Perspectivism in current epigenetics


https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-020-00302-z

PAPER IN GENERAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Perspectivism in current epigenetics

Karim Bschir1

Received: 21 October 2019 / Accepted: 2 March 2020
© The Author(s) 2020

Abstract
Discussions about perspectivism in the current philosophical literature often focus on
questions concerning perspectival modeling or the compatibility between perspec-
tivism and realism. In this paper, I propose to extend the debate on perspectivism
by taking into account the social dimension of scientific perspectives. Scientific per-
spectives are always adopted and advocated for by individual scientists and groups of
scientists with different epistemic affinities. I describe an example of a current and
ongoing controversy in the field of epigenetics in order to illustrate that diverging
scientific perspectives on open scientific questions are often not fully explained by
empirical underdetermination or diverging theoretical approaches alone. Opposing
perspectives frequently arise from differences in systems of practice and the scientific
socializations of the involved scientists, including differences in training, experimen-
tal skills, and epistemic priorities. The paper ends with a discussion of the important
epistemic function of perspectives in scientific discovery. Ultimately, perspectivism
is described as a valid philosophical position that explains how scientific knowledge
is generated in situations of empirical underdetermination and why trust in science
can be justified even in the absence of a community consensus.

Keywords Perspectivism · Epigenetics · Systems of practice · Disagreement

1 Introduction: from perspectival models to perspectival practices

The basic idea of perspectivism in the philosophy of science is to highlight the per-
spectival character of scientific knowledge. Another way to put it would be to say that
perspectivism is a philosophical position that views all scientific knowledge claims as
essentially contextual. Or to frame it negatively: perspectivism denies the existence

This article belongs to the Topical Collection: Perspectivism in science: metaphysical and
epistemological reflections
Guest Editor: Michela Massimi

� Karim Bschir
karim.bschir@unisg.ch

1 University of St. Gallen, St. Gallen, Switzerland

/ Published online: 2020September17

European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2020) 10: 41

http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s13194-020-00302-z&domain=pdf
mailto: karim.bschir@unisg.ch


of what Ernest Nagel famously called a “view from nowhere” that would provide a
neutral and objective standpoint from which diverging scientific knowledge claims
can be judged (Nagel 1986). The consequence of denying the existence of such an
objective standpoint is to say that all scientific knowledge, all scientific theories and
frameworks, provide perspectives on reality from within specific contexts. Michela
Massimi describes perspectivism as a “family of positions that in different ways place
emphasis on our scientific knowledge being situated” (Massimi 2018c, p. 164).

One may also try to capture the essence of scientific perspectivism by looking at
its predecessors in the philosophical tradition. Perspectivism has two main historical
origins: The first is Kant’s transcendental idealism and the second is pragmatism.
With pragmatism perspectivism shares the idea that science must be understood first
and foremost as a human activity and that scientific knowledge should be seen in
the first place as the product of such an activity. Hasok Chang recently provided an
excellent analysis of the pragmatist roots of current perspectivist positions (Chang
2020). With Kant’s philosophy perspectivism shares the emphasis on the active and
constructive contribution of the human mind in the making of phenomena and thus
in the production of empirical knowledge (Massimi 2018d).

In the recent literature, perspectivism has been proposed in different varieties for
example in the form of perspectival realism by Ron Giere, who draws on elements
in Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific change (Giere 2006; see also Giere 2013 and
Teller 2020) or in Bas van Fraassen’s perspectivist account of scientific representa-
tion (van Fraassen 2008). There is, however, no commonly accepted definition in the
current literature about what philosophical position the term “perspectivism” exactly
denotes (see Massimi and McCoy 2020, p. 2). Despite a missing universally accepted
definition of what it means to take a perspectivist position, one thing is hardly con-
troversial, namely that perspectivism in one way or the other implies some sort of
epistemic pluralism.

A more contested question concerns the compatibility of perspectivism with real-
ism (and hence also of perspectivist pluralism with realism). In fact, the relationship
to realism is one of the most discussed issues in the current philosophical literature
on perspectivism. The topic is often treated in the context of the so called problem
of inconsistent models (Morrison 2011). The problem arises in situations where sev-
eral inconsistent models provide approximately true, partial de re representations of
a given target system. Such models veridically represent certain essential properties
of the target system while being inconsistent with other models that veridically rep-
resent a different set of essential properties of the same target system (the example
discussed by Morrison (2011) is the family of different physical models of the atomic
nucleus such as the liquid drop model, the shell model or the quark model.) Attempts
to interpret such a situation in a realistic manner quickly lead to a dilemma. Either
one claims that while not all the models can be equally true at the same time, there
must be one single model that truthfully describes the target, whether it is in the cur-
rently available set of models or not; or one gives up the claim that scientific models
are veridical representations of physical systems altogether. Either way the problem
of inconsistent models poses a challenge to the realist.

Perspectivism is often brought forward as a way out of this conundrum. Recently,
Michela Massimi has proposed an account of perspectival modeling in order “to show

41 Page 2 of 18 European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2020) 10: 41



that perspectival modeling—suitably reinterpreted—can deliver on the quest for real-
ism without abdicating on pluralism” (Massimi 2018b, p. 338). Massimi’s account of
perspectival models has three main components. First, it reinforces the realist intu-
ition that models have sui generis representational content (i.e. they are “about” the
system under scrutiny). Second, the representational character of the models must
not be understood in terms of some mapping relation, as a widely held view about
model representation has it. And third, the relation between the various models and
the target system must be understood as a modal one, such that the primary func-
tion of the models is to help explore and understand what is possible and what is
impossible in the system. Ultimately, perspectival models are supposed to advance
our understanding of reality in the sense that they explore the possibilities of what
entities, structures, or processes might or might not exist within the system under
scrutiny. Massimi writes: “The realist quest can be vindicated when one considers
the indispensable role that such a plurality of perspectival models plays in advancing
our knowledge of what might be real (i.e., what kind of fundamental particles might
or might not exist” (Massimi 2018b, p. 338).

