id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_h7pyzymyzjca3gzdylkp32552y	Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay	Two Dogmas of Strong Objective Bayesianism	2010	21	.pdf	application/pdf	11370	815	59	scientific inference, in particular that concerning evidential relations, is not (in the appropriate sense) logical, the second fails to provide a non-question-begging account of 'same (i) Bernardo thinks that the agent's background information should help the investigator build a statistical model, hence ultimately influence which prior the latter For simple statistical hypotheses, the Bayes factor and the likelihood ratio are identical, and capture the bare essentials of an account of evidence without any appeal to prior probability (Berger 1985, The first set of agents holds the same background information including the belief that simpler theories should be assigned high prior probabilities. One possible response to our second objection, that sameness of background information does not force different agents to arrive at one unique probability for a conclusion is that it not a genuine problem for strong objectivism. something like exchangeability to arrive at a unique probability, then the further question arises, 'how does a strong objectivist differ from a personalist Bayesian who	./cache/work_h7pyzymyzjca3gzdylkp32552y.pdf	./txt/work_h7pyzymyzjca3gzdylkp32552y.txt