id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_r3x2luuuv5bgvkpjgkl53h67ci	Gergei Bana	On the Formal Consistency of the Principal Principle	2016	14	.pdf	application/pdf	5708	779	81	Rédei and Gyenis suggest that Lewis's Principal Principle is meaningful only if it satisfies certain consistency conditions: starting from any assignment of credences to some However, I also argue that this requirement is unnecessary: the Principal Principle concerns subjective beliefs about objective chance; hence, events concerning those probabilities are meant to be in the Lewis's example indicates that a credence function defined onthe possible values of the objective chances of chancy events and also on the possible Unfortunately, Rédei and Gyenis wrote their Principal Principle in the form psubj(AjKpobj(A) 5 rL) 5 pobj(A), which is confusing as it In our treatment, pobj is just a measure over Sobj; it may actually be different from the real objective chance, although Rédei and The abstract Principal Principle is defined to be strongly consistent if the following hold: Given any probability space (Xobj, Sobj, pobj)	./cache/work_r3x2luuuv5bgvkpjgkl53h67ci.pdf	./txt/work_r3x2luuuv5bgvkpjgkl53h67ci.txt