id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_xxkkrf6a7ne2poybzsuiflum4u	Bert Leuridan	Can Mechanisms Really Replace Laws of Nature?*	2010	24	.pdf	application/pdf	11047	959	56	Today, mechanisms and mechanistic explanation are very popular in philosophy of science I argue that (1) all complex-systems mechanisms ontologically must rely on stable regularities, while (2) the reverse need not hold. that explanation involves mechanistic models (i.e., descriptions of mechanisms) instead of strict laws, might be very welcome. A generalization is a pragmatic law if it allows for prediction, explanation, or between mechanistic models and pragmatic laws is still an open question, which I address in this article. Glennan [2002], Woodward [2002], and Craver [2007], all of whom explicitly endorse the role of what I call 'causal P-laws' in the mechanistic they both present mechanisms and mechanistic explanation as an alternative to strict laws of nature and D-N explanation. the concepts of strict law/regularity and D-N explanation (in the context assessment of both strict laws/regularities and D-N explanation. section 5, I argue that this is no coincidence: cs-mechanisms are ontologically dependent on the existence of regularities.	./cache/work_xxkkrf6a7ne2poybzsuiflum4u.pdf	./txt/work_xxkkrf6a7ne2poybzsuiflum4u.txt