Reclaiming the Individual From Hofstede’s Ecological Analysis—
A 20-Year Odyssey: Comment on Oyserman et al. (2002)

Michael Harris Bond
Chinese University of Hong Kong

D. Oyserman, H. M. Coon, and M. Kemmelmeier (2002) challenge the stereotype that European
Americans are more individualistic and less collectivistic than persons from most other ethnic groups.
The author contends that this stereotype took firm empirical root with G. Hofstede’s (1980) monumental
publication identifying the United States as the most individualistic of his then 40 nations. This empirical
designation arose because of challengeable decisions Hofstede made about the analysis of his data and
the labeling of his dimensions. The conflation of concepts under the rubric of cultural individualism plus
psychologists’ unwarranted psychologizing of the construct then combined with Hofstede’s empirical
location of America to set a 20-year agenda for data collection. Oyserman et al. disentangle and organize
this mass of studies, enabling the discipline of cross-cultural psychology to forge ahead in more
productive directions, less reliant on previous assumptions and measures.

First to enter is the master—Book of Han by Pan Ku (A.D. 32–92)

The heroic integration of research on individualism–
collectivism by Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier (2002)
touches on some issues that have exercised me considerably over
the last quarter century of doing cross-cultural social/personality
psychology. I take this opportunity to comment on one of these
issues: the freeing of our discipline from the intellectual shackles
of Hofstede’s (1980) intellectual achievement. I believe that we
cross-cultural psychologists have long been held in thrall by Hof-
stede’s essential contribution and that many continue to misunder-
stand what he did, wrestling with the ghosts of his legacy instead
of developing cross-cultural psychology in more productive direc-
tions. Those directions include identifying individual-level con-
structs whose strength and connections with other constructs need
to be examined across cultural groups; linking the strength of these
individual constructs to socialization practices and institutional
processes, which vary across cultural groups; examining the im-
portance of extraindividual factors, such as norms, roles, and
aspects of language, in generating social cognitions and behavior;
and searching out novel constructs, processes, and theories ex-
plaining human social behavior from the repository of non-
Western cultural traditions (Smith & Bond, in press).

This reflection focuses on the first of these directions and begins
by considering why cross-cultural psychologists have spent the
last 20 years reaching the disciplinary conclusion about
individualism– collectivism described by Oyserman et al. (2002).
By understanding this laborious process, I hope that the field can
move forward more adroitly in the 21st century.

Hofstede’s (1980) Nation-Mapping

Hofstede is an organizational sociologist with an engineering
background (see Hofstede, 1997). As research director at IBM in
the mid-1960s, he had access to its employee survey, which
surveyed equivalent, stratified samples of its workers in more
than 40 countries. This survey included 32 items that Hofstede
(1980) described as work goals or values. For each of his (initial-
ly) 40 nations, Hofstede computed an average score for the en-
dorsement given by each nation-sample to each of those 32 work-
related values. He then produced a correlation matrix for these 32
average “nation-values.” This matrix was factor analyzed, yielding
three factors, the largest of which was subdivided. This procedure
yielded four dimensions by which nations could be described in
terms of their factor score on each of the four dimensions. Hof-
stede had mapped the values of nations much as former Dutch
explorers had mapped the geography of terra incognita.

Hofstede’s (1980) Herculean achievement was to provide the
social sciences with an empirical mapping of 40 of the world’s
major nations across four dimensions of culture, integrating these
results with previous theorizing and data about national cultures,
dimension by dimension. Social scientists were galvanized, and in
the ensuing 20 years, Hofstede has become one of the most widely
cited social scientists of all time (Hofstede, 1997). Cross-cultural
psychologists like myself felt ourselves unleashed because we now
enjoyed an empirical justification for considering our samples
of subjects to be drawn from nations with different positions on
one of Hofstede’s four dimensions. In part because of its distin-
guished lineage in the social sciences, that dimension was usually
individualism– collectivism.

