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Philosophy of Science A Personal Peek into the Future

Citation for published version:
French, S & Massimi, M 2013, 'Philosophy of Science A Personal Peek into the Future', Metaphilosophy,
vol. 44, no. 3, pp. 230-240. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12034

Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1111/meta.12034

Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer

Document Version:
Peer reviewed version

Published In:
Metaphilosophy

Publisher Rights Statement:
This is a post-peer reviewed version of the following article: French, S. & Massimi, M. (2013) "Philosophy of
Science A Personal Peek into the Future", In : Metaphilosophy. 44, 3, p. 230-240, which has been published in
final form at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/meta.12034

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Download date: 06. Apr. 2021

https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12034
https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12034
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Philosophy	
  of	
  Science:	
  A	
  Personal	
  Peek	
  into	
  the	
  Future	
  
Steven	
  French	
  and	
  Michela	
  Massimi	
  
	
  

Steven	
  French	
  
School	
  of	
  Philosophy,	
  Religion	
  and	
  History	
  of	
  Science	
  
University	
  of	
  Leeds	
  	
  
s.r.d.french@leeds.ac.uk	
  
	
  
Michela	
  Massimi	
  
School	
  of	
  Philosophy,	
  Psychology	
  and	
  Language	
  Sciences	
  
University	
  of	
  Edinburgh	
  
michela.massimi@ed.ac.uk	
  
	
  
	
  
Abstract:	
  In	
  this	
  opinion	
  piece,	
  the	
  authors	
  offer	
  their	
  personal	
  and	
  idiosyncratic	
  views	
  of	
  the	
  future	
  of	
  the	
  
philosophy	
  of	
  science,	
  focusing	
  on	
  its	
  relationship	
  with	
  the	
  history	
  of	
  science	
  and	
  metaphysics,	
  respectively.	
  
With	
  regard	
  to	
  the	
  former,	
  they	
  suggest	
  that	
  the	
  Kantian	
  tradition	
  might	
  be	
  drawn	
  upon	
  both	
  to	
  render	
  the	
  
history	
  and	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science	
  more	
  relevant	
  to	
  philosophy	
  as	
  a	
  whole	
  and	
  to	
  overcome	
  the	
  challenges	
  
posed	
  by	
  naturalism.	
  When	
  it	
  comes	
  to	
  the	
  latter,	
  they	
  suggest	
  both	
  that	
  metaphysics	
  has	
  much	
  to	
  learn	
  
from	
   the	
   philosophy	
   of	
   science	
   and	
   that	
   it	
   offers	
   an	
   array	
   of	
   tools	
   that	
   philosophers	
   of	
   science	
   can	
  
themselves	
  appropriate.	
  
	
  
Keywords:	
  Kant;	
  metaphysics;	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science.	
  
	
  
	
  
Philosophy	
  of	
  science	
  is	
  entering	
  a	
  new	
  exciting	
  era.	
  As	
  the	
  editors	
  of	
  the	
  British	
  Journal	
  for	
  the	
  Philosophy	
  of	
  
Science	
  (BJPS),	
  we	
  witness	
  an	
  enlarged	
  horizon	
  of	
  topics,	
  areas,	
  and	
  buzzing	
  interactions	
  between	
  philosophy	
  
and	
  the	
  sciences	
  that	
  the	
  founders	
  of	
  the	
  journal,	
  back	
  in	
  1950,	
  could	
  not	
  possibly	
  have	
  dreamt	
  of.	
  While	
  the	
  
programmatic	
   intent	
  of	
  the	
  journal	
   in	
  the	
  original	
  Editorial	
  was	
  to	
  explore	
  “the	
  whole	
  range	
  of	
  science—
physical,	
  biological,	
  and	
  psychological”	
  and	
  take	
  “science,	
  both	
  past	
  and	
  present	
  .	
  .	
  .	
  as	
  the	
  primary	
  datum	
  
for	
  consideration”	
  (BJPS	
  1950,	
  3	
  and	
  4),	
   it	
  would	
  have	
  been	
  hard	
  to	
  predict	
  how—some	
  sixty-­‐three	
  years	
  
later—the	
  complex	
  dynamics	
  between	
  philosophy	
  and	
  science	
  would	
  have	
  radically	
  changed	
  the	
  landscape	
  
of	
   the	
   subject	
   area.	
   From	
   foundational	
   studies	
   of	
   physics,	
   to	
   evolutionary	
   developmental	
   biology;	
   from	
  
neuroimaging	
  and	
  evolutionary	
  psychology	
  to	
  causal	
  decision	
  theories	
  and	
  signal-­‐	
  ling	
  games:	
  these	
  are	
  just	
  
a	
  few	
  of	
  the	
  many	
  faces	
  of	
  contemporary	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science.	
  The	
  field	
  has	
  expanded	
  in	
  myriad	
  directions,	
  
and	
  has	
  engaged	
  in	
  serious	
  conversation	
  with	
  the	
  sciences	
  at	
  large,	
  following	
  the	
  naturalistic	
  trend	
  of	
  the	
  
second	
  half	
  of	
  the	
  last	
  century.	
  We	
  could	
  never	
  do	
  justice	
  to	
  the	
  complexity	
  of	
  the	
  current	
  panorama,	
  and	
  do	
  
not	
   even	
   attempt	
   in	
   what	
   follows	
   to	
   provide	
   an	
   overview	
   of	
   the	
   many	
   intricate	
   and	
   alluring	
   topics	
   and	
  
subfields	
  on	
  which	
  we	
  have	
  the	
  honour	
  of	
  publishing.	
  The	
  interested	
  reader	
  is	
  kindly	
  referred	
  to	
  the	
  table	
  of	
  
contents	
  of	
  any	
  issue	
  of	
  the	
  BJPS	
  for	
  that.	
  

