whipple, gallant seaman as ever trod a deck,--a man whom Farragut or Nelson would have loved as a brother, first of the glorious procession of American naval heroes, first to fire an American gun at the flag of England on the sea, first to unfurl the flag of his own country on the Thames, first pioneer of the river commerce of the Ohio to the Gulf; Meigs, hero of Sagg Harbor, of the march to Quebec, of the storming of Stony Point, the Christian gentleman and soldier, whom the Cherokees named the White Path, in token of the unfailing kindness and inflexible faith which had conveyed to their darkened minds some not inadequate conception of the spirit of Him who is the Way, the Truth, and the Life; Parsons, soldier, scholar, judge, one of the strongest arms on which Washington leaned, who first suggested the Continental Congress, from the story of whose life could almost be written the history of the Northern War; the chivalric and ingenious Devol, said by his biographer to be 'the most perfect figure of a man to be seen amongst a thousand'; the noble presence of a Sproat; the sons of Israel Putnam and Manasseh Cutler; Fearing, and Greene, and Goodale, and the Gilmans; Tupper, leader in Church and State, the veteran of a hundred exploits, who seems, in the qualities of intellect and heart, like a twin brother of Rufus Putnam; the brave and patriotic, but unfortunate St. Clair, first Governor of the Northwest, President of the Continental Congress;--the mighty shades of these heroes and their companions pass before our eyes, beneath the primeval forest, as the shades of the Homeric heroes before Ulysses in the Land of Asphodel." It did not argue that the New Englanders on the Ohio could hold their ground simply because the Kentucky movement had been for over a decade such a marvellous success. Its very success was the chief menace of the Kentucky problem. The eyes of five thousand Indians were fastened there, for from Kentucky had come army after army, driving the savages northward out of the valleys of the Muskingum, Scioto, and Miami Rivers, until now they hovered about the western extremity of Lake Erie. By a treaty signed at Fort McIntosh in 1786, the Indians had sold to the United States practically all of eastern and southern Ohio. And so the settlement at the mouth of the Muskingum at this critical moment was in every sense a test settlement. There was a chance that the savages would forget the Kentuckians who had driven them back to the Lakes and made possible the Ohio Company settlement and turn upon the New Englanders themselves who now landed at the mouth of the Muskingum on the 7th of April, 1788, and began their home-building on the opposite bank of the Muskingum from Fort Harmar. Here sprang up the rude pioneer settlement which was to be, for more than a year, the capital of the great new Territory--forever the historic portal of the Old Northwest. These Revolutionary soldiers under Putnam combined the two names Marie Antoinette, and named their capital Marietta in memory of the faithfulness of Frenchmen and France to the patriot cause. Here arose the stately forest-castle, the Campus Martius, and near it was built the office of the Ohio Company, where General Putnam carried on, in behalf of the Ohio Company, the important business of the settlement. In July, 1788, Governor St. Clair arrived, and with imposing ceremony the great Territory was formally established and its governor inaugurated. Putnam's brave dream had come true. The best blood and brain of New England were now on the Ohio to shape forever the Old Northwest and the great States to be made from it. The soldiers were receiving the promised bounties, and an almost worthless half-a-million dollars had been redeemed in lands worth many millions. The scheme of colonization, which was but a moment before a thing of words and paper, became a living, moving influence of immense power. Another New England on the Ohio arose full-armed from the specifications of the great Ordinance and the daring confidence of Rufus Putnam and his colony. South of the Ohio, the miserable Virginia system of land ownership by tomahawk-claim was in force from the Monongahela to the Tennessee; north of the Ohio, the New England township system prevailed. South of the Ohio, slavery was permitted and encouraged; to the northward, throughout the wide empire included within the Ordinance, slavery was forever excluded. Two more fundamental differences could not have existed. And to these might be added the encouragement given by the Ordinance to religion and education. The coming of the Ohio Company to Marietta meant many things to many men, but the one great fundamental fact is of most importance. The founding of Marietta by Rufus Putnam in reality made possible the Ordinance of 1787--of which Daniel Webster said, "I doubt whether one single law of any lawgiver, ancient or modern, has produced effects of more distinct, marked, and lasting character." The heroic movement which has justly given Rufus Putnam the title "Father of Ohio" has been one of the marvellous successes of the first century of our national expansion. Three other settlements were made on the Ohio in 1788 near Cincinnati by sons of New Jersey. Within ten years, Connecticut sent a brave squad of men through the wilderness of New York to found Cleveland; Virginia sent of her brain and blood to found one of the most important settlements in Ohio in the fair Scioto valley. These four settlements, before 1800, in the Black Forest of Ohio were typically cosmopolitan and had a significant mission in forming, so far west as Lake Erie and so far south as the lower Ohio, the cosmopolitan American State par excellence. But of all these early prompters--Symmes, Cleaveland, Massie, and Putnam--the last is the most lovable, and the movement he led is the most significant and interesting. Our subject is so large in all its leading features, that the personality of Putnam can only be touched upon. As manager for the Ohio Company, a thousand affairs of both great and trifling moment were a part of his tiresome routine. Yet the heart of the colony's leader was warm to the lowliest servant. Many a poor tired voyager descending the Ohio had cause to know that the founder of Marietta was as good as a whole nation knew he was brave. In matters concerning the founding of the "Old Two-Horn," the first church in the Old Northwest,--and in the organizing of the little academy in the block-house of the fort, to which Marietta College proudly traces her founding, the private formative influence of Putnam is seen to clear advantage. Noble in a great crisis, he was noble still in the lesser wearing duties of that pioneer colony of which he was the hope and mainstay. Now called upon by Washington to make the long journey, in the dark days of 1792 after St. Clair's terrible defeat, to represent the United States in a treaty with the Illinois Indians on the Wabash; again, with sweet earnestness settling a difficulty arising between a tippling clergyman and his church; now, with absolute fairness and generosity, criticising his brave but high-strung governor for actions which he regarded as too arbitrary, the character of Rufus Putnam appeals more and more as a remarkable example of that splendid simplicity which is the proof and crown of greatness. A yellow manuscript in Washington's handwriting is preserved in the New York State Library, which contains his private opinion of the Revolutionary officers. It is such a paper as Washington would not have left for the public to read, as it expresses an inside view. Relatives of a number of these Revolutionary heroes would not read its simple sentences with pleasure, but the descendants of Rufus Putnam may remember it with pride: Putnam had not been accused of securing certificates from his soldiers by improper means; he was not, like Wayne, "open to flattery--vain"; the odor of a whiskey flask was not suggested by his name; on the contrary, "he possesses a strong mind and is a discreet man." Considering the nature and purpose of this high encomium, it is not less than a hearty "Well done" to a good and faithful servant. CHAPTER V _The Grave of David Zeisberger, Moravian Missionary to the Indians.--The Great Length of his Service.--His Flight from Moravia to Saxony.--Arrival at Bethlehem, Pa.--He studies the Mohawk Language.--Visits the Land of the Iroquois and is captured as a French Spy.--Imprisoned by Governor Clinton and freed by Parliament.--The Iroquois place in his Mission-house the Archives of their Nation.--He converts Many Delawares in Western Pennsylvania.--His Work interrupted by Pontiac's Rebellion.--The Delawares invite him to the Black Forest of Ohio.--He takes with him Two Whole Villages of Christian Indians.--Their Unfortunate Location between Fort Pitt and Fort Detroit in the Revolutionary War.--They are removed by the British to Sandusky.--One Hundred of them, being permitted to return, are murdered by the Americans.--The Remnant, after Many Hardships, rest for Six Years in Canada, and return to Ohio.--Zeisberger's Death._ DAVID ZEISBERGER: HERO OF "THE MEADOW OF LIGHT" [Illustration] IN the centre of the old Black Forest of America, near New Philadelphia, Ohio, a half-forgotten Indian graveyard lies beside the dusty country road. You may count here several score of graves by the slight mounds of earth that were raised above them a century or so ago. At one extremity of this plot of ground an iron railing incloses another grave, marked by a plain, marble slab, where rest the mortal remains of a hero, the latchets of whose shoes few men of his race have been worthy to unloose. And those of us who hold duty a sacred trust, and likeness unto the Nazarene the first and chiefest duty, will do well to make the acquaintance of this daring and faithful hero, whose very memory throws over the darkest period of our history the light that never was on sea or land. The grave is that of David Zeisberger, the Moravian missionary to the Indians in New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Canada for fifty active years, who was buried at this spot at his dying request, that he might await the Resurrection among his faithful Indians. His record is perhaps unequalled in point of length of service, by the record of any missionary of any church or sect in any land at any time. Among stories of promotion and daring in early America, this one is most unique and most uplifting. On a July night in 1726 a man and his wife fled from their home in Austrian Moravia toward the mountains on the border of Saxony for conscience' sake. They took with them nothing save their five-year-old boy, who ran stumbling between them, holding to their hands. The family of three remained in Saxony ten years. Then the parents emigrated to America, leaving the son of fifteen years in Saxony to continue his education. But within a year he took passage for America and joined his parents in Georgia, just previous to their removal to Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. The lad soon became interested in the study of the Delaware Indian language among the natives of that tribe living along the Susquehanna, and at once showed great proficiency. Appreciating his talent, the fathers of the Moravian Church determined to send the young man to Europe, that in the best universities he might secure the finest training. He went as far as New York. There, just as his ship was to sail, he pleaded with tears and on his knees to be allowed to return to the woods of Pennsylvania and the school of the red men there. The words of the wise were overcome by those of the youth, and an earnest soul, as brave as it was earnest, was saved to a life of unparalleled sacrifice and devotion. On returning to Bethlehem Zeisberger joined a class that was studying the Mohawk tongue, the language of that most powerful tribe of the Iroquois nation which practically controlled, by tomahawk and threat, all the territory between the colonies and the Mississippi. Soon the looked-for opportunity of visiting the Iroquois land came, and the young student was told off to accompany the heroic Frederick Christian Post. This was in the dark year 1744, only a few months previous to the outbreak of the Old French War. The lad was now in his twenty-third year. In February of the next year, after these two men entered the shadow of New York, the report was circulated in New York City that two spies had been captured among the Iroquois, who were guilty of attempting to win that nation over to the French. Such a charge at this time was the most serious imaginable, for the contest for the friendship of the Iroquois between the French on the St. Lawrence and the English on the Atlantic was now of great importance. Upon that friendship, and the support it guaranteed, seemed to hang the destiny of the continent. The report created endless consternation, and the spies were hurried on to Governor Clinton, who demanded that the younger be brought before him instantly. "Why do you go among the Indians?" asked Clinton, savagely. It was David Zeisberger to whom he spoke, a youth not daunted by arrogance and bluster. "To learn their language," he replied, calmly. "And what use will you make of their language?" "We hope," replied the lad, "to get the liberty to preach among the Indians the Gospel of our crucified Saviour, and to declare to them what we have personally experienced of His grace in our hearts." The Governor was taken aback. This was a strange answer to have come from a spy's lips. Yet he drove on rough-shod, taking it for granted that the lad was lying, and that there was an ulterior motive for the dangerous journey at such a time. Remembering the fort the English had built near the present site of Rome, New York, and by which they hoped to command the Mohawk Valley and the portage path to Wood Creek and Lake Oneida, he continued: "You observed how many cannon were in Fort William, and how many soldiers and Indians in the castle?" "I was not so much as in the fort, nor did I count the soldiers or Indians." Balked and angry, as well as nonplussed, Governor Clinton insisted: "Our laws require that all travellers in this government of New York shall swear allegiance to the King of England and have a license from the Governor." Governor Clinton's name would certainly not adorn a license for these men. Whether or not the youth saw the trap, he was as frank as his interrogator: "I never before heard of such a law in any country or kingdom in the world," replied Zeisberger. "Will you not take the oath?" roared Governor Clinton, amazed. "I will not," said the prisoner, and he was straightway cast into a prison, where he and his companion lay for six weeks, until freed by an ordinance passed by Parliament exempting the missionaries of the Moravian Church from taking oath to the British crown. Back into the Iroquois land journeyed the liberated prisoner, and for ten doubtful years, until 1755, Zeisberger was engaged in learning the languages of the various tribes of the Six Nations, and in active missionary service. His success was very great. Perhaps in all the history of these famous Indians there was no other man, with the exception of Sir William Johnson, whom they trusted as much as they trusted David Zeisberger. Cheated on the one hand by the Dutch of New York, and robbed on the other by agents of the French and the English, the Iroquois became suspicious of all men; and it is vastly more than a friendly compliment to record that in his mission-house at Onondaga they placed the entire archives of their nation, comprising the most valuable collection of treaties and letters from colonial governors ever made by an Indian nation on this continent. But war now drove the missionary away, as throughout his life war was ever to dash his fondest dreams and ever to drive him back. At the close of the Old French War, the missionaries of the Moravian Church were out again upon the Indian trails that led to the North and West. The first to start was Zeisberger, now in the prime of life, forty-two years old. But he did not turn northward. A call that he could not ignore had come to him from the friends of his boyhood days, the Delawares, who lived now in Western Pennsylvania. With a single companion he pushed outward to them. Taking up his residence in what is now Bradford County, Pennsylvania, he soon began to repeat the successes he had achieved in the Iroquois land, many being converted, and the whole nation learning to love and trust the earnest preacher. Then came Pontiac's terrible rebellion. Compelled to hurry back to the settlements again, Zeisberger awaited the end of that bloody storm, which swept away every fort in the West save only Fort Pitt and Fort Detroit. At last the way was again open, and Zeisberger soon faced the wilderness. The Church fathers now came to the conclusion that it was best to extend missionary labor farther than ever before. The entire West had been saved to England, and the future was bright. It was Zeisberger to whom they looked, and not for a moment did the veteran flinch. "Whither is the white man going?" asked an old Seneca chieftain of Zeisberger. "To the Alleghany River," was the reply. "Why does the paleface travel such unknown roads? This is no road for white people, and no white man has come this trail before." "Seneca," said the pale man, "the business I am on is different from that of other white men, and the roads I travel are different too. I am come to bring the Indian great and good words." The work now begun in Potter County, and later extended to Lawrence County, on the Beaver River, in the province of Pennsylvania, was not less successful than Zeisberger's work in New York. "You are right," said the bravest Indian of the nation to his Indian chieftain; "I have joined the Moravians. Where they go I will go; where they lodge I will lodge; their God shall be my God." His faith was soon tested, as was that of all Zeisberger's converts. For there was yet a farther West. Beyond the Beaver, the Delaware nation had spread throughout the Black Forest that covered what is now Ohio to the dots of prairie land on the edge of what is Indiana. Somewhere here the prairie fires had ceased their devastation. Between the Wabash and the crest of the Alleghanies lay the heaviest forest of the old New World. Of its eastern half the Delawares were now masters, with their capital at Goschgoschunk on the Muskingum, the present Coshocton, Ohio. The fame of Zeisberger had come even here, and the grand council of the Delawares sent him a call to bring his great and good words into the Black Forest. It was an irresistible appeal. Yet the Moravian Church could not allow Zeisberger to leave the congregations in Pennsylvania, for no one could take his place. The brave man gave his answer quickly: "I will take them with me." He kept his word, and in the Spring of 1772 the heroic man could have been seen floating down the Beaver and Ohio rivers with two whole villages of Christian Indians, seeking a new home in the Black Forest on the Upper Muskingum. Here they founded three settlements in all, Schönbrunn (Beautiful Spring), Lichtenau (Meadow of Light), Gnadenhütten (Tents of Grace), where the fabled wanderer is made by the poet to extend his search for Evangeline. Here the Moravian missionaries, Zeisberger and his noble assistant, Heckewelder, spent five marvellously successful years, in what is known as the first settlements of whites in the present State of Ohio, excepting such French as had lived in the Lake region. The settlements were governed by a complete set of published laws, and in many respects the experiment was an ideality fully achieved. The good influence of the orderly and devout colony spread throughout the Central West at a time when every influence was bad and growing rapidly worse. For five or six years Zeisberger here saw the richest fruit of his life; here also he was doomed to see what was undoubtedly the most disgraceful and dastardly crime ever committed in the name of freedom on this continent. [Illustration: JOHN HECKEWELDER _Missionary to the Indians_] The Revolutionary War now broke out, as if to despoil wantonly this aged hero's last and happiest triumph. The Moravians determined upon the impossible role of neutrality, with their settlements just beside the hard, wide war-path which ran between Fort Pitt and Fort Detroit; these were the strongholds, respectively, of the Americans and the British, who were quarrelling bitterly for the allegiance of the savages in the Black Forest between them. The policy was wholly disastrous. For some time the Christian Indians, because the influence of the past few years had been so uplifting, escaped unharmed. But as the conflict grew, bitter suspicion arose among both the Americans in Western Pennsylvania and the British at Sandusky and Detroit. The British first took action. In 1781 three hundred Indians under a British officer appeared and ordered the inhabitants of the three villages to leave the valley they loved and go to Sandusky, where a stricter watch might be kept over them. Like sheep they were driven northward, the aged Zeisberger toiling at the head of the broken-hearted company. As Winter came down from the north, there being very little food, a company of one hundred Christian Indians obtained permission to return to their former homes to harvest corn which had been left standing in the fields. It was an unfortunate moment for the return, and the borderers on the ravaged Pennsylvania frontier looked upon the movement with suspicion. It is said that a party of British Indians, returning from a Pennsylvania raid, left here a sign of their bloody triumph. Be that as it may, a posse of Americans suddenly appeared on the scene. The entire company of Moravian sufferers was surrounded and taken captive. The question was raised, "Shall we take our prisoners to Pittsburg, or kill them?" The answer of the majority was, "Kill." The men were hurried into one building and the women into another, and the murderers went to work. "My arm fails me," said one desperado, as he knocked his fourteenth bound victim on the head. "I think I have done pretty well. Go on in the same way." And that night, as the moon arose above the Tuscarawas, the wolves and panthers fought in the moonlight for the bodies of ninety Christian Indians most foully murdered. Had each been his own child, the great grief of the aged Zeisberger could not have been more heartrending. After the storm had swept over him and a shadow of the old peace came back to his stricken heart, Zeisberger called his children about him and offered a most patient prayer. The record of Zeisberger's resolute faithfulness to the remnant of his church from this time onward is almost incredible. Like a Moses he led them always, and first to a temporary home in Macomb County, Michigan. From there they were in four years driven by the Chippewas. The forlorn pilgrims now set sail in two sloops on Lake Erie; they took refuge from a terrible storm in the mouth of the Cuyahoga River. For a time they rested at a temporary home in Independence Township, Cuyahoga County. Famine drove them in turn from here. Setting out on foot, Zeisberger led them next along the shore of Lake Erie westward to the present site of Milan, Erie County, Ohio. Here they resided until the outbreak of the savage Indian War of 1791. To escape from this, Zeisberger secured from the British government a tract of land twelve miles long and six miles wide for the Moravian Indians along the Grand River in Canada. Here the pilgrims remained six years. But with the close of the Indian War, it was possible for them to return to their beloved home in the Tuscarawas Valley. The United States had given to the Moravian Church two tracts of land here, embracing the sites of the three towns formerly built, containing in all twelve thousand acres. Back to the old home the patriarch Zeisberger brought his little company in the year 1798. His first duty in the gloomy Gnadenhütten was not forgotten. With a bowed head and heavy heart the old man and one assistant gathered from beneath the dense mass of bush and vine, whither the wild beasts had carried them, the bones of the ninety and more sacrificed Christians, and over their present resting-place one of the proudest of monuments now rises. For full ten years more this hero labored in the shadow of the forests where his happiest days had been spent, and only as the Winter of 1808 came down upon the valley from the lakes did his great heart cease beating and his spirit pass through the heavenly gates. The dust of this true hero lies, as he requested, surrounded by the remains of those "brown brethren" whom he led and loved so long, when all the world reviled them and persecuted them and said all manner of evil against them falsely. In 1908 the memory of this man will have blessed us for a full century. Shall not a more appropriate token of our esteem replace the little slab that now marks that hallowed grave? And yet no monument can be raised to the memory of David Zeisberger so valuable or so significant as the little pile of his own manuscripts collected by Edward Everett and deposited by him under lock and key, in a special case in the library of Harvard University. Here are fourteen manuscripts, including a Delaware Indian dictionary, a hymn book, a harmony of the Gospels, a volume of litanies and liturgies, and a volume of sermons to children. CHAPTER VI _Clark's Birth and Parentage.--Wholesomeness of the Family's Home Life.--Achievements of George and his Five Brothers.--George's Lack of Book-learning.--How he became a Surveyor.--Great Opportunities enjoyed by Surveyors in his Day.--His Introduction to the West.--Learns of George Washington's Great Acquisitions of Land.--How Clark acquired his Craving for Liquor.--His Acquaintance with the Rev. David Jones, Missionary to the Shawnees.--Their Encampment near the Site of Wheeling, W. Va.--A Trip to Pittsburg.--His Claim for a Piece of Land on the Ohio.--Takes Service in Dunmore's War.--His Work as a Surveyor in Kentucky.--Becomes a Leader of Pioneers into Kentucky.--The Conflict between Clark and the Transylvania Company.--He becomes the Leader of the Kentucky Movement.--His Brilliant Military Leadership in the Conquest of Illinois.--The Founding of Louisville.--Clark draws a Plan of the Future City.--His Efforts to induce Immigration to the Lower Ohio.--He is discarded by the State of Virginia._ GEORGE ROGERS CLARK: FOUNDER OF LOUISVILLE [Illustration] ABOUT two miles east of Charlottesville, Virginia, and more than a mile south of Thomas Jefferson's famous homestead, Monticello, on a sunny knoll by the little Rivianna River, stood the humble farmer's home in which George Rogers Clark was born, November 19, 1752. The baby's father and mother, John Clark and Ann Rogers Clark, had moved into Albemarle County two years before from King-and-Queen County, Virginia, where they had been married in 1749. Their first child was born August 1, 1750, and was given his grandfather's name, Jonathan; this second son was given the name George Rogers, from one of his mother's brothers--as though his parents had looked with prophetic vision through the long years to a time when the baby should become the idol and savior of Kentucky, and had named him from a Kentucky pioneer. It was a busy farmer's home to which the young child came and in which he received the first hard lessons of life. His parents were sturdy, hard-working people, like their ancestors as far back as the records went, even to the first John Clark, who came from England to Virginia about the same time that the Puritans came to Plymouth Rock, or to Giles Rogers, on his mother's side, who also came from England at very nearly the same time. Giles Rogers's son John married Mary Byrd of the well-known Virginian Byrd family, and George Rogers Clark's mother was the second daughter of that union. Who the boy's playmates may have been we cannot know; his brother Jonathan was two years his elder, and the two were probably comrades together on the nursery floor and on the green lawn before the farmhouse. When George was three years of age his sister Ann was born; and two years after that, in 1757, his brother John was born. It has been said that George Clark may have had Thomas Jefferson as a playmate by the Rivianna, but there is some doubt as to this, though the friendship of the two in later life was undoubtedly warmer because of the proximity of their boyhood homes. George's father's land ran down and adjoined that of Randolph Jefferson--Thomas Jefferson's father. If the two boys who were to become so famous met and played together it was probably at the Jefferson Mill, where, it is said, George Clark used to be sent with grist. As the Clark family moved away from this neighborhood in 1757, when George was only five years old, it does not seem likely that he was sent to mill with grist very often. Soon after John Clark, Jr., was born, George's father and mother determined upon removing from the Rivianna farm to land patented and surveyed by Mrs. Clark's father in Caroline County, Virginia, on the headwaters of York River and just south of the upper Rappahannock. So, late in the year 1757, we find the father and mother and the four children, with all their worldly possessions, on their eastward journey to their new home. The Rivianna farm had been sold for fifteen hundred dollars, and the family can probably be said to have been in comfortable circumstances for those days. None of the four children were of an age to share in the hardships of this removal, but for the two eldest it must have been an epoch-making event. Jonathan and George were old enough to enjoy the novelty of the long journey,---the scenes along the busy roads, the taverns where all was bustle and confusion, the villages with their shops and stores, the cities where the children must have felt swallowed up in noise. But at last the new home was reached, and the family was busily at work preparing for the next year's crops. Of the Caroline County home of the Clarks we know little save the happy record of births of children; yet this in itself gives us a large picture of the merry household, its great joys, and the host of little troubles which intensified the gladness and hallowed it. Within three years Richard Clark was born; Edmund was born September 25, 1762; Lucy, September 15, 1765; Elizabeth, February 11, 1768; William, August 1, 1770, his brother Jonathan's twentieth birthday; and Frances, January 20, 1773. Jonathan and George were soon old enough to be little fathers to the younger children, and Ann must have been able to help her mother to mend the clothes for her rollicking brothers at a comparatively early age; and I do not doubt for a moment that there was a good deal of mending to be done for these boys, for in later life we know they loved adventure, and they must have had many a boyish contest of strength and speed with little thought of how many stitches it would take to make things whole again. This was a fine farmer's family to look in at of a summer's morning or a winter's night--just such a family as old Virginia was to depend upon in the hard days of the Revolution