Nation-Level Individualism–Collectivism

One wonders how the last 20 years of cross-cultural psychology
would have differed if Hofstede (1980) had not made a number of
crucial choices. The first was to label one of his four factors,
individualism– collectivism. Six nation-values, in this case work

I wish to express my thanks to Peter B. Smith for his wise counsel on
an earlier version of this article.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Michael
Harris Bond, Department of Psychology, Chinese University of Hong Kong,
Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong, S. A. R. China. E-mail: mhb@cuhk.edu.hk

Psychological Bulletin Copyright 2002 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
2002, Vol. 128, No. 1, 73–77 0033-2909/02/$5.00 DOI: 10.1037//0033-2909.128.1.73

73



goals, constituted the factor. Personal time, freedom, and challenge
were added together to define and constitute the individualism end
of the dimension; use of skills, physical conditions, and training
were added together to define and constitute the opposite end of
the bipolar factor. The first three work goals bear obvious relations
to individualism as that multifaceted construct has been discussed
in the literature of the social sciences. How the last three work
goals described anything resembling collectivism was, however, a
mystery to many.

Those three work goals constituted a bipolar contrast to the three
individualistic items. Given linguistic conventions and theoretical
comparisons developed in previous sociology, the temptation to
label the contrasting three work goals as collectivism must have
been overwhelming. I suggest that this labeling of a bipolar con-
trast drawn at the national level has structured our subsequent
thinking about this construct as a bipolar contrast at the individual
level.

I find it intriguing that Hofstede’s (1980) decision at another
choice point may have deeded us this contrast. Factor analyses of
raw value scores yield factors with values all loading positively on
their prime factor. Hofstede, however, had first standardized his 32
nation-values within each of his 40 nations to eliminate any
acquiescence bias that may have distorted a nation’s resulting
position on the extracted factors. This procedure yields both pos-
itively and negatively loading items, thereby creating bipolar con-
trasts in the resulting factor loadings. Hofstede subsequently found
that the extent of a country’s acquiescence bias correlated with its
score on one of his four dimensions, power distance. As Hofstede
argued, it makes sense that persons socialized into a hierarchical
social system should be inclined to agree with most things asso-
ciated with authority, like items in an employee survey.

Thus, a nation’s degree of acquiescence has a meaningful rela-
tionship to one of the extracted dimensions and may encapsulate
important cultural distinctions. Had Hofstede (1980) not standard-
ized the 32 work-related values within each nation, the subsequent
nation positions may well have been the same as they were
following his standardization. Indeed, my collaborators and I
found that standardizing our Chinese values in 22 different nations
made no difference in the resulting country positions when com-
pared with results from the nonstandardized solution (Chinese
Culture Connection, 1987). So, had Hofstede not standardized his
nation-values within each nation, thereby generating bipolar di-
mensions, the contrast of collectivism against individualism might
never have influenced our subsequent work.

The United States and Individualism

Nonetheless, these six particular and perhaps peculiar work
goals, three positive, three negative, were combined to yield scores
for each of the 40 nations. By happy chance, the United States was
located at the extreme of the dimension, the very exemplar of
Hofstede’s (1980) individualism. The United States is the center of
the world as far as the production of social science (Featherman,
1993) and empirical psychology is concerned. Consequently, it
constitutes the contrasting culture against which most cross-
cultural comparisons are made. Many literate, scholarly essays had
long been a part of our disciplinary corpus, contrasting some
cultural system with the American cultural system and using the

contrasting concepts of individualism– collectivism to frame that
discussion (e.g., Hsu, 1953).

A plethora of cross-cultural research began to emerge after the
publication of Hofstede’s (1980), Culture’s Consequences, fram-
ing comparisons between American results and those of other
cultures, usually Asian, in terms of individualism– collectivism.
Given the richness of this concept, authors found this an easy
argument to cast. The findings were cooperative too, given the
elasticity of the conceptual contrast and the standard operating
procedure of using only two cultural groups and then comparing
the average score of American respondents with that of respon-
dents from some non-Anglo Saxon nation.

Few psychologists read Hofstede’s (1980) detailed methodology
closely. Most forgot that Hofstede had extracted the dimension of
individualism– collectivism by subdividing the larger first factor
that emerged from his initial 40-nation factor analysis. Hofstede
labeled the other subfactor power distance, with an individualism–
collectivism and power distance correlation of -.67. On this di-
mension of power distance, the United States was not located in an
extreme position, with 14 countries showing lesser power distance.
Had Hofstede stayed with his original three-factor solution and its
strong first factor, it seems most unlikely that the United States
would have been first among his 40 nations. More likely it would
have been Israel, Ireland, Denmark, Great Britain, or Australia.
Even if Hofstede had persisted with the label individualism–
collectivism, would we still have enjoyed the efflorescence of
cross-cultural studies on this cultural concept had the United States
not been its prime exemplar?

