id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_coedkfbp5fckrhit27d66squea	Nicholas Maxwell	Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Incompatible?	1985	22	.pdf	application/pdf	10200	590	47	Thus special relativity denies that there exists the kind of absolute, universal, frame-independent distinction between past and future, does not contradict special relativity, interpreted in this somewhat phenomenalistic way, as long as all actual causal evolutions of physical states special relativity interpreted realistically, to assert that all inertial reference frames are physically, ontologically equivalent, there existing nothing physical (such as an ether, or instantaneous annihilation of spatially Given ontological probabilism, the world cannot be conceived of as spread out in Minkowskian space-time, as it can given predictive probabilism, just because this ignores the physical reality of future with Newtonian space-time does not, it should be noted, face this objection since in this case alternative possibilities are all in the future; and special relativity in such a way that objectism is presupposed; it was Minkowski who was responsible subsequently for the space-time, eventism 	./cache/work_coedkfbp5fckrhit27d66squea.pdf	./txt/work_coedkfbp5fckrhit27d66squea.txt