now drawing on apace. And though you looked the Colonies through from Northern Maine to Southern Georgia, you could not have found by another fireside six boys in one family who were to gain so much fame in their country's service as these six. Jonathan was one of the first men to enter the American army, and he became a lieutenant-colonel with a splendid record before the war was ended. His brothers John and Edmund, and perhaps Richard, were in the Revolutionary armies; all four were recipients of Virginia bounty lands at the close of the war. George Rogers Clark in the meantime became the hero of the most famous military expedition in Western history,--the capture of Vincennes and its British fort and Governor; and William, the next to the youngest in that merry crowd of ten children, was to write his name high on the pillar of fame as joint leader of the memorable Lewis and Clark Expedition through the Louisiana Territory to the Pacific Ocean in 1804. It was surely no accident that these lads grew into daring, able men, for good blood will tell; and Virginia in that day was giving the world her richest treasures lavishly on the altar of liberty. I know of no picture of the father of these six boys; but the pictures of George and William are remarkably similar, showing a strong mark which must have come directly from one of the grandfathers, either on the Clark or Rogers side of the family. We may be sure Farmer Clark and his wife exerted, a strong, wise influence on their children, and Jonathan and George were called upon at an early age to assist in the management of the children, to settle disputes, to tie up injured fingers, to reprimand, and to praise. And in the school of the home and the family circle these boys received the best and about the only education they ever had; and it would be well if many a boy nowadays would learn more in the home of patient, wise parents and a little less from books. The Clark boys, at least George Clark, would have been benefited by a little more schooling in books, especially a speller. It is quite sure that George did not take full advantage of even the few school privileges that he did have; but while all his letters of later life are poorly spelled, that may have been his principal weakness, and in other branches he may have succeeded much better; we know he did in one. For nine months he was under the instruction of Donald Robertson, under whom James Madison, afterwards President of the United States, studied at about the same time. Strangely enough this boy, who would not learn to be careful with letters, became proficient in the matter of figures and did well in that most difficult of studies, mathematics. In Clark's day a boy proficient in mathematics did not have to look far for a profession which was considered both honorable and lucrative, and that was the surveyor's profession. It was doubly enticing to a youth of brains and daring; the call for surveyors to go out into the rich empire beyond the Alleghanies was loud and continuous, and had been since Lord Fairfax sent that young Virginia surveyor into the singing forests of the Upper Potomac before the outbreak of the Old French War; and from George Washington down, you may count many boys who went into the West as surveyors and became the first men of the land. The surveyor had many, if not all, the experiences of the soldier; and every boy in Virginia envied the soldier of the French War. The surveyor found the good lands, and here and there surveyed a tract for himself; this, in time, would become of great value. The surveyor knew the Indians and their trails; he knew where the best hunting-grounds and salt-licks were located; he knew where the swamps lay, and the fever-fogs that clung to them; he knew the rivers, their best fishing-pools, and how far up and down they were navigable; he was acquainted with everything a man would wish to know, and he knew of things which every man wished to escape,--floods, famines, skulking redskins, fevers. For these reasons the surveyors became the men needed by generals to guide the armies, by the great land-companies to point out right fields for speculation, by transportation companies and quartermasters and traders to designate the best paths to follow through the black forests. The tried, experienced surveyor was in an admirable position to secure a comfortable fortune for his labor. While Washington (the largest landholder in America in Clark's day--and half his lands in the West) selected in person much of his own land, yet, as we have seen, the time came when he employed William Crawford to find new lands for him. Perhaps young Clark came but slowly to a realization that he could enter the fine profession of a surveyor; but when the time came to decide he seized upon the opportunity and the opening with utmost enthusiasm and energy. Both of his grandfathers had been surveyors to a greater or less extent; possibly their old instruments were in his father's possession. If so, these were taken out and dusted, and the boy was set to work surveying, probably, his father's farm. Its dimensions were well known, and the boy could be sure of the accuracy or inaccuracy of his experiments. In time George probably was called upon to do odd pieces of surveying in the neighborhood in which he lived; thus the days and the years went by, each one fitting the lad for his splendid part on the world's stage of action. The first act in the drama was Clark's introduction to the West--the land of which he had so often dreamed, and which he now in his twentieth year went to see. We cannot be sure just when young Clark set out from his home, but we find him in the little town of Pittsburg early in the summer of 1772, and we can well suppose he made the long trip over Braddock's Road from Virginia with some friends or neighbors from Caroline County, with whom he joined himself for the purpose of looking at the land of which he had heard so much, and possibly picking out a little tract of land in the Ohio Valley for himself. As a surveyor of some experience he was in a position to offer his services to any one desiring them, and thus turn an honest penny in the meantime. Of the wars and bloody skirmishes fought around this town every Virginia boy had heard; through all of George Rogers Clark's youth great questions were being debated here in these sunny Alleghany meadows or in the shadowy forests--and the arguments were of iron and lead. The French had come down the rivers from the Great Lakes to seize the Ohio Valley; the colonists had pushed slowly across the Alleghanies to occupy the same splendid land. Nothing but war could have settled such a bitter quarrel; and, as the Clark boy now looked for the first time upon the relics of those small but savage battles, his heart no doubt warmed to his Virginian patriots who had saved the West to America. How little did the lad know that there was another savage war to be fought for this Ohio Valley, and that he himself was to be its hero! All along the route to Pittsburg the boy and his comrades, whoever they may have been, kept their eyes open for good farm sites; perhaps they were surprised to find that all the land beside and adjacent to Braddock's Road was already "taken up." Washington himself had acquired that two-hundred-and-thirty-two-acre tract in Great Meadows where Fort Necessity stood; not far from Stewart's Crossing (Connellsville, Pa.) Washington had the other piece of land with the mill on it. Everywhere Clark went in the West he found land which had been taken up by the shrewd Mount Vernon farmer or his agents. I do not believe Clark begrudged Washington a single acre, but was, on the other hand, pleased to know that the Colonel was to receive some good return for all his hard campaigning in the West in addition to his paltry pay as an officer. Clark passed as a young gentleman among the strange, rough populace of infant Pittsburg, where fighting, drinking, and quarrelling were going on in every public place; I can see the boy as he went about the rude town and listened to the talk of the traders and the loungers who filled the taverns and stores. It might have been at this time that the boy first began to satisfy an honest thirst with dishonest liquids, which would in time become his worst enemy and sadly dull the lustre of as bright a name as any man could win. Of course we must remember that at that day it was highly polite and gentlemanly to take an "eye-opener" every morning and a "night-cap" every night, and drink the health of friends often between times; yet no young man but was injured by this awakening of an unknown craving, and, in the case of our hero, it was to prove a craving that would cost him almost all the great honors that he should win. The lad looked with wide-open eyes, no doubt, at the remains of old Fort Duquesne, where many brave Virginians had lost their lives; for many had been fiendishly put to death by savages driven to bitter hatred by French taunts and made inhuman by French brandy. He must have been greatly interested in little Fort Pitt, which had withstood the wild attacks of Pontiac's most desperate hell-hounds of war, the Shawnees. Here, if anywhere on the continent, men had been brave; here, if anywhere, men had dropped into deathless graves. He was greatly interested in the future, though the ringing notes of the past must have stirred his heart deeply; and I can see the lad with bended head listening to catch every word of a speaker who would talk of the present feeling of the dreaded Shawnees, who refused to acknowledge that the Six Nations had any right to sell to white men their fine hunting-grounds between the Ohio and the Tennessee. [Illustration: REV. DAVID JONES _Companion of George Rogers Clark_] When we hear directly of Clark in Pittsburg he was in admirably good company and well spoken of; he had fallen in with the Rev. David Jones, the enterprising Baptist missionary from New Jersey, who had come into the West on a joint mission concerning both the possibilities of missionary service among the Shawnees on the Scioto, and Franklin's proposed settlement on the eastern bank of the Ohio River. He was, therefore, a prospector for land and for missionary openings--a good man for the lad Clark to know. Mr. Jones was thirty-six years of age, enthusiastic and brave, or he would not have been on the Ohio in 1772. He was old enough to remember well the story of the Old French War, as well as Pontiac's Rebellion, and the story of the West from that day down. Of this, no doubt, the two talked freely. Mr. Jones kept a diary, and his record for Tuesday, June 9, reads: "... Left Fort Pitt in company with Mr. George Rogers Clark, and several others, who were disposed to make a tour through this new world." Gliding on down the Ohio, the canoe and its adventurous pilgrims were glad to get safely by the Mingo town near Steubenville, Ohio, whose Indian inhabitants (remnants of the Iroquois Indians, in the West known as Mingoes) were desperate savages, canoe plundering being the least harm that might be expected from them. Farther down, at the mouth of Grave Creek, near where Wheeling, West Virginia, now stands, the party camped; here Mr. Jones's interpreter, David Owens, joined them, having come across country from the Monongahela River. This spot was to become an important point on the Upper Ohio; it was to become well known to the young adventurer, who now looked upon it for the first time; it was soon to become his first home in the West. But for the present he went on with Mr. Jones. The party proceeded as far down as the mouth of the Little Kanawha River, where Parkersburg, West Virginia, now stands. Returning up the river June 24, they reached Grave Creek within two weeks; the party, including at least Higgins and the interpreter Owens together with Jones and Clark, started on an overland trip to the Monongahela. Jones records: "... Therefore moved up to Grave Creek, leaving there our canoes; crossed the desert (wilderness) to Ten Mile Creek, which empties into [the] Monongahela.... The season was very warm; all except myself had loads to carry, so that on the 2d day of July, with much fatigue we arrived to the inhabitants [at the settlements], faint, weak, weary, and hungry--especially Mr. Clark and myself." The size of the settlement can be judged from the fact that on the second Sunday of Mr. Jones's stay on George's Creek he preached to a congregation of about two hundred. On July 14 the four travellers set out again overland for Fort Pitt. They reached the fort on Wednesday, July 22, and the Virginia boy was probably glad to leave the forests and the river for a while and rest quietly in the little village of Pittsburg. For one thing, he had some letters to write, and we can imagine how anxious the friends at home were to hear from him. Would he like the country? Would he wish to stay in the West? Would he want the other members of the family to emigrate there too? These were some of the questions his parents and brothers and sisters were asking in the old home in Caroline County as the summer days went by. We are certain that Clark was immensely pleased with all he had seen; whether it was pushing a canoe down the rivers, or sleeping on a river's shore with the water babbling beside him, or carrying a pack over the "blind" trails of the old Southwest, he loved the land, its freshness, the freedom of its forests, the air of hope and adventure which pervaded everything and everybody. All this appealed to him and fascinated him. After a good rest he hurried on home in the wake of his glowing letters, to enforce them, and if possible to induce the home people to come quickly to obtain the good lands before they were all taken. Before he went it is probable that he entered his claim for a piece of land on the Ohio near the mouth of Fish Creek, some thirty miles below the present site of Wheeling. How interesting must have been that home-coming! What a fine picture that would be, if we could see the young lad, who was to be the hero of the West, sitting before his father's doorstep, describing to a silent audience of relatives and neighbors the grandeur and greatness of the West, the crowds of immigrants, the growing villages, the conflicts between the white and the red men! Perhaps he drew a rough map of the Ohio in the sand at the foot of the front doorsteps, showing where his claim was located, and where Washington's rich tracts were located. Then he told of the Ohio, its islands and its fierce eddies, of the Indian trails that wound along on the "hog-backs" from settlement to settlement, of the great mounds which the ancient giants (as people once thought the mound-building Indians were) built beside the Ohio. And then at last he told of his purpose to return and live in that country and grow up with it. The records of the next few years were very much confused. Young Clark visited various portions of the West, perhaps remaining longest at a claim he took up near the mouth of Grave Creek, on the present site of Moundsville, West Virginia, from which point he addressed letters to his brother Jonathan, January 9, 1773. In the Spring of the next year he formed one of Captain Cressap's party assembled at Wheeling in readiness for service in Dunmore's War. In this war Clark saw considerable service, following Dunmore's wing of the army, but not participating in the battle at Point Pleasant, which was fought by General Lewis. In the Spring of the year following, 1775, we find Clark returning again to his original mission in the West,--that of surveying land and securing tracts for himself. "I have engaged," he wrote his brother Jonathan from Stewart's Crossing, "as a deputy surveyor under Cap'n Hancock Lee, for to lay out lands on ye Kentuck, for ye Ohio company, at ye rate of 80£ pr. year, and ye privilege of taking what land I want." Midsummer found him at Leestown, a mile below Frankfort, seventy miles up the Kentucky River, where he said fifty families would be living by Christmas time. The public, however, needed the service of the young man, and it is plain that his experience in the war had been serviceable, for he was made commander of the scattered militia of Kentucky. During the next Winter, however, we find him again in Virginia; it is probable that his constant moving about had brought advantages, though his private affairs may have suffered more or less from neglect. The Spring of the next year he was back in Kentucky, and soon, in no uncertain way, the leader of the busy swarms of pioneers. "He was brave, energetic, bold," writes William H. English, "prepossessing in appearance, of pleasing manners, and in fact with all the qualities calculated to win from a frontier people. The unorganized and chaotic condition of the company needed such a man, and the man had come." It is interesting to notice the conflict which was precipitated between Clark as leader of the pioneers and Richard Henderson's Transylvania Company, and a pleasure to note that Clark never seemed to speak or act in a vindictive way with reference to Henderson's questionable purchase; in fact he wrote to his brother in 1775: "Colonel Henderson is here and claims all ye country below Kentucke. If his claim should be good, land may be got reasonable enough, and as good as any in ye world. My father talked of seeing this land in August. I shall not advise him whether to come or not; but I am convinced that if he once sees ye country he will never rest until he gets on it to live. I am ingrossing all ye land I possibly can, expecting him." It is plain from this quotation that Richard Henderson was the friend of the Kentucky pioneer. But there was a very important question to be settled immediately; did Kentucky belong to Virginia or was it independent? What was its political status? It was decided to get at the facts of the case, and Clark was instrumental before all others in calling a mass meeting of Kentucky pioneers at Harrodstown, June 6, 1776, where he expected that two or more "agents" would be selected by the people with general power to consult Virginia as to the legal status of "Transylvania." Clark arrived late at this meeting, and on arrival found that he himself, and John Gabriel Jones, had been selected, not as agents, but as actual "members of the Virginia Legislature," to represent a County of Kentucky. The Transylvania Company had performed its important mission, and Richard Henderson was reimbursed for any losses incurred. George Rogers Clark now steps into the position occupied by Henderson as the leader and sustainer of the Kentucky movement. The brilliancy of Clark's military leadership during the next few years, while he was effecting a conquest of Illinois, has entirely put into shade the genuine influence and merit of his service previously rendered. No herald of empire in the Middle West who was especially prominent in military affairs did more to accelerate and assure the victory of the army of axe-bearing pioneers than did George Rogers Clark in these critical years, 1775, 1776, and 1777. He fell heir, though a mere boy, to a day's responsibility and taxing toils relinquished by Richard Henderson; and it would not be too much to say, perhaps, that were we to omit the humble, less spectacular services that were performed in these three years, or the renowned service heroically performed in 1778 and 1779, the nation could more easily spare those of the later period. But as Clark now went eastward as a delegate to the Virginia Legislature, he appreciated more and more that the danger of Kentucky lay in the two British forts at Kaskaskia and Vincennes; not because of the proximity of the troops there located, but because of the baneful influence exerted upon all the neighboring Indian tribes by English officers and American renegades who occupied them. The campaign in Illinois, prosecuted with so much brilliancy and renown, had for its vital motive not the conquest of thousands of forest-strewn miles of wilderness, but rather the salvation of the pioneer settlers in _Ken-ta-kee_. Any other view of the matter would be a serious error. The proud city of Louisville dates its founding from Clark's famous Illinois campaign, for while descending the Ohio River he left some twenty families on Corn Island, May 27, 1778, who were the first of their race to make a permanent home within the sound of the chattering waters of the historic Falls of Ohio, first visited by La Salle over a hundred years before. In less than a year the settlement was moved to the Kentucky shore, and a fort was built at the foot of what is now Twelfth Street, in what was then the town of Falls of Ohio, the present Louisville. General Clark may be justly called the founder of that city, as it was his decision that made "The Falls" the rendezvous and metropolis of the Lower Ohio. "This action," writes Mr. English, "and the security given by the forts he caused to be built there, attracted the first settlers and fixed the future destiny of Louisville, Jeffersonville, and New Albany.... Clark undoubtedly gave the matter much thought, and looked far into the future in making this selection. He expected two great cities to arise some day at the Falls; first Louisville, to be followed later, as the country became populous, by one on the other side of the river, which he hoped would bear his name. But, until Virginia made the grant for Clarksville, the plan of what he expected would be a great city at Louisville absorbed his attention." One of his first acts was to draw a map of the future city, marking the public and private divisions of land as he would have had them located; in this plan he left a number of vacant spaces for public parks, and it is one of the vain regrets of the citizens of the present city that the plan of General Clark in this respect could not have been remembered. It is important to notice that Clark believed that the best way to maintain the conquest of Illinois was by inducing immigration to the Lower Ohio and the building up of a strong pioneer colony, not in Illinois, but along the river. "Our only chance at present," he wrote to Colonel John Todd, the Governor of Illinois County, "to save that country is by encouraging the families; but I am sensible nothing but land will do it. I should be exceedingly cautious in doing anything that would displease the Government [Virginia], but their present interest, in many respects obvious to us here, calls so loudly for it, that I think, sir, that you might even venture to give a deed for forty or fifty thousand acres of land at said place at the price that Government may demand for it." The place referred to here is not Louisville, but near the mouth of the Ohio River. In fact it is very plain from many sources that Clark was the prime mover in the settlement of the Lower Ohio up to the year 1783, when he was wantonly and ignominiously turned adrift by the State of Virginia, which then owed him thirty thousand dollars, with only four shillings in its treasury. The latter portion of Clark's life is not one which we are proud to remember, but he never sank so low that the nation has been able to forget his brilliant and persistent courage. There was ground for his bitter cry: "I have given the United States half the territory they possess, and for them to suffer me to remain in poverty, in consequence of it, will not redound much to their honor." It is little comfort that nearly thirteen years after his death the sum justly owed to the man was paid to his heirs. The memory of Clark's leadership of the army that bore the sword is a precious inheritance; the facts respecting his equally important enthusiasm and earnestness in leading the scattered cohorts of the army bearing the broadaxe should likewise have a place in history. CHAPTER VII _Importance of the Cumberland Road.--Expected to be a Bond of Union between East and West.--Roads of Former Days only Indian Trails.--The Cumberland Road made between 1806 and 1840.--Promoted by Gallatin and Clay.--Undertaken by Congress, 1802.--The Road a Necessity for the Stream of Immigration after the Revolution.--Open for Traffic to the Ohio, 1818.--Other Internal Improvements now undertaken.--The first Macadamized Roads earlier than this Cumberland Road.--The Great Cost of Macadamizing this Road.--Disputes as to the Government's Constitutional Right to build it.--Ohio demands that the Road be continued, according to the Act admitting her to Statehood.--The Road's Progress to Vandalia.--Unanimity of Western Members in Favor of the Road.--Toll-gates are erected.--Lively Scenes on the Road in Old Times.--Sums appropriated for it by Congress.--Why Henry Clay championed the Undertaking._ HENRY CLAY: PROMOTER OF THE FIRST AMERICAN HIGHWAY [Illustration] IT may be said without fear of contradiction that the subject of the Panama and Nicaragua canals has not received more popular attention in this day and generation than our first and greatest national highway--legally known as the Cumberland Road, from its starting point--received in the first generation of the nineteenth century. For it was clear to the blindest that the great empire west of the Alleghanies, of which Washington dreamed and planned, where Zeisberger labored and built the first home, and to which brave Henderson and Putnam led their colonies of patriots, must soon be bound to the Union by something stronger than Indian trails. France and England had owned this West and lost it; could the little Republic born in the fierce fires of 1775 hold what they--proud kingdoms--had lost? Could it mock the European doctrine that, in time, mountains inevitably become boundaries of empires? Those little States of which Berkeley sang, placed by the hand of God as rebukes to lustful and universal dominion--were they needed in the destinies of America? Such questions were asked freely in those hard days which succeeded the Revolution. Then the whole world looked upon the East and the West as realms as distinct as Italy and France, and for the same geographical reason. England and Spain had their vast "spheres of influence" marked out as plainly in America then as Germany and France and Russia have theirs marked in the China of to-day. Kentucky became a hotbed of foreign emissaries, and the whirl of politics in that pivotal region a decade after the Revolution will daunt even the student of modern Kentucky politics. So patriotic and so faithful is that eastern West to-day that it is difficult to believe by what a fragile thread it hung to the trembling Republic on the Atlantic slope--"one nation to-day, thirteen to-morrow"--in those black days when Wilkinson and Burr and even George Rogers Clark "played fast and loose with conspiracy." The Indian trails were the threads which first bound the East and the West. Soon a large number of these threads were twisted, so to speak, into a few cords--hard, rough pioneer roadways which wound in and out among the great trees and morasses in the forest shades. Then came a few great, well-built (for their day) roadways which meant as much commercially and politically, in their age, as the steel hawsers which in our time have bound and welded a great people so closely together. The greatest of these old-time highways was that wide avenue opened from Cumberland, Maryland, through Pennsylvania, the "Panhandle," and on across Ohio, between 1806 and 1840. It is popularly known as the Old National Road; its legal name was the Cumberland Road. It was the logical result of Washington's cherished plan of binding the trans-Alleghany region firmly to the East. It was largely promoted by Albert Gallatin, who in 1806 made a report, as Secretary of the Treasury, strongly urging such works of internal improvement. But its best friend and stanchest champion was Henry Clay; and beside it stands to-day a monument to his memory near the little hamlet which bears his name--Claysville, Pennsylvania. [Illustration: HENRY CLAY _Statesman and Abolitionist_] This great road was born in the Act of Congress of 1802, which enabled the State of Ohio to enter the Union. Section VII of that act decreed that the money received from the sale of one-twentieth of the public lands in Ohio should be applied to building roads from the navigable waters of Atlantic streams to and within the new State "under the authority of Congress." The matter was put in charge of the War Department, and soon commissioners appointed by the President of the United States were surveying a route for a national road from East to West. The first government appropriation was dated 1806, and was thirty thousand dollars. Words cannot describe the intense wave of enthusiasm which swept over the West when it was known that this mighty new power in Western life was actually to come into existence. Our government never carried out a more timely or popular measure, for it was as timely as it was popular. When the Revolutionary War was over, a great stream of immigration poured into the West, but the Indian War of 1790-95 severely checked it. With the treaty of Greenville the great social movement again began, and the War of 1812, in turn, again interfered to postpone the genuine settlement of the old Northwest. This national road was begun at Cumberland, Maryland, in 1811, and, even in the dark days of the war, was slowly pushed along over the Alleghanies by way of Uniontown and Washington, Pennsylvania, toward Wheeling on the Ohio River. When the war was over it was nearing its destination, and in 1818 was open for traffic to the Ohio. If studied closely, the last three years of the second decade of the nineteenth century are fascinating years to a student of our national expansion. The beginning of successful steam navigation on the Ohio and its tributaries, and the completion of the Cumberland National Road to the Ohio, were largely responsible for this. Such impressive material advances, coming at the time when both Great Britain and the Indians had been effectually disposed of (so far as national growth was concerned), gave enthusiasm to the eager spirit of the time. Great deeds were proposed; great economic questions began to be faced and fought out as never before. The many-sided question of internal improvements, the beginning of the Erie Canal, the opening of the Lehigh coal fields, the problem of applying the power of steam to vehicles as well as vessels, the difficult problem solved later by the Missouri Compromise, and the one involved in Birkbeck's English Prairie settlement in Illinois, the problem of steam navigation on the Great Lakes,--all these and many more like them were the topics of the hour when this Cumberland Road, the first of all our great feats of improvement, reached and then threw itself across the Ohio River. Measured by the hopes it inspired and not by miles, judged by the power it was expected to exert in national life and not by the ruins that now mark its ancient track, this road from the Potomac to the Mississippi must be considered a most significant monument to those wild but splendid years when as a people we were first facing some of the most fundamental questions of existence. There comes in every boy's life a period when he shoots suddenly out and up to the stature of a man. Young America sprang up like