id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
971	Spinoza, Benedictus de	Ethics — Part 4			.txt	text/plain	22594	1339	78	imperfect: for men are wont to form general ideas of things natural, no thing's power of action, in so far as this is understood by its nature, Proof.The power, whereby each particular thing, and consequently man, Proof.Desire is the essence of a man (Def. of the Emotions, i.), Proof.Virtue is human power, which is defined solely by man's essence Proof.In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it cannot be thing is to man most useful, which is most in harmony with his nature as he has a greater knowledge of God. Proof.Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason, are most Proof.Pleasure (III:xi.&Note) is emotion, whereby the body's power of man's true power of action or virtue is reason herself (III:iii.), as emotions of pleasure and pain; as for the desires, they are good or bad	./cache/971.txt	./txt/971.txt