id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_rwomld6jxrbstlhui2aejqb6h4	K. Brad Wray	A Defense of Longino's Social Epistemology	1999	16	.pdf	application/pdf	7273	536	55	Though many critics of traditional analytic epistemology agree that we need to account for the role that social factors play than mere subjective opinions, and thus deserve to be called "knowledge." In this paper I want to both explain and defend Longino's epistemology. will present Longino's own account of scientific knowledge and inquiry. By construing hypotheses and evidence to be related syntactically, the positivists ensure that "inference to a hypothesis is not mediated by possibly value-laden assumptions" (Longino 1990, 48). Kitcher's criticism implies that Longino's view does not differ significantly from sociological accounts of science. Second, Longino believes that sociological accounts of science mistakenly make no distinction between knowledge and opinion. Underlying Kitcher's criticism of Longino's account are disagreements about (1) the relationship between truth and knowledge, and Longino believes that the key constraint on a viable philosophical account of knowledge and inquiry is Longino, Helen (1990), Science as Social Knowledge.	./cache/work_rwomld6jxrbstlhui2aejqb6h4.pdf	./txt/work_rwomld6jxrbstlhui2aejqb6h4.txt