Social Constructionism Now More Than Ever: Following the Hermeneutic Money Trail in a Post-Truth World


Social Constructionism Now More Than Ever:
Following the Hermeneutic Money Trail
in a Post-Truth World

Michael Adorjan1

Published online: 30 April 2019
# Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

In the summer of 2017, at the annual meetings of the Society for the Study of Social
Problems, I had the great privilege of organizing two very special critical dialogue
sessions centered on both the origins of social constructionism, as well as future
directions. The year marked the 40th anniversary of the publication of Spector and
Kitsuse’s (1977) landmark Constructing Social Problems (herein CSP). This special
issue of The American Sociologist presents some of the key papers presented at these
sessions, which included many well-seasoned experts who have contributed to
constructionism since the publication of CSP, including Malcolm Spector himself, as
well as several relatively junior scholars who are at the vanguard of new directions and
advances – both empirical and theoretical – of constructionism going forward.

Since the conference took place in Montreal, a particularly apt Leonard Cohen quote
came to my mind (who grew up in Montreal and remains closely affiliated with it),
which I decided to recite while opening the first session, which I chaired. The lines
come from Cohen’s song The Future, off the album of the same name:

Things are gonna slide / slide in all directions
Won’t be nothing / nothing you can measure anymore
The blizzard / the blizzard of the world has crossed the threshold
And it’s overturned the order of the soul

The lyrics can be interpreted in a number of ways, but seems to aptly project today’s
general ‘post-truth’ climate (where ‘nothing can be measured anymore’), replete with
‘alternative facts’ and algorithmically-driven news feeds on social media. As part of the
contemporary societal malaise, particularly concentrated in the United States following
the election of Donald Trump, the passage may also link to attacks on journalism,
academia and academic knowledge. On a wider global scale there is appears to be a

The American Sociologist (2019) 50:160–174
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12108-019-9415-7

* Michael Adorjan
madorjan@ucalgary.ca

1 Department of Sociology, University of Calgary, 2500 University Dr. NW, Calgary,
Alberta, Canada

http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s12108-019-9415-7&domain=pdf
mailto:madorjan@ucalgary.ca


surge in authoritarian state power, extreme forms of nationalism and xenophobia,
associated also with radicalism, polarization and animosity (Diamond et al. 2016;
Giroux 2017; Hobolt 2016). Given this zeitgeist, sociology and the knowledge it
produces is particularly fragile, especially if the knowledge produced through socio-
logical research is easily dismissed as ideologically driven propaganda emanating from
‘the far left’, or irrelevant ‘relativist’ musings projected from the ivory tower.

It makes eminent sense, then, for sociologists, and scientists across all disciplines, to
proceed with caution and conduct carefully crafted examinations that help to produce
reliable, valid and reproducible knowledge which responds to Cohen’s ‘blizzard’ on
crucial issues and social problems such as global warming, immigration, and widening
gaps in structured inequalities, among others. Many of us inspired by sociology come
to embrace the insights that accrue from the development of a sociological imagination
(Mills 1959), giving us both the knowledge and tools to take action. Social activism
seems braided to the very essence of sociology, and concomitantly, to the various
inspiring forms of activism arising from the #metoo and #timesup awareness networks,
among others (cf. Glaser and Strauss 1964). In this moment, then, given the pressures
sociology is facing, we must expect calls for emboldening its theoretical and episte-
mological armament; to ready itself for combat against the social forces that set
themselves against the sociological, given that to ‘commit sociology’ is, in this
politically charged moment, seen as ideological folly and one more permutation of
false knowledge (Kay and Beland 2014; Singh 2014). Searching for the rational, the
objective, and the valid in such a climate seems not only prudent but essential. This is
certainly the charge of ‘professional sociology’ as defined by Burawoy (2005).

