id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_jbghm2evgresfd2b3hlx43vtoy	David Glick	Generalism and the Metaphysics of Ontic Structural Realism	2018	21	.pdf	application/pdf	9857	663	55	given in terms of individuals bearing properties, but rather, general facts about which Structural realism in the philosophy of science maintains that our best scientific theories tell the world is not given in terms of individuals bearing properties, but rather, general facts version of structural realism, OSR requires making a concession to the antirealist; much OSR draws motivation from two main paths: the problem of theory change in the philosophy Instead of telling us what individuals there are and how they're propertied, generalism provides a qualitative description of the entire situation—only its structure, one might by Dasgupta's claim that there are no (facts about) individuals grounding general states In the above, it was assumed that OSR seeks to replace the default "objects bearing properties" view with a rival metaphysical account that consists of only structure. meta-metaphysical view, by contrast, allows for OSR to explain permutation invariance in	./cache/work_jbghm2evgresfd2b3hlx43vtoy.pdf	./txt/work_jbghm2evgresfd2b3hlx43vtoy.txt