that in those momentous years. Nearly a score of years before the Cumberland Road was built, the first macadamized road in the United States, the Lancaster Turnpike, was constructed by a private company between Philadelphia and Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania had macadamized portions of her highway across the mountains by way of Chambersburg and Bedford to Pittsburg. But on no highway was the principle of macadamization carried so far as on the Cumberland Road. The cost was found to be prodigious. Between Cumberland, Maryland, and Uniontown, Pennsylvania, it was $9745 per mile instead of $6000, which the commissioners estimated, without bridging. Between Uniontown and Wheeling the cost ran up to the startling average of about $13,000 per mile--within $800 of the estimated cost per mile of the Erie Canal. Too liberal contracts accounted, in part, at least, for this extravagance. The stones used were reduced to four ounces each and spread in three layers, traffic being permitted for a time over each layer in succession. No covering was laid until these layers had become comparatively solid. Catch-water drains, with a gradual curvature, were located at proper distances. Several of the officers in charge of the work stand high in the estimation of their countrymen. There was McKee, who fell at Buena Vista, and Williams, who gave his life to his country at Monterey; there were Gratiot, Delafield, Bliss, Bartlett, Hartzell, Colquit, Cass, Vance, Pickell; and there was Mansfield, who, as major-general, fell at Antietam. Among the names in one of the surveying corps is recorded that of Joseph E. Johnston. This national road rested legally upon an interpretation of the Constitution held by those who favored internal improvement as a means of investing the Government's surplus. A great plan had been outlined in 1806 by Albert Gallatin, then Secretary of the Treasury. The Constitution gives the Government the right to regulate post-roads and the mails. This implied the right, the promoters of internal improvement argued, to build roads, with the sanction of the States through which such roads passed. There were those who opposed the theory, and even from the very beginning there was strong opposition by strict constructionists to the road appropriations. The very first vote on the first appropriation was 66 to 50, showing that at the start there was almost an even division on the legality of the question. The opposition increased as greater and still greater sums were asked of the Treasury each year. Three hundred thousand dollars was asked in 1816, and more in 1818. In the next year the tremendous amount of $535,000 was asked for and voted. It is little wonder that Congress was staggered by the amount of money absorbed by this one road. What if other national roads proposed--through the South and northward from Washington to Buffalo--should demand equally large sums? It was easily to be seen that the entire revenue of the Government could readily be spent in filling up the bog-holes of American roads with limestone. [Illustration: ALBERT GALLATIN _Promoter of the Cumberland Road_] Yet the policy of internal improvements was a popular one, advocated by politicians and applauded by the people; and every year, despite the same Constitutional arguments advanced, and though at times the opposing forces had their way, the Cumberland Road bills came back for reconsideration, and were at last passed. But it finally appeared that the matter of getting the road repaired when once it was built was a more serious question than the mere building problem. Members of Congress who had been persuaded to give their vote for the initial expense bolted outright on voting money each year to extend the road farther westward and also repair the portions already built. The matter was precipitated in 1822, when a bill was presented to the House and Senate providing that toll-gates be erected and that the Government should charge travellers for the use of the road. The bill passed both branches of Congress, but it was vetoed immediately by President Monroe on the ground that the national Government could not collect toll unless, as sovereign, it owned the ground that the road occupied. This was an interesting question, and one of great importance, bringing as it did upon Congress an earnest discussion bordering on the intricate problem of States Rights. Mr. Clay urged that if the Government had a right to build the road it had the right to preserve it from falling into decay. Of course there was now, as always, a strong opposition to the road on the general ground of Constitutionality; but those who were aware that their objections to the road would be overruled by the majority, in any event, took the consistent ground that if they could not prevent the enactments of laws they could, by passing laws creating toll-gates, relieve the Government at least from the expense of repairing the road. As President Monroe, however, did not agree with or believe in the original right to build the road, he was compelled to deny the Government's right to charge toll on roads in the various States. He outlined his conclusions and returned the bill vetoed. A cry which shook the country went up from the West. In the act which admitted Ohio to the Union, five per cent of money received from the sale of lands was, as before noted, to be applied by the Government to the building of roads to and in the West. Of this five per cent, three was to be devoted to building roads within the State of Ohio, and two per cent toward the expense of building a road from Atlantic tide-water to Ohio, according to a supplementary law passed March 3, 1803. By allowing the Cumberland Road to stop at Ohio's eastern boundary, the Government was "breaking faith" with the West. This must not be, and therefore in 1824 President Monroe found an excuse to sign another Cumberland Road bill. The technicality honestly raised by Monroe was against the spirit of the times and the genius of the age. Legal technicalities were put aside, and the great road swept on westward; it was ordered to be projected through the capitals of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois to Jefferson, Missouri. It reached Columbus in 1833, and Indianapolis about 1840. It was graded to Vandalia, then the capital of Illinois, and marked out to Jefferson, Missouri, but was never completed under national auspices. It is to be observed that the Cumberland Road went forward largely because of the compact between the State of Ohio and the national Government. Knowing, as we now do, that the road was one of the most important material items in our national growth, it must seem fortunate from any point of view that the Ohio compact was made when and as it was. By its terms the Government was to build a road with the money accruing from a certain source. The originators of the compact seemed to have no real knowledge of the questions at issue, either concerning the amount of money needed for the purpose of building the road from tide-water to the Ohio River, or of the amount that was likely to accrue from the source indicated. What if the fund produced from the sales of land was not sufficient to build the road? For some time the appropriations were made on the theory that the money would eventually come back into the treasury from the land sales; but it soon became plain that there was not a hope left that even fifty per cent of the amount expended would return from the expected source. When this fact became patent, the friends of the road were put to their utmost to maintain its cause; some interesting points were raised that could not but weigh heavily with men of generous good sense, such as this: surveys had been made outlining the course of the road far in advance of the portion that was being actually built, and some of the States were planning all their roads with reference to this great Appian Way that was to be the main highway across the continent. Large preparations had been made here and there along the proposed route by those owning property, in the way of building taverns and road houses, not to speak of villages that sprang up in a night at points where it seemed certain the road would meet important branch roads. Throughout the years when the Cumberland Road bills were under discussion it is of particular interest to note how men were influenced by the greater, more fundamental human arguments, rather than by mere technical or legal points. Of course the Western members were without a dissenting voice in favor of the road. And when Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri were successively admitted to the Union, a similar provision concerning the sale of public lands and road-building was inserted as in the case of Ohio; and though it is not clear that any one believed the source of income was equal to the object to be benefited, yet the magnanimous legislation went on without a pause through the twenties and into the thirties. In the Senate, for instance, the opposition to the road bills could usually depend on two solid votes from North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and New York; and one vote, ordinarily, from Maine, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Alabama. On minor points other votes could be temporarily secured, but on the main question there was always a safe majority in favor of the enterprise. However, it is plain the opposition to the road was sectional only in the sense that it came from the States not to be directly benefited. Though two or more New England votes could be depended upon in the Senate to be thrown against a Cumberland Road bill, yet such a man as Edward Everett said in an address at Lexington, Kentucky, in 1829: "The State of which I am a citizen [Massachusetts] has already paid between one and two thousand dollars toward the construction and repair of that road; and I doubt not she is prepared to contribute her proportion toward its extension to the place of its destination." But, it must be remembered, Everett was one who caught as few others did the spirit of our genius for expansion, the man who in 1835 uttered the marvellous words: "Intercourse between the mighty interior West and the seacoast is the great principle of our commercial prosperity." If there is one practical lesson in all the peculiar history of the one national road that America built (for the others proposed were never constructed), it is with reference to the repairing of the road. At first it seemed that the great question was merely to obtain funds for the first cost of making the road. But it soon appeared that the far greater question was to operate and repair the road; it was well enough that the Government build the road, seemingly, but it was early realized that a local power must control the road and see to its repairs, or an enormous waste of public money would result. The experience of those years brought home the lesson that the problem of maintenance and operation is far more serious than the problem of original cost. The objection raised to the Government's erecting toll-gates and collecting tolls, as implying sovereignty over the land occupied by the road, was at last silenced by allowing each State through which the road passed to accept it from the Government as fast as it was completed, and to take charge of its operation and control. Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Ohio accepted completed portions between 1831 and 1834. Toll-gates were immediately erected by State authorities, and tolls collected. From her twelve toll-gates Pennsylvania received over $37,000 in the twenty months following May 1, 1843. In the most prosperous year in Ohio, 1839, the treasurer of that State received $62,496.10 from the National Road tolls. What per cent received by toll-gate keepers was actually turned in cannot be discussed, as those were the "good old days." Each toll-gate keeper, it must be observed, retained two hundred dollars per annum as salary, and five per cent of all receipts above one thousand dollars at this time. This fast and loose system was the means of discovering some great rascals. Between 1831 and 1877 Ohio received $1,139,795.30 from the Cumberland Road in tolls. These sober statistics give only a hint of those gay, picturesque days when this highway was a teeming thoroughfare, lined with towns of national importance that are now forgotten, and with thousands of taverns and road-houses, even the foundation-stones of which have vanished from the old-time sites. Great stagecoach lines operated here, known as widely in their day as the railways are now, their proprietors boasting over rival lines in points of speed, safety, and appointments. The largest company on the Cumberland Road was the National Road Stage Company, with headquarters at Uniontown, Pennsylvania. The Ohio National Stage Company was the most important west of the Ohio River. There were the "Good Intent" line, and the "Landlords," "Pioneer," "June Bug," and "Pilot" lines. Fine coaches bore names as aristocratic as our Pullman cars do to-day. There were "trusts" and "combinations," quarrels and lawsuits, worthy of the pen of any sensational magazine-writer or novelist. The advertisement of an "opposition" stagecoach line of 1837 is of interest on several accounts: OPPOSITION! DEFIANCE FAST LINE COACHES DAILY FROM WHEELING, VA., to Cincinnati, O., via Zanesville, Columbus, Springfield, and intermediate points. Through in less time than any other line. "_By opposition the people are well served._" The Defiance Fast Line connects at Wheeling, Va., with Reside & Co.'s Two Superior daily lines to Baltimore, McNair and Co.'s Mail Coach line, via Bedford, Chambersburg, and the Columbia and Harrisburg Rail Roads to Philadelphia being the only direct line from Wheeling--: also with the only coach line from Wheeling to Pittsburg, via Washington, Pa., and with numerous cross lines in Ohio. The proprietors having been released on the 1st inst. from burthen of carrying the great mail (which will retard any line), are now enabled to run through in a shorter time than any other line on the road. They will use every exertion to accommodate the travelling public. With stock infinitely superior to any on the road, they flatter themselves they will be able to give general satisfaction; and believe the public are aware, from past experience, that a liberal patronage to the above line will prevent impositions in high rates of fare by any stage monopoly. The proprietors of the Defiance Fast Line are making the necessary arrangements to stock the Sandusky and Cleveland Routes also from Springfield to Dayton--which will be done during the month of July. All baggage and parcels only received at the risk of the owners thereof. JNO. W. WEAVER & CO., GEO. W. MANYPENNY, JNO. YONTZ, _From Wheeling to Columbus, Ohio_. JAMES H. BACON, WILLIAM RIANHARD, F. M. WRIGHT, WILLIAM H. FIFE, _From Columbus to Cincinnati_. The Cumberland Road became instantly a great mail-route to Cincinnati and St. Louis; from these points mails were forwarded by packets to Louisville, Huntsville, Alabama, Nashville, Tennessee, and all Mississippi points. Mails from Washington reached the West in 1837 as follows: Washington to Wheeling 30 hours Washington to Columbus 45-1/2 hours Washington to Indianapolis 65-1/2 hours Washington to Vandalia 85-1/2 hours Washington to St. Louis 94 hours Nashville was reached from Louisville by packet in twenty-one hours, Mobile in eighty hours, and New Orleans in one hundred and sixty-five hours. Some of the larger appropriations for the Cumberland Road were: 1813 $140,000 1816 300,000 1819 535,000 1830 215,000 1833 459,000 1834 750,000 1835 646,186 1836 600,000 1838 459,000 The total of thirty-four appropriations from March 29, 1806, to June 17, 1844, was $6,824,919.33. The old road was well built; nothing proves this so well as the following advertisement for bids for repairing it in Ohio in 1838: "Sealed proposals will be received at Toll-gate No. 4, until the 6th day of March next, for repairing that part of the road lying between the beginning of the 23rd and end of the 42nd mile, and if suitable bids are obtained, and not otherwise, contracts will be made at Bradshaw's hotel in Fairview, on the 8th. Those who desire contracts are expected to attend in person, in order to sign their bonds. "On this part of the Road three hundred rods or upwards (82-1/2 cubic feet each) will be required on each mile, of the best quality of limestone, broken evenly into blocks not exceeding four ounces in weight each; and specimens of the material proposed must be furnished, in quantity not less than six cubic inches, broken and neatly put up in a box, and accompanying each bid; which will be returned and taken as the standard, both as it regards the quality of the material and the preparation of it at the time of measurement and inspection. "The following conditions will be mutually understood as entering into, and forming a part of the contract, namely: The 23, 24, and 25 miles to be ready for measurement and inspection on the 25th of July; the 26, 27, and 28 miles on the 1st of August; the 29, 30, and 31 miles on the 15th of August; the 32, 33, and 34 miles on the 1st of September; the 35, 36, 37 miles on the 15th of September; the 38, 39, and 40 miles on the 1st of October; and the 41 and 42 miles, if let, will be examined at the same time. "Any failure to be ready for inspection at the time above specified, will incur a penalty of five per cent for every two days' delay, until the whole penalty shall amount to 25 per cent on the contract paid. All the piles must be neatly put up for measurement and no pile will be measured on this part of the work containing less than five rods. Whenever a pile is placed upon deceptive ground, whether discovered at the time of measurement or afterward, half its contents shall in every case be forfeited for the use of the road. "Proposals will also be received at the American Hotel in Columbus, on the 15th of March, for hauling broken materials from the penitentiary east of Columbus. Bids are solicited on the 1, 2, and 3 miles counting from a point near the Toll-gate towards the city. Bids will also be received at the same time and place, for collecting and breaking all the old stone that lies along the roadside, between Columbus and Kirkersville, neatly put in piles of not less than two rods, and placed on the outside of the ditches." [Illustration: GENERAL ARTHUR ST. CLAIR _Appointed Governor of Ohio by Congress_] The dawning of the era of slackwater navigation and of the locomotive brought the public to the realization, however, that a macadamized road was not in 1838 all the wonder that it was thought to be in 1806. But in its day the Cumberland Road was a tremendous power in opening a new country, in giving hope to a brave but secluded people who had won and held the West for the Union. This was why Henry Clay championed the movement, and why he should be remembered therefor. As a Kentuckian he knew the Western problem, and with the swiftness of genius he caught the true intent and deeper meaning of a great national work such as the building of such a material bond of union. Nothing has done so much for civilization, after the alphabet and the printing press, Macaulay has said, as the inventions which have abridged distance. In those years, quick with hopes and vast with possibility at the opening of the nineteenth century, the Cumberland Road, stretching its yellow coils out across the Alleghanies and into the prairies, advanced civilization as no other material object did or could have done. "If there is any kind of advancement going on," wrote Bushnell, "if new ideas are abroad and new hopes rising, then you will see it by the roads that are building." This old road, worn out and almost forgotten, its milestones tottering, its thousand taverns silent where once all was life and merriment, is a great monument of days when advancement was a new word, when great hopes were rising and great ideas were abroad. As such it shall be remembered and honored as one of the greatest and most timely acts of promotion our young Government executed. CHAPTER VIII _Gouverneur Morris's Day-dream of the Coming Blessings of Liberty.--He predicts Artificial Channels from the Lakes to the Hudson.--The Sight of the Caledonian Canal enables him to foresee Wealth for the Interior of America.--Seeing Ships on Lake Erie, he predicts that Ocean Vessels will soon sail on the Lakes.--Inland Navigation a Great Factor in this Country's Development.--Many Rivers not made Navigable for Lack of Engineering Skill.--President Jefferson recommends that the Surplus in the Treasury be used for Internal Improvements.--Jesse Hawley writes Articles in Behalf of an Erie Canal.--A Bill in the New York Legislature for the Same Object.--Hindrances to the Execution of the Project.--Names of Some Notable Friends of the Undertaking.--Erie Canal Bill passed by the New York Legislature, 1817.--Lack of Good Roads necessitates Transportation of Materials for the Canal in Winter only.--Other Difficulties.--Clearing away the Timber and laying out the Track from Albany to Buffalo.--Imported Machinery used for uprooting Trees and Stumps.--Neighboring States urged to Contribute.--Cost and Profits both Greater than Estimated.--Rejoicings at the Opening of the Canal.--The Success of this Canal leads to other Enterprises._ MORRIS AND CLINTON: FATHERS OF THE ERIE CANAL [Illustration] AS we survey the early period of the nation's history, there appear a number of famous conventions of notables which will ever live in the memory of thoughtful Americans. There are, however, a number of such gatherings that are not familiar to many, and it is at one of these that any story of the far-famed Erie Canal must begin. In the year 1777 General Schuyler's army was at Fort Edward, New York, during its slow and sullen retreat before Burgoyne's advancing redcoats. Gouverneur Morris was sent to the army at Fort Edward, and on a certain evening, amid a company of army officers, that brilliant man told a day-dream before the flickering camp-fire. The dream concerned the future of America when once the foreign yoke should be thrown off. In language consonant with the fascinating nature of his theme the speaker described in some detail what would be the result on the minds and hearts of men when liberty for all had been secured, and the inspiring advance in arts and letters, in agriculture and commerce, that would come. He was a dreamer, but his dream became a realization and the wonder of young America. A comrade that night heard his words. "He announced," wrote that person, Governor Morgan Lewis, then Quartermaster-General, "in language highly poetic, and to which I cannot do justice, that at no very distant day the waters of the great Western inland seas would, by the aid of man, break through their barriers and mingle with those of the Hudson. I recollect asking him how they were to break through these barriers. To which he replied, that numerous streams passed them through natural channels, and that artificial ones might be conducted by the same routes." A number of eminent authorities, such as James Geddes, Simeon de Witt, and Elkanah Watson, all leave evidence that the idea of a canal from Lake Erie to the Hudson was first brought to men's attention by the man who told his vision to those sleepy Revolutionary officers at Fort Edward. In his diary of a journey in Scotland in 1795 Morris thus exclaims at the sight of the Caledonian Canal, "When I see this, my mind opens to a view of wealth for the interior of America, which hitherto I had rather conjectured than seen." Six years later he wrote to a friend, after seeing ships on Lake Erie: "Hundreds of large ships will, at no distant period, bound on the billows of these inland seas.... Shall I lead your astonishment up to the verge of incredulity? I will. Know then that one-tenth of the expense borne by Great Britain in the last campaign would enable ships to sail from London through Hudson's River into Lake Erie." Simeon de Witt said in 1822: "The merit of first starting the idea of a direct communication by water between Lake Erie and Hudson's River unquestionably belongs to Mr. Gouverneur Morris. The first suggestion I had of it was from him. In 1803 I accidentally met with him at Schenectady. We put up for the night at the same inn and passed the evening together. He then mentioned the project of 'tapping Lake Erie,' as he expressed it himself, and leading its water in an artificial river, directly across the country to Hudson's River." James Geddes first heard of the early canal idea from Mr. Morris in 1804. "The idea," he said, "of saving so much lockage by not descending to Lake Ontario made a very lively impression on my mind." [Illustration: GOUVERNEUR MORRIS _Promoter of the Erie Canal_] Looking back over the colonial history of America it is very interesting to note the part that was played in our country's development by inland navigation. Practically all the commerce of the colonies was moved in canoes, sloops, and schooners; the large number of Atlantic seaboard rivers were the roads of the colonies, and there were no other roads. In Pennsylvania and Georgia a few highways were in existence; in the province of New York there were only twelve miles of land carriage. Villages, churches, and courthouses in Maryland and Virginia were almost always placed on the shore of the rivers, for it was only by boat that the people could easily go to meeting or to court. Indeed the capital of the country, Washington, was located upon the Potomac River, partly for the reason that its founders believed that the Potomac was to be the great commercial highway of the eastern half of the continent. As roads were the arteries of trade and travel it was natural for our forefathers to hold the opinion that to increase the commerce of the country it was necessary only to increase the number of navigable miles of the rivers. The story of the struggle to improve the navigation of the two rivers, Mohawk and Hudson, upon which the attention of our earliest engineers centred, occupies other pages of this volume; and it is for us to note here the fact merely in passing that, beginning with 1786, strenuous efforts were made to render these waterways, and a large number of less important rivers, navigable. The efforts failed of success, the reason being that engineering skill was not of a grade high enough to master the problem. And consequently, when the nineteenth century dawned, we may say with fair regard to truth that the campaigns that had been waging in a number of the States for the betterment of America's navigation by means of improved rivers had failed and were discarded. Then it was that public attention was turned to the subject of making artificial water channels, or canals. Generations before this, the great Forth and Clyde Canal in Scotland had been completed by Smeaton; the Royal Canal in Ireland was finished in 1792; the Schuylkill and Susquehanna Canal in Pennsylvania had been surveyed in 1762, and a few miles of it had been dug in 1794; the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal, though surveyed as early as 1764, was not begun until 1804. It was natural, therefore, that the idea of a canal between the Hudson and Lake Erie should have presented itself forcibly to New Yorkers at this time, and all the latent possibilities were aroused to activity in 1807 by the recommendation made by President Jefferson in his message to Congress in October, that the surplus money in the Treasury of the United States be used for undertaking a large number of internal improvements. Whether or not Jefferson's recommendation or some other preliminary proposal of this kind may have inspired it, a New Yorker named Jesse Hawley was now preparing a series of articles advocating a canal between the Hudson and the Lakes. Before these articles, to which the name of "Hercules" was signed, were ready to appear in print, Mr. Hawley changed his place of residence to Pittsburg, and, oddly enough, it was in "The Commonwealth," a Pittsburg paper, that the first published broadside in behalf of an Erie canal appeared; this was on the fourteenth day of January, 1807. This series of articles, as a whole, appeared in "The Genesee Messenger," of Canandaigua, weekly from October, 1807, to March, 1808. The author had studied the problem with great earnestness, though the Mohawk River was to be used as a part of the system. In February of the following year the idea gained added impetus and circulation by a bill offered in the New York Legislature; its author was Joshua Forman, a member from Onondaga County, and it read as follows: "Whereas the President of the United States by his message to Congress, delivered at their meeting in October last, did recommend that the surplus money in the treasury, over and above such sums as could be applied to the extinguishment of the national debt, be appropriated to the great national objects of opening canals and making turnpike roads; And whereas the State of New York, holding the first commercial rank in the United States, possesses within herself the best route of communication between the Atlantic and Western waters, by means of a canal between the tide-waters of the Hudson River and Lake Erie, through which the wealth and trade of that large portion of the United States bordering on the upper lakes would for ever flow to our great commercial emporium; And whereas the Legislatures of several of our sister States have made great exertions to secure to their own States the trade of that wide-extended country west of the Alleghanies to those of this State; And whereas it is highly important that these advantages should as speedily as possible be improved, both to preserve and increase the commerce and national importance of this State: Resolved (if the honourable the Senate concur herein), that a joint committee be appointed to take into consideration the propriety of exploring, and causing an accurate survey to be made of, the most eligible and direct route for a canal to open a communication between the tide-waters of the Hudson River and Lake Erie; to the end that Congress may be enabled to appropriate such sums as may be necessary to the accomplishment of that great national object." For a number of years the great project was held in abeyance by a series of unforeseen events. First among these was the War of 1812, during which the State of New York was the frontier and saw a number of the most important campaigns. Then, too, the inherent difficulties of the project--the vast amount of ground necessarily to be covered, the low plane of engineering science at that day, the immeasurable difficulties of gaining access to the interior of a heavily wooded country, the low ebb of the financial condition of the State--all combined to strengthen the opposition to the canal. But its friends grew in number and steadily grew in power. First among them was Governor Clinton, who was so closely allied with the great undertaking that its enemies frequently called it "Clinton's Ditch"; Gouverneur Morris, Fulton, and Livingston (who were just now succeeding in