id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_smdw2easj5ghrmoidnwhjubakm	Matthew J. Brown	Values in Science beyond Underdetermination and Inductive Risk	2013	2	.pdf	application/pdf	1557	128	56	Values in Science beyond Underdetermination and Inductive Risk science (Douglas), i.e., the role of values in the logic of scientific practice (vs. Underdetermination arguments for the value-ladenness of science extend Duhem's & Quine's thoughts about testing. gap argument for value-laden science (Intemann 2005). value-free ideal of science (Kitcher 2001). These two arguments against the value-free ideal of science The gap argument holds that values can play a role in the Both arguments take evidence as fixed in the context of certification, and values play a role in the space left over—they assume the lexical priority of evidence over values. Why such a strict priority of evidence over values? Douglas (2009): "Values are not evidence; wishing does not values interfering with this process the problem of wishful Notice that the lexical priority of evidence over values coheres • Anderson (2004), "Uses of Value-Judgments in Science" • Douglas (2000), "Inductive Risk & Values in Science"	./cache/work_smdw2easj5ghrmoidnwhjubakm.pdf	./txt/work_smdw2easj5ghrmoidnwhjubakm.txt