Instead,	
  given	
  the	
  aim	
  and	
  scope	
  of	
  the	
  present	
  contribution	
  as	
  an	
  opinion	
  piece,	
  we	
  have	
  decided	
  to	
  
follow	
  a	
  more	
  familiar	
  path	
  in	
  providing	
  two	
  personal,	
  inevitably	
  incomplete,	
  and	
  unashamedly	
  idiosyncratic	
  
views	
   of	
   how	
   we	
   see	
   the	
   field	
   evolving.	
   The	
   views	
   are	
   personal	
   as	
   they	
   reflect	
   our	
   respective	
   personal	
  
research	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  field	
  as	
  authors,	
  before	
  being	
  editors	
  (and,	
  in	
  fact,	
  quite	
  independently	
  of	
  our	
  role	
  



	
  

as	
  editors	
  of	
  the	
  BJPS).	
  They	
  are	
  inevitably	
  incomplete,	
  as	
  the	
  short	
  remarks	
  here	
  below	
  cannot	
  possibly	
  do	
  
justice	
  even	
  to	
  the	
  two	
  chosen	
  trends	
  (history	
  and	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science	
  [HPS]	
  and	
  metaphysics	
  of	
  science)	
  
on	
  which	
  we	
  have	
  decided	
  to	
  concentrate.	
  They	
  are	
  finally	
  unashamedly	
  idiosyncratic,	
  because	
  they	
  reflect	
  
our	
   individual	
   take	
   on	
   each	
   of	
   these	
   two	
   fields.	
   In	
   what	
   follows,	
   we	
   take	
   a	
   look	
   in	
   turn	
   at	
   HPS	
   and	
   the	
  
metaphysics	
  of	
  science,	
  as	
  just	
  two	
  families	
  inhabiting	
  the	
  many-­‐storeyed	
  house	
  of	
  contemporary	
  philosophy	
  
of	
  science.	
  Although	
  the	
  limited	
  selection	
  of	
  subfields	
  preempts	
  any	
  temptation	
  to	
  draw	
  grand	
  conclusions	
  
about	
  the	
  future	
  of	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science,	
  we	
  hope	
  that	
  what	
  follows	
  may	
  serve	
  as	
  a	
  spring-­‐	
  board	
  for	
  wider	
  
reflections	
  on	
  how	
  each	
  of	
  these	
  two	
  areas	
  has	
  affected	
  the	
  remit	
  of	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science	
  as	
  a	
  whole,	
  and	
  is	
  
bound	
  to	
  shape	
  (at	
  least	
  in	
  part)	
  its	
  future.	
  

	
  
	
  

A	
  New	
  Era	
  for	
  History	
  and	
  Philosophy	
  of	
  Science	
  
	
  

When	
  it	
  comes	
  to	
  new	
  directions	
  in	
  the	
  vast	
  field	
  of	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science,	
  it	
   is	
  hard	
  not	
  to	
  mention	
  the	
  
recent	
  revival	
  of	
  the	
  trend	
  that	
  goes	
  under	
  the	
  name	
  of	
  HPS,	
  or	
  history	
  and	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science.	
  Since	
  both	
  
of	
  us	
  work	
  on	
  and	
  have	
  made	
  contributions	
  to	
  HPS,	
  we	
  have	
  chosen	
  it	
  as	
  our	
  first	
  paradigmatic	
  example	
  of	
  
future	
  directions	
  in	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science,	
  with	
  an	
  important	
  caveat.	
  Once	
  more,	
  the	
  following	
  reflections	
  on	
  
the	
  status	
  of	
  HPS	
  and	
  its	
  future	
  are	
  just	
  personal	
  considerations	
  from	
  the	
  point	
  of	
  view	
  of	
  our	
  own	
  work	
  in	
  
the	
  field.	
  They	
  are	
  not	
  intended	
  to	
  be	
  reflections	
  about	
  BJPS	
  publishing	
  policy	
  or	
  editorial	
  directions.1	
  

Caveat	
   aside,	
   there	
   is	
   no	
   doubt	
   that	
   recent	
   times	
   have	
   witnessed	
   a	
   very	
   productive	
   and	
   renewed	
  
interaction	
  between	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science	
  and	
  history	
  of	
  science.	
  Far	
  from	
  being	
  a	
  remnant	
  of	
  foregone	
  
times,	
   when	
   the	
   likes	
   of	
   Popper,	
   Lakatos,	
   Kuhn,	
   and	
   Feyerabend	
   set	
   out	
   HPS	
   as	
   a	
   distinctive	
   discipline,	
  
contemporary	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science	
  has	
  explored	
  promising	
  new	
  ways	
  of	
  drawing	
  on	
  the	
  history	
  of	
  science	
  
to	
  illuminate	
  both	
  old	
  and	
  new	
  philosophical	
  problems.	
  	
  Be	
  it	
  foundational	
  issues	
  about	
  	
  spacetime	
  	
  theories	
  	
  
(see,	
  e.g.,	
  Norton	
  1985,	
  2000,	
  2008;	
  and	
  Howard	
  1985,	
  2010)	
  or	
  the	
  science	
  of	
  measurement	
  or	
  metrology	
  
(Chang	
  2004;	
  Tal	
  2011;	
  Teller	
  2013);	
  be	
  it	
  realism	
  and	
  anti-­‐realism	
  about	
  science	
  (Giere	
  2006;	
  Stanford	
  2006;	
  
van	
   Fraassen	
   2008),	
   or	
   the	
   nature	
   of	
   scientific	
   theories	
   and	
   models	
   (Morrison	
   2000);	
   be	
   it	
   biological	
  
complexity	
   (Mitchell	
   2009)	
   or	
   the	
   evolution	
   of	
   physical	
   concepts	
   (Arabatzis	
   2006),	
   the	
   many	
   faces	
   of	
  
contemporary	
   HPS	
   show	
   how	
   thriving	
   the	
   field	
   is.	
   A	
   new	
   national	
   and	
   international	
   movement,	
   called	
  
Integrated	
  HPS,	
  to	
  which	
  both	
  of	
  us	
  have	
  actively	
  contributed	
  since	
   its	
  foundation	
  back	
   in	
  2006,	
  provide	
  
annual	
  national	
  and	
  biennial	
  international	
  gatherings	
  where	
  the	
  state	
  of	
  the	
  art	
  in	
  the	
  field	
  is	
  presented.	
  The	
  
programmatic	
   manifesto	
   recommends	
   more	
   than	
   just	
   the	
   Lakatosian	
   dictum	
   of	
   a	
   historically	
   informed	
  
philosophy	
  of	
  science	
  on	
  pain	
  of	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science	
  being	
  empty.	
  Good	
  HPS	
  is	
  not	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science	
  
with	
  interspersed	
  case	
  studies.	
  Instead,	
  it	
  is	
  both	
  good	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science	
  and	
  good	
  history	
  of	
  science.	
  It	
  is	
  
philosophy	
   of	
   science	
   that	
   brings	
   history	
   of	
   science	
   to	
   the	
   fore	
   and	
   genuinely	
   draws	
   on	
   it,	
   without	
   any	
  
preconceived	
  philosophical	
  agenda.	
  