40 years before this moment, CSP stridently declared itself in opposition to norma-
tive, professional sociology, with the striking remark on the 1st page: Bthere is not and
never has been a sociology of social problems^ (Spector and Kitsuse 1977: 1). Spector
and Kitsuse challenged the normative (specifically structural functionalist) frameworks
that social problems up to then were studied in sociology. But what of the legacy of
CSP today? What do some of constructionism’s most luminary figures have to say
about its impact? The contributors to this special issue explicate the various contribu-
tions of the perspective, and some of the challenges it has faced over the decades,
including the critiques which have emerged within constructionist circles, as well as
those from without. I proceed by highlighting these contributions, before turning to the
broader question of what all this means given the general assault on sociological
knowledge today noted above.

Reflections and Reminders

This special issue begins with Malcolm Spector’s own reflections on the 40 years since
the publication of CSP. Spector offers a candid glance at the mentoring role John
Kitsuse played to Spector, and how they came to work together to develop the
framework of social constructionism. Spector highlights Kitsuse’s intellectual style
and work within the ‘societal reaction’ approaches popular during the 1960s and
1970s (e.g., the work of Howard Becker and Edwin Lemert) including a rejection of
a Bbalanced approach^, opting instead for an approach which did Bnot compromise^
and Btry to make everyone happy .̂ Spector notes his admiration for Woolgar and

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Pawluch’s influential article ontological gerrymandering (Woolgar and Pawluch 1985),
which raised epistemological questions about whether it is possible to avoid introduc-
ing objective assumptions into the analysis. Spector argues that Woolgar and Pawluch
were making a point that Bwas essentially philosophical,^ but adds Bwe are not
philosophers.^ Spector reveals he is less concerned about whether the junior (i.e.,
untenured) constructionist scholars of today employ a ‘strict’ or ‘contextual’ stance
(see Rafter 1992; Troyer 1992), so long as they do not center their analyses on the
Bcauses of the conditions.^ Spector ends his article with some prescient advice for
junior scholars taking up empirical constructionist research.

Claimsmaking discourses are fundamentally moral discourses, and constitute Bsocial
problems as moral action^. This is a central insight ushered forth in Joseph Schneider’s
contribution to this special issue. His aim is to retrace some of Spector and Kitsuse’s
foundational arguments in order to ‘double down’ on the importance of an approach
which takes seriously the notion that Bsocial problems are what people think they are^.
Schneider highlights the symbolic interactionist and ethnomethodological influences on
social constructionism, especially from Steven Woolgar, who drew (partly from his
collaborations with Bruno Latour), an appreciation for the sociological significance of
relativism. Social constructionists’ ‘core’ Bnon-negotiable claim,^ Schneider pinpoints:
Bno claims-making, no social problems. Full stop.^ (As an aside, Tony Christensen’s
article in this special issue picks up on this very point). Due to constructionism’s focus
on moral discourses, Schneider argues a Bselective agnosticism^ is required, whereby
Bthe sociologist cannot use their own personal morality or ideology to identify condi-
tions as problems.^ Social constructionists are certainly not amoral and agnostic to
social problems in their everyday lives (see Dorothy Pawluch’s article in this special
issue), but while conducting their research they should be, he argues, agnostic to the
claims themselves. Schneider is aware of the challenges this poses in the present
political climate of – especially – the United States. This approach may well be
perceived as undercutting sociologists as experts on social conditions and how to best
ameliorate them. Indeed, it Bbrings the social scientist under analytical scrutiny .̂ Yet
this approach is singular and prescient insofar as it centers on, Schneider lucidly
articulates, Ba very particular ontological indifference with respect not to what exists
but rather to what their theory warrants as relevant data; which is to say, definitional
activities.^ This does not Bweaken^ sociological knowledge, but rather Bthe point is to
acknowledge the put-together and relative nature of all claims such that the very
practices of that making are themselves available for scrutiny.^ Drawing from Latour,
and insightfully animating his advocacy of selectively agnostic constructionist research,
Schneider observes Bthe more constructed, the more real.^

Another contemporary of Kitsuse, Peter Ibarra, contributes an article geared to
providing advice to constructionist scholars on how to hone their craft. Ibarra was
Kitsuse’s former student and later collaborator, contributing to the debates revolv-
ing around ontological gerrymandering and ‘strict’ versus ‘contextual’
constructionism (e.g., Ibarra and Kitsuse 2003). Ibarra underscores Kitsuse’s
advocacy of fieldwork-based research, the importance of tracing Bhow claims
travel across institutionalized spaces, thereby connecting texts to their auspices,^
and the significance of theorizing the social processes associated with
claimsmaking, rather than the social conditions under examination. He remarks
on the need for continual reflexivity during the course of research and, perhaps

