id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_m2yevwxc2jaflaoczu24axrz7y	Elliott O. Wagner	Evolving to Divide the Fruits of Cooperation*	2012	15	.pdf	application/pdf	5573	515	61	rather than examining the dynamics of the individual games, the interactions are combined so that players first choose whether to cooperate, and then, if they jointly cooperate, they bargain over the fruits of their cooperation. replicator dynamics and reinforcement learning.1 Similarly, fairness is often viewed as an equal split in a bargaining game. Furthermore, for some payoffs the basin of attraction for cooperation in the stag hunt is also increased. In the Nash demand or bargaining game, however, players simultaneously demand portions of a pie of size C. Like the stag hunt, bargaining games have also been suggested as idealizations of social contract formation. both players choose hare is a Nash equilibrium of this game. Phase portraits for both the stag hunt (a) and the Nash demand game Replicator dynamics for the compound cooperation/bargaining game Replicator dynamics for the compound cooperation/bargaining game and fair division than either the stand-alone stag hunt is for cooperation	./cache/work_m2yevwxc2jaflaoczu24axrz7y.pdf	./txt/work_m2yevwxc2jaflaoczu24axrz7y.txt