id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_djb7iwd5o5frzghd5hcjdm4w2e	Simon M. Huttegger	Evolution and the Explanation of Meaning*	2007	27	.pdf	application/pdf	12189	1454	75	The state-act coordination problem underlying our simple signaling Simple signaling games based on state-act coordination problems can Simple signaling games based on state-act coordination problems can These questions become particularly pressing if the candidates for conventions are entirely symmetric as they are in a simple signaling game. of conventions is guaranteed because the structure of the game, the payoffs, and the rationality of the players are common knowledge. of the rest points of signaling games under the replicator dynamics (1). points in for the evolutionary dynamics of signaling games aref(n)int(D ) Notice that Theorem 6 holds for the replicator dynamics of any symmetrized simple signaling game. results to the theorems above, Pawlowitsch (2006) proposes another interpretation of the fact that the replicator dynamics can generically converge to suboptimal states. signaling games this means that more than one state of the world may The results on the evolutionary dynamics of signaling games may generalized simple signaling games, almost every initial state converges	./cache/work_djb7iwd5o5frzghd5hcjdm4w2e.pdf	./txt/work_djb7iwd5o5frzghd5hcjdm4w2e.txt