To be sure, the perspectivist approach to the problem of inconsistent models
does not stand uncontested and non-perspectivist alternatives have been proposed
(see e.g. Chakravartty 2010 or Saatsi 2020). While these are fruitful philosophi-
cal debates that highlight important aspects of scientific modelling, representation,
realism and the role of contextuality in science, they take away focus, as I will
argue in the following, from another crucial aspect of perspectivism, namely the
fact that perspectives are held and advocated for by individuals and groups of indi-
viduals with different epistemic affinities, background beliefs or scientific training.
Scientific perspectives are tightly linked to the actual human beings engaged in spe-
cific research activities who adopt those perspectives. That is to say that scientific
perspectives also have a social dimension attached to them and that philosophical
discussions about perspectivism should include an analysis of that social dimension.
While individual scientists may well be capable of adopting diverse perspectives and
not all perspectives are incompatible, scientific controversies that arise from conflict-
ing perspectives cannot be properly understood if one misses the social aspects of
scientific perspectives.

In the following I thus intend to shift the focus away from questions related to
perspectival modeling and the compatibility of perspectivism with realism towards
an analysis of scientific perspectives in a broader sense, a sense that includes the
social and practical aspects of scientific perspectives. This means a shift away from
a view of perspectivism in terms of perspectival models to an account of scientific
practices as perspectives. This is in line with Michela Massimi’s description of a sci-
entific perspective as “the actual—historically and intellectually situated—scientific
practice of a real scientific community at a given historical time”, which includes
“the experimental, theoretical, and technological resources available to the scientific
community at the time” (Massimi 2018a, p. 15). I suggest to call this the “practices
as perspectives” view.

My understanding of “practices” in this contexts is congruent with Hasok Chang’s
definition of a system of practice: “A system of practice is formed by a coherent
set of epistemic activities performed with a view to achieve certain aims” (Chang

Page 3 of 18 41European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2020) 10: 41



2012, p. 16). Chang also uses the term “systems of knowledge” interchangingly with
“systems of practice”. Chang’s definition is useful because it highlights two crucial
aspects of scientific practices: First, it captures scientific practices as activities that
are oriented towards specific practical or epistemic aims (note the whiff of pragma-
tism). As I will argue in more detail later, this is one of the most crucial advantages
of linking perspectives to practices. It helps to understand that scientists adopt certain
perspectives, because they are pursuing specific epistemic goals, and that differences
in perspectives are rooted in differences concerning the goals that are pursued by dif-
ferent groups of researchers. The second advantage of Chang’s definition is its focus
on epistemic practices. These include reports of experience, definitions of concepts,
adoption of enabling assumptions, and logical deductions (Chang 2012, p. 242). One
may also think of practices that are related to the collection and interpretation of
empirical evidence: experimental methods and methods of measurement, statistical
methods for data testing, and the interpretation of measurements and empirical find-
ings. In the most general sense, epistemic activities include virtually everything that
scientists do: describing, predicting, explaining, hypothesizing, testing, observing,
detecting, measuring, classifying, representing, modeling, simulating, synthesizing,
analyzing, abstracting, idealizing (Chang 2012, p. 16).

In order to highlight the necessity of linking perspectives with practices and of
developing an account of perspectival practices, I present in the following two sec-
tions a case study of a current and ongoing scientific controversy between two
opposing camps in the field of epigenetics – the mechanist camp on one side and the
phenomenologist camp on the other. The goal of the case study is to show that this
controversy can be understood and analyzed in terms of two rivaling scientific per-
spectives. Each of these perspectives is associated with different systems of practice
that include different epistemic activities and goals. A discussion of the benefits and
problems of a practice-centered account of perspectivism follows in Section 4.

Before I turn to the case study, let me also note the obvious fact that the purpose of
the present paper is more programmatic than it is systematic. It is not supposed to be a
contribution to the above mentioned discussion about perspectival modeling or about
the compatibility between perspectivism and realism. Nor do I intend to take sides in
the scientific controversy outlined below. The analysis at hand must be understood
as a plea for the inclusion of aspects of scientific practices and social epistemology
in current debates about perspectivism.

2 Varying perspectives in current epigenetics

The term “epigenetics” in the broad sense refers to the study of the influence of
environmental factors on biological heredity. Before the modern synthesis of evolu-
tionary theory in the early decades of the 20th century, the fact that environmental
factors acting on parents can have an influence on the phenotypes of their progeny
was a common theme in theories of heredity and evolution. “Heredity is only the
sum of all past environment.” This statement by the American Botanist Luther Bur-
bank from his 1906 book The training of the human plant (Burbank 1906) nicely
expresses this widely held view among biologists at the time. With the emergence

41 Page 4 of 18 European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2020) 10: 41



of Neo-Darwinism, however, the dogma shifted and it became commonly accepted
that acquired phenotypic changes cannot possibly affect genotypes and therefore are
not transmitted to later generations. The underlying principle behind this idea was
August Weismann’s theory of the germ plasm according to which somatic cells are
separated from germ cells and environmentally-induced changes in the somatic cells
would not be transferred to germ cells (Weismann 1892).