In	
  some	
  philosophical	
  quarters,	
  noses	
  turn	
  up	
  at	
  the	
   idea	
  of	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science	
  drawing	
  on	
  the	
  
history	
  of	
  science.	
  For	
  surely	
  the	
  normative	
  role	
  of	
  philosophy	
  would,	
  appear	
  to	
  some	
  to	
  be	
  impoverished	
  by	
  
renewed	
  attention	
  to	
  the	
  history	
  of	
  science.	
  Prejudices	
  aside,	
  two	
  challenges	
  stand	
  on	
  the	
  way	
  of	
  HPS	
  as	
  a	
  
promising	
  direction	
  of	
  research:	
  

	
  
I.	
  Disciplinary	
  enclaving:	
  we	
  are	
  using	
  a	
  strong	
  word	
  here	
  to	
  convey	
  the	
  perceived	
  uneasiness	
  felt	
  in	
  

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1	
  BJPS	
  publishes	
  first-­‐rate	
  articles	
  in	
  HPS,	
  among	
  many	
  other	
  areas,	
  although	
  HPS	
  does	
  not	
  constitute	
  the	
  distinctive	
  
remit	
  of	
  the	
  journal,	
  by	
  contrast	
  with	
  Studies	
  in	
  History	
  and	
  Philosophy	
  of	
  Science	
  (A,	
  B,	
  and	
  C),	
  among	
  other	
  journals.	
  



	
  

some	
  HPS	
  quarters	
  of	
  working	
  in	
  isolation	
  from	
  the	
  broader	
  philosophy	
  community,	
  as	
  testified	
  by	
  the	
  
low	
  presence	
  of	
  HPS	
  papers	
  at	
  the	
  meetings	
  of	
  several	
  main	
  philosophical	
  societies,	
  for	
  example.	
  What	
  
good	
  is	
  HPS	
  to	
  philosophy,	
  in	
  general?	
  

	
  
II.	
  Naturalism,	
  or	
  when	
  a	
  virtue	
  may	
  become	
  a	
  vice:	
  that	
  philosophical	
  inquiry	
  should	
  be	
  continuous	
  
with	
  science	
  is	
  a	
  hard-­‐to-­‐resist	
  tenet	
  after	
  Quine.	
  That	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science	
  should	
  engage	
  with	
  the	
  
details	
  of	
  actual	
  scientific	
  practice	
  is	
  also	
  a	
  sine	
  qua	
  non	
  of	
  any	
  credible	
  inquiry	
  into	
  science	
  and	
  its	
  
modes	
  of	
  inquiry.	
  But	
  how	
  to	
  walk	
  the	
  thin	
  line	
  between	
  philosophy	
  and	
  the	
  sciences?	
  
	
  

The	
  two	
  challenges	
  seem	
  to	
  be	
  pulling	
  HPS	
  in	
  opposite	
  directions.	
  Any	
  serious	
  attempt	
  to	
  bridge	
  the	
  gap	
  with	
  
philosophy	
  seems	
  prima	
  facie	
  to	
  force	
  HPS	
  away	
  from	
  its	
  naturalistic	
  leanings;	
  as	
  much	
  as	
  following	
  those	
  
leanings	
  risks	
  transforming	
  HPS	
  into	
  a	
  series	
  of	
  scientific	
  case	
  studies.	
  In	
  what	
  follows,	
  we	
  selectively	
  look	
  at	
  
a	
  possible	
  (by	
  no	
  means	
  exclusive)	
  way	
  of	
  addressing	
  these	
  two	
  challenges	
  in	
  contemporary	
  HPS,	
  namely,	
  
“dynamic	
  Kantianism.”	
  

	
  
How	
  to	
  Bridge	
  the	
  Gap	
  Between	
  HPS	
  and	
  Philosophy:	
  The	
  “Back	
  to	
  Kant”	
  Recipe	
  

	
  
There	
  is	
  something	
  prima	
  facie	
  surprising	
  about	
  the	
  recent	
  revival	
  of	
  Kantianism	
  in	
  HPS.	
  	
  For	
  surely	
  nothing	
  
would	
   seem	
   more	
   remote	
   from	
   contemporary	
   scientific	
   practice	
   than	
   Kant’s	
   outmoded	
   view	
   of	
   natural	
  
science.	
  Why	
  hark	
  back	
  to	
  Kant	
  and	
  neo-­‐Kantianism	
  in	
  our	
  post-­‐	
  Euclidean	
  and	
  post-­‐Newtonian	
  world?	
  (See	
  
Wilson	
   2010.)	
   How	
   could	
   Kant’s	
   philosophy	
   ever	
   illuminate	
   the	
   nature	
   of	
   contemporary	
   physics	
   without	
  
mentioning	
  biology	
  or	
  cognitive	
  sciences?	
  The	
  ideas	
  of	
  apodeictic	
  certainty	
  and	
  necessity,	
  which	
  formed	
  the	
  
bedrock	
  of	
  Kant’s	
  program,	
  were	
  long	
  ago	
  discarded.	
  

Yet	
  there	
  is	
  some	
  profound	
  insight	
  in	
  the	
  Kantian	
  tradition	
  that	
  con-­‐	
  temporary	
  HPS	
  can	
  still	
  draw	
  on.	
  
