id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_tvxyuk66zfejbhok5ygxsonmee	M. Strevens	The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses	2001	42	.pdf	application/pdf	10576	673	65	At the heart of Bayesian confirmation theory is Bayes' rule of conditionalization, which dictates how one's subjective probabilities ought to change when one learns that a piece of evidence e has been observed, one's new probability for a hypothesis h, which I will write P +(h), ought to be set equal to Bayesian confirmation theory appears to show, in an utterly straightforward way, that the Quine-Duhem thesis is false. 3. Posterior Objectivism: There are no objectively justified rules for assigning values to the prior probabilities. the priors, Bayesian conditionalization can be shown to produce posterior probabilities with certain objectively desirable properties. formula, the posterior probabilities P +(h) and P +(a) act in objectively desirable ways.4 Howson and Urbach (1993, §7.h) add further historical arguments of course, does not tell us much about the Quine-Duhem problem, which demands that an objective basis for the probability shifts be provided.	./cache/work_tvxyuk66zfejbhok5ygxsonmee.pdf	./txt/work_tvxyuk66zfejbhok5ygxsonmee.txt