The term “epigenetics” was coined by the British embryologist Conrad Hal
Waddington in 1942 (Waddington 1942) in reference to Valentin Haecker’s “Pheno-
genetics” (Haecker 1918). However, it is important to note that Waddingtion used
the term to refer to the complex interaction between genotype and phenotype dur-
ing development and not for the heredity of acquired phenotypic traits. A common
definition coins epigenetics as “the study of mitotically and/or meiotically heritable
changes in gene function that cannot be explained by changes in DNA sequence”
(Riggs and Porter 1996). Several other definitions have been brought forward.1

For the purposes of this article, epigenetic inheritance will be understood as the
alteration of gene expression patterns across meiotic cell divisions and across gen-
erations without changes in DNA sequence. It is, however, important to distinguish
truly transgenerational epigenetic effects from merely intergenerational ones. Both
types of inheritance are epigenetic insofar as they refer to effects that are not DNA-
encoded. Intergenerational (also called parental) effects include only those types of
inheritance in which the developing embryo or its germline is exposed in utero to the
same environmental changes as the parent. Typically these are changes in nutritional
supply, hormonal effects, or environmental toxin exposure. Because such environ-
mental triggers can affect the embryo’s germline, their consequences can, under
special circumstances, also be observed in the next generation (i.e. the grandchil-
dren of the exposed parent). Intergenerational effects on grandchildren are therefore
always necessarily maternal. Only if also the grand-grandchildren (F3) exhibit the
acquired phenotypic trait, one may speak of a truly transgenerational epigenetic
effect, because only in this case, the trait acquired in the F0 parent has been transmit-
ted transgenerationally. If the male parent gets exposed to the environmental trigger
a truly transgenerational effect can occur already in the F2 generation, because there
is no possibility of the embryo being exposed and the trigger directly effects the
epigenome of the the father’s germline (see Fig. 1).

Several molecular mechanisms have been proposed for transgenerational epige-
netic inheritance. The most important are:

– DNA methylation and other chromatin-related mechanisms
– mRNA and protein feedback loops
– non-coding RNAs
– prions

DNA methylation describes the activation and deactivation of genes during develop-
ment through the alteration of the methylation state of selected DNA segments. DNA

1See e.g. Bird (2007) or Felsenfeld (2014); and Stotz and Griffiths (2016) for different meanings of
“epigenetics”. Baedke (2018 ,p. 7) describes “epigenetics” as a “cluster concept”.

Page 5 of 18 41European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2020) 10: 41



Fig. 1 Comparison between inter- and transgenerational epigenetic effects via the male or female line.
Reprinted from Heard and Martienssen (2014, p. 97) with permission from Elsevier

methylation together with histone modifications is one of the best studied mech-
anisms for transgenerational epigenetic inheritance. However, it remains unclear
how stable these modifications are during development and to what extent they are
species-specific. It has been suggested that mRNA and protein feedback loops can
also induce heritable states, but, again, the stability of the alteration of gene expres-
sion via such loops is a matter of ongoing investigation. Other promising candidates
for a molecular carrier of epigenetic information are small RNAs and long non-
coding RNAs that interfere in transcription and translation and are involved in DNA
and histone modification. More recently, the role of prions, i.e. proteins that act
as structural templates for other proteins, in epigenetic inheritance is increasingly
studied, in particular in fungi.

Talking about the potential mechanisms of epigenetic inheritance, one should not
forget to also mention confounding factors. As it is often the case in experimental

41 Page 6 of 18 European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2020) 10: 41



studies of molecular mechanisms, the study of epigenetic inheritance likewise
requires a careful examination of a variety of causal factors that could interfere with
the mechanism under scrutiny. In the case of epigenetic inheritance, these factors
include a phenomenon called germline reprogramming, whereby the DNA methy-
lations (among other DNA modifications) in parental gamets become removed and
reset during embryonic development.2 Understanding the reprogramming of the
parental epigenome during development is crucial if one is interested in the heredi-
tary stability of epigenetic states. Other confounding factors are parental behavioral
effects that can induce heritable changes in the progeny’s nervous system, such as
diet, exposure to chemicals due to behavioral patterns etc., or the transmission of
information across generations via the microbiome, which is also linked to behav-
ioral factors (Heard and Martienssen 2014, p. 99). It is important to note that
post-natal parental effects are sometimes treated not as confounding factors, but
as genuine intergenerational effects that are on the same level as in utero effects.
This merely shows the fluidity of the definitions involved in the study of epigenetic
inheritance.

Confounding factors render the study of the molecular mechanisms underlying
epigenetic inheritance an inherently difficult task. Isolating the causal factors that
are involved in the transmission of epigenetic information over several generations
in living organisms requires an extensive control of the experimental environment.
This makes epigenetics a challenging, but also highly attractive field of research. But
epigenetics is not only attractive because of the interesting experimental problems
it poses. Epigenetics is an interesting and dynamic subfield of current biologi-
cal research for several other reasons. First, epigenetics has a paradigm-shattering
potential. As mentioned earlier, new epigenetic findings could potentially replace
decade-old biological paradigms, such as the idea of the “Weissmann barrier”, i.e.
that hereditary information can only flow from germ cells to somatic cells and never
the other way. Second, epigenetics carries a lot of public appeal. It may be assumed
that the number of popular books, magazine and newspaper articles, documentaries
and television pieces on epigenetics far exceeds the number of contributions on
other domains of current biological research. The reason for this is quite obvious:
If science could prove that our behavioral habits and the environmental influences
that we experience during our lifetime can have manifest biological effects on later
generations, this would have far reaching consequences not only biologically, but
also for our broader understanding of human nature. Last but not least, epigenet-
ics stands out as a field of research because of its high degree of interdisiplinarity.
Epigenetics attracts researchers from a variety of biological sub-disciplines such as
molecular biology, genetics (and plant genetics in particular), developmental biology,
evolutionary biology, epidemiology, medicine, neurobiology and psychology.

The latter point also renders epigenetics a highly interesting subject for philosoph-
ical investigation. Because research in epigenetics is done by scientists with a variety
of disciplinary backgrounds, theoretical interests and methodological affinities, inter-
estingly enough the answer to the most basic question in epigenetics—whether

2See Monk (2015) or Leitch et al. (2013).

Page 7 of 18 41European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2020) 10: 41



transgernarational epigenetic inheritance exists in mammals and if so how stable
it is—varies with the disciplinary background of the involved scientists, as will be
shown in the following.

