id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_5iohwi7axfhhtn56twyz25i72e	Bradford Skow	Levels of Reasons and Causal Explanation	2017	12	.pdf	application/pdf	5656	426	76	I defend the theory that the reasons why some event occurred are its causes. An example that treats a secondlevel reason as a first-level reason will look like a counterexample if that second-level Reasons on the two different levels appear in answers to different why questions. The first-level reasons are the facts that belong in the complete answer In fact, I hold that laws of nature are second-level reasons that are not I asserted without argument that laws are second-level reasons, but this is In the simple example, I know that if I just answer the question by saying no, then Sally will immediately ask me why he is not coming. In other words: Fisher's explanation does not say, for example, that the sex ratio in the year 1000 was such and such and that this caused In this article I have presented a new causal theory of explanation that says that the reasons why an event occurred are its causes.	./cache/work_5iohwi7axfhhtn56twyz25i72e.pdf	./txt/work_5iohwi7axfhhtn56twyz25i72e.txt