The Puzzling Position of Japan

As Oyserman et al. (2002) remind us, Japan is perhaps the most
intensely studied exemplar of the collectivist cultural extreme,
certainly by cross-cultural psychologists. It was, however, not the
obvious choice for a contrast using Hofstede’s (1980) taxonomy
because 16 of Hofstede’s 40 countries are even more collectivistic
than Japan. On power distance it was 22nd, close to the United
States’s 15th position. Again, this closer inspection of Hofstede’s
results suggests that had Hofstede left his first factor intact, Japan
and the United States would have been cultural neighbors, not
distant contrasts. Indeed, a two-factor solution (Bond, 1996) to a
more recent multicultural study of values (Schwartz, 1994) puts
Japan and the United States in almost the same exact position from
among the 37 countries in the array! Therefore, one might well ask
why Oyserman et al. evinced such surprise in their readers when
they convincingly demonstrated, as have Takano and Osaka
(1999), that Japanese are often more individualistic, not less, than
Americans? Using hindsight, we never should have been so
surprised.

Psychologizing National Individualism–Collectivism

Hofstede’s (1980) four-dimensional mapping of national values
met a growing academic hunger for structure concerning culture.
Previously, cultural contrasts in the social sciences had often
seemed tendentious, Procrustean, and ideological. By contrast,
Hofstede had deployed the full scientific armamentarium of ana-
lytical techniques to 116,000 questionnaires gathered from
matched samples in 40 nations, repeated twice, in 1967 and 1971.

74 BOND



He then positioned these 40 nations on his four dimensions and
supported this dimensionalizing with a daunting array of support-
ive theory and findings culled from his extensive knowledge of the
social science literature. I submit that social psychologists were
mesmerized by this “fearful symmetry” and all too willingly
ignored anomalies and the fine print.

Many overlooked Hofstede’s (1980) division of his first factor,
embraced his location of the United States as the highest of the 40
nations on individualism, accepted his characterization of coun-
tries high on the six work goals as validly defining a contrast
between individualism– collectivism, and then proceeded to com-
mit the ecological fallacy of regarding Americans as the world’s
most individualistic persons. Hofstede (1980) had warned readers
about this flaw in logic. The ecological fallacy occurs when an
association among nation-level variables (ecological indices) is
assumed to apply to individuals. Such a fallacy would be perpe-
trated, for example, if readers assumed that the six work goals
defining nation-level individualism– collectivism in Hofstede’s
analysis would likewise define individualism– collectivism at the
individual level.

If one could legitimately do so, it would be a simple extension
of Hofstede’s (1980) results to conclude that because the United
States was first in nation-level individualism and last in nation-
level collectivism, Americans are therefore more individualistic
and less collectivistic on average than persons from any other
country. Social scientists may not do so. As has been shown by
many authors (e.g., Hofstede, Bond, & Luk, 1993; K. Leung, 1989;
Shweder, 1973), the pattern of correlations at the national (or
organizational or group) level is not replicated at the individual
level. Even though some forcefully argue that there is pressure
within the social system for an individual organization of value
groupings to align itself with a national organization of value
groupings (Schwartz, 1994), in practice such isomorphism does
not occur. Nation-level constructs are not logically or empirically
constituted the same way as individual-level constructs, conve-
nient as it would be.

Unpackaging Individualism Psychologically

Many cross-cultural psychologists were alert to this fallacy and
struggled to ladder Hofstede down from the national to the indi-
vidual level. If one could identify an equivalent construct measur-
ing individual-level individualism, then one could begin examin-
ing relations between this individual-level individualism and other
relevant variables within a number of national groups to see if
these relations were culture-general or culture-specific. Psychol-
ogy could then move toward creating universal theories that were
empirically grounded in findings from a number of different cul-
tural groups.

In fact, Bosland (1985), an associate of Hofstede’s, tried to
examine the associations among the Hofstede (1980) work goals at
the individual level across 10 of the Hofstede nations. He found it
impossible to extract a metrically equivalent grouping or set of
groupings at the individual level from so many different cultural
groups. Metrically equivalent groupings of items into constructs
are necessary when one wants to compare individuals and indi-
vidual processes across different cultural groups (Van de Vijver &
Leung, 1997). Procedures for assessing equivalence have been
developed for comparisons across two cultural groups, such as

Cronbach alphas for item groupings and coefficients of congru-
ence for factor structures. However, when these criteria are ex-
tended beyond two cultural groups, it becomes very difficult to
achieve the levels of metric equivalence normally judged to be
adequate in two-culture comparisons.