162 The American Sociologist (2019) 50:160–174



most unpredictably, why constructionist analysts should Bcultivate a sense of the
absurd.^ The paper proceeds to explicate each of these points in turn. Scholars
who are ‘cutting their teeth’ with a constructionist project, such as graduate
students or even seasoned sociologists taking up a constructionist study for the
first time, will find useful Ibarra recalling what it was like to discuss
constructionism with Kitsuse, including the sort of ‘general scope’ questions
Kitsuse would be known to ask his students. These are questions readers are
encouraged to ask themselves to help develop stronger empirical and theoretical
directions of analysis. Perhaps ironically, given some – such as Spector, this issue
– who critique Ibarra and Kitsuse’s later work as advocating a focus too centered
on solely the discursive (see Ibarra and Kitsuse 1993, 2003), Ibarra highlights
Kitsuse’s encouragement for the collection of multiple sources of content (a
Bvariegated… social problems process^ (Ibarra and Kitsuse 1993)), especially
ethnographic research, in order to better situate the context of claimsmaking under
examination (see also Ibarra and Adorjan 2018 for further discussion of Kitsuse’s
sense of the importance of social context for constructionist analyses). Ibarra also
highlights the argument that constructionism, while often focused on ‘successful’
claims, also has the potential to examine social processes of failure (or contesta-
tion), an argument which also resonates with Tony Christensen’s article in this
issue.

Dorothy Pawluch’s contribution centers on a reminder of the strengths of Spector
and Kitsuse’s vision of a sociology of social problems, not conditions. She recognizes
both the professional and personal challenges with positioning oneself as a construc-
tionist scholar today, especially given academic reproaches in traditionally receptive
associations such as the Society for the Study of Social Problems. She also refers to
challenges based on pressures to engage in social activism and ‘public sociology’. The
stress placed upon sociology to ‘batten down the positivist hatches’ comes from all
directions (arguments I revisit myself below), and it is no wonder that sociological
research has widely become synonymous with research on inequality. Pawluch refers to
Harris (2006), who observes that sociology’s Bpreoccupation with inequality has
permeated virtually all subfields of the discipline.^ She places these challenges in
relation to a wider backdrop of controversies regarding the university’s role in wider
society, both in terms of public engagement and outreach (again, ‘public sociology’)
and engagement in ‘social justice’. Significantly, she highlights how many publics do,
in fact, embrace constructionist insights despite knowledge produced ‘on the sidelines’
in relation to truth claims; she also draws attention to how calls for freedom of
expression on university campuses and calls for universities to teach how to think not
just what to think are, perhaps, in line with constructionism’s call for agnostic analyses
pinpointing social processes through which both words and actions are embroiled.
Pawluch’s article proceeds by making a call for constructionists to reaffirm their
commitments to a constructionist research agenda that is emboldened against the
Bcurrent zeitgeist in sociology departments and on university campuses,^ but also does
not place in the rear view mirror the important epistemological debates which took
place in the 1980s and 1990s. Reviewing these debates in detail, she suggests not
a single ‘holy’ way forward, but simply argues constructionist scholars should
be aware of the analytical choices they make and their implications. The
original sorts of ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions that Spector and Kitsuse espoused

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are far from exhausted, she argues. We are only beginning to realize the
breadth of our questions.