3 Phenomenologists vs. mechanists

As mentioned earlier and as it is indicated in Fig. 1, the heritable stability of transgen-
erational epigenetic information remains a matter of scientific investigation. Different
scientists offer varying assessments of how relevant epigenetic effects are, especially
in mammals. If asked for their opinion as to “[h]ow much epigenetic inheritance takes
place”, leading scientists in the field provide the following answers:3

[Quote 1 by a pediatric geneticist, who studies environmental epigenomics and
human transgenerational responses]
Molecular evidence for transgenerational epigenetic inheritance in humans is
limited, but I suspect that it is commonplace. Transgenerational epigenetic
inheritance is the best candidate mechanism to explain the male-line transgen-
erational effects that are now being demonstrated within cohort studies capable
of dealing with many social and other confounders. If these observations are
statistically sound and cannot be explained by genetic or cultural inheritance,
then this is transgenerational epigenetic inheritance in its broadest sense.

[Quote 2 by a developmental geneticist, who studies genomic imprinting and
environmental epigenetic effects in mammals]
The impact of the environment has been observed to extend over multi-
ple generations in both human populations and animal models, suggesting
transgenerational epigenetic effects. However, a defined mechanism for such
inheritance is missing.

What is interesting about these statements is the fact that it is admitted that
“[m]olecular evidence for transgenerational epigenetic inheritance in humans is lim-
ited” and that “a defined mechanism for such inheritance is missing”, but nevertheless
epigenetic inheritance is viewed as “commonplace” and that “the impact of the envi-
ronment has been observed to extend over multiple generations.” Furthermore, in
quote 1, epigenetic inheritance is taken to be the best explanation for a variety of
“statistically sound” observations. In terms of its inferential structure, this statement
amounts to an inference to the best explanation, for it proposes the existence of
stable epigenetic inheritance as the only viable explanation for certain observable
correlations.

In opposition to the above statements, we also find claims like the following:

3All the following quotations are taken from (Grossniklaus et al. 2013). This paper published in Nature
Reviews Genetics contains the answers four leading scientist working in epigenetics to two questions: 1)
How much transgenerational epigenetic inheritance takes place? 2) How much impact does transgenera-
tional epigenetic inheritance have on organisms? All four scientist are listed as co-authors of the paper.
The following quotes are excerpts from these answers.

41 Page 8 of 18 European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2020) 10: 41



[Quote 3 by a plant geneticist, who studies the genetic and molecular basis of
plant reproduction]
In mammals, only very few—sometimes controversial—cases of meitotically
inherited epialleles have been reported, mostly with a variable degree of
inheritance.

[Quote 4 by a plant geneticist, who studies the genetic and molecular basis of
plant reproduction]
In principle, many inherited traits could have an epigenetic basis, as one cannot
easily distinguish whether a phenotype is due to genetic or epigenetic varia-
tion without a detailed molecular analysis. It is also possible that epigenetically
controlled traits are rare.

Scientists who make this second type of statements cast a general doubt on the very
reality of epigenetic inheritance especially in mammals and ipso facto in humans. At
least they leave room for the possibility that we are facing a very rare phenomenon,
which is the exact opposite of calling it “commonplace”, as one of the earlier quoted
scientists would. Typically, scientists of the second type also highlight the fact that
the molecular mechanisms for epigenetic inheritance are not sufficiently under-
stood and that isolating and studying the responsible causal factors is experimentally
challenging due to the abundance of potential confounding factors.

The differences in the above answers mark a crucial difference between two broad
camps in the highly divers community of scientists engaged in epigenetic research.
I suggest to call one group “phenomenologists” and the other “mechanists”. Phe-
nomenologists argue from the level of the observable phenomena (i.e. statistically
robust correlations between observables), whereas mechanists tend to highlight the
need for an understanding of the underlying molecular mechanisms that would
provide a causal explanation for the observed correlations. In absence of such a mech-
anism, the latter argue, the existence of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance is at
best plausible, but it cannot be considered a scientifically proven fact.

The frequently cited and widely discussed Oeverkalix study conducted and pub-
lished under the supervision of the nutritional scientist and epidemiologist Lars Olov
Bygren and the paediatric geneticist Marcus Pembrey in 2014 is a typical exam-
ple of a phenomenologist approach to epigenetics. The study reported correlations
between the fluctuation in food supply in grandparents and cardiovascular mortality
in grandchildren in 277 families based on a statistical analysis of Swedish and Finnish
local parish registers. The authors conclude that they have found an environmentally
induced transgenerational effect. They do not propose a possible mechanism for the
effect (Bygren et al. 2014). On the other hand, an example for a mechanistic approach
to epigenetics is a study conducted by the group of plant biologist Ueli Grossniklaus
already 20 years ago in which the researchers investigated the allel specificity of
maternal DNA imprinting in the Arabidopsis MEDA gene and its effects on offspring
development. (Vielle-Calzada et al. 1999).

From a methodological point of view, the two studies clearly differ. While the
Oeverkalix study mainly included statistical methods from epidemiology applying
a proportional hazards model to historical data sets, the MEDEA study employed

Page 9 of 18 41European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2020) 10: 41



standard methods of wet-lab biology such as in situ hybridisation, RT-PCR analysis
and histological analysis.

Phenomenologists and mechanists also differ in their answers to the question:
“How much impact does transgenerational epigenetic inheritance have on organ-
isms?” (Grossniklaus et al. 2013, p. 9). While mechanists typically emphasize our
extensive understanding of epigenetic molecular mechanisms in plants, phenomenol-
ogists are keen to highlight the importance of epigenetic inheritance in mammals.
Here are the mechanists speaking:

[Quote 5 by a plant geneticist, who studies the genetic and molecular basis of
plant reproduction]
One can easily imagine that it would be beneficial for plants, as sessile
organisms, to take advantage of the information that they acquire about their
environment and to pass it onto their progeny. The likelihood that the progeny
will experience a similar environment is rather high, given that seeds are often
dispersed locally. Thus, passing on such information to the progeny would have
an adaptive value, and epigenetic inheritance is the prime candidate for its trans-
mission. Indeed, plants have an extensive repertoire of epigenetic regulation
involving mechanisms based on DNA methylation, histone modification and
RNA.