And	
   this	
   is	
   the	
   idea	
   that	
   the	
   problem	
   of	
   knowledge,	
   of	
   how	
   we	
   come	
   to	
   know	
   what	
   we	
   do,	
   should	
   be	
  
addressed	
  by	
   looking	
  at	
  the	
  natural	
  sciences	
  and	
  at	
  the	
  specific	
  ways	
   in	
  which	
  knowledge	
  of	
  the	
  natural	
  
world	
  is	
  gained	
  in	
  the	
  first	
  instance.	
  Two	
  centuries	
  after	
  Kant	
  in	
  the	
  Prolegomena	
  raised	
  the	
  question	
  “How	
  is	
  
natural	
  science	
  possible?”	
  contemporary	
  HPS	
  scholars	
  find	
  themselves	
  asking	
  similar	
  questions.	
  How	
  is	
   it	
  
possible	
   for	
   us	
   to	
   have	
   the	
   experience	
   of	
   nature	
   delivered	
   by	
   contemporary	
   science?	
   How	
   has	
   our	
  
experience	
  of	
  nature	
  changed	
  over	
  time	
  and	
  across	
  scientific	
  revolutions,	
  with	
  the	
  advent	
  of,	
  say,	
  relativity	
  
theory	
   and	
   quantum	
   mechanics?	
   Most	
   important	
   of	
   all,	
   in	
   our	
   post-­‐Kuhnian	
   world,	
   how	
   could	
   these	
  
transitions	
   occur?	
   Following	
   the	
   well-­‐trodden	
   path	
   of	
   neo-­‐Kantianism	
   at	
   the	
   turn	
   of	
   the	
   last	
   century,	
  
contemporary	
   HPS	
   scholars	
   can	
   pursue	
   these	
   questions	
   with	
   an	
   eye	
   both	
   towards	
   the	
   broader	
  
epistemological	
  framework	
  within	
  which	
  they	
  arise	
  and	
  towards	
  history	
  of	
  science	
  and	
  history	
  of	
  philosophy	
  
of	
  science.	
  

HPS	
  inquiry,	
  then,	
  does	
  not	
  reduce	
  to	
  a	
  mere	
  investigation	
  into	
  the	
  methodology	
  of	
  science.	
  But	
  it	
  
becomes	
  continuous	
  with	
  epistemology,	
  or	
  with	
  what	
  the	
  Marburg	
  School	
  called	
  Erkenntnistheorie,	
  while	
  
also	
  fruitfully	
  drawing	
  on	
  the	
  rich	
  and	
  complex	
  details	
  of	
  scientific	
  history.	
  In	
  the	
  past	
  two	
  decades,	
  Michael	
  
Friedman	
  (1992,	
  1999,	
  2001,	
  2010)	
  has	
  shed	
  new	
  light	
  on	
  the	
  importance	
  of	
  this	
  philosophical	
  tradition	
  for	
  
contemporary	
   HPS,	
   and	
   beautifully	
   exemplified	
   (in	
   our	
   view)	
   a	
   possible	
   way	
   in	
   which	
   HPS	
   can	
   avoid	
   the	
  
aforementioned	
  disciplinary	
  enclaving.	
  “Dynamic	
  Kantianism,”	
  as	
  Friedman	
  brands	
  his	
  view,	
  shows	
  the	
  good	
  
that	
  comes	
  from	
  embedding	
  the	
  practice	
  of	
  history	
  and	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science	
  within	
  epistemology	
  (broadly	
  
construed).	
  And	
  it	
  has	
  opened	
  up	
  promising	
  new	
  avenues	
  of	
  research,	
  both	
  for	
  a	
  serious	
  re-­‐appraisal	
  of	
  the	
  
historical	
  and	
  philosophical	
  foundations	
  of	
  physics	
  (see,	
  e.g.,	
  Ryckman	
  2005,	
  2012)	
  and	
  for	
  the	
  vast	
  area	
  that	
  
goes	
  under	
  the	
  name	
  of	
  history	
  of	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science	
  (HOPOS),	
  whereby	
  the	
  history	
  of	
  the	
  discipline	
  can	
  



	
  

provide	
  precious	
  insights	
  into	
  the	
  epistemological	
  foundations	
  of	
  HPS	
  (regardless	
  of	
  whether	
  one	
  embraces	
  
dynamic	
  Kantianism;	
  see,	
  e.g.,	
  Richardson	
  1998,	
  2002).	
  

	
  
How	
  to	
  Walk	
  the	
  Thin	
  Line	
  Between	
  Philosophy	
  and	
  Science:	
  The	
  “Back	
  to	
  Kant”	
  Recipe,	
  Again	
  

	
  
But,	
   one	
   may	
   wonder,	
   how	
   can	
   Kantianism	
   help	
   with	
   the	
   challenge	
   of	
   naturalism	
   mentioned	
   above?	
   If	
  
anything,	
  the	
  naturalistic	
  trend	
  in	
  the	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science	
  of	
  the	
  past	
  fifty	
  years	
  originated	
  as	
  a	
  reaction	
  to	
  
Kantianism.	
  Quine’s	
  naturalism	
  was	
  the	
  last	
  straw	
  that	
  put	
  to	
  an	
  end	
  any	
  attempt	
  	
  to	
  defend	
  not	
  only	
  Kant’s	
  
distinction	
   	
  between	
  analytic	
  and	
  synthetic	
  knowledge	
  but	
  also	
  Carnap’s	
  Aufbau	
   (rooted	
  as	
   it	
  was	
   in	
  the	
  
Kantian	
   tradition;	
   see	
   Friedman	
   1999).	
   At	
   the	
   same	
   time,	
   Thomas	
   Kuhn’s	
   (1962)	
   new	
   agenda	
   for	
   HPS	
  
cemented	
  what	
  Kitcher	
  (1992)	
  has	
  poignantly	
  portrayed	
  as	
  a	
  form	
  of	
  “radical	
  naturalism,”	
  which	
  was	
  bound	
  
to	
   make	
   philosophy	
   of	
   science	
   a	
   chapter	
   of	
   history	
   of	
   science,	
   or,	
   after	
   Kuhn,	
   a	
   chapter	
   of	
   sociology	
   of	
  
science	
  or	
  science	
  studies.	
  By	
  reacting	
  to	
  the	
  logical	
  empiricist	
  tradition	
  that	
  he	
  saw	
  still	
  exemplified	
  by	
  Carl	
  
Gustav	
  Hempel,	
  Kuhn	
  rediscovered	
  the	
  central	
  role	
  that	
  history	
  of	
  science	
  plays	
  for	
  philosophical	
  questions	
  
about	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  scientific	
  revolutions	
  and	
  the	
  nature	
  of	
  theory-­‐choice.	
  

