id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_ewuoprvborejjheg6xklspkdri	Judith K. Crane	On the Metaphysics of Species*	2004	18	.pdf	application/pdf	8082	523	54	biology believe that species are individuals whose parts are organisms. arguments that have been given for the species-as-individuals thesis (SAI) Kitcher argues that both individuals and sets of organisms may be historically connected in this way, so the claim that species are historical is fact that biologists continue to conceive species as ''classes of organisms Hull rightly insists that our ordinary intuitions regarding concept applicability are not particularly relevant, because the conceptual prohibition against re-evolving species flows from biological usage. identifies a species with a set of organisms consisting of a founder population plus some of its descendants. species are natural kinds, then, they are sets, the members of which share Ghiselin and Hull endorse Relational Species Concepts, and Mayr Kitcher ([1984] 1992), species are ''sets of organisms related to one that species are theoretically interesting sets, or natural kinds. species may be neither individuals nor sets, but ''historical entities,''	./cache/work_ewuoprvborejjheg6xklspkdri.pdf	./txt/work_ewuoprvborejjheg6xklspkdri.txt