id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_z3nfx7qpojda7hzdakzlb77l2m	Lyle Zynda	Representation Theorems and Realism about Degrees of Belief	2000	25	.pdf	application/pdf	11551	742	55	if attributions of degrees of belief are understood either antirealistically or purely qualitatively, or if the representation theorems are supplemented by arguments based on utility f ~ ~ n c t i o n s defined by the representation, and degrees of belief similarly defined that conform to the laws of probability, which are as follows: His preferences obey the axioms of expected utility theory, and so he claims (in line with the Reality Condition it is possible they might accept only the view that degrees of belief, utilities, and preferences are not "independently existing, interacting mental states" without the further definition of Maurice's degrees of belief as what is common to all probability functions that can represent his preferences in the usual manner all subjective probabilities that occur in some expected utility representation of their preferences, then such people would have no degrees of of degree of belief in expected utility theory over Maurice's definition, such 	./cache/work_z3nfx7qpojda7hzdakzlb77l2m.pdf	./txt/work_z3nfx7qpojda7hzdakzlb77l2m.txt