The	
  healthy	
  naturalistic	
  trend	
  of	
  the	
  past	
  half	
  century	
  enjoins	
  philosophers	
  of	
  science	
  to	
  dig	
  into	
  the	
  
details	
  of	
  actual	
  scientific	
  practice	
  as	
  much	
  as	
  it	
  enjoins	
  HPS	
  scholars	
  to	
  plunge	
  into	
  the	
  details	
  of	
  scientific	
  
history.	
  We	
  witness	
  this	
  healthy	
  naturalistic	
  trend	
  in	
  the	
  BJPS	
  publishing	
  tradition,	
  where	
  first-­‐rate	
  work	
  in	
  
contemporary	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science	
  comes	
  from	
  a	
  serious	
  engagement	
  with	
  scientific	
  practice.	
  New	
  exciting	
  
research	
   on	
   neuroimaging	
   being	
   used	
   to	
   illuminate	
   old	
   philosophical	
   questions	
   about	
   theories	
   of	
   mind;	
  
detailed	
   analyses	
   of	
   modelling	
   practices	
   bearing	
   on	
   pressing	
   questions	
   about	
   climate	
   change;	
   population	
  
genetics	
  models	
  questioning	
  perennial	
  issues	
  about	
  the	
  nature	
  of	
  selection:	
  these	
  are	
  just	
  three	
  examples	
  of	
  
how	
  contemporary	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science	
  has	
  flourished	
  under	
  the	
  naturalistic	
  trend.	
  In	
  the	
  HPS	
  tradition,	
  
the	
  naturalistic	
  trend	
  is	
  in	
  turn	
  reflected	
  in	
  a	
  serious	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  sciences	
  of	
  the	
  past;	
  and	
  not	
  just	
  
with	
   textual	
   evidence	
   but	
   also	
   with	
   past	
   experimental	
   traditions	
   and	
   the	
   conceptual	
   resources	
   made	
  
available	
  by	
  them,	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  understand	
  what	
  images	
  of	
  nature	
  were	
  in	
  fact	
  accessible	
  to	
  the	
  scientists	
  of	
  
the	
  past.	
  

The	
  worry—as	
  always—is	
  how	
  to	
  walk	
  the	
  thin	
  line	
  that	
  separates	
  philosophy	
  from	
  science	
  (past	
  and	
  
present).	
  Or	
  better,	
  how	
  to	
  draw	
  from	
  the	
  (past	
  and	
  present)	
  sciences	
  in	
  a	
  philosophically	
  compelling	
  way,	
  
rather	
  than	
  leaving	
  the	
  sciences	
  to	
  speak	
  for	
  themselves,	
  as	
  it	
  were.	
  This	
  is	
  not	
  the	
  place	
  to	
  rehearse	
  the	
  old	
  
dispute	
  whether	
  philosophy	
  (in	
  this	
  case,	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science)	
  should	
  or	
  should	
  not	
  have	
  a	
  normative	
  role.	
  
Instead,	
  what	
  is	
  at	
  stake	
  is	
  the	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  fruitful	
  interaction	
  between	
  science,	
  on	
  the	
  one	
  hand,	
  and	
  both	
  
philosophy	
   of	
   science	
   and	
   HPS,	
   on	
   the	
   other	
   hand,	
   as	
   a	
   two-­‐way	
   (rather	
   than	
   one-­‐way)	
   street.	
   Scientific	
  
practice	
  (past	
  or	
  present)	
  should	
  inform	
  philosophical	
  inquiry,	
  as	
  much	
  as	
  the	
  latter	
  can	
  and	
  should	
  throw	
  
light	
  on	
  the	
  former	
  via	
  its	
  own	
  rules	
  and	
  investigative	
  methods.	
  

The	
   “back	
   to	
   Kant”	
   recipe,	
   once	
   again,	
   may	
   help	
   here.	
   Kant’s	
   philosophy	
   of	
   natural	
   science	
   was	
  
informed	
  by	
  the	
  sciences	
  of	
  his	
  time,	
  as	
  much	
  as	
  it	
  was	
  meant	
  to	
  illuminate	
  their	
  foundations	
  by	
  its	
  own	
  
philosophical	
  lights.	
  Dynamic	
  Kantianism	
  no	
  longer	
  invokes	
  a	
  priori	
  categories	
  of	
  the	
  understanding	
  or	
  pure	
  
forms	
  of	
  intuitions,	
  it	
  instead	
  takes	
  the	
  lead	
  from	
  logical	
  empiricism	
  (especially	
  Carnap	
  and	
  Reichenbach)	
  to	
  
provide	
   a	
   new	
   spin	
   on	
   Kant’s	
   old	
   notion	
   of	
   “constitutive	
   a	
   priori,”	
   as	
   it	
   may	
   still	
   be	
   applicable	
   to	
  
contemporary	
  physics	
  with	
  all	
  due	
  provisos	
  (see	
  Friedman	
  2001	
  and	
  2010).	
  Friedman’s	
  notion	
  of	
  “relativized	
  
constitutive	
  a	
  priori”	
  is	
  at	
  the	
  centre	
  of	
  an	
  ongoing	
  debate,	
  as	
  many	
  HPS	
  scholars	
  would	
  firmly	
  resist	
  both	
  its	
  
Kantian	
   spirit	
   and	
   its	
   applicability	
   to	
   modern	
   physics.	
   But	
   in	
   our	
   view,	
   the	
   merit	
   of	
   this	
   trend	
   consists	
   in	
  
having	
  shed	
  new	
  light	
  on	
  the	
  role	
  of	
  our	
  scientific	
  history	
  both	
  for	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science	
  and,	
  more	
  broadly,	
  
for	
  epistemology.	
  Within	
  this	
  tradition,	
  Newton	
  and	
  Einstein	
  become	
  philosophical	
  figures	
  in	
  their	
  own	
  right,	
  



	
  

whose	
  scientific	
  work	
  integrates	
  into	
  and	
  illuminates	
  the	
  very	
  epistemological	
  foundations	
  of	
  science.	
  This	
  is	
  
just	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  many	
  ways	
  (and	
  obviously	
  not	
  an	
  exclusive	
  one)	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  challenge	
  of	
  naturalism	
  can	
  be	
  
satisfactorily	
  met.	
  It	
  certainly	
  does	
  so	
  with	
  an	
  eye	
  towards	
  philosophy,	
  more	
  in	
  general;	
  accordingly,	
  it	
  is	
  an	
  
enticing	
  way	
  of	
  addressing	
  both	
  aforementioned	
  challenges.	
  

