id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_4mr5swfc2negddomneag4bqtvu	Jacqueline Anne Sullivan	Construct Stabilization and the Unity of the Mind-Brain Sciences	2016	12	.pdf	application/pdf	5084	326	39	This article offers a critique of an account of explanatory integration that claims that explanations of cognitive capacities by functional analyses and mechanistic explanations It is shown that achieving such explanatory integration requires that the terms designating cognitive capacities in the two forms of explanation are In section 3, I make the case that the integration of functional analyses and mechanistic explanations requires that components of the two types of explanation, namely, cognitive capacities, are stable. both within and across the relevant areas of science is not directed at stabilizing the meanings of the terms designating cognitive capacities that occur in More specifically, the terms designating cognitive capacities in an explanation by functional analysis must have roughly the same referents as the For example, an experimental paradigm used to investigate a cognitive capacity like spatial memory will include a set of production procedures that specify the stimuli (e.g., distal and local cues) to be	./cache/work_4mr5swfc2negddomneag4bqtvu.pdf	./txt/work_4mr5swfc2negddomneag4bqtvu.txt