id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_rq43ctq6bffcnb3wkpitzamzki	Patrick Maher	Joyce's Argument for Probabilism	2002	10	.pdf	application/pdf	3687	457	86	argument for the conclusion that a person's credences ought to satisfy the laws of The premises of Joyce's argument include six axioms about what counts paper shows that (a) Joyce's argument for one of these axioms is invalid, (b) his (d) without these implausible axioms Joyce's vindication of probabilism fails. Joyce's "Main Theorem" is that these axioms imply that if a person's credence function b does not satisfy the laws of probability Joyce's Main Theorem assumes that the set of propositions is countable. In Section 3 I show that Joyce's argument for one of his axioms is Joyce is here claiming that Weak Convexity follows from a premise that and so Joyce's argument for Weak Convexity is invalid. We have seen that Joyce's arguments for Weak Convexity and Symmetry are both unsound. Joyce's first four axioms may be stated as follows. Besides the six axioms, Joyce's argument for probabilism assumes that	./cache/work_rq43ctq6bffcnb3wkpitzamzki.pdf	./txt/work_rq43ctq6bffcnb3wkpitzamzki.txt