id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_33fl3nmtkbgn7oyvtpw3fpe3vq	Branden Fitelson	Logical Foundations of Evidential Support	2006	6	.pdf	application/pdf	5564	388	63	Carnap's inductive logic (or confirmation) project is revisited from an "increase in firmness" (or probabilistic relevance) point of view. The emphasis here will be on explaining how Carnap's epistemological desiderata for inductive logic will xvi) distinguished two kinds of inductive-logical confirmation relations: confirmation as firmness, which he informally characterized as "How probable the logic (the confirmation as increase in firmness relation), and epistemology (the For Carnap, then, inductive logic involves a confirmation relation c which has 4Here, I have in mind Carnap's early writings on confirmation and inductive logic. by Carnap (1962) in his discussion of confirmation as increase in firmness. like the sort of bridge principle Carnap wanted (as stated above) for for confirmation as firmness and credence. am suggesting the following bridge principle (or inference rule) relating confirmation as increase in firmness and evidential support: bridge principles relating comparative confirmation (as increase in firmness)	./cache/work_33fl3nmtkbgn7oyvtpw3fpe3vq.pdf	./txt/work_33fl3nmtkbgn7oyvtpw3fpe3vq.txt