their steamboat enterprise), Simeon de Witt, Thomas Eddy, General Philip Schuyler, Chancellor Kent, and Judges Yates and Platt are remembered as the most influential promoters of America's first great work of internal improvement. Strangely enough, one of the most serious hindrances to the beginning of the work proved in the end to be the great argument in its favor, and that was the War of 1812. The act which gave birth to the canal was passed by the New York Legislature April 15, 1817, and then went before the Council of Revision. "The ordeal this bill met with in the Council of Revision," writes M. S. Hawley in his valuable pamphlet,[3] "came near being fatal to it; it could not have received a two-thirds vote after a veto. The Council was composed of Lieutenant-Governor John Taylor,--acting Governor, as President of the Council,--Chief Justice Thompson, Chancellor Kent, and Judges Yates and Platt. Acting Governor Taylor was openly opposed to the whole scheme. The Chief Justice was also opposed to this bill. Chancellor Kent was in favor of the canal, but feared it was too early for the State to undertake this gigantic work. Judges Yates and Platt were in favor of the bill; but it was likely to be lost by the casting vote of the acting Governor. Vice-President Tompkins (recently the Governor) entered the room at this stage of the proceedings, and, in an informal way, joined in conversation upon the subject before the Council, and in opposition to this bill. He said: 'The late peace with Great Britain was a mere truce, and we will undoubtedly soon have a renewed war with that country; and instead of wasting the credit and resources of the State in this chimerical project, we ought to employ all our revenue and credit in preparing for war.' "'Do you think so, sir?' said Chancellor Kent. "'Yes, sir,' replied the Vice-President; 'England will never forgive us for our victories, and, my word for it, we shall have another war with her within two years.' "The Chancellor, then rising from his seat, with great animation declared, "'If we must have war ... I am in favor of the canal, and I vote for the bill.' "With that vote the bill became a law." It is difficult for us to-day to realize what a tremendous undertaking it was to try to throw this great "Ditch" of Clinton's across those hundreds of miles of forest and swamp which, for so many generations, had been known as the "Long House of the Iroquois." As you fly through that beautiful territory watered by the Mohawk, Seneca, and Onondaga rivers to-day, it is hardly possible to re-create, with any measure of truth, the old-time appearance of the land. It was well into the nineteenth century before a good road was ever built in Central New York; indeed, during the years while the Erie Canal was being built, the necessary materials for the building, and provisions for the builders, were transported thither in the winter season because at that time only was it accessible by any known means of transportation. Think what it meant, then, to dig a great trench through the heavily wooded region where even the road-builders had not had the temerity to go. It was the forest growth that held back the road-maker; the tangled forest, the heavily wooded overgrowth that bound the heavy trees inextricably together. The canal-builder had all that the road-maker found to combat with above the ground,--the tangled mesh of bush, vine, and tree,--but he had also what was far more difficult to attack and conquer, namely, the tremendous labyrinth of roots that lay beneath the ground. Thus, his task was double that of the road-maker; and look as far as you will through our early history, you will not find an enterprise launched on this continent by any man or any set of men that will compare in daring with the promotion of this great work of interior improvement to which New York now set herself. For there was no hesitating. Within a very few days of the passing of the act creating the Erie Canal you could have seen surveyors and chainmen pushing out into the shadowy forest-land, driving five lines of stakes across New York toward the setting sun. These men, like those who sent them, were ridiculed everywhere they went by some of the people; but still the ringing blows grew fainter and fainter as those five lines of stakes crept on up the Mohawk, along the Seneca, through poisonous swamps, on the banks of running rivers, around the shores of the still-lying lakes. Those who ridiculed prophesied that next we would be building a bridge across the Atlantic, and then a tunnel to China beneath the Pacific; but the sneers and ridicule of that portion of the people that will be fools all the time could not stop those earnest stake-drivers or the small army of men, mostly Americans, who came in and worked with pick, shovel, and wheelbarrow. The two outer lines of stakes were sixty feet apart; this indicated the space from which the forest was to be cleared. Two lines of stakes within these, measuring forty feet apart, represented the exact width of the proposed canal; and the remaining single line of stakes located its mathematical centre. The whole distance of the canal from Albany to Buffalo was divided into three sections, and these sections were subdivided into very small portions, which were let to contractors. The first contract was signed June 27, 1817, and work was begun at historic Rome, New York, on the following Fourth of July, with appropriate ceremony. After a short address by one of the commissioners, Samuel Young, and amid a burst of artillery, Judge Richardson, the first contractor, threw out the first spadeful of earth. To present-day readers acquainted with so many wonderful feats of engineering of modern days, the history of the building of this canal must seem commonplace; the marvellous thing about it, after all, was its conception and the campaign of education which brought about its realization. One of the romantic phases of the story, that will forever be of interest to those of us who can never know a primeval forest, was the experience of the engineering corps crashing their way through the New York forests, where the surveyors' stakes could hardly be seen in the dense gloom. Machinery unknown in America at the time was called upon to perform this arduous labor of grubbing and clearing this sixty-foot aisle. One machine, working on the principle of an endless screw connected with a cable, a wheel, and a crank, enabled a single man to haul down a tree of the largest size without any cutting. The machine being located at a distance of one hundred feet from the foot of the tree, the cable was attached to the trunk fifty or sixty feet from the ground, a crank was turned, the screw revolved, and the tree was soon prostrated, as the force which could be exerted by this principle was irresistible. A machine for hauling out stumps was constructed and operated as follows: "Two strong wheels, sixteen feet in diameter, are made and connected together by a round axle-tree, twenty inches thick and thirty feet long; between these wheels, and with its spokes inseparably framed into their axle-tree, another wheel is placed, fourteen feet in diameter, round the rim of which a rope is several times passed, with one end fastened through the rim, and with the other end loose, but in such a condition as to produce a revolution of the wheel whenever it is pulled. This apparatus is so moved as to have the stump, on which it is intended to operate, midway between the largest wheels, and nearly under the axle-tree; and these wheels are so braced as to remain steady. A very strong chain is hooked, one end to the body of the stump, or its principal root, and the other to the axle-tree. The power of horses or oxen is then applied to the loose end of the rope above mentioned, and as they draw, rotary motion is communicated, through the smallest wheel, to the axle-tree, on which, as the chain hooked to the stump winds up, the stump itself is gradually disengaged from the earth in which it grew. After this disengagement is complete, the braces are taken from the large wheels, which then afford the means of removing that stump out of the way, as well as of transporting the apparatus where it may be made to bear on another." An implement devised for the underground work demanded on the Erie Canal was a peculiar plough having a very heavy blade by which the roots of the trees were cut; two yoke of oxen could draw this plough through any mesh of roots none of which exceeded two inches in diameter. The middle section of the canal, from Rome to Lockport, was completed in 1819, twenty-seven miles being navigable in that year. By 1823 the canal was opened from Rochester to Schenectady. Water was admitted into the canal between Schenectady and Albany in October of that year; and by September, 1824, the line was completed from Lockport to Black Rock Harbor on Lake Erie. In evidence of what the promoters of the Erie Canal expected that highway would be to the Central West we find this interesting fact: Ohio, and even Kentucky, were called upon officially to aid in raising the funds for its building. Indeed, the commissioners in 1817 went so far as to utter a threat against the States lying on each side of New York in case they should not be willing to contribute to the building of this commercial route, which was to be for their common benefit; this consisted in a threat to charge high duties on articles transported to and from those States and the Territories of the United States. It would seem as though New York never expected to be compelled to finance, unassisted, the great work of improvement which she began in 1817. Agents went canvassing for her both in Vermont on the east and in Ohio on the west for the purpose of raising contributions to the canal fund. Agents also were sent to the national Government at Washington, and it was believed that national aid could perhaps be secured from the sale of the public lands in Michigan, very much in the same way as the old National Road was paid for in part by the sale of lands in Ohio a decade before. Though assurances of interest and sympathy were forthcoming from the Government and from all the interested States, there is no evidence at hand to show that New York was aided to the extent of a single penny from any extraneous source. To this fact, we shall see in another chapter, may be charged the opposition of New York delegates in Congress to many government-aid propositions that came up in the era of internal improvements. As is usually the case, the expense of this great work exceeded all the scheduled estimates; but, as has seldom if ever been the case with works of this character, the receipts from the tolls on the Erie Canal also exceeded all estimates. In only eight years following the completion of the canal the receipts from it exceeded all estimates by nearly two and one-quarter millions of dollars, whereas the total cost of the canal, including the amount required for completion and payment of all claims at the close of the year 1824, was only $7,700,000. Indeed, the success of the canal was so great that it was hardly completed before plans for an enlargement were necessary. Yet on its completion a great celebration was held, which probably was the most picturesque pageant ever seen on this continent to that time. For many days previous to the completion of the work, committees in all the cities and villages throughout the route of the canal were preparing to do honor to Governor Clinton as he should make a triumphal tour from end to end in the first boat that made the journey. Looking back through the years, the scene presented of the Governor of that State sailing in a little flotilla of canal boats from Buffalo to Albany, the violent rejoicing of political friends along the route, the demonstrations and orations by the score, the transparencies, illuminations, and jollifications, stand without a parallel in the early history of our country. At the moment when Clinton's boats weighed anchor at Buffalo, a burst of artillery sent the message eastward; cannon located along the route took up the message, and in comparatively few moments it was passed across the State to the metropolis. When Clinton reached New York, the canal boats having been towed down the Hudson, a spectacular ceremony was performed off Sandy Hook, where a keg of Lake Erie water was poured into the sea in commemoration of the wedding of the ocean and the lakes. The procession in New York City was the greatest, it is said, that had ever formed in America up to that time. The illuminations were in harmony with the whole scale of the celebration, as was true of the grand ball in Lafayette Amphitheatre in Laurens Street; here, in order to secure necessary floor space, a circus building on one side and a riding-school on the other were temporarily united to make the largest ballroom in America. [Illustration: DE WITT CLINTON _Friend of the Erie Canal Project_] The Erie Canal was of tremendous national importance in more ways than it is possible to trace. The hopes and dreams of its promoters were based on such sound principles, and the work they planned was so well executed, that the success of their adventure gave inspiration to hundreds of other enterprises throughout the length and breadth of the country. That was the Erie Canal's great mission. It is hardly necessary to say that the State of New York reaped a great benefit from the successful prosecution of the work. But it was not New York alone that benefited; for the Erie Canal was the one great early school of civil engineers in the United States, and in all parts of the country, from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at Baltimore to the Portland Canal at far-away Louisville, Kentucky, the men who engineered New York's great canal found valuable work to do. It is most remarkable that now, at the beginning of another century, the people of New York should be planning a new Erie Canal; and perhaps the most significant fact in connection with the one-thousand-ton barge canal now projected is the fact that wherever rivers are available, as for instance the Mohawk, these are to be taken advantage of, showing that modern engineering science approves the early theory entertained by Washington and Morris of the canalization of rivers. The old Erie Canal cost upwards of eight millions, which was deemed an immense sum at that day. It is difficult always to measure by any monetary standard the great changes that the passing years have brought; but the new canal now to be built is to cost one hundred and one millions, which is in our time a comparatively moderate sum. The influence of the building of the old canal spread throughout the nation, and scores of canals were projected in the different States; it seems now that the influence of the promotion of the new Erie Canal will likewise be felt throughout the country. New York again leads the way. FOOTNOTE: [3] "The Origin of the Erie Canal." CHAPTER IX _The Demand for Canals and Navigable Rivers.--Washington's Search for a Route for a Canal or Road to bind the East and West.--Much Money spent in the Attempt to make Certain Rivers Navigable.--Failure of the Potomac Company to improve Navigation on the Potomac.--The Need for a Potomac and Ohio Canal to withhold the Western Trade from the Erie.--The Potomac Canal Company, re-named the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company.--Apparent Impossibility of building a Canal from the Potomac to Baltimore.--Philip E. Thomas conceives the Idea of a Railroad from Baltimore to the West.--The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company's Jealousy of this Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company.--Both the Canal and the Railroad started.--Difficulties in the Way of Both.--The Canal's Exclusive Right of Way up the Potomac to be now shared with the Railroad.--The Railroad completed to the Ohio, 1853.--A Canal from Philadelphia to Pittsburg built rapidly.--The Alleghany Portage Railway opened for Traffic in Three Years.--Washington's Efforts to accomplish the Same End.--The Railways to a Large Extent supersede the Canals._ THOMAS AND MERCER: RIVAL PROMOTERS OF CANAL AND RAILWAY [Illustration] ALTHOUGH the Cumberland National Road proved a tremendous boon to the young West and meant to the East commercially all that its promoters hoped, other means of transportation were being hailed loudly as the nineteenth century dawned. Improved river-navigation was one of these, and canals were another. When it was fully realized how difficult was the transportation of freight across the Alleghanies on even the best of roads, the cry was raised, "Cannot waterways be improved or cut from Atlantic tide-water to the Ohio River?" In our story of Washington as promoter and prophet it was seen that at the close of the Revolution the late commander gave himself up at once to the commercial problem of how the Potomac River might be made to hold the Middle West in fee. Passing westward in the Fall of 1784, he spent a month in the wilds of Northern Virginia seeking for a pathway for canal or road from the South Branch of the Potomac to the Cheat River. The result of his explorations was the classic letter to Harrison in 1784, calling Virginia to her duty in the matter of binding the East and West with those strongest of all bonds--commercial routes bringing mutual benefit. The immediate result was the formation of the Potomac Company, which proposed to improve the navigation of the Potomac from tide-water, at Washington, D. C., to the highest practicable point, to build a road from that point to the nearest tributary of the Ohio River, and, in turn, to improve the navigation of that tributary. One stands aghast at the amount of money spent by our forefathers in the sorry attempt to improve hundreds of unnavigable American rivers. You can count numbers of them, even between the Mohawk and Potomac, which were probably the poorest investments made by early promoters in the infant days of our Republic. When, in the Middle Ages, river improvement was common in Europe, it was proposed to make an unnavigable Spanish river navigable. The plan was stopped by a stately decree of an august Spanish council on the following grounds: "If it had pleased God that these rivers should have been navigable, He would not have wanted human assistance to have made them such; but that, as He has not done it, it is plain that He did not think it proper that it should be done. To attempt it, therefore, would be to violate the decree of His providence, and to mend these imperfections which He designedly left in His works." It is certain that stockholders in companies formed to improve the Potomac, Mohawk, Lehigh, Susquehanna, and scores of other American streams would have heartily agreed that it was, in truth, a sacrilege thus to violate the decrees of Providence. With Washington as its president, however, the Potomac Company set to work in 1785 to build a canal around the Great Falls of the Potomac, fifteen miles above Washington, D. C., and blast out a channel in the rocky rapids at Seneca Falls and Shenandoah Falls. Even during Washington's presidency, which lasted until his election as President of the United States in 1788, there was great difficulty in getting the stockholders to remit their assessments. Other troubles, such as imperfect surveys, mismanagement, jealousy of managers, and floods, tended to delay and discourage. The act of incorporation demanded that the navigation from tide-water to Cumberland, Maryland, be completed in three years. Nearly a dozen times the Legislatures of Maryland and Virginia, under whose auspices the work was jointly done, postponed the day of reckoning. By 1820 nearly a million dollars had been emptied into the Potomac River, and a commission then appointed to examine the Company's affairs reported that the capital stock and all tolls had been expended, a large debt incurred, and that "the floods and freshets nevertheless gave the only navigation that was enjoyed." By this time the Erie Canal had been partly formed, and it was clear that it would prove a tremendous success; its operation was no longer a theory, and freight rates on merchandise across New York had dropped from one hundred dollars to ten dollars a ton. Of the many canals (which were now proposed by the score) the Potomac Canal, which should connect tide-water with the Ohio River by way of Cumberland and the Monongahela River, was considered of prime importance. Virginia and Maryland (in other words, Alexandria and Baltimore) had held, by means of the roads they had built and promoted, the trade of the West for half a century. The Erie Canal seemed about to deprive them of it all; the Potomac Canal must restore it! So the Virginians believed, and on this belief they quickly acted. The Potomac Canal Company--soon re-named the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company--was formed, and chartered by Virginia. Maryland hesitated; could Baltimore be connected by canal with the Potomac Valley? Before this doubt was banished a national commission had investigated the country through which the proposed canal was to run, and reported that its cost (the Company was capitalized at six millions) would exceed twenty millions! The seventy miles between the Potomac and the head of the Youghiogheny alone would cost nearly twice as much as the entire capital of the Company! And soon it became clear that it was impossible to build a connecting canal between the Potomac and Baltimore. The situation now became intensely exciting. A resurvey of the canal route lowered the previous high estimate, and the Virginians and Marylanders (outside of Baltimore) believed fully that the Ohio and the Potomac could be connected, and that the Erie Canal would not, after all, monopolize the trade of the West. Alexandria and Georgetown would then become the great trade centres of the continental waterway from tide-water to the Mississippi basin,--in fact, secure the position Baltimore had held for nearly a century. Baltimore had been a famous market for Western produce during the days of the turnpike and "freighter"; the rise of the easy-gliding canal-boat, it seemed, was to put an end to those prosperous days. Trade already had become light; Philadelphia was forging ahead, and even New York seemed likely to become a rival of Baltimore's. A Baltimore bank president--whose name must be enrolled high among those of the great promoters of early America--sat in his office considering the gloomy situation. That he saw it clearly there is no doubt; very likely his books showed with irresistible logic that things were not going well in the Maryland metropolis. This man was Philip Evan Thomas, president of the Mechanics' Bank. Before many days he conceived the idea of building a railroad from Baltimore to the West, which would bring back the trade that had been slipping away since the turnpike roads had been eclipsed by the canal. Baltimore's position necessitated her relying on roads; so far as the West was concerned there were no waterways of which she could avail herself. Railroads had been proving successful; one in Massachusetts three miles long served the purposes of a common road to a quarry advantageously. At Mauch Chunk, Pennsylvania, a railroad nine miles long connected a coal mine and the Lehigh River. Heavy loads could be deposited on the cars used on these roads, and on a level or on an upgrade horses could draw them with ease. If a short road was practicable, why not a long one? A three-hundred-mile railroad was as possible as a nine-mile road. Mr. Thomas admitted to his counsels Mr. George Brown; each had brothers in England who forwarded much information concerning the railway agitation abroad. On the night of February 12, 1826, an invited company of Baltimore merchants met at Mr. Thomas's home, and the plan was outlined. A committee was appointed to review the situation critically and report in one week. On February 19 the report was made, unanimously urging the formation of a Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company. The intense rivalry of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company forms of itself a historical novel. The name "Ohio" in their legal titles signifies the root of jealousy. The trade of the "Ohio country," which included all the trans-Alleghany empire, was the prize both companies would win. The story is the more interesting because in the long, bitter struggle which to its day was greater than any commercial warfare of our time, the seemingly weaker company, handicapped at every point by its stronger rival, and also held back because of the slow advance of the discoveries and improvements necessary to its success, at last triumphed splendidly in the face of every difficulty. The first act in the drama was to hold rival inaugural celebrations. Accordingly, on July 4, 1828, two wonderful pageants were enacted, one at Baltimore and the other at Washington. At Baltimore the aged Charles Carroll of Carrollton, the only surviving signer of the Declaration of Independence, laid the "cornerstone" of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. At Washington, President John Quincy Adams, amid the cheering of thousands, lifted the first spadeful of earth in the great work of digging a canal from Washington to Cumberland. The fact that the spade struck a root was in no wise considered an ill omen. Redoubling his efforts, President Adams again drove the implement into the ground. The root held stoutly. Whereupon the President threw off his coat, amid the wildest cheering, and, with a powerful effort, sent the spade full length downward and turned out its hallowed contents upon the ground. Washington, Georgetown, and Alexandria were represented by dignified officials. Baltimore, so long mistress of the commerce of the West, was now to be distanced by the Potomac Valley cities. And it was soon seen that the Canal Company did hold the key to the situation. Having inherited the debts and assets of the old Potomac Company, it also inherited something of more value,--that priceless right of way up the Potomac Valley, the only possible Western route through Maryland for either a canal or a railroad. The railroad struck straight from Baltimore toward Harper's Ferry and the Point of Rocks, on the Potomac; the Canal Company immediately stopped its work by an injunction. The only terms on which it agreed to permit its rival to build to Harper's Ferry was that a promise should be given that the Railroad Company would not build any part of the road onward to Cumberland, Maryland, until the canal should have been completed to that point. Could it have been realized at the time, this blow was not wholly unfortunate. There were problems before this first railroad company in America more difficult than the gaining of a right of way to Cumberland. Every feature of its undertaking was in most primitive condition,--road-bed, tracks, rails, sleepers, ties, cars, all, were most simple. The road was an ordinary macadamized pathway; the cars were common stagecoaches, on smaller, heavier wheels. More than all else, the motor force was an intrinsically vital problem. Horses and mules were now being used; a car with a sail was invented, but was, of course, useless in calm weather, or when the wind was not blowing in the right direction. In the meantime the steam locomotive was being perfected, and Peter Cooper's "Tom Thumb" settled the question in 1830, on these tracks of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. For a number of years the ultimate practicability of the machine was in question, but when the railroad was in a position to expand westward, in 1836, the locomotive as a motor force was acknowledged on every hand to be a success. In all other departments, likewise, the railroad had been improving. The six years had seen a vast change. With the canal, on the other hand, these had been discouraging years. Though master of the legal situation, money came to it slowly, labor became more costly, unexpected physical difficulties were encountered, floods delayed operations. Again and again aid from Maryland had been invoked successfully; and now, in 1836, it was reported that three millions more was necessary to complete the canal to Cumberland. Maryland now passed her famous "Eight-million-dollar Bill," giving the railroad and canal each three million dollars, with a condition imposed on the Canal Company that the two companies should have an equal right of way up the Potomac to Cumberland. Though the directors of the Canal Company objected bitterly at thus being compelled to resign control of the situation, the needs of the Company were such that acquiescence was imperatively necessary. The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal was completed to Cumberland in 1851, at a cost of over eleven million dollars, the root of Maryland's great State debt. The passage of this epoch-making law was the turning-point in this long and fierce conflict. It marked the day when the city of Baltimore at last conquered the State of Maryland,--when the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad mastered the situation, of which in 1832 the canal was master. The panic of 1837 delayed temporarily the sweep of the railway up the Potomac to Cumberland, but it reached that strategic point in 1842. Work on the route across the mountains was begun at various points, and the whole line was opened almost simultaneously. The first division, from Cumberland to Piedmont, was opened in June, 1851; by the next June the road was completed to Fairmount on the Monongahela River; and on the night of January 12, 1853, a banquet-board was spread in the city of Wheeling to celebrate the completion of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to the Ohio River. Of the five regular toasts of the evening none was so typical or so welcome as that to the president under whose auspices this first railway had been thrown across the Alleghanies,--"Thomas Swann: standing upon the banks of the Ohio, and looking back upon the mighty peaks of the Alleghanies, surmounted by his efforts, he can proudly exclaim, 'Veni, vidi, vici.'" The story of the building of the Pennsylvania Canal, and later the Pennsylvania Railway, a little to the north of the two Maryland works, is not a story of bitter rivalry, but is remarkable in point of enterprise and swift success; it also shows another of the results of the successful operation of the Erie Canal. In 1824 the Pennsylvania Legislature authorized the appointment of a commission to select a route for a canal from Philadelphia to Pittsburg. The success of New York's canal (now practically completed) impressed the Pennsylvanians as forcefully as it did Marylanders and Virginians; Philadelphia desired to control the trade of the West as much as New York or Baltimore. The earnestness of the Pennsylvanians could not be more clearly shown than by the rapid building of their canal. The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal up the Potomac Valley was over twenty-five years in building; within ten years of the time the above commission was appointed, canal-boats could pass from Philadelphia to