id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_gqwr6lebjvfzrf4v2scdzb4qhe	James M. Joyce	A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism	1998	29	.pdf	application/pdf	13704	1052	69	The pragmatic character of the Dutch book argument makes it unsuitable as an "epistemic" justification for the fundamental probabilist dogma that rational partial beliefs Moreover, when called upon to defend the claim that rational degrees of belief must obey the laws of probability we generally and then explaining why having beliefs that obey the laws of probability contributes to the basic epistemic goal of accuracy. will then follow from NGA that it is irrational, from the purely epistemic perspective, to hold partial beliefs that violate the laws of probability. Section 5 shows that degrees of belief which violate the axioms of probability are less accurate than they otherwise could be relative to any reasonable measure of accuracy. and precise that their strengths can be measured by a real-valued credence function b that assigns every proposition X ( Q a unique degree truth-value, so too the accuracy of a partial belief should be a function 	./cache/work_gqwr6lebjvfzrf4v2scdzb4qhe.pdf	./txt/work_gqwr6lebjvfzrf4v2scdzb4qhe.txt