id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_xgiutywie5ai5goh7jme6notei	James Woodward	Social Preferences in Experimental Economics	2008	12	.pdf	application/pdf	5535	258	51	of one-shot laboratory games to measure social preferences of stability or robustness: it must be possible to detect or measure preferences in laboratory contexts and then generalize or export this information to other contexts, including real life field contexts under conditions experimental results described in Section 2 fail to show that subjects exhibit non-self-interested behavior and/or have social preferences? use of evidence from one-shot games to measure social preferences. Alternatively, subjects may play the laboratory game by importing (perhaps conSOCIAL PREFERENCES IN EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 651 with selfish preferences in the repeated game into the one-shot laboratory importation of patterns of play that are sustained by self-interested preferences in repeated games. the preferences that explain cooperative behavior in the real life repeated On the one hand, the proponent wants to use cooperative behavior in one-shot games to show that subjects have nonselfish preferences; on the assumption that play in repeated games can be explained	./cache/work_xgiutywie5ai5goh7jme6notei.pdf	./txt/work_xgiutywie5ai5goh7jme6notei.txt