Joel Best’s article takes stock of the ‘internal’ debates within constructionist circles
since the publication of CSP, but also acknowledges some of the more recent critiques
external to the paradigm. He begins by acknowledging the influence CSP had in the
late 1970s, but argues that, given developments in the four decades since the book’s
publication, placing too much emphasis on the origin of CSP Bwould come at a cost^.
CSP, he reminds us, illuminated a need at the time for the case study method, which
produced a series of important empirical ‘natural histories’ of social problems. Never-
theless, constructionism risks devolving into internally-centric epistemological essays,
he argues, unless it can push beyond case studies and develop theory related to the
social processes that can be examined comparatively across individual cases (Best
2015). Best also refers to what inspired his term ‘strict constructionism’ and under-
scores his long-standing advocacy of the ‘contextual’ approach to constructionism
(e.g., Best 1993), based on his position that Bit [is] impossible to conduct research that
would meet the standards of a strong, strict constructionist reading.^ His paper draws
from an interesting and applicable bumblebee analogy, arguing that despite these
unresolvable epistemological dilemmas, constructionists have pursued fruitful empiri-
cal research; one with an international scope. Even though these studies continue to,
unavoidably, produce ‘ontological gerrymandering’, Best centers on an insight that
sociological analysis devoid of context (implying strict constructionism) ceases to
remain sociological, if sociology’s domain of expertise is the explication of social
context and its relevance to social life. Best’s paper is also unique among the contrib-
utors here, as he then turns to criticisms ‘from the outside’ (external to
constructionism), that continue to challenge the utility of social constructionism. He
highlights the recent critiques by Dello Buono (2013, 2015), previous President of the
Society for the Study of Social Problems, who argues from a conflict-theory lens that
constructionism fails to acknowledge the objective facticity of capitalism and the need
to synthesize this to reinvigorate constructionism and make it politically relevant for
activism. I return to Dello Buono’s arguments below. Best writes Bone can imagine a
set of analogous calls for moving beyond social constructionism from analysts favoring
other ideologies—say, conservatism, feminism, or fundamentalism.^ His argument is,
rather than synthesizing or incorporating the assumptions (e.g., regarding power) of
such approaches, constructionist scholars should focus on strengthening
constructionism itself. He encourages constructionists to ask themselves ‘so what’
questions pertaining to new empirical studies, which he argues need to go beyond
merely another social construction of ‘X’. Best’s own work has examined the
processes that occur when claimsmaking spreads around the world, contributing
knowledge to the global scope of claimsmaking activities and the social processes
animating them (Best 2001b).1

Amir Marvasti’s contribution encourages constructionists to Bhave a better appreci-
ation of the diversity of constructionist thought and its research practices,^ through an
overview of the various ways Bwords^ and Bnumbers^ are employed in constructionist

1 A recent special issue of Qualitative Sociological Review (2015, XI(2)) also includes new empirical studies
and theoretical directions (including constructionist examinations outside the Anglo Global North, cyberspace
and ‘big data’), indicating the continued vibrancy of new scholarship.

164 The American Sociologist (2019) 50:160–174



research. Rather than asking constructionists to position themselves as either ‘strict’ or
‘contextual’ constructionists, he argues that the analytical framework is contingent
upon the questions being asked. He begins by problematizing the assumption that
constructionist research is necessarily qualitative, and highlighting the varying reasons
constructionists may be drawn to qualitative methods. The careful tracking of subjec-
tive interpretations and the explication of ‘lived experiences’ remains arguably central,
primarily through interviews, discourse analysis or ethnography. These approaches
center on the ‘whats’ and ‘hows’ of claims-making activities and processes. Words,
his paper shows, can be used as constructive of social conditions, including people,
morality and emotion (Loseke 1999), and words can also be Breflexively connected
with concrete conditions^ (Gubrium and Holstein 1997).

Marvasti then turns to the use of numbers in constructionist research. ‘Strict
constructionists’, for instance, usually opt not to challenge Bthe accuracy of numbers
but understanding how they are constructed and used, particularly in institutional
setting^. Some constructionists employ numbers to establish causal relations – here
asking ‘why’ questions, seeking to go beyond ‘how’ and ‘what’. Others seek to use
numbers to Bestablish fallacies^ and unwarranted societal responses to social problems.
For some, Marvasti writes,

causal analysis and inferential statistics are not inherently antithetical to the
project of constructionism. Namely, it would be worth knowing not just how
but why (i.e., as a result of what social conditions) X changed into Y.