[Quote 6 by a molecular biologist, who studies the epigenetic memory and
reprogramming using C. elegans as model organism]
An argument against any potential lasting impact of epigenetic phenomena
is that many of the processes are dynamic, and even the self-reinforcing or
maintenance mechanisms have some inherent variability [...].

And here are two statements by phenomenologists:

[Quote 7 by a biomedical researcher, who studies the effects of protein folding
on evolution and human disease]
The impact is enormous, in part because prions change cell biology in many,
many different ways.

[Quote 8 by a pediatric geneticist, who studies environmental epigenomics and
human transgenerational responses]
I wrote a commentary entitled ‘Time to take epigenetic inheritance seriously’.
Ten years on, I regard understanding human TGR [transgenerational response]
as crucial, even if the eventual mechanisms do not meet the definition of
transgenerational epigenetic inheritance that the purists demand!

Again, the phenomenologist in the last statement does not deny the fact that we are
lacking a robust understanding of the molecular mechanisms underlying the epi-
genetic inheritance in mammals, but they nevertheless insist that the phenomenon
exists and that it should be taken seriously. The statement also makes it clear that the
division in (at least) two camps is not just an arbitrary artefact of the philosophical
analysis proposed here, but that it coincides with the self-description of the involved
researchers if established scientists feel inclined to distinguish themselves as not
being among the “purists”.

41 Page 10 of 18 European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2020) 10: 41



It is also interesting to note that review articles often echo the skepticism of the
mechanists, whereas discussions in public outlets show a tendency to take up the
phenomologists’ claims about the potential relevance of epigenetics for humans. It is
reasonable to assume that this is due to the more consequential social implications
that would follow from the phenomenologist’s conclusions. A 2010 article (Cloud
2010) in Time Magazine, for instance, states the following:

[Quote 9] Bad news first: there’s evidence that lifestyle choices like smoking
and eating too much can change the epigenetic marks atop your DNA in ways
that cause the genes for obesity to express themselves too strongly and the genes
for longevity to express themselves too weakly.

The journalist supports his claims by reference to scientific literature:

[Quote 10] In February 2009, the Journal of Neuroscience published a paper
showing that even memory—a wildly complex biological and psychological
process—can be improved from one generation to the next via epigenetics.

And he goes on to imagine human control over epigenetic inheritance:

[Quote 11] DNA, we thought, was an ironclad code that we and our children
and their children had to live by. Now we can imagine a world in which we can
tinker with DNA, bend it to our will.

In comparison to such a language, the tone of a scientific review article (Heard and
Martienssen 2014) is much soberer, highlighting the many reasons that exist to doubt
the importance and stability of epigenetic inheritance in mammals. First and fore-
most, the review is critical with regards to the extent to which epigenetic inheritance
might occur in humans:

[Quote 12] Although the inheritance of epigenetic characters can certainly
occur—particularly in plants—how much is due to the environment and the
extent to which it happens in humans remains unclear.

It is also highlighted that epidemiological studies are often not suited to rule out
intergenerational effects:

[Quote 13] [M]ost of the studies so far concern intergenerational (parental or
grandparental exposure) rather than truly transgenerational inheritance, and in
most of the epidemiological studies, it has been difficult to rule out other effects
such as the influence of postnatal nutritional environment and the use of cohorts
where important covariates are missing.

Finally, it is questioned whether epigenetically inherited traits are actually adaptive
and thus evolutionary preserved.

[Quote 15] Thus, although transmission of acquired states can occur in some
animals (such as nematodes), proof that transgenerational inheritance has an
epigenetic basis is generally lacking in mammals. Indeed, evolution appears to
have gone to great lengths to ensure the efficient undoing of any potentially
deleterious bookmarking that a parent’s lifetime experience may have imposed.

Page 11 of 18 41European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2020) 10: 41



Summing up these observations, we can identify some general characteristics of the
controversy between mechanists and phenomenologists in epigenetics. First, phe-
nomenologists tend to depict epigenetic inheritance as a scientifically proven fact,
not only in plants, but also in mammals. In order to support their claims they use
an abductive inference: Epigenetic inheritance provides the best scientific expla-
nation for correlations among certain observables that span two generations such
as for example food supply for grandparents and cardiovascular health indicators
in grandchildren. They believe that such inferences are warranted even if we have
not yet elucidated the precise causal mechanism underlying epigenetic inheritance.
Lack of molecular evidence is not seen as a sufficient reason to deny the reality of
transgenerational epigenetic effects in mammals.

Mechanists, on the other hand, cast serious doubts on the existence of transgen-
erational inheritance in mammals, precisely because detailed causal knowledge of
mechanisms is missing. They thus challenge the phenomenologists’ inference to the
best explanation. They do not rule out the possibility that there might be alterna-
tive explanations for the correlations of macroscopic observables, explanations that
do not include reference to some sort of epigenetic inheritance pathway. They think
that their challenge against the phenomenolgists’ inference is justified even if they
are unable to identify the correct alternative explanation. The fact that not all of the
explanatory alternatives have been ruled out is sufficient for casting doubt on the
existence of transgenerational epigenetic effects.

The controversy is thus not so much about the correctness of the available evi-
dence. It is rather about the legitimacy of certain types of inferences that can be drawn
from the evidence, i.e. whether certain types of evidence entitle to certain conclu-
sions. In the case at hand, the controversial question is whether phenomenological
evidence alone is sufficient to infer the existence of transgenerational epigenetic
inheritance. Insofar as the evidence itself is under debate, it is so mostly because the
available molecular evidence in mammals is of such a kind that it does not, according
to the orthodox mechanists, allow to draw any inference on the temporal stability of
the alleged epigenetic effects. When those who believe in the existence and impor-
tance of mammalian transgenerational inheritance present molecular evidence (e.g.
involving studies of micro-RNAs in mice as in Gapp et al. 2014), critics point again
at the gaps in the causal chain between the alleged causes at the molecular level and
the stable transgenerational effect, the existence of which the evidence is supposed
to establish. They argue that such studies typically do not rule out all possible con-
founding factors. Thus the debate is not so much about whether or not one should
provide molecular evidence for epigenetic inheritance in mammals, but rather about
what kind of molecular evidence warrants specific conclusions. Ultimately, the con-
troversy boils down to two opposing views about the necessary degree of skepticism
in the interpretation of the evidence. Mechanists clearly take the skeptic side in the
debate.

