id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_rivwyuy6andiznvpzhaom5tlx4	Paul Weirich	Initiating Coordination	2007	12	.pdf	application/pdf	5229	420	54	It shows that individual rationality generates coordination in the game Hi-Lo, at least if agents are Is it rational for an agent to perform the act the commitment issues? alleges that pre-game commitment resolves the Hi-Lo paradox for comprehensively rational agents given that they are informed about each other coordination, I investigate whether fully rational agents may form, maintain, and honor the commitment. that fully rational agents may use intentions to generate coordination. a perfect agent, who may act in a utility maximizing way without deliberation or decision, may profit from forming an intention to act because A rational agent may form an intention to act because of the consequences To show that a fully rational agent may form an intention to act, with Such an agent forms an intention to perform an act only if the act maximizes utility. Fully rational agents may generate reasons by forming intentions.	./cache/work_rivwyuy6andiznvpzhaom5tlx4.pdf	./txt/work_rivwyuy6andiznvpzhaom5tlx4.txt