Pittsburg. The route, at first, was by the Schuylkill to the Union Canal, which entered the Susquehanna at Middletown; this was nominally the eastern division of the Pennsylvania Canal, it having been completed in 1827. The central division extended from Middletown (later from Columbia) up the Susquehanna and Juniata rivers to Hollidaysburg. This division was completed in 1834, at a cost of nearly five and one-half millions. The western division ran from Johnstown down the Conemaugh, Kiskiminetas, and Alleghany valleys; it was completed to Pittsburg in 1830, at a cost of a little over three millions. As stated, canal-boats could traverse this course as early as 1834, and the uninformed must wonder how a canal-boat could vault the towering crest lying between Hollidaysburg and Johnstown, which the Pennsylvania Railway crosses with difficulty at Gallitzin, more than two thousand feet above sea-level. The answer to this introduces us to the Alleghany Portage Railway, a splendid piece of early engineering, which deserves mention in any sketch of early deeds of expansion and promotion in America. The feat was accomplished by means of inclined planes; the idea was not at all new, but, under the circumstances, it was wholly an experiment. The plan was to build a railway which could contain eleven sections with heavy grades, and between them ten inclined planes. A canal-boat having been run into a submerged car in the basin on either side of the mountain, it could be drawn over the level by horses or locomotives, and sent over the summit, 1,441 feet above Hollidaysburg, on the inclines by means of stationary engines. The scheme was first advanced early in the history of the canal, but it was not finally adopted until 1831, and in three years the portage railway was opened for traffic. The ten planes averaged about 2,000 feet in length and about 200 feet in elevation. They were numbered from west to east. Certain of the levels were quite long, that between Planes No. 1 and No. 2 being thirteen miles in length; the total length of the road was thirty-six miles. It was built through the primeval forests, and an aisle of one hundred and twenty feet in width (twice as wide as that made for the Erie Canal) was cleared, so that the structure would not be in danger of the falling trees which were continually blocking early highways and demolishing pioneer bridges. Two names should be remembered in connection with this momentous work,--Sylvester Welch and Moncure Robinson, the chief and the consulting engineer who erected it. It was in October, 1834, that the first boat, the "Hit or Miss" from the Lackawanna, was sent over the Alleghany Portage Railway intact. According to a local newspaper, it "rested at night on the top of the mountain [Blair's Gap], like Noah's Ark on Ararat, and descended the next morning into the valley of the Mississippi and sailed for St. Louis." Fifty years before, to the month, the pioneer expansionist, Washington, was floundering along in Dunkard Bottom seeking a way for a boat to do what the "Hit or Miss" did in those October days of 1834. It is a far cry, measured by hopes and dreams, back to Washington, but one feature of the picture is of great interest: in Washington's famous appeal to Governor Harrison in 1784 he said of the young West: "The Western inhabitants would do their part [in forming a route of communication].... Weak as they are, they would meet us halfway." What a splendid comment on Washington's wisdom and foresight it is to record that the ten stationary engines on the Alleghany Portage Railway, which hauled the first load of freight that ever crossed the crest of the Alleghanies by artificial means, were made in the young West, in Pittsburg! The West was certainly ready to meet the East halfway when their union was to be perfected. But no sooner was the Pennsylvania Canal in working order than the success of railways was conceded on every hand. At first the eastern section of the canal was superseded by the Philadelphia and Columbia Railway, a portage railway from the Schuylkill to the Susquehanna. Then, in 1846 the Pennsylvania Railroad Company was organized. The old route was found to be the best. The advance was rapid. In two years the road was open to Lewisburg in the Juniata Valley; the western division from Pittsburg to Johnstown was also built rapidly, and in 1852 communication was possible between Pittsburg and Philadelphia, the Alleghany Portage Railway still serving to connect Hollidaysburg and Johnstown. In 1854 this cumbersome method was superseded by the railway over the mountain by way of Gallitzin. The Pennsylvania Canal, instead of delaying the Pennsylvania Road, assisted it, for the latter was encouraged by the State, and the State owned the canal. In 1857 the railway bought both the canal and its portage railway. The latter was closed almost immediately; the canal has been operated by a separate company under the direction of the Pennsylvania Railroad. But the whole western division from Pittsburg to Johnstown was closed in 1864, and the portion in the Juniata Valley was abandoned in 1899, and that in the Susquehanna Valley in 1900. Two magnificent railways, standing prominent among the great railways of the world, have succeeded the old canals and that old-time Alleghany Portage Railway. But these great successes are not their richest possessions; they still own, we may well believe, that spirit which wrought success out of difficulty,--the persistent, irresistible ambition to better present conditions and overcome present difficulties, which is the very essence of American genius and the great secret of America's progress. If you wish a painting that will portray the secret of America's marvellous growth, ask that the artist's brush draw Philip Evan Thomas in his bank office at Baltimore, struggling with the problem how his city could retain the trade of the West; or draw Sylvester Welch struggling with his plans for the inclined planes of the Alleghany Portage Railway. There, in those eager, unsatisfied, and hopeful men, you will find the typical American. CHAPTER X _Ignorance of the American People regarding the Territory called New France and that called Louisiana.--Civilization's Cruel March into Louisiana.--Lewis and Clark, Leaders of the Expedition to the Far West, already Trained Soldiers.--Its Aim not Conquest, but the Advancement of Knowledge and Trade.--Some Previous Explorers.--The Make-up of Lewis and Clark's Party.--Fitness of the Leaders for the Work.--The Winter of 1804-1805 spent at Fort Mandan.--First Encounter with the Grizzly Bear.--Portage from the Missouri to the Columbia, 340 Miles.--Down the Columbia to the Coast near Point Adams.--The Return Journey begun, March, 1806.--British Traders blamed for the Indians' Hatred of Americans.--The Americans thus driven to Deeds which made them despised by the British.--Arrival of the Explorers at St. Louis.--News of this Exploration starts the Rush of Emigrants to the West.--Zebulon M. Pike's Ascent of the Mississippi, 1805.--He explores the Leech Lake Region.--Ordered to the Far West, he reaches the Republican and Arkansas Rivers.--Sufferings of his Party travelling toward the Rio Grande.--He sets up the American Flag on Spanish Territory and is sent away.--The West regarded as the Home of Patriotism._ LEWIS AND CLARK: EXPLORERS OF LOUISIANA [Illustration] WHEN the vast region known as Louisiana was purchased by President Jefferson, a century ago, the American people knew as little about it as the American colonies knew about the great territory called New France which came under English sovereignty at the end of the French War, fifty years earlier. But however great Louisiana was, and whatever its splendid stretch of gleaming waterway or rugged mountain range, it was sure that the race which now became its master would not shirk from solving the tremendous problems of its destiny. In 1763 the same race had taken quiet possession of New France, including the whole empire of the Great Lakes and all the eastern tributaries of the Mississippi River; in the half-century since that day this race had proved its vital powers of successful exploitation of new countries. In those fifty years a Tennessee, a Kentucky, an Ohio, and an Indiana and Illinois had sprung up out of an unknown wilderness as if a magician's wand had touched, one by one, the falling petals of its buckeye blossoms. Thus, New France had been acquired by a great kingdom, but the power of assimilation lay in the genius of the common people of England's seaboard colonies for home-building and land-clearing. Soon the era of brutal individualism passed from the Middle West and the old Northwest; weak as it was, the young American Republic, in the person of such men as Richard Henderson and Rufus Putnam, threw an arm about the wilderness, while George Rogers Clark, "Mad Anthony" Wayne, and William Henry Harrison settled the question of sovereignty with the red-skinned inhabitants of the land. Civilization often marched rough-shod into the American Middle West, bringing, however, better days and ideals than those which it harshly crushed. After Anthony Wayne's conquest of Northwestern Indiana at Fallen Timber (near Toledo, Ohio) in 1794 the burst of population westward from Pittsburg and Kentucky to the valley of the Mississippi was marvellous; by the time of the purchase of Louisiana in 1803 the rough vanguard of the race which had so swiftly opened Kentucky and Ohio and Tennessee to the world was crowding the banks of the Mississippi, ready to leap forward to even greater conquests. What these irrepressible pioneers had done they could do again. Those who affirmed that the purchase of Louisiana must prove a failure had counted without their host. Nothing is of more interest in the great Government expedition of exploration which President Jefferson now sent into the unknown territory beyond the Mississippi than this very fact of vital connection between the leaders of the former movement into the eastern half of the Mississippi Basin and this present movement into its tremendous western half. In a previous story we have shown that the founders of the old Northwest were largely heroes of the French and Indian and the Revolutionary wars; it is now interesting indeed to note that these leaders in Far Western exploration--Meriwether Lewis and William Clark--were in turn heroes of the British and Indian wars, both of them survivors of bloody Fallen Timber, where, on the cyclone's path, Anthony Wayne's hard-trained soldiers made sure that Indian hostility was never again to be a national menace on the American continent. [Illustration: MERIWETHER LEWIS _Of the Lewis and Clark Expedition_] The proposed exploration of Louisiana by Lewis and Clark is interesting also as the first scientific expedition ever promoted by the American Government. For it was a tour of exploration only; the party did not carry leaden plates such as Céloron de Bienville brought fifty years back in those days of gold interwoven with purple, to bury along the tributaries of the Ohio as a claim to land for his royal master and the mistresses of France. There was here no question of possession; Lewis and Clark were, on the contrary, to report on the geography, physiography, and zoölogy of the land, designate proper sites for trading stations, and give an account of the Indian nations. It is remarkable that little was known of Louisiana on these heads. Of course the continent had been crossed, though not by way of the Missouri River route, which had become the great highway for the fur trade. Mackenzie had crossed the continent in the Far North, and Hearne had passed over the Barren Grounds just under the Arctic Circle. To the southward from the Missouri the Spaniards had run to and from the Pacific for two centuries. The commanding position of St. Louis showed that the Missouri route was of utmost importance; the portage to the half-known Columbia was of strategic value, and a knowledge of that river indispensable to sane plans, commercial and political, in the future. In May, 1804, the explorers were ready to start from St. Louis. They numbered twenty-seven men and the two leading spirits, Lewis and Clark; fourteen of the number were regular soldiers from the United States army; there were nine adventurous volunteers from Kentucky; a half-breed interpreter; two French voyageurs and Clark's negro servant completed the roster. The party was increased by the addition of sixteen men, soldiers and traders, whose destination was the Mandan villages on the Missouri, where the explorers proposed to spend the first Winter. There is something of the simplicity of real grandeur in the commonplace records of the leaders of this expedition. "They were men with no pretensions to scientific learning," writes Roosevelt, "but they were singularly close and accurate observers and truthful narrators. Very rarely have any similar explorers described so faithfully not only the physical features, but the animals and plants of a newly discovered land. ... Few explorers who did and saw so much that was absolutely new have written of their deeds with such quiet absence of boastfulness, and have drawn their descriptions with such complete freedom from exaggeration." The very absence of incident in the story is significant to one who remembers the countless dangers that beset Lewis and Clark as they fared slowly on up the long, tiresome stretches of the Missouri; surprises, accidents, misunderstandings, miscalculations, and mutinies might have been the order of the day; a dozen instances could be cited of parties making journeys far less in extent than that now under consideration where the infelicities of a single week surpassed those known throughout those three years. These splendid qualities, which can hardly be emphasized save in a negative way, make this expedition as singular as it was auspicious in our national annals. Good discipline was kept without engendering hatred; the leaders worked faithfully with their men at the hardest and most menial tasks; in suffering, risking, laboring, they set examples to all of their party. In dealing with the Indians good judgment was used; even in the land of the fierce Dakotas they escaped harm because of great diplomacy, presenting a more bold and haughty front than could perhaps have been maintained if once it had been challenged. With all Indian nations conferences were held, at which the purchase of Louisiana from France was officially announced, and proper presents were distributed in sign of the friendship of the United States. The Winter of 1804-1805 was spent at Fort Mandan, on the Missouri River, sixteen hundred miles from its junction with the Mississippi. In the Spring the party, now thirty-two strong, pressed on up the Missouri, which now turned in a decidedly westward direction. Between the Little Missouri and the upper waters of the Missouri proper, game was found in very great quantities, this region having been famous in that respect until the present generation. One game animal with which white men had not been acquainted was now encountered,--the grizzly bear. Bears in the Middle West were, under ordinary circumstances, of no danger; these grizzlies of the upper Missouri were very bold and dangerous. Few Indians were encountered on the upper Missouri. Fall had come ere the party had reached the difficult portage from the Missouri to the Columbia; the distance from the Mississippi to the Falls of the Missouri, at the mouth of the Portage River, the point near which the land journey began, was 2,575 miles. The Portage to the Columbia was 340 miles in length. Having obtained horses from the Shoshones, the Indians on the portage, the explorers accomplished the hard journey through the Bitter Root Mountains. The strange white men were received not unkindly by the not less strange Indians of the great Columbia Valley, though it needed a bold demeanor, in some instances, to maintain the ground gained. Yet on the men went down the river and encamped for the Winter on the coast near Point Adams,--the end of a journey of over four thousand miles. Here the brave Captain Gray of Boston, thirteen years before, had discovered the mouth of the Columbia and given the river the name of his good ship. The Winter was spent hereabouts, the explorers suffering somewhat for lack of food until they learned to relish dog-flesh, the taste for which had to be acquired. By March, 1806, they were ready to pull up stakes and begin the long homeward journey. This was almost as barren of adventure as the outward passage, though a savage attack by a handful of Blackfeet,--henceforward to be the bitter foes of Rocky Mountain traders and pioneers,--and the accidental wounding of Lewis by one of his party, were unpleasant interruptions in the monotony of the steady marching, paddling, and hunting. It is remarkable that, throughout the western expansion of the United States after the Revolution, our northern pioneers from Pennsylvania to Oregon should have felt--in many cases bitterly--the tricky, insulting hatred of British traders and their Indian allies. As Washington in 1790 laid at the door of British instigators the cause of the long war ended by Wayne at Fallen Timber, so, all the way across the continent our pioneers had to contend with the same despicable influence, and were driven by it to deeds which made them, in turn, equally despised by their northern rivals. "I was in hopes," wrote an early pioneer, "that the British Indian traders had some bounds to their rapacity ... that they were completely saturated with our blood. But it appears not to have been the case. Like a greedy wolf, not satisfied with the flesh, they quarrelled over the bones.... Alarmed at the individual enterprise of our people ... they furnished [the Indians] with ... the instruments of death and a passport [horses] to our bosom." Even at the very beginning these first Americans on the Columbia and the Bitter Root range had a taste of Indian hatred from both the Blackfeet and the Crows. On the way back to the Mandan villages the explorers had an experience which was by no means insignificant. As they were dropping down the upper Missouri, one day two men came into view; they proved to be American hunters, Dickson and Hancock by name, from Illinois. They had been plundered by the fierce Sioux, and one of them had been wounded; it can be imagined how glad they were to fall in with a party large enough to ward off the insults of the Sioux. The hunters did remain with Lewis and Clark until the Mandan villages were reached, but no longer. Obtaining a fresh start, the two turned back toward the Rockies, and one of Lewis and Clark's own soldiers, Colter (later the Yellowstone pioneer), went back with them. These three led the van of all the pioneer host under whose feet the western half of the continent was soon to tremble. Holding the Sioux safely at bay during the passage down the Missouri, Lewis and Clark in September were once again on the straggling streets of the little village of St. Louis, then numbering perhaps a thousand inhabitants. From any standpoint this expedition must rank high among the tours of the world's greatest explorers; a way to the Pacific through Louisiana, which had just been purchased, was now assured. Knowing as we do so well to-day of Russia's determined effort to secure an outlet for her Asiatic pioneers and commerce on the Pacific Ocean, we can realize better the national import of Lewis's message to President Jefferson giving assurance that there was a practicable route from the Mississippi Basin to the Pacific by way of the tumbling Columbia. Without guides, save what could be picked up on the way, these men had crossed the continent; and as the story told by returning Kentucky hunters to wondering pioneers in their Alleghany cabins set on foot the first great burst of immigration across the Alleghanies into the Ohio Basin, so in turn the story of Lewis and Clark and Gass and the others set on foot the movement which resulted in the entire conquest of the Rockies and the Great West. But as the stories of others besides Kentuckians played a part in the vaulting of the first great America "divide," so, too, others besides Lewis and Clark influenced the early movement into the Farthest West. One of these, who stands closest to the heroes of the Missouri and Columbia, was Zebulon M. Pike, a son of a Revolutionary officer from New Jersey, the State from which the pioneers of Cincinnati and southwestern Ohio had come. During Lewis and Clark's adventure this hardy explorer ascended the Mississippi, August, 1805, in a keel-boat, with twenty regular soldiers. The Indians of the Minnesota country were not openly hostile, but their conduct was anything but friendly. The Winter was spent at the beautiful Falls of St. Anthony, at Minneapolis. Pike explored the Leech Lake region but did not reach Lake Itasca. He found the British flag floating over certain small forts built by British traders, which he in every case ordered down. An American flag was raised in each instance, and the news of the Louisiana purchase was noised abroad. The British traders treated Pike's band with all the kindness and respect that their well-armed condition demanded. The expedition came down the Mississippi in April, 1806, to St. Louis. There were other regions, however, in Louisiana where the United States flag ought to go now, and General Wilkinson, who had sent Pike to the North, now ordered him into the Far West. Pike's route was up the Osage and overland to the Pawnee Republic on Republican River. His party numbered twenty-three, and with him went fifty Osages, mostly women and children, who had been captured in savage war by the Pottawattomies. The diplomatic return of these forlorn captives of course determined the attitude of the Osage nation toward Pike's company and his claims of American sovereignty over the land. And it was time for America to extend her claim and make it good. Already a Spanish expedition had passed along the frontier distributing bright Spanish flags and warning the Indians that the Spanish boast of possession was still good and would be made better. Pike travelled in the wake of this band of interlopers, neutralizing the effect of its influence and raising the American flag everywhere in place of the Spanish. [Illustration: WILLIAM CLARK _Of the Lewis and Clark Expedition_] Reaching the Arkansas, Pike ascended that river late in the Fall, and when Winter set in the brave band was half lost in the mountains near the towering peak which was forever to stand a dazzling monument to the hardihood and resolution of its leader. At the opening of the new year, near Canyon City, where deer were found wintering, a log fort was built in which a portion of the party remained with the pack animals, while Pike with twelve soldiers essayed the desperate journey to the Rio Grande. "Their sufferings were terrible. They were almost starved, and so cold was the weather that at one time no less than nine of the men froze their feet.... In the Wet Mountain Valley, which they reached in mid-January, ... starvation stared them in the face. There had been a heavy snow-storm; no game was to be seen; and they had been two days without food. The men with frozen feet, exhausted by hunger, could no longer travel. Two of the soldiers went out to hunt but got nothing. At the same time Pike [and a comrade] ... started, determined not to return at all unless they could bring back meat. Pike wrote that they had resolved to stay out and die by themselves, rather than to go back to camp 'and behold the misery of our poor lads.' All day they tramped wearily through the heavy snow. Towards evening they came on a buffalo, and wounded it; but faint and weak from hunger, they shot badly, and the buffalo escaped; a disappointment literally as bitter as death. That night they sat up among some rocks, all night long, unable to sleep because of the intense cold, shivering in their thin rags; they had not eaten for three days. But ... they at last succeeded, after another heartbreaking failure, in killing a buffalo. At midnight they staggered into camp with the meat, and all the party broke their four days' fast."[4] Pike at length succeeded in his design of reaching the Rio Grande, and here he built a fort and threw out to the breeze an American flag, though knowing well that he was on Spanish territory now. The Louisiana boundary was ill defined, but in a general way it ran up the Red River, passed a hundred miles northeast of Santa Fé and just north of Salt Lake, thence it struck straight west to the Pacific. By any interpretation the Rio Grande was south of the line. The Spaniards, who came suddenly upon the scene, diplomatically assumed that the daring explorer had lost his way; he suffered nothing from their hands, and was sent home through Chihuahua and Texas. All the hopes of the purchasers of Old Louisiana and of its flag-planters have come true, and, with them, dreams the most feverish brain of that day could not fashion. History has repeated itself significantly as our standard-bearers have gone westward. When the old Northwest was carved out of a wilderness, there was no fear in the hearts of our forefathers that was not felt when Louisiana was purchased. The great fear in each case was the same--the British at the north and the Spaniard at the south. And in each case the leaven of the East was potent to leaven the whole lump. Great responsibilities steady nations as well as men; the very fact of a spreading frontier and a widening sphere of influence--bringing alarm to some and fear to many--was of appealing force throughout a century to the conscience and honor of American statesmen. As, in the dark days of the Revolution, the wary Washington determined, in case of defeat, to lead the fragment of his armies across the Alleghanies and fight the battles over again in the Ohio Basin, where he knew the pioneers would forever keep pure the spirit of independence, so men in later years have looked confidently to the Greater West, to the Mississippi Basin and old Louisiana, for as pure a patriotism (though it might appear at times in a rough guise) as ever was breathed at Plymouth Rock. FOOTNOTE: [4] Theodore Roosevelt, "The Winning of the West," IV, 337, 338. CHAPTER XI _Fur Trade the Leading Business in the Northwest.--Rise of the Astor Family.--The U. S. Government fails as a Rival of the Northwest Company of Montreal, in the Fur Trade.--John Jacob Astor sees the Possibilities of the American Fur Trade.--He ships Furs from Montreal to London.--Irving's Opinion of Astor.--Astor plans to establish a Line of Trading-posts up the Missouri and down the Columbia.--The Scheme a Failure, but indirectly Valuable.--Astor's Enterprise helpful toward the Americanization of Louisiana.--He establishes the Pacific Fur Company, 1810.--This Company and the Northwest Company both seeking to occupy the Mouth of the Columbia; the Former arrives First.--In the War of 1812 the British take Possession of the Place.--Benefits to America from Astor's Example.