Second, there appears to be a social aspect to the debate in the sense that the mem-
bers of the two camps typically have different scientific socializations. Researches
with a training in fields that related to the study of human health (biomedical sci-
ence, epidemiology, neuroepigenetics) tend towards the phenomenologist side of the

41 Page 12 of 18 European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2020) 10: 41



debate. Molecular biologists, biochemists or plant biologists, who are mainly inter-
ested in the study of molecular phenomena, seem to lean towards the mechanist side
of the debate.

Third, scientific review articles tend to echo the mechanists’ doubts, while pub-
lic outlets frequently to take up the phenomenologists’ claims about the potential
relevance of epigenetic inheritance on human health.

4 Benefits of perspectival practices

The difference between the phenomenologist and the mechanist camp in current
epigenetics, I argue, may be understood as a case of perspectivism. Furthermore, hav-
ing different camps with different perspectives associated with different systems of
practice, can be epistemically beneficial for the field as a whole.

However, the kind of perspectivism that we are facing in this debate cannot be
interpreted in terms of perspectival models. It is not the case that the two camps
are proposing different models for one and the same biological phenomenon. The
conflict is not one between inconsistent models. It is rather a conflict between the
perspectives of two groups of scientists with different scientific backgrounds and cor-
responding differences in their systems of practice. These differences become
visible, for example, in the use of particular model organisms or experimental sys-
tems, in the focus on specific training or textbook knowledge, in the adoption of
specific explanatory or methodological standards, or in common publication strate-
gies. Most importantly, the two groups can be characterized in terms of varying
epistemic priorities. While the phenomenologists seem to be interested in elucidating
the potential impact of epigenetically induced effects on human health, the mecha-
nists are primarily focused on understanding causality on the cellular and molecular
level. Such differences of scientific practice can, I claim, lead to differences in the
evaluation of the validity of specific inferences drawn from the available evidence.

It is crucially important to note, however, that, if applied to an individual sci-
entist, the situation is rarely as clear-cut as the simple mechanist/phenomenologist
distinction might suggest. Of course, many researches working in epidemiology or
biomedical science are well-trained in molecular methods and frequently apply them
in their research. Likewise, molecular biologists or biochemists might very well be
able to appreciate the importance of epidemiological and statistical evidence when
it comes to the study of epigenetic phenomena. It is also possible that an individual
scientist remains undecided about whether epigenetic inheritance in mammals exists
or not. Or they might change their opinion over the course of time or when taking
into account previously unknown evidence. So the mechanist/phenomenologist dis-
tinction suggested here has to be taken with a grain of salt. It does not come with
hard criteria that would allow for the allocation of each individual researcher to one
of the camps.

The distinction is thus better understood as a distinction between perspectives in
the strict sense. An individual can adopt a perspective or not, and perspectives can
be changed under different circumstances. Yet in the version of perspectivism advo-
cated here, the perspectives themselves are characterized not only with respect to

Page 13 of 18 41European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2020) 10: 41



theoretical stances, but also in terms of differences in practices. Furthermore, a full
description of the practices and sociological differences underlying the perspectives
involved in the case presented above would require a much more refined sociolog-
ical analysis than can be provided in this article. It is conceivable that the result of
such an analysis would be a more fine-grained description including more than two
perspectives. The analysis might also include the study of differences in explana-
tory standards and ontological commitments between mechanistic explanations in
today’s molecular genetics and more holistic and dynamic approaches in epigenetics
(as suggested by Baedke 2018).

Differences between perspectives can also be captured by differences in what
Naomi Oreskes calls “epistemological affinities”. In a similar vain as the present case
study (though based on more detailed historical evidence), in her book The Rejec-
tion of Continental Drift (1999) Oreskes has analyzed the controversy around Alfred
Wenger’s theory of continental drift in the early decades of the 20th century (Oreskes
1999; see also Oreskes 2008). Oreskes shows how the evaluation of Wenger’s theory
by fellow scientists “was pervasively interwoven in a fabric of epistemic, cultural,
and social considerations” and that “[o]ne cannot understand any individual scien-
tist’s epistemic position vis à vis drift without understanding the cultural and social
vectors that defined that position” (Oreskes 2008, p. 256). She calls the epistemic,
cultural and social considerations that influence scientists’ judgements “epistemo-
logical affinities”, because they express themselves epistemologically in terms of
different weightings of evidence. Oreskes also stresses that the sources of the differ-
ences in epistemological affinities “were largely social” and integral to the scientific
practices of the individual scientists (Oreskes 1999, p. 53). But they must not be
considered as “external” factors that are somehow imposed on the scientists from
domains outside of their research. Quite on the contrary, epistemic affinities they can
be the sources of important epistemic differences between rivaling camps in scien-
tific controversies, and, as Oreskes has shown for the case of plate tectonics, they
can even lead to the delayed acceptance of valuable, and eventually widely accepted
scientific theories.

This constitutes a further reason for associating varying scientific practices that
are shaped and influenced by epistemic affinities with perspectives. To treat scientific
practices, or rather the differences between systems of practices due to epistemic,
methodological, cultural and social differences as perspectives helps to realize that
such differences are an integral part (and maybe even necessary part) of discovery
processes. They are not merely external disturbances that disrupt the rational and
objective scientific process of drawing conclusions from evidence. Diverging sys-
tems of practice constitute perspectives on reality. They shed light on open research
questions from different vantage points and thus help to describe and understand the
phenomena under scrutiny in a variety of possible ways.