If	
  the	
  aforementioned	
  interaction	
  between	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science,	
  epistemology,	
  and	
  history	
  of	
  science	
  
constitutes	
   in	
   our	
   view	
   a	
   promising	
   frontier	
   in	
   the	
   field,	
   another	
   prominent	
   one	
   is	
   characterized	
   by	
   the	
  
interaction	
  between	
  science,	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science,	
  and	
  metaphysics.	
  There	
  is	
  now	
  a	
  growing	
  appreciation	
  
that	
  the	
  often	
  fraught	
  relationship	
  with	
  contemporary	
  metaphysics	
  might	
  be	
   improved,	
  to	
  the	
  benefit	
  of	
  
both	
  metaphysicians	
  and	
  philosophers	
  of	
  science.	
  It	
  is	
  to	
  this	
  renewed	
  interest	
  in	
  the	
  metaphysics	
  of	
  science	
  
that	
  we	
  turn	
  next.	
  

	
  
Building	
  Bridges	
  Between	
  Metaphysics	
  and	
  Philosophy	
  of	
  Science	
  

	
  
From	
  the	
  perspective	
  of	
  the	
  history	
  of	
  the	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science	
  over	
  the	
  past	
  one	
  hundred	
  years	
  or	
  so,	
  the	
  
relationship	
  with	
  metaphysics	
  has	
  been	
  at	
  best	
  an	
  uneasy	
  one.	
  Dismissed	
  by	
  the	
  positivists	
  as	
  sterile	
  and	
  
useless,	
  and	
  more	
  recently	
  as	
  a	
  dead	
  intellectual	
  pursuit,	
  metaphysics	
  has	
  been	
  further	
  excoriated	
  as	
  reliant	
  
on	
  simplistic	
  intuitions	
  or,	
  at	
  best,	
  school	
  yard	
  science	
  (Ladyman	
  and	
  Ross	
  2007).	
  Nevertheless,	
  that	
  it	
  should	
  
be	
   perceived	
   as	
   having	
   drifted	
   so	
   far	
   from	
   any	
   mooring	
   in	
   physics	
   is	
   surprising,	
   first,	
   given	
   the	
   way	
   its	
  
heroes—here	
  the	
  likes	
  of	
  Putnam	
  and	
  Quine	
  in	
  particular	
  come	
  to	
  mind—drew	
  on	
  the	
  physics	
  of	
  the	
  day,	
  
secondly,	
  given	
  the	
  way	
  in	
  which	
  today’s	
  practitioners	
  model	
  their	
  meta-­‐metaphysical	
  moves	
  on	
  what	
  they	
  
see	
   as	
   the	
   methodology	
   of	
   the	
   sciences—appealing	
   to	
   simplicity,	
   explanatory	
   power,	
   and	
   the	
   like—and	
  
thirdly,	
   and	
   perhaps	
   most	
   significantly,	
   given	
   the	
   widely	
   held	
   commitment	
   to	
   some	
   form	
   of	
   physicalism.	
  
Perhaps	
  the	
  answer	
  lies	
  in	
  the	
  move	
  to	
  the	
  modal,	
  so	
  characteristic	
  of	
  modern	
  metaphysics,	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  
which	
  the	
   latter	
   is	
  now	
  seen	
  as	
  primarily	
  concerned	
  with	
  the	
  possible,	
  rather	
  than	
  the	
  actual	
  (Callender,	
  
2011).	
  Given	
  the	
  size	
  of	
  possibility	
  space	
  and	
  the	
  fact	
  that	
  actuality	
  occupies	
  such	
  a	
  small	
  fragment	
  of	
  it,	
  is	
  it	
  
any	
  wonder—this	
  line	
  of	
  speculation	
  goes—that	
  metaphysicians	
  would	
  prefer	
  to	
  roam	
  the	
  vast	
  reaches	
  of	
  
the	
  former	
  rather	
  than	
  get	
  to	
  grips	
  with	
  the	
  grubby	
  intricacies	
  of	
  the	
  latter?	
  

Of	
   course,	
   if	
   the	
   limits	
   of	
   possibility	
   are	
   delineated	
   by	
   what	
   is	
   conceivable,	
   the	
   actual	
   may	
   appear	
  
dwarfed	
   by	
   all	
   the	
   possibilities.	
   Conceivability	
   figures	
   prominently	
   in	
   philosophical	
   discussions	
   of	
   the	
  
epistemology	
   of	
   modality	
   (for	
   a	
   useful	
   introduction	
   see	
   http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-­‐
epistemology/).	
  Broadly	
  speaking,	
  success	
  in	
  conceiving	
  of	
  some	
  claim,	
  concept,	
  or,	
  indeed,	
  world	
  is	
  taken	
  to	
  
support	
  (or	
  even	
  entail)	
  that	
  the	
  claim,	
  concept,	
  or	
  world	
  is	
  possible.	
  The	
  nature	
  of	
  conceiving,	
  whether	
  it	
  is	
  
equivalent	
   to	
   imagining	
   or	
   goes	
   beyond	
   imagining,	
   the	
   extent	
   to	
   which	
   it	
   involves	
   construction	
   and	
   the	
  
nature	
  of	
  such	
  construction	
  loom	
  large	
  in	
  these	
  discussions.	
  In	
  particular,	
  if	
  conceivability	
  is	
  strongly	
  tied	
  to	
  
imaginability,	
  then	
  one	
  might	
  demand	
  general	
  conditions	
  governing	
  the	
  latter,	
  such	
  that	
  imagining	
  a	
  world	
  
or	
  situation	
  is	
  sufficient	
  to	
  provide	
  evidence	
  for	
  the	
  possibility	
  of	
  such	
  a	
  situation.	
  In	
  the	
  absence	
  of	
  such	
  
conditions,	
  one	
  should	
  at	
  least	
  acknowledge	
  that	
  conceivability	
  is	
  defeasible,	
  in	
  the	
  sense	
  that	
  one	
  may	
  not	
  
be	
   aware	
   of	
   some	
   consideration	
   that	
   undermines	
   the	
   relevant	
   evidential	
   link	
   (Yablo	
   1993).	
   Black’s	
   two-­‐
sphere	
  counterexample	
  to	
  the	
  Identity	
  of	
  Indiscernibles	
  appears	
  to	
  fit	
  this	
  model	
  quite	
  nicely,	
  as	
  Hacking	
  
(1975)	
  effectively	
  drew	
  on	
  considerations	
  from	
  physics	
  (specifically	
  General	
  Relativity)	
  to	
  show	
  that	
   what	
  
Black	
  had	
  conceived	
  was	
  not	
  sufficiently	
  fine-­‐grained	
  to	
  serve	
  as	
  a	
  relevant	
  possibility.	
  

