id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_by7cq5kzt5h4bokktu4f2fjmje	David Christensen	Confirmational Holism and Bayesian Epistemology	1992	19	.pdf	application/pdf	8527	491	49	The central Bayesian requirement of rationality is that an agent's degrees of belief conform to the probability calculus. The agent becomes certain of various propositions-that is, assigns them probability 1--directly, on the basis of experience. On Jeffrey's model of learning, experience changes the probability of This new degree of belief in G becomes the input to Jeffrey's learning model. who is about to examine the same cloth under the same lighting conditions, has a certain background belief: She gives a relatively high probability to the proposition that she is a subject in a perceptual psychology Thus the perceptual learning described in Jeffrey's cloth case cannot be fully accounted for even on the liberal version of the Conditionalization model.' role of background beliefs while avoiding the assumption that the probabilities of some propositions are determined directly by experience. by looking at two related attempts-by Carnap and by Field-to construct learning models that did not use the agent's postexperience degrees 	./cache/work_by7cq5kzt5h4bokktu4f2fjmje.pdf	./txt/work_by7cq5kzt5h4bokktu4f2fjmje.txt