At this point an overlap with Massimi’s account of perspectival models emerges.
Just like perspectival models have a modal function in exploring what is possible
within a target system, perspectival practices are modal in the sense that they guar-
antee the exploration of various theoretical and experimental possibilities through
which the phenomenon under scrutiny can be approached. However, in the case of
epigenetics described above, the modal aspect of the perspectives does not extend to

41 Page 14 of 18 European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2020) 10: 41



ontological possibilities. The two camps in the controversy do not argue about what
entities, structures or processes might exist or not. Their contention is not about real-
ism. It is about setting the limits for conclusions that can be drawn from the available
evidence.

One could object at this point that the controversy described above is just a simple
case of transient empirical underdetermination that does not require some sort of per-
spectivist analysis. Once we have collected additional evidence, e.g. about molecular
mechanisms responsible for epigenetic inheritance in mammals, the dispute will be
settled and there will be no room for varying perspectives on the question how much
epigenetic inheritance takes place in humans. So the situation is simply reflective of
the fact that many empirical questions remain open in current epigenetics and that
the answers to fundamental questions are underdetermined by the available evidence.
In such a situation, it is no surprise that scientists interpret the available evidence in
different ways and that they reach diverging conclusions. The case presented above
should thus be better described as a debate over epistemic warrant given various types
of evidence rather than a case of opposing perspectives.

Although the objection is factually adequate in the sense that it would be per-
fectly possible to describe the situation in current epigenetics in terms of evidential
warrant for causation, as has been frequently done in the literature in other contexts
(see e.g. Illari et al. 2011 or Gillies 2018). It is also true that the history of science
is full of debates that became settled once additional evidence became available, and
the described controversy might also be resolved in such a manner sometime in the
future. The objection nevertheless misses the point. Philosophical discussions about
epistemic warrant for causal claims often exclusively focus on purely epistemic fac-
tors in the reconstruction of historical cases. This is of course highly legitimate,
since these factors are usually important ingredients to the controversy and a rig-
orous philosophical analysis of such factors is crucial. However, the point of the
above case study was neither to engage in a discussion about evidential warrant for
causality in epigenetics nor to take sides in the controversy. The main argument
for framing the debate in terms of perspectivism was precisely that perspectivism
opens up a possibility to combine epistemic and social aspects in the description
of scientific controversies. A purely epistemic approach cannot provide reasons for
why different types of evidence are produced by different camps creating a situa-
tion in which the epistemic warrant for certain causal claims becomes controversial
in the first place. In the perspectivist account proposed above, varying perspectives
due to differences in the practices and socializations of the involved scientists are
teated as reasons why different camps produce different types of evidence. Such an
approach implies the inseparability of disagreements about evidential warrants for
causal claims from the underlying social factors that induce those disagreements.

In fact, the benefits of perspectival practices come to bear precisely in situations
where the answers to important theoretical questions are underdetermined by the
evidence. These benefits are best captured by what Hasok Chang has called “benefits
of co-optation” for interacting systems of practice (Chang 2012, pp. 280ff.). The
crucial point here is to acknowledge that each perspective has internal constraints
that can only be overcome by co-opting ideas, concepts, methods, or results from
competing perspectives.

Page 15 of 18 41European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2020) 10: 41



One might argue that such constraints and differences between systems of prac-
tice are destructive to discovery processes in epigenetics and elsewhere, because
overly mechanistic approaches or prevailing explanatory standards could constrain
less orthodox research frameworks. However, diverging systems of practice within a
field of research do not necessarily have to be detrimental. The idea of co-optation
and the account of perspectival practices advocated for in this paper allows to ascribe
a positive role to diverging systems of practice and to disagreement in science in gen-
eral. Disagreement can be epistemically valuable, not only because it fosters critical
discussion and forces each camp into clearer articulation, as classical accounts have
it (e.g. Mill or Popper), but also because each side of the controversy is associated
with particular data and evidence that leads to specific insights, which can be use-
ful to the entire domain.4 In developing fields like epigenetics, where the answers to
many theoretical questions are empirically underdetermined, adherence to a particu-
lar scientific camp is often not justified by evidence and rational argument alone but
is likewise driven by the epistemic affinities and interests of the involved scientists,
as was described above. In this sense, scientific controversies do in fact often involve
an “apparent element of arbitrariness”, to use Thomas Kuhn’s infamous expression
(Kuhn 1962, p. 4). However, differences in the epistemological affinities of differ-
ent camps in a field of research can have an epistemically valuable function, because
they lead to the production of various types of evidence and enable co-optation in
Chang’s sense.

Therefore, the presence of diverging perspectives does not render the process of
knowledge generation as a whole irrational. This claim implies that trust in the ratio-
nality of science does not necessarily have to be grounded in consensus, and that
disagreement in form of contrary but interacting perspectives plays an important role
in scientific discovery processes. This result lends support to perspectivism as a valid
philosophical position that explains how scientific knowledge is generated and why
trust in science is justified even in the absence of a community consensus.

Acknowledgments The author thanks Michela Massimi for the opportunity to contribute to this topical
issue. This paper was presented at the 2019 EPSA conference in Geneva and in a colloquium of the Lake
Geneva Biological Interest Group at the University of Geneva. The author thanks the members of both
audiences for their discussions and valuable feedback. Two anonymous reviewers have provided helpful
comments to an earlier draft.

Funding Open access funding provided by University of St.Gallen.

Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons
licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are
included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not
permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly
from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommonshorg/licenses/by/4.0/.

4I am here following an account of disagreement that has originally been proposed by Miriam Solomon;
see (Solomon 2001a, b, 2006).

41 Page 16 of 18 European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2020) 10: 41

http://creativecommonshorg/licenses/by/4.0/


References

Baedke, J. (2018). Above the gene, beyond biology: toward a philosophy of epigenetics. Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press.

Bird, A. (2007). Perceptions of epigenetics. Nature, 447, 396–398.
Burbank, L. (1906). The training of the human plant. New York: Century Co.
Bygren, L.O., Tinghög, P., Carstensen, J., Edvinsson, S., Kaati, G., Pembrey, M.E., Sjöström, M. (2014).