--Like him, some Other Promoters failed to achieve the Particular Ends in View._ ASTOR: THE PROMOTER OF ASTORIA [Illustration] THE brave explorations of Lewis and Clark and Pike opened up the vast Territory of Louisiana for occupation and commerce. The one great business in the Northwest had been the fur trade, and for a long period it was yet to be the absorbing theme of promoters and capitalists, the source of great rivalries, great disappointments, and great fortunes. No story of American promotion is more unique than that of the rise of the Astor family from obscurity to a position of power and usefulness, and this story has its early setting in the fur-trading camps of the Far Northwest, where Astoria arose beside the Pacific Sea. The tale is most typically American: Its hero, John Jacob Astor, was of foreign parentage; he came to America poor; he seized upon an opening which others had passed over; he had the support of a self-confidence that was not blind; he fought undauntedly all obstacles and scorned all rivalry; and at last he secured America's first princely fortune. Until the beginning of the nineteenth century the fur trade of the Northwest was in the hands of the powerful Northwest Company of Montreal, a race of merchant princes about whose exploits such a true and brilliant sheen of romance has been thrown. But the United States Government was not content that Canadian princes alone should get possession of the wealth of the Northern forests, and as early as 1796 it sent agents westward to meet the Indians and to erect trading-houses. The plan was a failure, as any plan must have been "where the dull patronage of Government is counted upon to outvie the keen activity of private enterprise." In almost every one of our preceding stories of America's captains of expansion, save that of the Lewis and Clark expedition only, a private enterprise has been our study, and each story has been woven around a personality. Even in the case of the exception noted, it was the personal interest and daring of Lewis and Clark that made their splendid tour a success, though it was promoted by the Government. The quiet little village of Waldorf near Heidelberg, Germany, was the birthplace of John Jacob Astor, and the name is preserved to-day in the princely splendor of the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. The young man, who never believed that he would become a merchant prince, spent his first years in the most rural simplicity. It is marvellous how America has imperiously called upon so many distant heaths for men with a genius for hard work and for daring dreams; it called St. Clair from Scotland, Zeisberger from Moravia, and Gallatin and Bouquet from Switzerland; and now a German peasant boy, inheriting blood and fibre, felt early in his veins this same mystic call, and saw visions of a future possible only in a great and free land. At an early age he went to London, where he remained in an elder brother's employ until the close of the Revolutionary War; now, in 1783, at twenty years of age, he left London for America with a small stock of musical instruments with which his brother had supplied him. At this time one of those strange providential miracles in human lives occurred in the life of this lad, who himself had had a large faith since childhood days; by mere chance, on the ocean voyage, or in the ice-jam at Hampton Roads, his mind was directed to the great West and its fur trade. From just what point the leading came strongest is not of great importance, but the fact remains that upon his arrival at New York young Astor disposed of his musical instruments and hastened back to London with a consignment of furs. The transaction proved profitable, and the youth turned all his energies to the problem of the fur trade. He studied the British market, and went to the continent of Europe and surveyed conditions there. He returned to New York and began in the humblest way to found his great house. All imaginable difficulties were encountered; the fur trade had been confined almost wholly to the Canadian companies, who brooked no competition; in the Atlantic States it had been comparatively unimportant and insignificant. At the close of the war of separation England had refused to give up many of her important posts on the American side of the Great Lakes,--a galling hindrance to all who sought to interest themselves in the fur trade. Again, the importation of furs from Canada to the United States was prohibited. The young merchant soon began making trips to Montreal, at which point he purchased furs and shipped them direct to London. In this fight for position and power young Astor showed plainly the great characteristics of the successful merchant,--earnestness and faith. He showed, too, some of the rashness of genius, which at times is called insanity; but search in the biographies of our great Americans, and how many will you find who did not early in their careers have some inkling of their great successes,--some whisper of fortune which rang in the young heart? The successes of John Jacob Astor were not greater than some of his day-dreams. "I'll build one day or other," he once said to himself on Broadway, "a greater house than any of these, in this very street." Irving writes of Astor: "He began his career, of course, on the narrowest scale; but he brought to the task a persevering industry, rigid economy, and strict integrity. To these were added an inspiring spirit that always looked upward; a genius, bold, fertile, and expansive; a sagacity quick to grasp and convert every circumstance to its advantage; and a singular and never-wavering confidence of signal success." It was the reports of Lewis and Clark that inspired Astor in his daring dream of securing a commercial control of the great Northwest which, by the help and protection of the American Government, would give impetus to the expansion of the American people into a great empire. The key to Astor's plan was to open an avenue of intercourse between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and form regular establishments or settlements across the continent from one headquarters on the Atlantic to another on the Pacific. Sir Alexander Mackenzie had conceived this idea in 1793, but it involved such herculean labors that it was not attempted; the business sinews of the Hudson Bay Company and the Northwest Company were so strong, and their long-cherished jealousies were so deep-rooted, that Mackenzie's plan of coalescence was impossible. In the meantime Lewis and Clark had found a route through Louisiana to the Pacific, and Captain Gray of Boston had anchored in the mouth of the Columbia. By land and water the objective point had been reached, and Astor entered upon the great task of his life with ardor and enthusiasm. The very obstacles in his way seemed to augment his courage, and every repulse fired him to increased exertion. [Illustration: JOHN JACOB ASTOR _Founder of Astoria_] It is a remarkable fact that at this time the principal market for American furs was in China. The British Government had awarded the monopoly of the China trade to the powerful East India Company, and neither the Hudson Bay Company nor the Northwest Company was allowed to ship furs westward across the Pacific to China. Astor planned to take full advantage of this ridiculous handicap under which the Canadian fur companies labored. He planned to erect a line of trading posts up the Missouri and down the Columbia, at whose mouth a great emporium was to be established; and to this the lesser posts which were to be located in the interior would all be tributary. A coastwise trade would be established, with the Columbia post as headquarters. Each year a ship was to be sent from New York to the Columbia, loaded with reënforcements and supplies. Upon unloading, this ship was to take the year's receipt of furs and sail to Canton, trading off its rich cargo there for merchandise; the voyage was to be continued to New York, where the Chinese cargo was to be turned into money. It is not because of the success of this intrepid promoter that the founding of Astoria occupies such a unique position among the great exploits in the history of American expansion. His attempt to secure the fur trade was not a success; but, considering the day in which it was conceived, the tremendous difficulties to be overcome, the rivalry of British and Russian promoters in the North and Northwest, and the inability of others to achieve it, the founding of Astoria on the Columbia must be considered typically American in the optimism of its conception and the daring of its accomplishment. If there is a good sense in which the words can be used, America has been made by a race of gamblers the like of which the world has never seen before. We have risked our money as no race risked money before our day. Astor was perhaps the first great "plunger" of America; his enthusiasm carried everything before it and influenced the spread of American rights and interests. The failure of the Astoria scheme did not check certain more fundamental movements toward the Pacific; the questions of boundaries and territorial and international rights were brought to the fore because of Astor's attempt. This promoter's lifelong enterprise was a highly important step, after the Lewis and Clark expedition, toward the Americanization of the newly purchased Louisiana; it hastened the settlement of questions which had to be faced and solved before Louisiana was ours in fact as well as on paper. Lewis and Clark found a way thither and announced to the Indian nations American possession; Astor, by means of a private enterprise, precipitated the questions of boundaries and rights which America and England must have settled sooner or later. One of the first interesting developments of an international nature followed close upon a diplomatic manoeuvre by which Astor attempted to thwart rivalry by seeking to have the Northwest Company become interested to the extent of a one-third share in his American company. The wily Canadians delayed their decision, and at last answered by attempting to secure the mouth of the Columbia before Astor's party could reach the spot. Astor pushed straight ahead, however, and on June 23, 1810, the Pacific Fur Company was organized, with Mr. Astor, Duncan McDougal, Donald McKenzie, and Wilson Price Hunt as chief operators. The stock in this newly formed company was to be divided into one hundred equal shares, fifty of which were to be at the disposal of Mr. Astor, the remaining fifty to be divided among the partners and associates. Mr. Astor was immediately placed at the head of the Company, to manage its business in New York. He was to furnish all vessels, provisions, ammunition, goods, arms, and all requisites for the enterprise, provided they did not involve a greater advance than four hundred thousand dollars. To Mr. Astor was given the privilege of introducing other persons into the Company as partners. None of them should be entitled to more than two shares, and two, at least, must be conversant with the Indian trade. Annually a general meeting of the Company was to be held at the Columbia River, at which absent members might be represented and, under certain specified conditions, might vote by proxy. The association was to continue twenty years if successful; should it be found unprofitable, however, the parties concerned had full power to dissolve it at the end of the first five years. For this trial period of five years Mr. Astor volunteered to bear all losses incurred, after which they were to be borne by the partners proportionally to the number of shares they held. Wilson Price Hunt was chosen to act as agent for the Company for a term of five years. He was to reside at the principal establishment on the West coast; should the interests of the association at any time require his absence from this post, a person was to be appointed in general meeting to take his place. The two campaigns now inaugurated, one by land and one by sea, aimed at the coveted point on the Pacific Coast. The "Tonquin" was fitted out in September, 1810, and sent under Captain Thorn around Cape Horn, and Hunt was sent from Montreal with the land expedition. The "Tonquin" arrived at the mouth of the Columbia March 22, 1811, and on April 12 the little settlement, appropriately named Astoria, was founded on Point George. In the race for the Columbia the Americans had beaten the Canadians. Hunt had gone to Montreal in July, 1810, and, setting out from that point by way of the Ottawa, reached Mackinaw July 22. Having remained at this point nearly three weeks, he reached St. Louis by way of the Green Bay route on September 3. The party was not on its way again until October 21, and it wintered at the mouth of the Nodowa on the Missouri, four hundred and fifty miles from its mouth. Proceeding westward in April, the party gained the Columbia on the 21st of January, 1812, after a terrible journey, and on the fifteenth of February Astoria was reached. Astor's great plan was now well under way toward successful operation; the promoter could not know for many days the fate of either the "Tonquin" or the overland expedition. But his resolute persistence never wavered; he fitted out a second ship, the "Beaver," which sailed October 10, 1811, for the Sandwich Islands and the Columbia. The months dragged on; there came no word from the "Tonquin"; no word from Hunt or Astoria; no word from the "Beaver"; thousands of dollars had been invested, and no hint was received concerning its safety, to say nothing of profit. Rumors of the hostility of the Northwest Company were circulated, and of their appeal to the British Government, protesting against the operation of this American fur company. Then came the War of 1812, and the darkest days for the promoter of Astoria. In 1813, despite the lack of all good news, Astor fitted out a third ship, and the "Lark" sailed from New York March 6, 1813. The ship had been gone only two weeks when news came justifying Astor's fears for the safety of his Pacific colony. A second appeal of the Northwest Company to the British Government had gained the ear of the ministry, and a frigate was ordered to the mouth of the Columbia to destroy any American settlement there and raise the British flag over the ruins. Astor appealed to the American Government for assistance; the frigate "Adams" was detailed to protect American interests on the Pacific. Astor fitted out a fourth ship, the "Enterprise," which was to accompany the "Adams." Now by way of St. Louis came the news of the safe arrival of both Hunt and the "Beaver" at Astoria, and of the successful formation of that settlement. Hope was high, and Astor said, "I felt ready to fall upon my knees in a transport of gratitude." Dark news came quickly upon the heels of the good. The crew of the "Adams" was needed on the Great Lakes, and the ship could not go to the Pacific. Astor's hopes fell, but he determined to send the "Enterprise" alone. Then the British blockaded New York, and the last hope of giving help to Astoria was lost. By the "Lark" Astor sent directions to Hunt to guard against British surprise. "Were I on the spot," he wrote with fire, "and had the management of affairs, I would defy them all; but, as it is, everything depends upon you and your friends about you. Our enterprise is grand, and deserves success, and I hope in God it will meet it. If my object was merely gain of money, I should say, 'Think whether it is best to save what we can, and abandon the place; but the very idea is like a dagger to my heart.'" The fate of Astoria is well known; McDougal, Astor's agent, fearing the arrival of a British man-of-war, capitulated, on poor financial terms, to agents of the Northwest Company, which was in occupation when the British sloop-of-war "Raccoon" arrived, November 30. On December 12 Captain Block with his officers entered the fort, and, breaking a bottle of wine, took possession in the name of his Britannic Majesty. The failure of Astoria did not by any means ruin its sturdy promoter, though it meant a great monetary loss. Astor's fortune kept swelling with the years until it reached twenty millions; portions of it are of daily benefit to many thousands of his countrymen in such public gifts as the Astor Library. But these material benefits never did a greater good than the influence Astor exerted in turning the minds and hearts of men to the Northwest. In many of our stories of early American promotion the particular end in view was never achieved. No hope of Washington's (after his desire for independence) was more vital than his hope of a canal between the Potomac and the Ohio. The plan was not realized, yet through his hoping for it and advocating it both the East and the West received lasting benefits. But of the stories of broken dreams, that of Astoria stands alone and in many ways unsurpassed. The indomitable spirit which Astor showed has been the making of America. The risks he ran fired him to heartier endeavor, as similar risks have incited hundreds of American promoters since his day; he stands, in failure and in success, as the early type of the American promoter and successful merchant prince. CHAPTER XII _Seeds of Christianity sown among the Indians by the Lewis and Clark Band.--A Deputation of Nez Percés to General Clark, requesting that the Bible be taught in their Nation.--The Methodists establish a Mission on the Willamette, but pass by the Nez Percés.--Interest in the New Field for Explorers and Missionaries is now awakened.--Marcus Whitman suited by Early Training to become an Explorer and a Missionary.--Becomes a Medical Practitioner and afterwards makes a Business Venture in a Sawmill.--His Character and Physique.--His First Trip to the West, in Company with Mr. Parker.--The Nez Percés and the Flatheads receive them gladly.--His Marriage at Prattsburg, N. Y., and Return to the West.--A Demand for Missionaries and Immigrants that Oregon may be occupied and held by the United States.--Whitman goes East to stimulate the Mission Board and to direct Immigration into Oregon.--Whitman publishes a Pamphlet on the Desirableness of Oregon for American Colonists.--Numerous Influences that brought about the Emigration of 1843.--Whitman's Outlook for the Future Prosperity of the Immigrants.--His Death and that of his Wife in the Massacre of 1847._ MARCUS WHITMAN: THE HERO OF OREGON [Illustration] THERE is probably not another example of the springing to life of the seeds of Christianity more interesting than in the case of the Lewis and Clark expedition into that far country where rolls the Oregon. To what extent the scattering of this seed was performed with any serious expectation of success is not to be discovered; but it seems that wherever that strange-looking band of explorers and scientists fared and was remembered by the aborigines that came under its influence, so widely had there gone the legend of the white man's Saviour. The Indians heard that the white man had a "Book from Heaven" which told them the way to walk in order to know happiness and reach the happy hunting-grounds; with this race, which lived forever on the verge of starvation, the expression "happy hunting grounds"--land where there was always game to be obtained--meant far more than the hackneyed expression does to us to-day. A book giving explicit directions for reaching a place where there was always something to eat was a thing to be sought for desperately and long; they did not appreciate the argument, once advanced with no little acumen by a Wyandot Indian, that, since the Indian knew neither the art of writing nor that of book-making, the Great Spirit could never have meant them to find the way of life in a book. On the contrary, these western Indians--Flatheads and Nez Percés--held a great meeting, probably in the early Spring of 1832, and appointed two old men and two young men to go back and visit their "Father," General Clark, at St. Louis. "I came to you," one of them is reported to have said to Clark when at last they reached St. Louis, "over a trail of many moons from the setting sun. You were the friend of my fathers, who have all gone the long way. I came with one eye partly open, for more light for my people who sit in darkness.... I am going back the long, sad trail to my people of the dark land. You make my feet heavy with burdens of gifts, and my moccasins will grow old in carrying them, but the Book is not among them. When I tell my poor blind people, after one more snow, in the Big Council, that I did not bring the Book, no word will be spoken by our old men or by our young braves. One by one they will rise up and go out in silence. My people will die in darkness, and they will go on the long path to the other hunting ground. No white men will go with them and no white man's Book to make the way plain." Two of the four Indians died in St. Louis, and the surviving two went West in the same caravan with George Catlin, the famous portrait painter, who included their portraits, it is said, in his collection,--Numbers 207 and 209 in the Catlin Collection of the Smithsonian Institution. The first missionary effort in the Far West was put forth by the Methodist General Conference, which sent the Rev. Jason Lee westward, starting overland from Fort Independence in April, 1834. The mission was located seventy miles up the Willamette River, and, singularly enough, the Nez Percés, who had sent emissaries to the "men near to God," who had the "Book from Heaven," were passed by. In the Spring of the same year the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, including then both Congregationalists and Presbyterians, became interested in the new field for explorers and in this strange call that had come ringing across the vast prairies and rugged mountains of the unknown West, as, in a previous study, we have noticed that the Moravian Brethren became interested in the call that came half a century before across the Alleghanies from the Delawares on the Muskingum. Nor was the David Zeisberger, fearless, patient, and devoted, found to be wanting in the present instance, for the call came through a channel now difficult to trace to a young man who was able to endure and dare. Two years after the beginning of the nineteenth century Marcus Whitman was born at Rushville, New York, of New England parentage, strong both morally and intellectually. His early life was spent in a typical pioneer home, where he knew the toil, the weariness, and the hearty humble joys of that era,--a home in which independence and general strength of character were formed and confirmed. The loss of his father when he was at the age of eight laid upon the shoulders of the growing lad responsibilities which made him old beyond his years. All this certainly had its part in preparing him for the sublimely humble work, as it seemed, that he was to be called upon to do; and little could he have known that there were to come those days of agony and exhaustion which demanded all his latent accumulation of iron strength and courage of steel,--days that would demand all his stores of resourceful foresight. Whitman's education was probably indifferent,--at least it was not above the average of the day. Converted at the age of seventeen, he did not join a church until he was twenty-two, which may be taken as showing the reticent or, rather, unobtrusive character of the man. An early purpose to prepare for the ministry was thwarted by physical weakness, and the young man proceeded to study medicine in the Berkshire Medical College at Pittsfield, Massachusetts. The first years of practice were spent in Canada; returning then to New York, his attention was unexpectedly absorbed in a business venture with his brother in a sawmill. How difficult it must have been for any one to read this leading aright, so seemingly adverse was it to the prescribed course that was customary among practitioners. Yet the same knowledge of business, perhaps, would not have come to Whitman in any other way, and it was providentially to stand him in good stead. "Dr. Whitman was a strong man, earnest, decided, aggressive. He was sincere and kind, generous to a fault.... He was fearless of danger, strong in purpose, resolute and unflinching in the face of difficulties. At times he became animated and earnest in argument or conversation, but in general he would be called a man of reticence. He was above medium height, rather spare than otherwise, had deep blue eyes, a large mouth, and, in middle life, hair that would be called iron-gray." Of Miss Prentiss of Prattsburg, New York, who soon became Mrs. Whitman, Mrs. Martha J. Lamb has said: "She was a graceful blonde, stately and dignified in her bearing, without a particle of affectation. When he was preparing to leave for Oregon, the church held a farewell service and the minister gave out the well-known hymn: Yes, my native land, I love thee, * * * * * Can I bid you all farewell? The whole congregation joined heartily in the singing, but before the hymn was half through, one by one they ceased singing, and audible sobs were heard in every part of the great audience. The last stanza was sung by the sweet voice of Mrs. Whitman alone, clear, musical, and unwavering." Whitman's first Western trip was a hurried tour of observation made in company with the Rev. Samuel Parker, a graduate of Williams. Leaving St. Louis in the Spring of 1835, they reached the country of the Nez Percés and Flatheads in August. It is interesting to note that these men crossed the Great Divide by way of the South Pass, concerning which Mr. Parker made an astounding prophecy, as follows: "Though there are some elevations and depressions in this valley, yet, comparatively speaking, it is level, and the summit, where the waters divide which flow into the Atlantic and into the Pacific, is about six thousand feet above the level of the ocean. There would be no difficulty in the way of constructing a railroad from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. There is no greater difficulty in the whole distance than has already been overcome in passing the Green Mountains between Boston and Albany; and probably the time may not be far distant when trips will be made across the continent, as they have been made to the Niagara Falls, to see Nature's wonders." The interviews with the Indians were uniform in character, and showed that the missionaries would receive hospitality at the hands of the Nez Percés and Flatheads. Wrote Mr. Parker: "We laid before them the object of our appointment, and explained to them the benevolent desires of Christians concerning them. We then inquired whether they wished to have teachers come among them, and instruct them in the knowledge of God, His worship, and the way to be saved; and what they would do to aid them in their labors. The oldest chief arose, and said he was old, and did not expect to know much more; he was deaf and could not hear, but his heart was made glad, very glad, to see what he had never seen before, a man near to God,--meaning a minister of the Gospel." It took only ten days in the country of the Indians to assure the men of the rich promise offered by the field; whereupon Dr. Whitman turned his face eastward, to make his report and be ready in the following Spring to return with reënforcements with a caravan of the American Fur Company. A great enthusiasm had seized him. He wrote to Miss Prentiss, "I have a strong desire for that field of labor.... I feel greatly encouraged to go on in every sense, only, I feel my unfitness for the work; but I know in whom I have trusted, and with whom are the fountains of wisdom.... You need not be anxious especially for your health or safety, but for your usefulness to the cause of Missions and the souls of our benighted fellow-men." Dr. Whitman was married early in 1836, and the couple were driven by sleigh from Elmira, New York, to Hollidaysburg, Pennsylvania, where they took a canal-boat over the Alleghany Portage Railway on their way westward. Their principal companions were the Rev. Henry H. Spaulding, a graduate of Western Reserve College,--two or three years Whitman's junior,--and wife, and Mr. William H. Gray; there were also two teamsters and two Indian boys, whom Dr. Whitman had brought East with him. Joining the caravan of the American Fur Company at Council Bluffs, they reached Fort Laramie early in June, and the South Pass on the following Fourth of July, where six years later Fremont raised an American flag and gained the immortal name of "Pathfinder." It is difficult to emphasize sufficiently the historic importance and significance of the advent of these women into the country beyond the Great Divide in Whitman's light wagon and cart; true, Ashley, Bridger, and Bonneville had taken wagons into the Rockies and left them there, but it was for this sturdy and determined physician to take a woman across the mountains in 1836, showing at once the practicability of a wagon road from the Atlantic to the Pacific. But the wagon seemed hardly less wonderful than the patient women in it. Rough mountaineers who had come to the rendezvous of the American Fur Company just westward of the "divide" were dumbfounded at the sight of the first white women on whom they had laid eyes since they had reached the States; tears came to the eyes of some of them as they shook hands with the first white women that ever crossed the Rocky Mountains; Mrs. Spaulding had been very ill, and the rough devotion of these men and their Indian wives gave her new hope and courage for the work. On the other hand, "From that day," one of these men said, "I was a better man." But it was for an old trapper to see the real national significance of the advent of these women into that far-flung country. "There," he said, pointing to the women, "is something which the honorable Hudson Bay Company cannot get rid of. They cannot send these women out of the country. They had come to stay." Dr. Whitman chose his station at Waiilatpu, near Walla Walla, Washington, while Spaulding went a hundred miles and more eastward among the Nez Percés of the Clearwater Valley. A quart of wheat brought with them, cherished as were the twelve potatoes brought around Cape Horn by the pioneers of Astoria a quarter of a century before, was planted amid hopes and fears, and yielded, in less than a dozen years, nearly thirty thousand bushels in a season. Their few cows multiplied to a herd; gardens and orchards were laid out; a printing press and sheep were secured from the Hawaiian Islands, and upon the press was printed a code of laws, differing in no great degree from those issued in Zeisberger's sweet "Meadow of Light" on the Muskingum half a century before. Mrs. Spaulding's school numbered five hundred pupils, and a church had grown to a membership of one hundred. It is not possible here to trace with faithfulness the brave successes now achieved, for we are seeking but one of the many lessons to be found in the Whitman story. There was labor and success for all, and trial for all as well; there were some differences of opinion among the workers, to be settled as the field grew large, for these men were independent thinkers, each one a man among his fellows. And then there was the rivalry with the missionaries to the northward, the Catholic priests located at Vancouver and extending their influence wherever the Hudson Bay Company, in turn, extended its interests. The priests, it should be observed, had been called in by the Company to take the place of the missionary of the Church of England, whom the Company had sent home. We cannot discuss here the tangled Oregon question and the tactics of America's rivals for that beautiful stretch of country. Two things stand fairly plain in it all: to be held, Oregon must have a strong American quota of settlers, and these missionaries were on the ground when the matter was precipitated. The conquest of Oregon was to be made, if made at all, at the hands of an army of men with broadaxes on their shoulders; not elsewhere in our national annals does this appear more clearly than in the case of Oregon. In the military sense there was no conquest to be effected; an enterprising fur company, controlled by men of principle but served by perfectly unprincipled agents, sought the land for its wealth of skins, and would not have wished it "opened," in any sense, to the world. The case is quite parallel to the attitude of England at the close of the Old French War, described on a previous page[5]; the proclamation of 1763, permitting no pioneer to erect a cabin beyond the head-springs of the Atlantic rivers, because, if populated, the land would not pour its treasures into the coffers of a spendthrift king, was as idle a selfish dream as was ever conceived with reference to Oregon by a Hudson Bay Company's _engagé_. In the case of no other distinct region in our entire domain, perhaps, was it equally plain that the first people to really occupy would be, in all likelihood, the people that would control and at last possess it. It was like so many early military campaigns in America, as, for instance, Forbes's march on Fort Duquesne and Clark's advance to Vincennes,--to reach the destination was of itself the chief hardship; for if in the case of Forbes that great army could be once thrown across the Alleghanies where lay Braddock's mouldering bones, the capitulation of Fort Duquesne would be but a commonplace consequent. What might have been the result had not this fragile missionary movement into the empire of Oregon (including, of course, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and parts of Montana and Wyoming) taken place cannot now be determined, but the rival interests were hurrying emigrants from Red River and from Canada in the full belief that to hold would mean to have. A counter action was that put forth by the American missionaries of all denominations in Oregon, chief of whom was Marcus Whitman. It seems as though some writers have believed that there can be a line drawn between what these first Americans did to promote missionary success and that done to advance what may be called American political interests in Oregon; to the present writer this seems impossible. What helped the one helped the other, whether the motive comprehended the larger interests at stake or not. That the missionaries desired that the Americans coming into Oregon should be men of sobriety and character should not in the least argue that they did not desire them at the same time to be good patriotic citizens, eager for their country's welfare. It is hardly fair to imply that these men were poor patriots in proportion as they were good missionaries; nor can the proposition be more reasonably entertained that these brave men desired to promote emigration thither in order to secure more assistance or success in the missionary work in which they were engaged. In all these considerations the hope of missionary success was inextricably bound up with national extension and national growth. Were the mission stations to be increased, it was of national moment; were they to be decreased, it was an ominous sign so far as possible American dominion was concerned. Unfortunate internal trouble among the missionaries, due to differences of opinion on policies and ways and means, caused the American Board to decide to eliminate a portion of the mission stations. Just what steps were to be taken is not important to us here; the important thing is the influence of this curtailing of the work of the American missionary. Was it to strengthen or weaken America's claim to the empire of Oregon? Was it to hinder or help the occupation of the land on the part of rival spirits? Those who might hold that the question was one of missionary policy totally apart from national politics take a view of the matter in which the present writer cannot share. These men were Americans; it is difficult to believe that with the Oregon question to the front these missionaries (who were on the spot) confined their attention solely to the missionary problem heedless of the national problem, which must have embraced and included all others in any analysis. The missionaries met to consider the order of the American Board late in the Fall of 1842. Marcus Whitman was granted leave of absence to visit the East and persuade the officers of the Board to rescind their action. Wrote one of the missionaries of the Board immediately after Whitman's departure concerning his plan: "I have no doubt that if his plan succeeds it will be one of great good to the mission and country. It is to be expected that a Romish influence will come in.... To meet this influence a few religious settlers around a station would be invaluable."