id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_nizyodc7ozb7nfbkoxzl7jljly	Francesca Pero	Varieties of misrepresentation and homomorphism	2015	21	.pdf	application/pdf	10345	709	55	There is by now a long tradition of structural approaches to scientific representation, starting in van Fraassen (1980) and Suppes (1967) to the most sophisticated recent accounts by We next turn to the best candidate we know for a structuralist conception of representation, namely Bartels' homomorphism theory, and argue that it can not accommodate Bartels explicitly endorses the structural account of representation when he claims that The homomorphism account of representation advocated by Bartels in fact comprises two According to Bartels' definitions, the following three conditions must obtain for a structure B to be homomorphic to A: for all j, all (a1, ..., an) in An, and all (f(a1), ..., f(an)) in Homomorphism theory seems then to fall short of what would be required for an adequate account of scientific representation even by Bartels' own standards. Bartels does claim that homomorphism is necessary for representation or misrepresentation	./cache/work_nizyodc7ozb7nfbkoxzl7jljly.pdf	./txt/work_nizyodc7ozb7nfbkoxzl7jljly.txt