Change in paternal grandmothers’ early food supply influenced cardiovascular mortality of the female
grandchildren. BMC Genetics, 15, 1–6.

Chakravartty, A. (2010). Perspectivism, inconsistent models, and contrastive explanation. Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 41(4), 405–412.

Chang, H. (2012). Is water H2O? Evidence, realism and pluralism. Dordrecht: Springer.
Chang, H. (2020). Pragmatism, perspectivism, and the historicity of science. In Massimi, M., & McCoy,

C.D. (Eds.) Understanding perspectivism (pp. 10–27). New York: Routledge.
Cloud, J. (2010). Why your DNA isn’t your destiny. Time Magazine.
Felsenfeld, G. (2014). A brief history of epigenetics. Cold Spring Harbor Perspectives in Biology, 6(1),

1–10.
Gapp, K., Jawaid, A., Sarkies, P., Bohacek, J., Pelczar, P., Prados, J., Farinelli, L., Miska, E., Mansuy, I.M.

(2014). Implication of sperm RNAs in transgenerational inheritance of the effects of early trauma in
mice. Nature Neuroscience, 17(5), 667–669.

Giere, R.N. (2006). Scientific perspectivism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Giere, R.N. (2013). Kuhn as perspectival realist. Topoi, 32(1), 53–57.
Gillies, D. (2018). Causality, probability and medicine. London: Routledge.
Grossniklaus, U., Kelly, W.G., Ferguson-Smith, A.C., Pembrey, M., Lindquist, S. (2013). Transgenera-

tional epigenetic inheritance: how important is it? Nature Reviews Genetics, 14(3), 228–235.
Haecker, V. (1918). Entwicklungsgeschichtliche Eigenschaftsanalyse (Phänogenetik): Gemeinsame Auf-

gaben der Entwicklungsgeschichte Vererbungs- und Rassenlehre. Fischer: Jena.
Heard, E., & Martienssen, R.A. (2014). Transgenerational epigenetic inheritance: myths and mechanisms.

Cell, 157(1), 95–109.
Illari, P.M., Russo, F., Williamson, J. (2011). Causality in the sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kuhn, T.S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Leitch, H.G., Tang, W.W.C., Surani, M.A. (2013). Primordial germ-cell development and epigenetic repro-

gramming in mammals. In Heard, E. (Ed.) Epigenetics and development, (Vol. 104 pp. 149–187).
San Diego: Academic Press.

Massimi, M. (2018a). A perspectivalist better best system account of lawhood. In Ott, W., & Patton,
L. (Eds.) Laws of nature (pp. 139–157). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Massimi, M. (2018b). Perspectival modeling. Philosophy of Science, 85(3), 335–359.
Massimi, M. (2018c). Perspectivism. In Saatsi, J. (Ed.) The Routledge handbook of scientific realism. New

York: Routledge.
Massimi, M. (2018d). Points of view: Kant on perspectival knowledge. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/

s11229-018-1876-7.
Massimi, M., & McCoy, C.D. (Eds.) (2020). Understanding perspectivism: scientific challenges and

methodological prospects. New York: Routledge.
Monk, D. (2015). Germline-derived DNA methylation and early embryo epigenetic reprogramming: the

selected survival of imprints. The International Journal of Biochemistry and Cell Biology, 67, 128–
138.

Morrison, M. (2011). One phenomenon, many models: inconsistency and complementarity. Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 42(2), 342–351.

Nagel, T. (1986). The view from nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Oreskes, N. (1999). The rejection of continental drift: theory and method in American earth science.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Oreskes, N. (2008). The devil is in the (historical) details: continental drift as a case of normatively

appropriate consensus?. Perspectives on Science, 16(3), 253–264.
Riggs, A.D., & Porter, T.N. (1996). X-chromosome inactivation and epigenetic mechanisms. In Russo,

E., Martienssen, R., Riggs, A. (Eds.) Epigenetic mechanisms of gene regulation (pp. 231–248). Cold
Spring Harbor: Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press.

Page 17 of 18 41European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2020) 10: 41

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1876-7
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1876-7


Saatsi, J. (2020). Realism and explanatory perspectivism. In Massimi, M., & McCoy, C.D. (Eds.)
Understanding perspectivism (pp. 65–84). New York: Routledge.

Solomon, M. (2001a). Consensus in science. In Cao, T.Y. (Ed.) The proceedings of the twentieth world
congress of philosophy, (Vol. 10 pp. 193–204). Bowling Green OH: Philosophy Documentation
Center.

Solomon, M. (2001b). Social empiricism. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Solomon, M. (2006). Groupthink versus the wisdom of crowds: the social epistemology of deliberation

and dissent. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 44(S1), 28–42.
Stotz, K., & Griffiths, P. (2016). Epigenetics: ambiguities and implications. History and Philosophy of the

Life Sciences, 38(4), 22.
Teller, P. (2020). What is perspectivism, and does it count as realism?. In Massimi, M., & McCoy, C. (Eds.)

Understanding perspectivism (pp. 49–64). New York: Routledge.
van Fraassen, B.C. (2008). Scientific representation: paradoxes of perspective. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.
Vielle-Calzada, J.P., Thomas, J., Spillane, C., Coluccio, A., Hoeppner, M.A., Grossniklaus, U. (1999).

Maintenance of genomic imprinting at the Arabidopsis medea locus requires zygotic DDM1 activity.
Genes and Development, 13(22), 2971–2982.

Waddington, C.H. (1942). The epigenotype. Endeavour, pp 18–20.
Weismann, A. (1892). Das Keimplasma. Eine Theorie der Vererbung. Jena: Verlag Gustav Fischer.

Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.

41 Page 18 of 18 European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2020) 10: 41


	Perspectivism in current epigenetics
	Abstract
	Introduction: from perspectival models to perspectival practices
	Varying perspectives in current epigenetics
	Phenomenologists vs. mechanists
	Benefits of perspectival practices
	References