id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_6nrxiwebsnfdngbhgdjsynb3va	Teddy Seidenfeld	A Conflict between Finite Additivity and Avoiding Dutch Book	1983	18	.pdf	application/pdf	7423	678	70	For Savage (1954) as for de Finetti (1974), the existence of subjective (personal) probability is a consequence of the normative theory of preference. Specifically, these authors argue that the theory of subjective probability is reducible to the theory of reasonable preference, i.e. coherent belief is a consequence of rational desire. expected utility hypothesis fails for acts with denumerably many outcomes, when probability (extraneous or otherwise) is merely finitely additive and consequences are absent. The first six of Savage's axioms yield a theory of expected utility for gambles, i.e. acts which produce at most finitely many hypothesis is valid for acts in general, some replacement for P7 is necessary even if the theory is worked out in a countably additive spirit. *Fishburn (1970, Theorem 14.1) offers a weakened version of P7 which suffices to extend expected utility theory to acts in general. Savage's theory all acts are equivalent given a null event.	./cache/work_6nrxiwebsnfdngbhgdjsynb3va.pdf	./txt/work_6nrxiwebsnfdngbhgdjsynb3va.txt