id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_p5pgd5oy45fw3hqrz6paivkwwq	Thomas Kelly	Hume, Norton, and Induction without Rules	2010	16	.pdf	application/pdf	4935	234	54	content of the general rules or principles that we follow in reasoning inductively. Rather, particular inductive inferences are underwritten by domainspecific facts or 'material postulates'. induction is something like this: the proponent of the material theory thinks that, once I find the material theory of induction an attractive account, in several respects. If inductive reasoning as it is understood on the material theory is less susceptible to are justified by inductions that are in turn grounded in the facts of other material In what sense are inductive inferences 'grounded in' material facts? knowledge of the material fact that licenses the induction. degrees' via induction, he must already know the material postulate that 'samples of observational knowledge and what we are justified in believing on the basis of induction thinking that skepticism about induction simply re-arises on the material theory. is not itself provided by the material theory of induction, I think.	./cache/work_p5pgd5oy45fw3hqrz6paivkwwq.pdf	./txt/work_p5pgd5oy45fw3hqrz6paivkwwq.txt