I, for example, pooled and factor analyzed balanced data sets of
values from 22 nations, extracting two factors (Bond, 1988). These
two factors, however, accounted for only 13% of the common
variance. That would seem a paltry amount in a monocultural
factor analysis, but how else should one assess such a level of
commonality across 2,200 persons from 22 different cultural
groups? What should the percentage of accountable variance and
the distribution of alphas or of coefficients of congruence look like
across persons from such a large set of constituent cultural groups?
Cross-cultural psychologists had no statistical ways to assess this
question.

Confirmatory factor analysis required a standard solution
against which the other solutions could be compared. But in
multicultural data sets, which culture was to provide the standard
solution? The historical operating procedure had been to export a
test of some construct usually developed in the United States and
use the scoring scheme developed there as the standard. That
procedure was labeled imposed etic by Berry (1969) and smacked
of intellectual imperialism because it implied that the United States
and its people could be used to define the organization of the
psychological world. When culture was the object of scientific
inquiry, however, openness to all cultural possibilities was a sine
qua non. Every culture’s voice must be equally privileged.

Hofstede (1980) in the Context of Psychological
Discovery

Hofstede (1980) provided a richly textured description of what
he deemed to be the components of each of his four cultural
dimensions. The inclusion of each component was justified by a
host of theoretical underpinnings and validational evidence from
national indexes. This cataloging of components provided fodder
for eager instrumentation by cross-cultural psychologists (e.g.,
Triandis et al., 1986), just as Hall’s (1976) work on high- and
low-context cultures later did for studies of communication across
cultures (Gudykunst et al., 1996).

Such concerns about instrumenting individual-level compari-
sons became ever more pressing with the publication of Markus
and Kitayama’s (1991) seminal article on independent and inter-
dependent self-construals as organizing constructs in motivation,
emotion, and cognition. Their article stimulated the development
of measures for independent and interdependent self-construals
(e.g., Gudykunst et al., 1996; Singelis, 1994). Comparisons of
Japanese and Americans on these sorts of measures yielded the
surprise noted by Oyserman et al. (2002) that Japanese were
sometimes more individualistic and sometimes less collectivistic
than Americans. Given the discipline’s history with the construct
of individualism– collectivism and Hofstede’s (1980) by now
widely known results, it is perhaps understandable that most of us
were surprised by these findings. We expected the Japanese to be
less individualistic and more collectivistic than the Americans.

75RECLAIMING THE INDIVIDUAL: COMMENT



Comparing Nations in Their Level of Psychological
Individualism

Oyserman et al. (2002) have content-analyzed the themes found
in the multitude of tests developed for individualism and for
collectivism at the individual level. Their seven individualism and
eight collectivism content domains underscore the complexity and
richness of this construct as it has been operationalized in the
social sciences. These categories are numerous and their opera-
tionalized constructs are correlated with one another to varying
degrees. There is a keen need to deconflate and integrate these
various measures conceptually. Perhaps, as Oyserman et al. sur-
mised, it will be concluded that the omnibus labels individualism
and collectivism are too broad and inclusive to be retained. Instead,
the discipline will move toward developing theories and conduct-
ing research on more focused aspects of individualism or of
collectivism. My guess is that the field will in fact abandon these
two overfreighted constructs altogether and move toward narrower
theories of culture based on more specific constructs.

Any one of these constructs could be used to map the psycho-
logical world in terms of average level of a construct in a nation’s
population, just as Hofstede (1980) mapped the national world.
The difficulties will be, first, ensuring adequate metric equivalence
for the construct across the populations in the national groups
included. Achieving such assurance may require the development
of new criteria about what constitutes equivalence and how to test
for it, as mentioned earlier (see Van de Vijver & Poortinga, 2001,
for a recently developed approach). With equivalent constructs
available, however, the field will be well positioned to test for
universal relationships and move toward developing universal
theories of social behavior (Smith & Bond, in press).

