id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_56ecc6wikzhz7ng4ohvu27ld3i	K Hutchison	What are conditional probabilities conditional upon?	1999	31	.pdf	application/pdf	15815	1442	66	This paper rejects a traditional epistemic interpretation of conditional probability. standard epistemic interpretation of conditional probability (the 'Rule of ' For here: PtXnY) = 1 (thc probability-prior-to-the-new-lnformation of the family BOTH containing two boys AND at least one hoy). understands how the information is being released, should allocate a probability of ~ to there being two girls in the family if he finds out there is at least observer should obviously reject this standard answer ~ (for the probability of two boys) aftcr finding out by this means there is a boy in the chance-process: onc can rationally update probabilities after receiving claims In consequence, the revised probability recommended by this version of the conditioning process is now 1. obscrver Adam's understanding of the observation-process is acquired separately from (and well before) the new knowledge about the outcome of the the observation-processes that provide the updating information about 	./cache/work_56ecc6wikzhz7ng4ohvu27ld3i.pdf	./txt/work_56ecc6wikzhz7ng4ohvu27ld3i.txt