id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_wpxp5byu4vfv7bnizq2go6q3yy	Stathis Psillos	Scientific Realism: Between Platonism and Nominalism	2010	13	.pdf	application/pdf	5567	407	59	In section 3, I question the idea that theories have well-defined nominalistic content and the idea that causal activity is a necessary condition for commitment to the reality of an entity. follows from the truth of (literally understood) scientific theories and (b) (NSR) and to retreat to the nominalistic adequacy of theories. concept of nominalistic adequacy and to argue that even if scientific theories cannot be nominalized, even if mathematics is theoretically indispensable, commitment to abstracta is avoided. theories purport to refer not just to theoretical entities but to mathematical about concrete causal entities (its nominalistic content) from whatever it (NC) Empirical science has a purely nominalistic content that captures its 'complete picture' of the physical world. n-adequacy thus: A (mathematized) theory "S is nominalistically adequate iff the concrete core of the actual world is an exact intrinsic duplicate of the concrete core of the abstract content of scientific theories (including the mathematical one)	./cache/work_wpxp5byu4vfv7bnizq2go6q3yy.pdf	./txt/work_wpxp5byu4vfv7bnizq2go6q3yy.txt