id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_nokzifccljftflj4jhxztdc5we	Cory D. Wright	Mechanistic explanation without the ontic conception	2012	20	.pdf	application/pdf	10883	758	55	results in the thesis that scientific explanations are ontic exhibitions of mechanisms. (2) Scientific explanations are ontic exhibitions of mechanistic activities fitting into committed to rendering mechanistic explanations ontically; for example, advocates of a broadly epistemic as the conception that 'explanations exhibit causal mechanisms' (2002: S343 (however, he also misdescribes it—I believe out of charity—as some kind of generic representational realism just a page later)). (2!) Scientific explanations are mechanisms that are responsible for (causal) patterns strategy, OC is motivated by the claim that the term explanation is lexically ambiguous and has a conceptually basic (ontic) sense. mechanisms, he then claimed, following Salmon, that the term explanation can and New Mechanists like Craver often insist that good causal explanations are those that, inter That explain and explanation seemingly pass the syllepsis/conjunction reduction test (b) Mechanistic explanations involve models and representations of mechanisms. activity is one thing, and the causal-mechanical explanation is another' really does	./cache/work_nokzifccljftflj4jhxztdc5we.pdf	./txt/work_nokzifccljftflj4jhxztdc5we.txt