While Marvasti recognizes that ‘mixed methods’ approaches are often criticized for
combining antithetical epistemological assumptions and even questions, his paper
effectively advocates for eclecticism in constructionist scholarship going forward.
The paper projects a broader argument: constructionists should be free to ask the
questions they wish, and make methodological choices in line with these questions,
rather than preconceived judgements applied to qualitative or quantitative, nor ‘strict’
or ‘contextual’ approaches.

Jared Del Rosso’s article also contributes ideas towards advancing constructionist
analysis, which can be seen as another approach to extending beyond case study
methodology. Del Rosso, drawing from Bruno Latour, advocates going beyond
claimsmaking to Bsocial problems chains^. This he defines as Bsites of social problems
activities connected by objectified forms of social problems, such as social problem
categories inscribed in texts or constructions of the reality of a problem^ (my empha-
sis). From the stability and mobility afforded by these objectified sites, constructionists,
Del Rosso argues, should trace how they connect to other social problems sites (i.e.,
social problems chains), examining the resources these other sites do or do not provide.
Del Rosso’s account aims to help develop social problems theory to account for, in
essence, the various permutations of power involved in social problems processes. His
goal is to Bexpand our sense of how and of what problems are made.^ He underscores a
particular problem sometimes identified in constructionism: that constructionists are
unable to distinguish between very different sorts of claims, especially if one is
unilaterally agnostic to the claims under scrutiny. Surely constructionists would ac-
knowledge the differences between claims to satanic cults versus HIV/AIDS in the
1980s, he asks rhetorically. One solution to Bbetter distinguish among problems^, Del

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Rosso argues, is to Bdiversify our analytic vocabulary, so we may better account for the
myriad of things that are part and parcel of social problems activities.^ He advocates
pushing beyond the ‘merely’ discursive to include ethnographic observation of social
problems claimsmaking and ‘chains’ (see also Ibarra and Adorjan 2018, and
Christensen, this issue). Included in this is the physical materiality relevant to claims
makers, which produces the contexts they draw from when articulating concerns about
social problems (Del Rosso uses the example of U.S. torture (see also Rosso 2011,
2014)). He writes: Bsocial problems theorists must be the most nimble of construction-
ists, recognizing the panoply of instruments and materials that claims-makers employ.^
Significantly, he acknowledges that this more eclectic incorporation of material condi-
tions relevant to claimsmakers is still not amenable to assessments of validity by
analysts (i.e., which claims and chains are more ‘correct’, factually or morally, than
others). He argues that such questions remain Bbeyond the horizon of the construction-
ist study. Rather, by revealing the different activities, instruments, and materials making
up those chains, our studies may better enable others to assess differences among
claims^ (my emphasis). Del Rosso concludes by explicating some methodological
challenges implementing such a constructionist project.

Optimistically, Sara Crawley lucidly articulates in her contribution to this special
issue, while social construction has become politically irrelevant, it has much potential
to address power, especially by paying much greater attention to material conditions
(here her arguments resonate with both Del Rosso and Christensen, this issue). BThe
value of constructionist perspectives is in seeing social relations as variable and
socially organized,^ she argues, Brather than as transhistorical, natural conditions,^;
and notes that Bexploring social relations exposes relations of power.^ Crawley argues
that constructionism suffers from Bepistemological encampment^, involving Ba tenden-
cy to view only one’s own epistemological leanings as valid,^ and resulting in a neglect
of the wider ‘so what’ question regarding the knowledge produced by constructionist
research. Rather, she advocates for Bepistemic gain^ involving Bwhat sociologists
might learn if we use epistemologies as provisional tools for seeing the social world.^
Indeed, resonating well with Christensen’s article in this issue, Crawley argues
Bempirical research not carefully grounded in theory and epistemology will be driven
by unacknowledged and unexamined assumptions.^ Part of the problem is (arguably
willful) ignorance of material conditions, especially in ‘strict’ forms of constructionism
that do not attend to material context outside of member’s claimsmaking. What
analytical purity sacrifices, she underscores, is practical relevance to non-academic
audiences, especially social activists; and especially in today’s politically charged
zeitgeist. Moreover, she argues, constructionism cannot avoid reference to material
conditions even if it desires to do so (suggesting the critique of ‘ontological
gerrymandering’ (Woolgar and Pawluch 1985)). It is Btoo great a price^ to
Bunsanction^ consideration of Bpower, equity, and human suffering,^ Crawley argues,
resonating also with Christensen’s call this issue for a more central consideration of
inequalities. One way forward may be to combine multiple Bepistemological strategies^
in one project. By this she does not refer to multi-method research, but a Bmulti-
epistemology^ approach. The goal here is Bnot truth-seeking but to see what we can
learn from viewing a problem via various analytical strategies.^ Crawley is not alone in
this issue in raising challenging and provocative questions. She does, however, remind
us that current debates, including discussions as the 2017 SSSP conference, only rehash