Of	
  course,	
  even	
   if	
  no	
  such	
  consideration	
   is	
   immediately	
  apparent,	
   it	
  may	
  still	
  be	
  “out	
  there,”	
  as	
   it	
  
were,	
  and	
  hence	
  one	
  might	
   insist	
  that	
  all	
  but	
  the	
  most	
  simple	
  conceptions	
  should	
  be	
  held	
  as	
  potentially	
  
defeasible.	
   One	
   can	
   even	
   imagine,	
   or	
   conceive	
   of	
   (!),	
   a	
   kind	
   of	
   spectrum,	
   beginning	
   with	
   prima	
   facie	
  
conceivability,	
   in	
  which	
  one	
  simply	
  conceives	
  of	
  or	
  imagines	
  a	
  situation	
  without	
  thinking	
  further	
  about	
  it,	
  



	
  

moving	
  into	
  better	
  thought	
  out	
  conceivability,	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  relevant	
  situation	
  becomes	
  more	
  fine-­‐	
  grained,	
  
and,	
  perhaps,	
  the	
  evidential	
  connection	
  decreases	
   in	
  defeasibility,	
  until	
  one	
  comes	
  to	
  some	
  form	
  of	
  fully	
  
constrained	
   conceivability,	
   where	
   no	
   further	
   fine-­‐graining	
   is	
   possible,	
   and	
   the	
   link	
   to	
   possibility	
   is	
  
indefeasible	
  because	
  the	
  possible	
  world	
  is	
  constrained	
  by	
  the	
  relevant	
  physics.	
  

Many,	
   perhaps	
   most,	
   metaphysicians	
   are	
   still	
   hanging	
   out	
   at	
   the	
   far	
   end	
   of	
   the	
   spectrum,	
   where	
  
conceivability	
  is,	
  if	
  not	
  unconstrained,	
  then	
  limited	
  only	
  by	
  intuition	
  or	
  broad	
  metaphysical	
  principles.	
  But	
  
attitudes	
  appear	
  to	
  be	
  shifting.	
  In	
  recent	
  years	
  there	
  have	
  been	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  conferences	
  and	
  workshops	
  
bringing	
  together	
  philosophers	
  of	
  science,	
  scientists,	
  and	
  metaphysicians	
  and	
  resulting	
  in	
  associated	
  special	
  
issues	
  and	
  collections.	
  More	
  metaphysicians	
  are	
  beginning	
  to	
  engage	
  seriously	
  with	
  physics,	
  whether	
  via	
  a	
  
consideration	
  of	
  the	
  implications	
  of	
  relativity	
  theory	
  for	
  issues	
  of	
  persistence	
  or	
  via	
  the	
  incorporation	
  of	
  non-­‐
supervenient	
   quantum	
   relations	
   in	
   bundle	
   theoretic	
   accounts	
   of	
   objects.	
   Here,	
   then,	
   there	
   are	
   welcome	
  
signs	
  of	
  new	
  bridges	
  being	
  built	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  old	
  connections	
  being	
  used	
  in	
  new	
  ways.	
  

But	
  more	
  than	
  this,	
  there	
  is	
  growing	
  awareness	
  that	
  in	
  their	
  exploration	
  of	
  the	
  space	
  of	
  possibilities	
  
metaphysicians	
  have	
  developed	
  various	
  sets	
  of	
  tools	
  that	
  might	
  then	
  be	
  appropriated	
  and	
  usefully	
  employed	
  
by	
  philosophers	
  of	
  science	
  (French	
  and	
  McKenzie	
  2012).	
  These	
  include	
  not	
  only	
  comparatively	
  well-­‐known	
  
concepts	
  such	
  as	
  supervenience	
  and	
  dependence	
  but	
  also	
  general	
  strategies,	
  manoeuvres,	
  or	
  metaphysical	
  
moves	
  in	
  general.	
  Thus,	
  Teller	
   long	
  ago	
  appropriated	
  the	
  concept	
  of	
  supervenience	
  for	
  the	
  philosophy	
  of	
  
science	
   and	
   employed	
   it	
   to	
   articulate	
   a	
   view	
   of	
   quantum	
   entanglement	
   as	
   involving	
   non-­‐supervenient	
  
relations	
  (Teller	
  1986).	
  Notions	
  of	
  dependence	
  of	
  course	
  feature	
  prominently	
  in	
  discussion	
  of	
  causation	
  but	
  
have	
  recently	
  been	
  applied	
  to	
  consideration	
  of	
  the	
  relationship	
  between	
  numbers,	
  say,	
  and	
  mathematical	
  
structures	
   (Linnebo	
   2008)	
   or	
   between	
   elementary	
   particles	
   and	
   the	
   symmetries	
   of	
   the	
   Standard	
   Model	
  
(McKenzie	
  forthcoming).	
  Moving	
  to	
  the	
  more	
  general	
  level	
  of	
  argumentative	
  strategies	
  and	
  manoeuvres,	
  it	
  is	
  
interesting	
   to	
   consider	
   how	
   eliminativism	
   in	
   physics,	
   for	
   example,	
   might	
   be	
   supported	
   by	
   the	
   moves	
  
deployed	
  by	
  metaphysical	
  monists	
  and	
  nihilists	
  elsewhere.	
  Thus	
  Horgan	
  and	
  Potrč	
  (2008)	
  have	
  defended	
  a	
  
monistic	
   ontology—there	
   is	
   only	
   one	
   thing,	
   called	
   (with	
   tongue	
   in	
   cheek)	
   “the	
   blob”—by	
   invoking	
   a	
  
distinction	
  between	
  truth	
  as	
  direct	
  and	
  as	
  indirect	
  correspondence,	
  with	
  the	
  latter	
  articulated	
  in	
  terms	
  of	
  
contextually	
  understood	
  semantic	
  standards.	
  Cameron	
  (2008),	
  on	
  the	
  other	
  hand,	
  offers	
  an	
  alternative	
  form	
  
of	
   truth-­‐maker	
   theory,	
   in	
   which	
   the	
   truth	
   of	
   sentences	
   referring	
   to	
   putative	
   entities	
   is	
   grounded	
   in	
  
something	
  other	
  than	
  those	
  entities.	
  

