id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_hki2ank2sffa5iabwiixdw6eie	James M. Joyce	Why We Still Need the Logic of Decision	2000	14	.pdf	application/pdf	6954	640	64	In The Logic of Decision Richard Jeffrey defends a version of expected utility theory In contrast with other decision theories, it is not possible within Jeffrey's framework to secure expected utility obtain them within Jeffrey's theory by imposing independent constraints on beliefs to go with the constraints we impose on preferences. * While Jeffrey's account is not viable as a logic of decision, its underlying account of rational belief and desire must be incorporated rational preferences and her beliefs, is the province of the theory of choice. Jeffrey's Theory of Pure Rationality: A confidence/preference ranking Most expected utility theories are founded on representation theorems that purport to deliver representations for preferences in which the probability in on rational belief from constraints on rational preference, pragmatist Bayesians may choose to reject Jeffrey's account in favor of some theory The reason is that we causal decision theorists need Jeffrey's theory to 	./cache/work_hki2ank2sffa5iabwiixdw6eie.pdf	./txt/work_hki2ank2sffa5iabwiixdw6eie.txt