[6] This contemporary document, written just as Whitman was leaving, ought to be good evidence, first, that he had a definite errand, and, secondly, that it concerned new emigrants. The friends of Whitman have gone very far in an attempt to maintain that he left Oregon hurriedly on the brave ride he now undertook in order to reach Washington in time to accomplish a specific political errand; if nothing more, such a sweeping assertion was sure to be called into question, and when this was done the querists were likely to be unable to keep from going to the other extreme of denying that Whitman ever went to Washington or had any political motive in coming East.[7] A brief but careful view of the documents in the case has inclined us to the view that Whitman came East as he did in order to be in time to have a part in arousing interest in and directing the course of the large emigration that it was felt would turn toward Oregon in the Spring of 1843. We are the more inclined to this opinion for the reason that this was the most important thing by far that could have occupied the man's mind, however one views the question; what could more have benefited the mission cause than a flood-tide of American pioneers into Oregon with axes to sing that old home-loving song sung long ago in the Alleghanies, in Ohio, in Kentucky, and beyond? And what more, pray, could be done than this to advance the interests of the United States hereabouts? In point of fact the nation had depended on the conquest of Oregon by pioneers, if it was to be conquered at all; treaties could be made and broken, but a conquest by the axe-bearing army would be final. "The policy," writes Justin Winsor, "which the United States soon after developed was one in which Great Britain could hardly compete, and this was to possess the [Oregon] country by settlers as against the nominal occupancy of the fur-trading company directed from Montreal. By 1832 this movement of occupation was fully in progress. By 1838 the interest was renewed in Congress, and a leading and ardent advocate of the American rights, Congressman Linn of Missouri, presented a report to the Senate and a bill for the occupation of Oregon, June 6, 1838. A report by Caleb Cushing coming from the Committee on Foreign Affairs respecting the Territory of Oregon, accompanied by a map, was presented in January and February in 1839: "'It was not till 1842 that the movements of aggression began to become prominent in politics, and immigration was soon assisted by Fremont's discovery of the pass over the Rocky Mountains at the head of the La Platte.[8] Calhoun in 1845 took the position that the tide of immigration was solving the difficulty and it was best to wait that issue and not force a conflict.'" It seems perfectly certain that Whitman was concerned especially with this "tide of immigration." He left home October 3; in eleven days Fort Hall was reached, four hundred miles away. Finding it best, he struck southward on the old Santa Fé Trail, by way of Fort Wintah, Fort Uncompahgre, and Fort Taos. From Santa Fé the course was in part by the old Santa Fé Trail to Bent's Fort and Independence. Bent's Fort was left January 7, 1843, but the date of reaching Westport (Kansas City), Missouri, is not definitely known; it was probably the last of January, and here he was busy for some little time helping to shape things up for the much talked of emigration of 1843. Indeed, there is evidence that he did not leave Westport until at least the 15th of February. Possibly it was here that he prepared and published a pamphlet describing Oregon, the soil, climate, and its desirableness for American colonists, and said that "he had crossed the Rocky Mountains that winter principally to take back that season a train of wagons to Oregon." The Doctor assured his countrymen that wagons could be taken to the Columbia River. "It was this assurance of the missionary," wrote one emigrant, "that induced my father and several of his neighbors to sell out and start at once for this country."[9] If this line of investigation is followed steadily with reference to Dr. Whitman's Eastern visit, the result is eminently satisfactory from any point of view. It is well and good to believe that he attempted to right the minds of some eminent men on the Oregon question, but he probably accomplished more by some plain talks with a score of frontiersmen at Westport and by his pamphlet on the subject than by visiting ten thousand men in high authority. What was to save Oregon was the emigration movement,--the rank and file of the army with the broadaxe,--not Whitman or Webster or a President or a congressman or a hundred congressmen. This Oregon missionary was a plain, straightforward, brave, modest man, not seeking notoriety, come eastward to have a part in inducing emigration that must start, if at all, _in the Spring months_. There you have an explanation for the Winter's ride. Pressing on eastward, Whitman went to Washington; this has been questioned because none of the public prints of the city noised abroad his coming or his presence. This proves he was not there as much as the absence of his foot-prints on those streets to-day proves it; so far as it indicates anything, it only shows the man was not seeking notoriety and cheap advertisement. A year afterwards, in June, 1844, the Hon. James M. Porter, Secretary of War, received a letter from Marcus Whitman which began, "In compliance with the request you did me the honor to make last winter, while in Washington, I herewith transmit to you the synopsis of a bill." Another sentence runs, "I have, since our interview, been," etc.,[10] making, in all, two definite statements in his own hand to the effect that Whitman visited the Secretary of War in Washington, and that while there he talked with the Secretary of War concerning the national character of the Oregon movement. Any who might incline to the view that Whitman came East solely on a mission errand must pay small attention to this letter, which proves that the Secretary of War and Whitman must have talked of a bill relative to Oregon emigration. Whitman certainly conversed with Porter along the lines of their subsequent correspondence, which resulted in the missionary's sending in a bill authorizing the President of the United States to establish a line of "agricultural posts or farming stations, extending at intervals from the present and most usual crossing of the Kansas River, west of the western boundary of the State of Missouri, thence ascending the Platte River on the southern border, thence through the valley of the Sweetwater to Fort Hall, and thence to settlements of the Willamette in the Territory of Oregon. Which said posts will have for their object to set examples of civilized industry to the several Indian tribes, to keep them in proper subjection to the laws of the United States, to suppress violent and lawless acts along the said line of the frontier, to facilitate the passage of troops and munitions of war into and out of the said Territory of Oregon, and the transportation of the mail as hereinafter provided." Whitman reached Boston probably March 30. There seems to be no question that his chief errand here with the officers of the American Board was to interest them in a plan to induce emigration for the sake of preserving the missions. On his return to Oregon he wrote Secretary Greene of the Board: "A [Catholic] bishop is set over this part of the work, whose seat, as the name indicates, will be at Walla Walla. He, I understand, is styled Bishop of Walla Walla. It will be well for you to know that from what we can learn, their object will be to colonize around them. I cannot blame myself that the plan I laid down when I was in Boston was not carried out. If we could have had good families, say two and three together, to have placed in select spots among the Indians, the present crisis, which I feared, would not have come. Two things, and it is true those which were the most important, were accomplished by my return to the States. By means of the establishment of the wagon road, which is due to that effort alone, the immigration was secured and saved from disaster in the Fall of forty-three. Upon that event the present acquired rights of the U. States by her citizens hung. And not less certain is it that upon the result of immigration to this country the present existence of this mission and of Protestantism in general hung also. It is a matter of surprise to me that so few pious men are ready to associate together and come to this country, when they could be so useful in setting up and maintaining religious society and establishing the means of education. It is indeed so that some of the good people of the East can come to Oregon for the double purpose of availing themselves of the Government bounty of land and of doing good to the country." This quotation undoubtedly contains in outline the fundamental purpose of Dr. Whitman's journey eastward through the Winter's snows; the American missions in Oregon were evidently on the point of being actually crowded out by the threatened emigrants from the North; to hold the ground gained, a rival emigration from the States was an imperative necessity, and that was the thing for which Whitman was working. So closely bound were the real interests, then, of the missions and the territorial interests of the United States, that for one to attempt a technical separation is to do an injustice to both. Read as widely as you will the few manuscripts left us in Dr. Whitman's hand, and the impression grows stronger with each word that the man was exceptionally clear-sighted and sane; and while a great deal of nonsense is and has been put into circulation about him, so far as Whitman himself is concerned we find his attention given to roads and trails, forage and provisions, axle grease and water; in all he wrote (and there is sufficient for a very fair guess at his purpose and plans) we find almost no reference whatever to the greater national work which he was actually doing,--a fact that cannot but be forever enjoyed by those to whom his splendid life work will appeal. On May 12 Whitman was again in St. Louis writing Secretary Greene, "I hope no time will be lost in seizing every favorable means of inducing good men to favor the interest of the Oregon." We should say here that, while in Boston, Whitman induced the officers of the American Board to rescind their action abolishing certain of the mission stations in Oregon. Now once more on the frontier, Whitman found that his hope of a large American emigration to Oregon was in a fair way of being realized; as George Rogers Clark came back to Virginia from Kentucky at an opportune moment to urge Patrick Henry to authorize the far-famed Illinois campaign, so now Marcus Whitman had come East at an opportune moment to add what weight he could in the interests of an Oregon campaign. But as in the case of Clark's visit to Virginia, so now, far more important causes had been at work to bring the desired result than the mere coming of a messenger. It would indeed be impossible to estimate the large number of forces that had been at work to bring about the famous emigration of 1843, but among them should be remembered the long debates in Congress on the Ashburton Treaty, the Linn Bill concerning Oregon lands, Greenhow's "Memoir," and Lieutenant Wilkes's report, as well as the missionary efforts of the various denominations, and the Whitman pamphlet, before referred to. As a result, as singular and interesting an army as ever bore the broadaxe westward now began to rendezvous in May near Independence, Kansas, just beyond the Missouri line. It would probably have gathered there to go forth to its brave conquest though there had been no Marcus Whitman or Daniel Webster, or any other man or set of men that ever lived; the saying that Whitman "saved Oregon" is just as false as the saying that Washington was the "Father of his Country," or that Thomas was the "Rock of Chickamauga," or Webster the "Defender of the Constitution"--and just as true; it is a boast, a toast, an idle fable to those who disbelieve it, a precious legend of heroism and magnetism to those who glory in it. On the 18th of May a committee of the emigrants was appointed to go to Independence and inquire of Whitman concerning the "practicability of the road," as one of the party (George Wilkes) wrote; another pioneer (Peter H. Burnett) said that on the twentieth he attended a meeting with Colonels Thornton and Bartleson, Mr. Rickman and Dr. Whitman, at which meeting rules and regulations for the "Oregon Emigrating Society" were adopted. There is no doubt that Whitman's advice was of considerable importance. Any man who had taken a wagon over the Rockies would have been of prime importance to these emigrants, irrespective of any other considerations. On the 22d of May the vanguard of the army started, with John Gant as guide, and the Kansas River was reached on the 26th, and wholly crossed on the last day of May. On the 30th of May we find him writing to Secretary Greene in the following strain: "You will be surprised to see that we are not yet started. Lieutenant Fremont left this morning. The emigrants have some of them just gone, and others have been gone a week, and some are yet coming on. I shall start to-morrow. I regret I could not have spent some of the time spent here in suspense with my friends at the East. "I have only a lad of thirteen, my nephew, with me. I take him to have some one to stay with Mrs. Whitman. I cannot give you much of an account of the emigrants until we get on the road. It is said that there are over two hundred men besides women and children. They look like a fair representative of a country population. Few, I conclude, are pious. Fremont intends to return by land, so as to be back early in winter. Should he succeed in doing so we may be able to send you an account of the Mission and country at that time. We do not ask you to become the patrons of emigration to Oregon, but we desire you to use your influence that, in connection with all the influx into the country, there may be a fair proportion of good men of our own denomination who shall avail themselves of the advantages of the country in common with others. Also that ministers should come out as citizens or under the Home Missionary Society. We think agents of the Board and of the Home Missionary Society, as also ministers and good men in general, may do much to send a share of good, pious people to that country. We cannot feel it to be at all just that we do nothing, while worldly men and Papists are doing so much.... I wish to say a few words about manufactures in Oregon, that I may remove an impression that they cannot compete with the English. First, let us take the operatives and the raw material from the Pacific Islands. It matters not at how much labor the Islander cleans the cotton, for it gives him employment, and for that he gets goods, and then for his coffee and sugar and salt and cotton, etc., etc., he gets goods also. This is all an exchange trade that only a population and manufacturers in Oregon can take advantage of, because they alone will want the articles of exchange which the Islander can give. The same will hold good in relation to Indians whenever they shall have sheep, and I intend to try and have the Government give them sheep instead of money, a result not likely to be delayed long. A good man or company can now select the best mill sites and spots, and likely would find a sawmill profitable at once. I think our greatest hope for having Oregon at least part Protestant now lies in encouraging a proper intention of good men to go there while the country is open. I want to call your attention to the operation of Farnham of Salem and the Bensons of New York in Oregon. I am told credibly that secretly Government aids them with the secret service fund. Captain Howard of Maine is also in expectation of being employed by Government to take out emigrants by ship should the Oregon Bill pass." Those who love the memory of this brave missionary must hold this letter exceedingly precious; it has, in addition to its enthusiasm and patriotism, that sane and practical outlook on the future that pervades so much of Washington's writings, especially the letters to William Crawford. Here is another man looking, on the Pacific slope, for such important commonplace things as mill sites in 1843, just as Washington was looking for mill sites in the Ohio Valley in 1770, and between the two it would be difficult to say which was the more seriously optimistic, though the influence of both must have been strong, in their respective days, on the advancing pioneer. For all the daring of the hardy Winter's journey that Whitman made[11] we look upon this other journey, with this splendid army of nearly a thousand Oregon pioneers and home-builders, as the one of supremest importance. Ay, here was Whitman's Ride,--not sung, perhaps, so widely as the one in the Winter's snows, and yet the one ride which Oregon could not have missed, and the one she can never forget! Let the fruitless debate go on as to the exact measure of this unpretentious missionary's influence in shaping Government policies and moulding public opinion; it is enough for me to know that he viewed the whole question as keenly as his few letters prove he unquestionably did, and then to know that when the great emigration started he was there to direct and inspire; that he could do the humblest duty and say the least about it, and at the same time show Fremont where to go if he would gain the immortal title of "Pathfinder." Whitman has suffered at the hands of his friends, who have been over-jealous touching matters concerning which his own lovable modesty and reticence would not allow him to speak; they have made claims and inferences unwarranted by the known facts of the case. His Winter's ride has been compared with Sheridan's from Winchester, and tasted no better in some mouths than does the ballad of Sheridan's Ride in the mouths of Crook's men, who knew their leader had, an hour back, given and carried out the order Sheridan is said (in the poem) to have given when he dashed upon the scene, when, in fact, he merely came to Crook and asked him what he had done.[12] And yet Reid's poem is as true to the spirit of the indomitable Sheridan as Butterfield's is true of Whitman. We have compared Whitman on the Walla Walla to Zeisberger on the Muskingum; and the terrible massacre of November 29, 1847, in which the brave hero of Oregon, with his wife and twelve others, gave their lives, belongs in history with the awful Gnadenhütten tragedy. The murder of these brave pioneers by Indians, to whom they had given the best of their lives and all their strength and prayers, is quite as fiendishly incongruous as the destruction of the Moravian band of corn-huskers by frenzied Monongahela frontiersmen; in each case the murderers knew not what they did. But Whitman's work was done, for we have it in his own hand that he would be contented if posterity would remember, not that he had influenced a President or a Congress or saved an Empire, but merely, as he wrote, that he was "one of the first to take white women across the mountains and prevent the disaster and reaction which would have occurred by the breaking up of the present emigration, and establishing the first wagon road across to the border of the Columbia."[13] And yet when you study this boast you will find that it contains in its essence all that any boast for Whitman could hold; for it was an army of axe-bearers that was to save Oregon; and if Meade won Gettysburg or Wolfe captured Quebec, then Whitman and the Americans who went in his track won for America the northern Pacific slope. FOOTNOTES: [5] See p. 46. [6] Dr. Cushing Eells's letter in archives of A. B. C. F. M., Boston. [7] "The Legend of Whitman's Ride," by Prof. E. G. Bourne, _American Historical Review_, January, 1901. [8] Dr. Whitman's route, as we have seen, in 1836. [9] "Letter of John Zachrey," _Senate Ex. Doc. No. 37_, Forty-first Congress, Third Session. [10] Letter file, office of Secretary of War, received June 22, 1844. [11] Friends of Whitman have unfortunately exaggerated this Winter's ride; though a daring feat, it has many parallels in the annals of the old Salt Lake Trail, on which Jim Bridger built the fort that bore his name as early as 1837. [12] The report of a worthy eyewitness of the Thirty-sixth Ohio. [13] Whitman to Secretary Greene, Nov. 1, 1843; Mowry, _Marcus Whitman_, 267. CHAPTER XIII _Captains of American Expansion always to be found in the National Legislature.--Great National Advance in the Second and Third Decades of the Nineteenth Century.--Definition of "The American System."--The Doctrine that Public Surplus should be used for Internal Improvements held for only a Short Time.--Party Struggles regarding Cumberland Road Legislation.--Inconsistent Resolutions of Congress on this Matter.--The Drift of Public Sentiment toward putting Works of Improvement under the Care of the Government.--Numerous Competitors for National Aid toward Local Improvements.--Mutual Jealousy of Various Localities with Regard to the Distribution of Government Aid.--Disputes as to the Comparative Usefulness of Canals and Railroads.--Polk's Sarcasm on the Abuse of the Word "National" as applied to the Route of a Proposed Road from the Lakes to the Gulf.--Several Beneficial Measures passed by Congress in Spite of Strong Opposition.--Sums granted for Education, Road-building, and Canal-building.--Beneficial Influence of the Government's Liberal Gifts as Encouragement to States and to Private Investors._ PILOTS OF "THE AMERICAN SYSTEM" [Illustration] AS we have reviewed from a more or less personal standpoint some of the exploits which definitely made for the growth and expansion of the young American Republic, it may have occurred to the reader that here was another great power at work helping, encouraging, and guiding the movement,--Pilots of the Republic in the halls of national legislation at Washington. Not that we refer specifically to any one man; some men, like Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, can be pointed to at certain periods as men who occupied this position, who in a sense fathered, against all opposition, great measures that we see now were of tremendous advantage; if the position was abdicated by one man it was filled by another; and so down through the century and a quarter of our national existence there has been a power at work in our councils that has been optimistic, and at the same time true to the genius of America's geographical position and her high calling among the nations of the earth. It is not because this has been marvellously illustrated since the outbreak of the Spanish-American War that reference is made to it here, though the illustration is apposite and fair; but if we look back down the decades from the day that Congress signed that contract with Rufus Putnam and his Revolutionary patriots, or the day when Jefferson dared to effect the Louisiana Purchase, we shall continually find men sitting in the Congressional seats at the capital who had the courage to try new paths, to assume common-sense views of the Constitution, and who believed in their country and wished to see it shirk no great responsibility. Such men as these were as truly captains of our expansion as was Putnam or Henderson or Astor. The age in our history to which our attention is turned on this subject is more particularly that lying between the beginning of the second and the ending of the third decade of last century. Much that was proposed before the opening of the nineteenth century, in the way of material national advance, was forgotten in the taxing days of 1811-1815. Chief among these was the Erie Canal proposition, and it is perhaps not too much to say that had the war with England not come as it did, possibly the Government would, by means of the money accruing from the sale of Michigan lands, have invested in the Erie Canal project; the Cumberland Road was one of the great works that went on despite the war. The moral effect of the victories of Perry and Jackson, one to the north and the other to the south, was very great; with the triumphant ending of the war the little victorious nation sprang into a strength and a passion for power that well-nigh frightened those acquainted with the policy and conservatism of the ante-bellum days. We have touched slightly on one of the great questions of this most wonderful period of American history, that of the constitutionality of the appropriations for the Cumberland Road, and Henry Clay's championship of the measure. But this was only one of a score of propositions in a campaign of internal improvements, and Clay was but one of a hundred champions who assisted a weak nation to take on the elements of strength by encouraging agriculture and manufactures, and binding a far-flung land by means of communication and intercourse. [Illustration: PRESIDENT JAMES K. POLK] At the beginning of the second generation in the century the problem of internal improvements came to the fore as on no previous occasion, backed by the strongest men then in the public eye,--Clay, Calhoun, Adams, and Webster. The Cumberland Road had been making its way westward, but had not yet thrown its tawny length over the Ohio River and into the States beyond. But the argument for this great national work was not to be gainsaid, for the original compact with Ohio had been reiterated on the admission of Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri, respectively, and a part of the sales of the public lands in those States was already pledged to this object. As one of the fruits of the much discussed "American System," championed by Henry Clay, the Cumberland Road was a popular success, though there was never a time when any measure concerning it could not secure a strong following in the House and the Senate. The American System stood for a use of the public surplus for works of internal improvement; it was not a popular policy for a long time, but while in vogue it was of immeasurable benefit to the expanding country, its champions being veritable captains of the country's advance. The most interesting features of the history of this doctrine are the vehemence with which it was advocated for a few critical years when nothing else would have equally aided the national advance, the questionable basis on which the doctrine rested, and the readiness with which it was abandoned when its providential mission was effected. Even before the real internal improvement era came it was foreshadowed by the historic position of the two parties toward the object, as shown in Cumberland Road legislation. The bitterness of the struggle could not be shown better than by the repudiations of Congress in 1817 in its votes on this subject. In that year Congress passed the following inconsistent resolutions: (1) Congress has the power to build public roads and military roads, and to improve waterways; (2) Congress has _not_ power to construct post roads or military roads; (3) Congress has _not_ power to construct roads or canals to carry commerce between the States; (4) Congress has _not_ power to construct military roads. "Thus we see," said a triumphant enemy of the so-called American System, "by the solemn decision of this House in 1817, all power over this subject was repudiated in every form and shape." Despite these inconsistencies the movement was ever a forward movement, until at last, in 1824, it assumed gigantic proportions, alarming to some degree the very men who had urged it forward. The revenue of the Government at this time was about twenty-five millions, and the running expenses--including interest on the slight remaining debt--about half that sum. To what better use could the ten or twelve surplus million dollars be devoted than to the internal improvement of the land, as Gallatin and Jefferson had advocated twenty years before? Here the contest shifted to the tariff, a reduction of which would do away with the necessity of finding a way to employ a surplus. The drift of public sentiment, however, was largely in favor of turning the fostering care of the Government to works of improvement, either by direct appropriation, or by taking stock in local companies, or by devoting to their use the proceeds of the sale of public lands; in any way the result would be the same, and the nation as a whole would feel the benefit. The policy swept a large part of the country like wildfire, and ten thousand dreams, many of them chimerical to the last degree, were conceived. As a rule the result was, without question, bitter disappointment; but amid all the dangers that were in the way, and all the possibilities of untold harm, an influence was put to work that did more for the awakening of the young land than anything that had ever preceded it. Over a hundred and twenty-five claimants for national aid were considered by squads of engineers sent out by the Government. In the sarcastic words of one of the opposers of the system (and on this subject there was a chance for sarcasm that seldom came to Congressmen) every creek and mill-race in the United States was being surveyed by engineers sent out by the chief executive. It was asserted, and not without some plausibility, that such surveying expeditions were used very craftily to influence votes, being sent to view rivers and roads in disputed regions where the information was circulated that, unless the champions of internal improvement were put in power, great local blessings would be lost to these districts. But this was not by any means the chief danger in the campaign. As was most forcefully argued by the opposition, the influence of this paternal policy on the part of the Government would be to awaken hostility and set one