id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_gmxk5xdl25hz5gkowey3evndhi	Jenann Ismael	Science and the Phenomenal	1999	20	.pdf	application/pdf	9658	477	63	This paper has three parts: I will say what the hard problem is supposed to be, describe a way of thinking of physical theories that is as the identification of an ostended bit of physical space and the coordinates assigned the spot on a map of the terrain, which is to say are supposed to stand against any identification of phenomenal properties with their physical bases, the arguments from which the hardness by a space of metaphysically possible worlds (one for each mathematically describable assignment of properties to arrangements of individuals), with a distinguished class corresponding to the physical possi The fact that such and such a physical property represents this rather than that phenomenal one is a fact about the interpretation of the maps of possibility space contained in our physical point to apparently possible worlds in which physical and phenomenal our epistemic relations to physical and phenomenal properties.	./cache/work_gmxk5xdl25hz5gkowey3evndhi.pdf	./txt/work_gmxk5xdl25hz5gkowey3evndhi.txt