166 The American Sociologist (2019) 50:160–174



– arguably unproductively so – an older set of debates on revitalizing social
constructionism from the early 1990s (Holstein and Miller 1993). Crawley’s proposals
are geared to (re)ignite a more inclusive constructionist imagination that avoids further
siloing of sociological approaches to the study of social problems.

In his article, Tony Christensen takes up the call for a more inclusive approach by
including consideration of the voices of marginalized claims-makers; what Miller
(1993) dubs ‘claims from the underside’. This may at first seem counter-intuitive, as
constructionists are usually drawn to those claimsmakers, Christensen argues, with the
power to broadcast their views (who he dubs ‘top dog’ claimsmakers), and have them
taken up by institutions and organizations who champion for their cause. He writes Bthe
social problems game, like all other social processes, is a rigged game that reflects the
inequalities found in the broader social context in which it is played.^ He thus wonders
why Bconstructionists have paid little attention to unpacking how the game is rigged
and the consequences of that rigging for how social problems claims are articulated.^
The answer lies, Christensen argues, in latent assumptions found in constructionist
examinations of social problems which, if rendered more manifest, would reveal
serious omissions in how claimsmaking is analyzed. Relatedly, fundamental questions
become problematized such as what is a claim, and how do we recognize a claim?
Turning constructionist concepts inward, he suggests that constructionists too often rest
on their own ‘formula stories’ about what claimsmaking looks like, centering on Bthose
who likely benefit from various forms of privilege and power.^ A major argument here
is that Bthere is a strangely generalized assumption that recognition by official organi-
zations will be desired by claimsmakers, that those organizations themselves are
viewed as legitimate and respectable by audiences and that claimsmakers measure
success in terms of institutional response.^ Indeed, Christensen argues, claimsmakers in
a position of distrust against key institutions (the police is one example given) are not
likely to pursue ‘policy making’ with them as a key stage of the ‘natural history’ model
often highlighted in constructionist scholarship. Further, assumptions regarding the
democratic contexts within which claims are produced undercuts the visibility of social
problems Bblack markets^.

Several intriguing questions may be asked here, including BHow does a state with
influence or a monopoly over the media change the social problems game? How do we
conceptualize violence and intimidation as a form of claimsmaking or counter-
claimsmaking? How do non-state claimsmakers go about making and propagating
claims in an environment where speaking out publicly carries a risk of punishment?^
While Christensen’s arguments naturally suggest enlarging the scope of constructionist
research beyond western, liberal democracies, an important aspect of his arguments
highlights the importance of also addressing unacknowledged limitations and
expanding the analytical scope of scholarship in the Anglo-Global North. A widened
epistemological scope is well suited to Christensen’s goals. Here he calls on construc-
tionists to move beyond ‘words’ alone, especially for those without discursive access to
‘appropriate’ claimsmaking channels. Claimsmaking can take a number of different
forms, including visual imagery (perhaps online ‘memes’ as symbols of social protest).
Social constructionists, as with scholars in general, are academics working in a
discursive medium, through which the draw to discourse is obviated. This, however
risks a confirmation bias linked to constructionists’ inductively-geared approaches. Yet
there may be fruitful avenues of research involving the extra-discursive, Christensen

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argues, especially for those marginalized from the resources to engage the (formal)
discursive social problems process. At root, his paper pushes considerations of power
to the forefront of constructionist analyses of social problems, challenging others to
produce constructionist research that is arguably more relevant in today’s post-truth era.

