id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_rzwa7x4uz5fnffmoqqpfuw62ba	Manolo Martínez	Common Interest and Signaling Games: A Dynamic Analysis	2016	25	.pdf	application/pdf	8467	625	65	sender and receiver tend to want the same acts performed in a given state of considered a few cases of imperfect alignment of interests in a Lewis signaling model, and showed that communication could be an equilibrium state in We ask how different degrees of common interest affect the evolutionary trajectories of populations of senders and receivers interacting in Section 2 describes the model used: a family of Lewis sender-receiver games, Our model uses a Lewis sender-receiver game of the kind characterized in the If sender and receiver populations follow the two-population replicator dynamics, the rate of change over time of the frequency of each type is given by the A population of senders (the same applies to receivers) is characterized in terms of the frequencies of the 27 types of pure strategists who may resulting population states was "translated" into a sender-receiver configuration, in the way described above, and the mutual information between states	./cache/work_rzwa7x4uz5fnffmoqqpfuw62ba.pdf	./txt/work_rzwa7x4uz5fnffmoqqpfuw62ba.txt