id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_6g2p65rvxff4fplbrlvwjdgynm	Markus I. Eronen	No Levels, No Problems: Downward Causation in Neuroscience	2013	12	.pdf	application/pdf	5247	340	63	I show that the recent account of levels in neuroscience proposed by Craver and Bechtel is incompatible with Craver and Bechtel's account of downward causation. Carl Craver and Bill Bechtel have recently presented a theory of "levels of mechanisms" Craver and Bechtel claim that although levels of mechanisms is certainly not the neuroscience and downward causation, but the general arguments I raise against levels apply Craver and Bechtel see this as a point in favor of the mechanistic account of levels, since For example, a component C1 of mechanism M is at one level lower than component C2 of M is also one level lower than the mechanism M, and its subcomponent S2 is (or component-mechanism) relation are not at higher or lower levels with respect to each the same mechanistic level is that they are in the same mechanism, and neither is a component 	./cache/work_6g2p65rvxff4fplbrlvwjdgynm.pdf	./txt/work_6g2p65rvxff4fplbrlvwjdgynm.txt