id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_qgorfqwkm5dobcrprynus6l33a	Carl Brusse	Responsiveness and Robustness in the David Lewis Signaling Game	2017	11	.pdf	application/pdf	4907	387	62	endowing receivers with a more realistic set of responses significantly decreases the likelihood of signaling, while allowing for unequal selection between world-observing senders and action-making receivers using costless signals; in contrast to games where interests may differ and where costly signals world, and receivers act on those signals so as to secure the mutual payoff. Senders and receivers (in the evolutionary treatment of such games) are two populations of highly abstract and constrained 2It is worth noting here that the 'hedgehog' strategy in this Lewis signaling game is in many 2x2x2 David Lewis signaling game, with the two-population discrete-time replicator dynamics. If the receiver's action matches the state of the world, then both signaler Table 1: Signaler and receiver strategies in the standard 2x2x2 common interest Figure 2: Effect of hedgehog strategy and bias of nature on number of simulations reaching signaling equilibria. the effect of making signaling more likely when sender strategies evolve faster	./cache/work_qgorfqwkm5dobcrprynus6l33a.pdf	./txt/work_qgorfqwkm5dobcrprynus6l33a.txt