id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_xoculevqcncjjdvvjerdciffcq	Christian Wallmann	The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism	2019	14	.pdf	application/pdf	7305	583	66	This paper poses a problem for Lewis' Principal Principle in a subjective Bayesian problem points to a tension between the Principal Principle and the claim that conditional degrees of belief are conditional probabilities. We show in Section 1 that standard subjective Bayesianism has a problem in accommodating David Lewis' Principal Principle. In the context of CBCP and Bayesian Conditionalisation, the Principal Principle implies that at time t, if one's evidence includes the proposition that the current chance of A is x then one should believe A to degree x, as long as one's other evidence E does not include anything that defeats this ascription of rational belief. It is apparent, then, that standard subjective Bayesianism does not provide a satisfactory framework for Lewis' Principal Principle. While the Principal Principle uses evidence to constrain rational degrees of belief, By avoiding CBCP, this version of objective Bayesianism is immune to the problem developed in Section 1.	./cache/work_xoculevqcncjjdvvjerdciffcq.pdf	./txt/work_xoculevqcncjjdvvjerdciffcq.txt