id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_4qu4b5aspfhfbazhkhrwpgnupa	Boaz Miller	Science, values, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge	2014	18	.pdf	application/pdf	10207	654	56	judgments in science, and psychological evidence about people's inability to objectively reason about Keywords Science and Values; Knowledge; Action; Subject-Sensitive Invariantism; Interest-Relative for scientific theory acceptance inevitably involve social value judgments. I devote the bulk of the paper to arguing that considerations against valuefree science and empirical psychological evidence about the limits of human rationality 2 Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge and the Value-Free Ideal of that Douglas draws between an epistemic judgment, evidence, and social values in their Gettier (1963) made clear that mere justified true belief is not knowledge. (7) Justifiably accepted scientific theories satisfy the belief condition for acceptance of scientific theories satisfies the justification condition for knowledge. knowledge do not and should not exceed the standard of justified acceptance of wellestablished scientific theories. scientific theories is that epistemic standards for knowledge should not exceed normal theories as knowledge, because in the process of their acceptance, scientists for the 	./cache/work_4qu4b5aspfhfbazhkhrwpgnupa.pdf	./txt/work_4qu4b5aspfhfbazhkhrwpgnupa.txt