id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_3iyijyyk5zectbkzfv3ieq25ii	H. Orri Stefánsson	How Valuable Are Chances?	2015	39	.pdf	application/pdf	11990	805	67	Chance Neutrality, David Lewis' (1980) Principal Principle, according to which a person Hence, we make room for attitudes that violate Chance Instrumentalism/Neutrality without running the risk of trivialising decision theory.6 Secondly, while our version of the Principal Principle makes reference to an arbitrary partition of propositions {Ai} with respect to which chances are specified, Lewis's is restricted In other words, Chance Neutrality and the Principal Principle entail Linearity. Now it follows from the above observation that what is entailed by the Principal Principle and Chance Neutrality is Linearity limited to propositions for which the agent in question Given the Principal Principle, Chance Neutrality* implies Linearity*. But the Principal Principle entails that P(Wi | 〈Ch(Wi) = αi〉) = αi and Chance Neutrality* The best way to evaluate the Principal Principle as a norm of practical rationality, is to envision a situation where we are choosing between 'lotteries' with known (and fixed) chances	./cache/work_3iyijyyk5zectbkzfv3ieq25ii.pdf	./txt/work_3iyijyyk5zectbkzfv3ieq25ii.txt