part of the nation against the other, for in no way could the division of the surplus be made equal. It could not be made on the basis of population even if this were admitted to be constitutional, for some parts of the country needed help far more than others; a naturally impregnable harbor did not need a fourth of the money expended on it that a comparatively defenceless harbor did. Again, the division could not, for the same reason, be made on the basis of receipts; the States of the seaboard, in which the great part of the Government's revenue was raised, would then be almost the only beneficiaries; the West would receive nothing. The accusation of favoritism came with piercing force. Suppose, for instance, New York and Mississippi should come at the same time to Congress, the one asking for the improvement of the Erie Canal, and the other for the improvement of the Mississippi River. Which party would Congress listen to if the public treasury was not in a position to satisfy both applicants? It was urged that this procedure destroyed the whole principle of representative responsibility. Take the case of New York and her great canal,--the most important material improvement in the fifty years of the nation's life; New York came to the Government when the project was first broached, asking for aid. The cause was a good one; in peace it would be a benefit to at least six States, and in war it would be a national advantage of untold moment; in fact, as we have seen, the possibility of another war with England along the Lakes was the very argument that turned the scale and caused the canal to be built. The project was discouraged at Washington, and not a cent of Government treasure went into the undertaking. Why now, a score of years later, should New York representatives vote money from the national treasury for objects no less national or needful than the Erie Canal? Several neighboring States (Ohio, for instance) had declined to invest funds in the Erie Canal venture when it was first promoted; why now should New York representatives vote national funds (such a large part of which came from New York ports) for improvements in these States, whose delegates in Congress refused aid to the Erie Canal in its dark hours? On the other hand it was urged that even the Erie Canal, the most famous work of internal improvement promoted by any of the States, had done "nothing toward the extinguishment of its debt," up to 1830; if this great work did not reimburse the treasury which built it, though operated by a purely local authority well acquainted with all conditions and able to take advantage of all circumstances, how would it be with works promoted by the national Government, in distant parts of the country, with little or no knowledge of local circumstances or conditions? Another argument, more powerful than was realized at the time, was that which prophesied the swift advance of the locomotive and the railroad, and the consequent decay and disuse of the common road and the canal. Said a member of Congress in debate on the floor of the House, "The honorable gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Mercer, the father of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal], Sir, must hear the appalling, the heartrending fact, that this mighty monument [the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal] which, for years, he has been laboring with zeal and exertion to erect to his memory, and which, no doubt, he had fondly hoped would transmit his name down to the latest posterity, must fall, and must give place to the superior improvement of railroads." On the proposed national road from Buffalo to New Orleans by way of Washington the opposition poured out its vials of sarcasm and ridicule. To the arguments of the friends of the measure, that the road was needed as a commercial and military avenue and for the use of the Post-office department, the reply was a denial so sweeping, from such reliable and informed parties, that there was no hope for the measure. Perhaps the strongest argument for the negative was advanced by James K. Polk, who was little less than withering in his fire, piling up ridicule on top of sarcasm to a degree seldom seen in Congress. Polk found that twenty-one routes between Washington and Buffalo had been outlined by engineers for this road "in the rage for engineering, surveying, reconnoitring, and electioneering." He alleged that the entire population in a space of territory one hundred miles in width between the two cities had been made to expect the road, and the surveys had been conducted in the heat of a political campaign. "The certain effect of this system, as exemplified by this road, is, first, to excite hopes; second, to produce conflicts of section arrayed against section; and lastly, dissatisfaction and heart-burnings amongst all who are not accommodated." The speaker exhausted his keen-edged sarcasm on the word "national" and the uses to which the word was put by the defenders of the improvement bills. He affirmed that he was sure a number of men who proposed to support the Buffalo-New Orleans Road Bill would not consider it sufficiently "national" if it were known that it was not to pass through their districts; he affirmed that every catfish in the Ohio River was a "national" catfish as truly as the Cumberland Road was a national road; he challenged the friends of the bill to decide definitely upon a route for the proposed road from the Lakes to the Gulf, and then hold true to the measure representatives from districts through which the road was not to pass. Polk affirmed that the many various surveys were made merely to ally with the friends of the measure the representatives of all districts touched by these alternative courses. "This same national road was mounted as a political hobby in my district," said the Tennessean; "for a time the people seemed to be carried away with the prospect of having millions of public money expended among them. We were to have a main route and cross routes intersecting the district in every direction. It was to run down every creek, and pass through almost every neighborhood in the district. As soon as there was time for reason to assume her seat the delusion passed off." These points of opposition to the improvement campaign have been outlined at some length to show the strength of the opposition and the ground it took. No measure went through Congress for any kind of Government aid without the strongest kind of opposition; in fact, the Virginia delegates worked and voted against the Dismal Swamp Canal in their own State in order to be consistent with their oft-expressed views on such questions. Yet, one by one, a considerable number of important measures of internal improvement went through Congress and received the signatures of the different Presidents; the effect of these measures was inestimably beneficial, giving a marked impetus to national development, and awakening in men's minds a dim conception of the growth that was to be the one great wonder of the century. From the adoption of the Constitution to the year 1828 the following sums were granted by the general Government for purposes either of education or road-building or canal-building: Maine, $9,500; New York, $4,156; Tennessee, $254,000; Arkansas, $45,000; Michigan, $45,000; Florida, $83,417; Ohio, $2,527,404; Illinois, $1,725,959; Indiana, $1,513,161; Missouri, $1,462,471; Mississippi, $600,667; Alabama, $1,534,727; Louisiana, $1,166,361. In addition to this the Government built, or assisted in building, five great works of improvement from among the scores that were proposed. For the Delaware and Chesapeake Canal $300,000 was advanced; for the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, $10,000; for the Dismal Swamp Canal, $150,000; for the Louisville and Portland Canal, $90,000; for the Cumberland Road, $2,230,903; for western and southwestern State roads, $76,595, making a total appropriation of $13,838,886. The danger of the system was in making the national purse an object of plunder for Congressmen, and the consequent danger of unholy alliances and combinations for looting the public treasury. It is interesting that for so long a period as it was in vogue there were so slight symptoms of this sort of thing; and men little knew that, by acting on liberal lines at the time, despite the dangers and risks, they were exerting a power to shape the new nation, to incite private investment, to encourage State and private works of promotion, and to aid the commercial awakening of a people to an activity and an enterprise whose possibilities cannot at the present day be estimated. Take the Portland Canal around the historic "falls of the Ohio" at Louisville; this was a work for no one State in particular to perform, not even Kentucky; it was a detriment to Louisville itself, for it destroyed the old portage business, as the Erie Canal ruined the overland carrying trade between Schenectady and Albany. All the States bordering on the Ohio were benefited by this improvement, as was equally true respecting the Government's improvement of the Ohio River itself, which began in 1825. The Portland Canal was one of the important investments which tended to prove the financial benefit of such investments. The Government's total subscription of stock was $233,500; when the affairs of the Company were closed in 1874 by the purchase of the canal by the Government, it was found that the national profit (in mere interest) had been $257,778. This was due to exorbitant tolls charged by the Company, which resulted, finally, in the purchase of the canal and throwing it open toll-free. The men who labored for this era of improvement are practically unknown, with the exception of two or three who became prominent because of special ability or renown gained in other lines of activity, like Clay and Calhoun. It is not important here to attempt to catalogue them; the work they did by voting for the so-called American System was of critical importance; but, still greater, in so doing they were showing a braver, more optimistic, more American spirit and a high faith in the fundamental good judgment of the people. It was, without doubt, a dangerous extreme to approach, possible of wanton violation in unprincipled hands, and a precedent of very questionable tendencies. But it was of immeasurable importance that such moral support as just such acts as these afforded should have come at just this time; and, could we read the result aright, it would be seen, possibly, that much of our commercial success found its origin at this very moment, and came into being because a number of men at this crucial time gave an impetus to private adventure and private investment that was almost providential in its ultimate effect on our national life. Losing their individual identity in the common promotion of temporary measures of infinite national advantage, they will be remembered only in a vague, impersonal way as men who honored their country by trusting in its destiny and believing in the genius of its growth. INDEX "ADAMS," 295 Adams, Herbert B., 78 Adams, John Quincy, 244, 344 "Adventure Galley," 119 Alleghany Portage Railway, 251-255 American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 304, 317, 318, 329 American Fur Company, 310, 311 _American Historical Review_, 320 "American System," 345-358 Ashburton Treaty, 330 Ashley, --, 311 Astor, John Jacob, 282-297, 343 Astoria, 282, 289-296 BACON, James H., 201 Baltimore, 36, 241-244, 248, 255 Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 36, 77, 243-245, 248 Bartleson, Colonel, 331 Bartlett, --, 189 "Beautiful Spring" (Schönbrunn), 141 "Beaver," 294, 295 Bensons, The, in Oregon, 333 Bethlehem, Pa., 133, 134 Bliss, --, 189 Block, Captain, 296 Bonneville, --, 311 Boone, Daniel, 29, 30, 89-101 Boonesborough, Ky., 96, 101, 116 Bouquet, --, 284 Bourne, Prof. E. G., 320 Bradford County, Pa., 138 Bridger, James, 311, 335 Brown, George, 242 Buffalo-New Orleans Road, 352-354 Bullock, Leonard Henley, 90 Bunch of Grapes Tavern, Boston, 112 Burnett, Peter H., 331 Bushnell, --, 206 Butterfield, --, 336 CALHOUN, John C., 322, 344, 358 Calk, William, 96 Canals, 35, 36, 209-232, 239-245, 247, 249-254 Carroll, Charles, 77, 244 Carter's Valley, 99 Cass, --, 189 Catholic missionaries in Oregon, 314, 319, 326, 333 Catlin, George, 304 Chastellux, Chevalier de, 62 Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, 76, 215, 240, 243-245, 247-249, 352, 356 Clark, George Rogers, 100, 151-178, 261, 329 Clark, Jonathan, 153-157 Clark, William, 156, 157, 262-272, 281, 283, 287, 290, 303 Clarksville, 176 Clay, Henry, 184, 192, 205, 342, 344-346, 358 Claysville, Pa., 184 Cleaveland, Moses, 124 Cleveland, Ohio, 124 Clinton, Gov. De Witt, 35, 135-137, 218, 229, 230 "Clinton's Ditch," 218, 221 Coal, 54, 56 Colquit, --, 189 Colter, --, 270 _Commonwealth, The_ (Pittsburg), 216 Congregational missions to Indians, 304 Congress, Powers of, 346 Connellsville, Pa., 163 Coshocton, Ohio, 141 Crab Orchard, Ky., 97 Crawford, William, 45-47, 49-52, 55, 334 Cressap, Captain, 170 Cumberland Gap, 98 Cumberland Road, 35, 74, 77, 181-206, 228, 235, 343-345, 356 Cushing, Caleb, 321 Cutler, Rev. Manasseh, 111-115, 117; his son, 120 "DEFIANCE" stage line, 200, 201 Delafield, --, 189 Delaware and Chesapeake Canal, 356 Devol, --, 120 DeWitt, Simeon, 211, 212, 218 Dickson, --, 270 Dismal Swamp Canal, 355, 356 Dunmore, Governor, 87 Dunmore's War, 91, 170 EAST India Company, 288 Eddy, Thomas, 218 Eells, Dr. Cushing, quoted, 319 English, William H., quoted, 171, 176 "Enterprise," 295 Erie Canal, 35, 74, 76, 209-232, 239, 249, 343, 350, 351, 357 Everett, Edward, 147, 196, 197 "FALLS of the Ohio" (Louisville), 97, 175, 176 Farnham, --, 333 "Father of Ohio," 124 Fearing, --, 120 Fife, William H., 201 Forbes's Road, 118 Forman, Joshua, 216 Fort Boone, 96, 99, 101 Fort Detroit, 139, 143 Fort Duquesne, 164, 315, 316 Fort Edward, N. Y., 210, 211 Fort Harmar, 116, 121 Fort Necessity, 163 Fort Pitt, 115, 139, 143, 164 Fort William, N. Y., 136 "Founders of Ohio," 118 Freeman, Thomas, 52 Fremont, John C., 311, 321, 332, 335 Fulton, Robert, 218 Fur trade, 281, 282, 284-296, 314, 315 GALLATIN, Albert, 184, 189, 284, 347 Gant, John, 331 Geddes, James, 211, 212 _Genesee Messenger, The_, 216 Gilmans, The, 120 Gnadenhütten, Ohio, 141, 146, 336 "Good Intent" stage line, 200 Goodale, --, 120 Government ownership, 191, 198 Gratiot, --, 189 Gray, Captain, 268, 287 Gray, William H., 310 Great Meadows, 47, 163 Greene, --, 120 Greene, --, of American Board of Foreign Missions, 326, 329, 331, 337 Greenhow's "Memoir," 330 Grist-mill, First west of Alleghanies, 55 HANCOCK, --, 270 Hanks, Abraham, 96 Harrison, William Henry, 261 Harrodsburg, Ky., 97 Harrodstown, Ky., 173 Hart, David, 90, 93 Hartzell, --, 189 Hawley, Jesse, 215, 216 Hawley, M. S., 219 Heath, General, 108 Heckewelder, John, 31, 142 Henderson, Ky., 99 Henderson, Richard, 29, 30, 83-101, 172-174, 182, 260, 343 "Hercules" (Jesse Hawley), 215 Higgins, --, 167, 168 "Hit or Miss," 252, 253 Hoar, Senator, quoted, 107-110, 119, 120 Hogg, James, 90 Howard, Captain, 334 Hudson Bay Company, 287, 288, 312, 314 Hunt, Wilson Price, 291-295 ILLINOIS, 100, 105, 174, 175, 177 Independence Township, Cuyahoga Co., Ohio, 145 Indiana, 100, 105 Indians, 31, 87, 121, 131-146, 164-166, 302, 303, 309 Irving, Washington, quoted, 286 JEFFERSON, Thomas, 79, 153, 215, 259, 262, 342, 347 Jeffersonville, Ky., 176 Johnson, Thomas, 59 Johnson, Sir William, 137 Johnston, Joseph E., 189 Johnstone, William, 90 Jones, Rev. David, 165-168 Jones, John Gabriel, 173 "June Bug" stage line, 200 KANSAS City (Westport), 322 Kent, Chancellor, 218-220 Ken-ta-kee, Kentucky, 117-175 Kentucky, 29, 30, 79, 91-100, 171-176, 183 LAMB, Mrs. Martha J., quoted, 307 Lancaster Turnpike, 187, 188 "Landlords" stage line, 200 Lands, Western, 28, 39-58, 66, 163 "Lark," 294 Lawrence County, Pa., 140 Lawyer's examination, 83-86 Lee, Capt. Hancock, 171 Lee, Rev. Jason, 304 Leestown, on Kentucky River, 171 "Legend of Whitman's Ride, The," 320 "Letter of John Zachrey," 323 Lewis and Clark Expedition, 79, 157, 262-272, 281, 283, 287, 290, 301 Lewis, Gen. Andrew, 87 Lewis, Meriwether, 262-272, 281, 283, 287, 290 Lewis, Gov. Morgan, 210, 211 Lichtenau, Ohio, 141 Linn, Lewis F., 321, 330 Livingston, Robert R., 218 Locomotives, 246 "Long Hunters," 87, 88 Louisiana Territory, 259-277, 281, 290 Louisville, Ky., 97, 175, 176 Louisville and Portland Canal, 356-358 Luttrell, John, 90, 93 MACKENZIE, Sir Alexander, 287 Macomb County, Mich., 145 Madison, James, 158 Mansfield, --, 189 Manufactures in Oregon, 333 Manypenny, Geo. W., 201 "Marcus Whitman," 337 Marietta, O., 116, 121-125 Marietta College, 125 Martin, Captain Joseph, 93, 97 Maryland, 239-248 Massie, --, 124 Mauch Chunk, Pa., 242 Maysville Road Bill, 74 McDougal, Duncan, 291, 296 McKee, --, 189 McKenzie, Donald, 291 "Meadow of Light" (Lichtenau), 31, 141, 313 Meigs, --, 119 "Memoir" (Greenhow), 330 Mercer, Colonel, 49 Mercer, --, of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, 352 Methodist missions to Indians, 304 Michigan, 105 Milan, Erie Co., Ohio, 145 Millstones from Alleghanies, 55 Missionaries to Indians, 304, 309-319, 326-328, 332, 333 Mohawk Valley route, 62, 76, 78, 214 Monroe, President, 191-193 Moravian Brethren, 31, 115, 131-146, 304, 305 Morris, Gouverneur, 35, 210-212, 218 Mounds in Ohio Valley, 170 Moundsville, W. Va., 170 Mowry, William A., 337 NATIONAL Road Stage Company, 199 Neville, Presley, 57 New Albany, Ky., 176 New Philadelphia, Ohio, 131 New York City, 241 North Carolina, 30, 87, 98-100 Northwest Company of Montreal, 282, 287, 288, 290, 294, 296 OCONOSTOTA, Cherokee chief, 90 Ohio, 30, 31, 76, 100, 105, 113-147, 243 Ohio Company, 48, 49, 92, 113-125 Ohio National Stage Company, 199 "Old Two-Horn," 125 Ordinance of 1787, 41, 79, 92, 112-115, 117, 123 "Oregon Emigrating Society," 331 Oregon Territory, 301-338 "Origin of the Erie Canal, The," 219 Owens, David, 166-168 PACIFIC Fur Company, 291, 292 Parker, Rev. Samuel, 308, 309 Parkersburg, W. Va., 167 Parsons, --, 120 Pennsylvania Canal, 249-254 Pennsylvania Railway, 249, 250, 254 Pennsylvania Road, 118 Perryopolis, Fayette Co., Pa., 55 Philadelphia, 241 Philadelphia and Columbia Railway, 253 Pickell, --, 189 Pike, Zebulon M., 272-277, 281 "Pilot" stage line, 200 "Pioneer" stage line, 200 Pittsburg, 115, 163, 168 Platt, Judge, 218, 219 Polk, James K., 353, 354 Porter, Hon. James M., 324, 325 Post, Frederick Christian, 134-137 Potomac Company, 74-76, 236-240, 245 Potomac River Improvements, 58-61, 65-68, 72, 75, 79, 213, 236-240, 297 Potter County, Pa., 140 Prentiss, Miss (Mrs. Whitman), 307, 310 Presbyterian missions to Indians, 304 Putnam, Gen. Rufus, 106-114, 118-127, 182, 260, 342, 343 "RACCOON," 296 Railroads, 242-246, 248-255 Read, Thomas B., author "Sheridan's Ride," 336 Rianhard, William, 201 Richardson, Judge, 224 Rickman, --, 331 River improvement, 237 Road-building, 35, 77, 181-206, 352-356 Robertson, Donald, 158 Robinson, Moncure, 252 Rome, N. Y., 136, 223 Roosevelt, Theodore, quoted, 264, 275 SANDUSKY, Ohio, 143 Sargent, Winthrop, 112, 115 Schönbrunn, Ohio, 141 Schuyler, Gen. Philip, 218 Schuylkill and Susquehanna Canal, 215 Scioto Company, 114 Sheridan, Philip, 336 "Sheridan's Ride," 336 Slavery, 123 Soldiers' lands, 48-52, 111, 112, 122 South Pass, 308, 322 Spaulding, Rev. Henry H., and wife, 310-313 Sproat, Col. Ebenezer, 118, 120 Stagecoach lines, 199-202 St. Clair, Gov. Arthur, 120, 122, 125, 126, 284 Steamboats, 72, 218 Steubenville, Ohio, 166 Stewart's Crossing (Connellsville, Pa.), 163, 171 St. Louis, 263, 270 Surplus for internal improvements, 347 Surveyors, 158-160 Swann, Thomas, 248 TAYLOR, Lieut.-Gov. John, 219 "Tents of Grace" (Gnadenhütten), 141 Territory Northwest of the River Ohio, 113 Thomas, Nathaniel, 90 Thomas, Philip Evan, 35, 241-243, 255 Thompson, Chief Justice, 219 Thorn, Captain, 292 Thornton, Col., 331 Todd, Col. John, 177 Toledo, Ohio, 261 "Tom Thumb," Peter Cooper's locomotive, 246 Tompkins, Governor, 219, 220 "Tonquin," 292-294 Transylvania Company, 88-91, 98-100, 116, 172, 173 Treaty of Fort Mclntosh, 121 Treaty of Fort Stanwix, 59, 87-89 Treaty of Fort Watauga, 90 Tupper, --, 120 UNIONTOWN, Pa., 199 VANCE, --, 189 Varnum, --, 119 Virginia, 30, 59, 79, 87-89, 98-100, 173, 176, 177, 239, 240 WALKER, Felix, 91 Walpole Grant, 49, 51 "Washington and the West" (Hulbert), 65, 80 Washington Coal and Coke Company, 56 Washington, George, 27-30, 39-80, 106-108, 126, 159, 160, 163, 182, 236, 238, 252, 253, 297, 334 Washington State, Settlement of, 312, 316 Washington's Bottoms, 47 Washington's Letter to Benjamin Harrison, 1784, 68-74, 236, 253 Washington's Run mill, 55 Watauga Settlement, 89-92 Watson, Elkanah, 211 Wayne, Anthony, 126, 261 Weaver, Jno. W. & Co., 201 Webster, Daniel, 123, 330, 342, 344 Welch, Sylvester, 252, 255 West Newton, Pa., 118 Westport (Kansas City), 322 Wheeling, W. Va., 166 Whipple, --, 119 White, Major Hatfield, 117 Whitman, Marcus, 305-338 Whitman, Mrs., 307, 310-312 Wilkes, Lieutenant, 330, 331 Wilkinson, General, 273 Williams, --, 189 Williams, Judge John, 90 "Winning of the West, The," 275 Winsor, Justin, quoted, 321 Wisconsin, 105 Women in the Northwest, 311, 312 Wright, F. M., 201 YATES, Judge, 218, 219 Yontz, Jno., 201 Young, Samuel, 224 ZEISBERGER, David, 31, 115, 131-147, 182, 284, 305, 336 _Uniform with "Pilots of the Republic"_ THE GLORY SEEKERS THE ROMANCE OF WOULD-BE FOUNDERS OF EMPIRE IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE SOUTHWEST BY WILLIAM HORACE BROWN _Illustrated with portraits, and with original drawings by W. J. Enright. Price $1.50 net._ "Here is a history that reads like sheer romance. Mr. Brown tells in a delightful way the story of those who dreamed dreams of empire in the far West.... The book, typographically, is a fine sample of McClurg work. It is profusely illustrated."--_Toledo Times Bee._ "It is a pleasure to assure the reader that one may have as much fun reading 'The Glory Seekers' as William Horace Brown had writing it. Few historical books are written in such sprightly vein, and few informative books of any sort are so leavened with humor."--_St. Louis Post Dispatch._ "When romance and history, adventure and fact, are combined in readable style, and the history happens to be a field with which we are not all familiar, but in which we are much interested, a book is produced that will be irresistible to many.... Thrilling adventure is plentiful in these pages, and it has the added interest of its political significance. Written in a pleasant, familiar style, not without sharp and illuminating comment, 'The Glory Seekers' is a book to be read with keen delight by the student of history and the lover of romance."--_Des Moines Mail and Times._ "A volume which will find an honorable place among Americana.... Mr. Brown's style is detailed and explicit. He indulges in keen character delineation. He makes these hardy adventurers offer their specious apologies. They cease to be the dim and menacing figures of our national history and become comprehensible, if fatal, figures. The book is one which fills a vacancy in history."--_Chicago Tribune._ "His effort has been rather to scrape off the successive coats of whitewash which local historians have liberally applied to the darker side of their deeds, and, while giving the would-be empire builders full credit for their personal bravery and physical prowess, to show forth their ambitions and exploits in their true colors."--_New York Tribune._ "A book that reads like a novel.... It is not a story to make 'every American's cheek flush with pride,' but, 'The Glory Seekers' is a strong and vivid depiction of the true history of the Southwest, colored with incident and anecdote, and suffused with the enthusiastic Americanism which the most cynical attitude cannot hide."--_Butte Inter Mountain._ "A unique, interesting, and valuable story of the early days of the Southwest, when adventurous spirits tried at various times to establish an empire there. Mr. Brown has made an exhaustive study of his subject, and has the facts, which are presented with a cleverness of narration that makes them most delightful reading."--_Pittsburg Dispatch._ "Very unconventional in its style, lively and highly entertaining."--_The Churchman._ "The author of this excellent and exceedingly interesting work has made a thorough study of the various efforts to found local governments in Texas, independent of Mexico, at an early day.... He is to be congratulated for his excellent work in this historical summary of events in that great region."--_Salt Lake Tribune._ "The work is well done. The narratives are lively and well told, and while not highly important episodes, they are all worth preserving as correctives to the too partial story of the colonial patriots as served up in the usual United States histories, if for nothing else."--_New York American._ "The romantic story of conquest is brilliantly told."--_Portland Oregonian._ A. C. McCLURG & CO., _Publishers_ Volumes of Pioneer History By REUBEN GOLD THWAITES HOW GEORGE ROGERS CLARK WON THE NORTHWEST AND OTHER ESSAYS IN WESTERN HISTORY _With maps and illustrations_ The majority of the eight essays contained in the volume were first delivered as lectures, and were later accorded magazine publication. For the present publication they have been radically revised and brought down to date, and comprise an exceptionally interesting collection of papers covering a wide range of topics under the one general head. The titles of the essays are as follows: "How George Rogers Clark Won the Northwest," "The Division of the Northwest into States," "The Black Hawk War," "The Story of the Mackinac," "The Story of La Pointe," "A Day on Braddock's Road," "Early Lead Mining on the Upper Mississippi," "The Draper Manuscripts." ON THE STORIED OHIO _An Historical Pilgrimage of a Thousand Miles in a Skiff, from Redstone to Cairo. With new Preface and full-page illustrations from photographs._ This trip was undertaken by Mr. Thwaites some years ago, with the idea of gathering local color for his studies of Western history. The Ohio River was an important factor in the development of the West. The voyage is described with much charm and humor, and with a constant realization of the historical traditions on every side. For the better understanding of these references, the author has added a brief sketch of the settlement of the Ohio Valley. A selected list of journals of previous travellers has also been included. DOWN HISTORIC WATERWAYS _Six Hundred Miles of Canoeing upon Illinois and Wisconsin Rivers. Second Edition, revised, with new Preface, and eight full-page illustrations from photographs._ Mr. Thwaites' book is not only a charming account of a summer canoe trip, but an excellent guide for any one who is contemplating a similar "inland voyage." The course followed by the canoeist is described with a practical accuracy that makes it of great assistance, but in an engaging style that will appeal strongly to every lover of outdoor life. "It is a book to be read to get the spirit of the woods and rivers and streams and lakes."--_Worcester Spy._ _Uniform Binding. Each 12mo, $1.20 net._ A. C. McCLURG & CO., _Publishers_ MRS. DYE'S FAMOUS BOOKS ON THE NORTHWEST McDONALD OF OREGON By EVA EMERY DYE. A Tale of Two Shores. Illustrations by Walter J. Enright. 12mo, $1.50. The chance casting away of a party of Japanese on the Oregon coast many years ago inspired McDonald, a fully historical personage, to enact a similar drama in his own proper self with the characters and continents reversed. Landing on the shores of Japan he was passed from governor to governor until he reached the capital. There he was permitted to establish a school, and it was actually his pupils who acted as interpreters during the negotiations with Commodore Perry, generally supposed to be the first of Americans to enter Japan. Mrs. Dye has long been aware of the facts in McDonald's unusual career, having obtained them largely from his own lips; but she deferred publication until his papers finally reposed in her hands. It will be remembered that the hero of this new book entered largely into her story of "McLoughlin and Old Oregon," to which this later volume is in a sense a sequel. THE CONQUEST By EVA EMERY DYE. Being the True Story of Lewis and Clark. _Third Edition_, with frontispiece in full color by Charlotte Weber. 12mo, $1.50. No book published in recent years has more of tremendous import between its covers, and certainly no recent novel has in it more of the elements of a permanent success. A historical romance which tells with accuracy and inspiring style of the bravery of the pioneers in winning the western continent should have a lasting place in the esteem of every American. "No one who wishes to know the true story of the conquest of the greater part of this great nation can afford to pass by this book."--_Cleveland Leader._ "A vivid picture of the Indian wars preceding the Louisiana purchase, of the expedition of Lewis and Clark, and of events following the occupation of Oregon."--_The Congregationalist._ "It may not be the great American novel we have been waiting for so long, but it certainly looks as though it would be very near it."--_Rochester Times._ "The characters that are assembled in 'The Conquest' belong to the history of the United States; their story is a national epic."--_Detroit Free Press._ McLOUGHLIN AND OLD OREGON By EVA EMERY DYE. A Chronicle. _Fifth Edition._ 12mo, $1.50. This is a most graphic and interesting chronicle of the movement which added to the United States that vast territory, previously a British possession, of which Oregon formed a part, and how Dr. John McLoughlin, then chief factor of the Hudson's Bay Company for the Northwest, by his fatherly interest in the settlers, displeased the Hudson's Bay Company and aided in bringing this about. The author has gathered her facts at first hand, and as a result the work is vivid and picturesque and reads like a romance. "A spirited narrative of what life in the wilderness meant in the early days, a record of heroism, self-sacrifice, and dogged persistence; a graphic page of the story of the American pioneer."--_New York Mail and Express._ A. C. McCLURG & CO., _Publishers_ +----------------------------------------------------------------- + | Transcriber's Note: | | | | Minor typographical errors have been corrected without note. | | | | Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant | | form was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed. | | | | Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. | | | | Mid-paragraph illustrations have been moved between paragraphs | | and some illustrations have been moved closer to the text that | | references them. The List of Illustrations paginations were | | changed accordingly. | | | | Italicized words are surrounded by underline characters, | | _like this_. | | | | Superscripts are enclosed in brackets like this 2{nd}. | | | | Duplicated section headings have been omitted. | | | |Footnotes were moved to the end of chapters and numbered in one | |continuous sequence. | +------------------------------------------------------------------+