id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_fxcw6o4wrnepzfm3fc3aujxuy4	Kristina Rolin	Values in Science: The Case of Scientific Collaboration	2015	21	.pdf	application/pdf	9846	756	57	I examine the epistemic structure of scientific collaboration and argue that it gives rise to two arguments showing that moral and social values can legitimately play a role in scientists' decision to accept something as scientific knowledge. Arguments against the ideal are advanced in tandem with case studies where moral and social values are claimed to play a legitimate role in of philosophers argue that the value-free ideal is not feasible because nonepistemic values can legitimately influence the choice of background assumptions that play a role in a scientist's decision to accept a hypothesis individual scientists and scientific communities, they all neglect an intermediate social level in science: research groups. insofar as collective acceptance and trust-based acceptance play an epistemic role in science, some moral and social values can play a legitimate Therefore, a joint commitment provides group members with a moral and social reason for asserting and supporting a view (see also Mathiesen 2006, 169).	./cache/work_fxcw6o4wrnepzfm3fc3aujxuy4.pdf	./txt/work_fxcw6o4wrnepzfm3fc3aujxuy4.txt