So,	
   to	
   take	
   a	
   well-­‐known	
   example	
   from	
   the	
   history	
   of	
   science,	
   the	
   truth	
   of	
   statements	
   made	
   by	
  
Eddington	
   about	
   his	
   table	
   can,	
   on	
   Cameron’s	
   account,	
   be	
   grounded	
   in	
   the	
   relevant	
   elementary	
   particles	
  
“arranged	
   table-­‐wise.”	
   Now	
   the	
   sense	
   in	
   which	
   such	
   particles	
   can	
   be	
   regarded	
   as	
   the	
   metaphysicians’	
  
infamous	
   “simples,”	
   and	
   also	
   the	
   sense	
   in	
   which	
   we	
   are	
   supposed	
   to	
   understand	
   “arrangement”	
   in	
   this	
  
context,	
  remain	
  contentious,	
  and	
  here	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  need	
  for	
  further	
  to-­‐and-­‐fro	
  traffic	
  across	
  the	
  metaphysical	
  
bridge.	
  But	
  the	
  point	
   is	
  that	
  there	
  are	
  potentially	
  useful	
  sets	
  of	
  tools	
   in	
  the	
  metaphysicians’	
  toolbox	
  that	
  
philosophers	
  of	
  science	
  might	
  avail	
  themselves	
  of	
  and	
  deploy.	
  Of	
  course,	
  this	
  raises	
  further	
  issues,	
  such	
  as	
  
how	
  tools	
  developed	
  far	
  away	
  in	
  possibility	
  space,	
  as	
  it	
  were,	
  can	
  be	
  of	
  any	
  use	
  in	
  understanding	
  science	
  as	
  
developed	
   in	
   this,	
   the	
   actual,	
   world,	
   or	
   whether	
   the	
   use	
   of	
   such	
   tools	
   puts	
   the	
   philosophy	
   of	
   science	
   in	
  
tension	
   with	
   the	
   naturalistic	
   tendency	
   that	
   is	
   currently	
   prominent.	
   If,	
   however,	
   we	
   accept	
   that	
   the	
  
philosophy	
  of	
  science	
  has	
  to	
  achieve	
  an	
  appropriate	
  balance	
  between,	
  on	
  the	
  one	
  hand,	
  drawing	
  on	
  both	
  the	
  
practice	
  and	
  the	
  history	
  of	
  science,	
  as	
  indicated	
  above,	
  and,	
  on	
  the	
  other	
  hand,	
  articulating	
  an	
  account	
  or	
  
view	
  of	
  science	
  that	
  is	
  more	
  than	
  just	
  a	
  series	
  of	
  case	
  studies	
  and	
  that	
  involves	
  the	
  deployment	
  of	
  the	
  kinds	
  
of	
  tools	
  just	
  outlined,	
  then	
  these	
  issues	
  cannot	
  be	
  avoided.	
  

	
  
	
  



	
  

Conclusion	
  
	
  

As	
  we	
  indicated,	
  this	
  is	
  a	
  very	
  personal	
  view	
  of	
  potentially	
  fruitful	
  developments	
  in	
  two	
  selected	
  areas	
  of	
  
contemporary	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science.	
  As	
  well	
  as	
  exciting	
  new	
  work	
  in	
  the	
  philosophy	
  of	
  particular	
  sciences,	
  
especially	
  philosophy	
  of	
  the	
  bio-­‐medical	
  sciences	
  and	
  neurosciences,	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  standard	
  topics	
  still	
  have	
  
the	
   capacity	
   to	
   generate	
   interesting	
   lines	
   of	
   inquiry:	
   the	
   role	
   of	
   mathematics	
   in	
   science,	
   for	
   example,	
  
particularly	
   its	
   role	
   in	
   explanation;	
   decision	
   theory	
   and	
   reasoning	
   under	
   uncertainty	
   in	
   general;	
   and	
   the	
  
nature	
  of	
  scientific	
  representation,	
  where	
  useful	
  connections	
  have	
  been	
  drawn	
  with	
  the	
  philosophy	
  of	
  art,	
  
just	
  to	
  name	
  a	
  few.	
  Even	
  the	
  realism-­‐antirealism	
  debate,	
  which	
  for	
  some	
  may	
  appear	
  stagnant	
  as	
  the	
  various	
  
combatants	
  remain	
  locked	
  in	
  their	
  respective	
  positions,	
  shows	
  signs	
  of	
  renewed	
  vigour	
  as,	
  for	
  example,	
  the	
  
role	
   of	
   case	
   studies	
   in	
   propping	
   up	
   such	
   positions	
   is	
   re-­‐examined.	
   Some	
   years	
   ago	
   an	
   elder	
   statesman	
  
patiently	
  explained	
  to	
  one	
  of	
  us	
  that	
  the	
  philosophy	
  of	
  science	
  was	
  moribund	
  and	
  doomed	
  to	
  shrink	
  and	
  fade	
  
as	
  its	
  original	
  impetus	
  lost	
  steam.	
  In	
  fact,	
  the	
  field	
  seems	
  more	
  alive	
  with	
  ideas	
  and	
  exciting	
  developments	
  
than	
  ever,	
  as	
  it	
  engages	
  both	
  with	
  science	
  itself	
  and	
  with	
  philosophy	
  more	
  broadly.	
  As	
  editors,	
  we	
  are	
  proud	
  
to	
  be	
  a	
  part	
  of	
  this	
  venerable	
  tradition	
  that	
  has	
  published,	
  and	
  will	
  continue	
  to	
  publish,	
  the	
  very	
  best	
  results	
  
of	
  these	
  developments	
  in	
  the	
  pages	
  of	
  the	
  BJPS.	
  
	
  
References	
  
	
  
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   T.	
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   Electrons:	
   A	
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University	
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  Press.	
  
BJPS.	
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