id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_r7bloibmc5gntktovuotoh56ou	Jon Williamson	Justifying the principle of indifference	2018	29	.pdf	application/pdf	13890	1041	60	an epistemic argument, justifying the principle as needing to hold in order to minimise worst-case expected inaccuracy. Many Bayesians are committed to some version or other of the Principle of Indifference, which holds that in certain situations one's degrees of belief should be Principle of Indifference can thus be motivated in terms of epistemic rationality: supposing that epistemic rationality requires minimising worst-case expected inaccuracy, B and a belief function B is compatible with evidence just in case B ∈ E, the set of to the idea that degrees of belief should be calibrated to chances (a principle common to both the pragmatic approach and the epistemic approach under consideration if a belief function is epistemically rational then it satisfies Principle of Indifference According to BE, any belief function that is compatible with evidence is epistemically rational; there is no further requirement that one's degrees of belief should	./cache/work_r7bloibmc5gntktovuotoh56ou.pdf	./txt/work_r7bloibmc5gntktovuotoh56ou.txt