id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_wo6efkmu7vbs7jto3rtycs35mm	Branden Fitelson	Accuracy, Language Dependence, and Joyce's Argument for Probabilism*	2012	7	.pdf	application/pdf	3532	310	70	language-dependence of the accuracy of predictions can be applied to Joyce's (1998) notion of the accuracy of "estimates of numerical truth-values" (viz., Joycean credences). This leads to a potential problem for Joyce's accuracy-dominance-based argument for the conclusion that credences (understood as "estimates of numerical truth-values" in Table 1: Canonical example of the language dependence of the accuracy of predictions According to Joyce (1998), if we view credences (of rational agents) as numerical estimates Now, following Joyce, we will associate the truth-value True with the number 1 and the truthvalue False with the number 0. Joyce's theorem entails the existence of a coherent set of estimates (b0) of � and , which is same numerical inter-translation will yield such a reversal for any coherent function b0 that "credences are (numerical) estimates of (numerical) truth-values". there are crucial disanalogies between "estimation" (in Joyce's sense) and "prediction" (in "estimates" (in Joyce's sense) of the quantities hx;yi\.	./cache/work_wo6efkmu7vbs7jto3rtycs35mm.pdf	./txt/work_wo6efkmu7vbs7jto3rtycs35mm.txt