A second challenge will be to confront the consequences of the
heavy reliance noted by Oyserman et al. (2002) on Likert-type
scales to assess declarative self-knowledge. One such consequence
is the possibility that various response formats will affect the
resulting positioning of the typical person from various national
groups. Recent research on this problem by Chen, Lee, and Steven-
son (1995) has demonstrated that Chinese tend to use more mod-
erate responses but that such a moderation bias does not affect the
positioning of the average response of persons from the national
groups. Clearly, counterbalanced test items must be used to ensure
such an outcome. Some tests, such as those for values, invite a
different form of bias, the acquiescence bias, but as mentioned
above, this bias must itself be examined for its possibly useful
revelations about culture’s influence on psychological processes.

Subterranean Cultural Influences?

The above fine-tuning of measurement formats may, however,
distract the field from a more momentous problem. As Cohen
(1997) has pointed out, cultural influences on behavior may be
more pronounced precisely where they are less accessible:

But, because they are either so over-learned (or were never explicitly
taught in the first place), they may bypass conscious processing
altogether. Our verbal reports and judgments are most clearly tied to
conscious levels of processing, and so they may never get connected
with the cultural rules embedded in our preconscious. (p. 126)

Our reliance on verbal scales to assess declarative self-knowledge
may be disenabling the field from tapping into the more profound

reverberations of socialization through a collectivist or individu-
alist cultural system. For example, the characteristics of holistic
perception and responsiveness to the field theorized to distinguish
collectivists from individualists may be more accurately and val-
idly assessed by using tests designed to tap these less conscious
processes (see e.g., Abel & Hsu’s, 1949, use of Rorschach tests).
There has been a resurgence recently in the use of implicit (Mc-
Clelland, 1985) and at-a-distance (Winter, 1996) measures of
personality, many developed out of the earlier psychoanalytic
perspective. Despite improvements in the reliability of their scor-
ing (see e.g., Winter & Stewart, 1977), they have yet to be used in
cross-cultural work.

I expect that their use to measure aspects of individualism–
collectivism would yield greater predictive power than Oyserman
et al. (2002) pointed out is found with the denotative, declarative
measures for self-assessment currently in vogue. At least, they
may provide additional, nonoverlapping sources of outcome pre-
diction. This improved predictability may include those topic areas
frequently studied at present, such as degree of externality in
attributions or directness of communication style. They may be
even more powerful predictive tools in areas of study that have
emerged out of collective cultural concerns, such as interpersonal
relatedness (Cheung et al., 2001) or relationship harmony (Kwan,
Bond, & Singelis, 1997). The emergence of these more social
constructs from collectivist cultural traditions raises the possibility
of using differently focused measures, such as ratings of others
(Bond, Kwan, & Li, 2000), and different sources of ratings, such
as ratings by others (S.-K. Leung & Bond, 2001), for tapping into
collectivist processes at the individual level. Surely one of the
liberations gained from studying collectivist cultures is to move
past the intellectual constraint of the subjectivism arising out of the
individualistic cultural legacy (Sampson, 1981).

Conclusion

In science, as in other endeavors, we as psychologists proceed
“through a glass darkly” with ever so human a frame. There seems
to me an inevitability in our halting progress toward our current
appreciation of how individualism– collectivism is represented at
the psychological level: Hofstede (1980) proposed, and we eagerly
disposed. The magnitude of his achievement and our need for
structure about culture often persuaded us to blind ourselves to
important logical and procedural details. Inattentiveness to these
details set us on a merry chase but has resulted in our spending
considerable time disentangling intellectual puzzles and resolving
apparent paradoxes.

I believe that some dawning discoveries have emerged from out of
this energetic deployment of intellectual curiosity: Individualism–
collectivism at the level of nations is not the same as individualism–
collectivism at the level of individuals, either conceptually or opera-
tionally; individualism and collectivism may be conceptualized and
measured as separate, not necessarily bipolar, constructs at the indi-
vidual level; the omnibus constructs of individualism and collectivism
are multifaceted, permitting many different operationalizations; atten-
tion to intellectual developments in psychology from collectivist cul-
tures may provide the field with valuable approaches to understanding
and measuring individualism and collectivism at the individual level;
and this measurement may not be best achieved by relying on explicit,

76 BOND



paper-and-pencil measures of declarative self-knowledge. That is a
useful yield; it is time to reap the harvest.

Every wall is a door.—Ralph Waldo Emerson

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Received April 25, 2001
Revision received May 4, 2001

Accepted May 4, 2001 �

77RECLAIMING THE INDIVIDUAL: COMMENT