id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_mevw4vudavasnh3e26u6ahv4ke	Isaac Levi	Imprecision and Indeterminacy in Probability Judgment	1985	20	.pdf	application/pdf	9543	654	61	According to what I now call the "strict Bayesian" viewpoint, a rational agent is committed to recognizing a single probability function for By way of contrast, when a set of distributions is used under the permissibility construal to represent an agent's credal state, a fundamental The credal state should be represented by a set of permissible probability functions. Still strict Bayesians display a special fascination for black box interpretations of sets of probability distributions. 2Giirdenfors and Sahlin (1982a) derive the recommendations allowed by the permissibility interpretation of credal states from a decision theory that exploits sets of probability Thus, when belief states are represented as sets of probability distributions under the permissibility interpretation, there are implications ensuing for rational choice which strict Bayesians cannot countenance even Thesis 2: Jeffrey's sets of distributions can be given a black box interpretation; but then the set of probability distributions cannot be "naturally identified" with (i.e., represent) the belief state.	./cache/work_mevw4vudavasnh3e26u6ahv4ke.pdf	./txt/work_mevw4vudavasnh3e26u6ahv4ke.txt