id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_xgauczncv5e23jhlrxwubuuzqq	Matthew Parrott	Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities	2014	44	.pdf	application/pdf	12146	783	58	https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/bayesian-models-delusional-beliefs-and-epistemic-possibilities(a2a7c1fa-9fb3-4b55-8db7-8ae6a3a9df86).html BAYESIAN MODELS, DELUSIONAL BELIEFS, AND EPISTEMIC POSSIBILITIES BAYESIAN MODELS, DELUSIONAL BELIEFS, AND EPISTEMIC POSSIBILITIES essay is that Capgras subjects also have a delusional conception of epistemic possibility, In particular, I shall argue that nondelusional subjects do not think it is epistemically possible for an imposter to have modelling how a delusional subject comes to believe a specific hypothesis in the face of subjective probability that one assigns to ~p that is epistemically possible or impossible. subject's epistemic community know many things that are incompatible with Stranger. that a non-delusional subject might consider epistemic impossibilities like Stranger whether or not a subject's conception of epistemic possibility is delusional. about epistemic possibility, yet not delusional, but also say that a Capgras subject is in the Capgras delusion involve a delusional sense of epistemic possibility and that this delusional conception of epistemic possibility, a Capgras subject's prior level of credence 	./cache/work_xgauczncv5e23jhlrxwubuuzqq.pdf	./txt/work_xgauczncv5e23jhlrxwubuuzqq.txt