id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_7upq5uoyeffytgkapewib5co5i	Simon M. Huttegger	Robustness in Signaling Games	2007	9	.pdf	application/pdf	3724	426	68	In this paper I show that the basic results for the replicator dynamics of signaling These results show that standard evolutionary dynamics is quite likely to lead to states of partial communication. 2. Signaling Games and Standard Evolutionary Dynamics. If we assume that the players get the same payoff for each outcome,1 then a simple signaling game may be defined as a tripleSn The replicator dynamics of signaling games has been studied in Huttegger 2007. A game dynamics (2) is said to be payoff monotonic if and only if between payoff monotonic dynamics and the replicator equations (for a points of the replicator dynamics indeed carry over to payoff monotonic replicator dynamics of signaling games [Huttegger 2007]. states for any payoff monotonic dynamics (2) of .rSn stationary states for payoff monotonic dynamics coincide with the stability properties of rest points for under payoff monotonic dynamics.rSn replicator dynamics, that is, in which the evolution of signaling systems	./cache/work_7upq5uoyeffytgkapewib5co5i.pdf	./txt/work_7upq5uoyeffytgkapewib5co5i.txt