id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_a5hyfypnzjflpkgiqahhdg7et4	Juha T. Saatsi	On the Pessimistic Induction and Two Fallacies	2005	14	.pdf	application/pdf	5272	264	58	record of successful yet false theories to argue against the connection that realists like to draw (3) Then most past scientific theories are false, since they differ from current successful (Laudan 1981), or that 'the success of a theory is a reliable test for its (approximate) truth' (Lewis (1*) Of all the successful theories, current and past, most are taken to be false by the (3*) Success of a current theory is not a reliable indicator of its truth (by the reductio (4*) Therefore any current successful theory is probably false by inductive reasoning. This argument concludes that any one current successful theory, ceteris paribus, is probably false of [PMI*], and many realists indeed argue that at least some current successful theories are not on For Lewis the problem is that 'the premise that many false past theories were successful the PMI does not conclude that most current successful theories are probably false, the anti-realist has 	./cache/work_a5hyfypnzjflpkgiqahhdg7et4.pdf	./txt/work_a5hyfypnzjflpkgiqahhdg7et4.txt