Jun Ayukawa and Manabu Akagawa contribute articles that raise questions of how
the social problems process may or may not be different than the North American
model developed by Spector and Kitsuse. Both Ayukawa and Akagawa contribute
articles centered on social problems processes in Japan. Given John Kitsuse’s own
Japanese heritage, it is not surprising that a strong constructionist influence remains
there (e.g., Akagawa 2015; Ayukawa 2000; Nakagawa 1995). Ayukawa’s chapter, in
particular, focuses on claimsmaking regarding the death penalty in Japan. Japan retains
the death penalty, yet is beholden to international conventions on human rights that set
both warrants or grounds for social problems (Best 1990). Ayukawa makes compari-
sons with the United States, arguing that despite both nations upholding the death
penalty (and in opposition to international trends of abolishment or at least not applying
it), it is too simplistic to examine the claimsmaking processes in Japan in the same way
as the United States. He argues that Balthough the Japanese government refers to
international treaties and covenants in regard to many issues, it is less enthusiastic
about promoting international covenants on human rights.^ Despite this, reformers
such as civil rights groups and the Japanese Federation of Bar Associations draw from
international conventions (e.g., from the United Nations) which provide legitimacy
based on the warrants or grounds they discursively provide. Ayukawa observes that
Beven though both of Japan and [the United States] ratified the international covenants
on civil and political rights, such references to international consensus are much more
common in social problems rhetoric Japan, than in the U.S..^ Claimsmakers in support
of abolishment, however, face challenges based on the context of governance in Japan.
Obstacles include a Human Rights Bureau which is under the influence of the Ministry
of Justice (the latter which does not favor abolishment); and the influence of victims of
crime, who, drawing from emotions discourses (Loseke and Kusenbach 2008), are
having a discernable impact on public opinion, influencing a wave of support for
capital punishment. Here Japanese politicians appear to be under the same populist
pressures as in European and North American nations. Ayukawa writes Ba politician
who advocates the abolition of the death penalty cannot expect to win votes; in fact,
politicians do not speak about the issue during election time.^

Clearly there are some similarities, as well as differences, when considering the
national context of social problems claimsmaking in Japan. Ayukawa posits Bthe
lawyers and other people who strive for the abolition of the death penalty invoke
and emphasize universal values. On the other hand, the opinion leaders and the
people who support the death penalty believe in the traditional, domestic values of
Japan, and refuse to be compromised by European cultural values.^ While glob-
alization influences how claims spread internationally (Best 2001b), Ayukawa
concludes that constructionist studies need to be attuned to Bfit local conditions.^
Borrowing concepts from outside constructionism, I argue that constructionism
here can be advanced by paying closer attention to the ‘glocalization’ of
claimsmaking (Bauman 1998), and how global discourses and trends come into
friction with local exigencies and awareness contexts (Glaser and Strauss 1964;
Tsing 2005).

168 The American Sociologist (2019) 50:160–174



Manabu Akagawa contributes a natural history, drawing from Foucaultian discourse
analysis, of the putative low birth rate problem in Japan. The paper effectively
highlights the intersections of global trends in gender equality as well as localized
issues and interpretations, thus making it another good exemplar of how
constructionism informed by varying national contexts outside of the Anglo-Global
North can help produce important comparative knowledge. Akagawa highlights de-
bates and policy responses aimed at ameliorating Japan’s low birth rate, showing how
some were embraced while others rejected. He wishes to examine the ‘whats’ and
‘hows’ of this debate but also ask ‘why’ questions, such as Bwhy the policies which
were adopted tend to favor two-income families?^ His natural history covers seven key
events between 1990 to 2016 in order to explain why policies favoring social welfare
for working couples were favored over others. Interestingly, what began in a ‘top
down’ manner, with the Welfare Ministry announcing in June 1990 a low Japanese
birth rate of 1.57 (which became known as the B1.57 shock^), the natural history
reveals responses and discord generated from multiple claimsmakers, including gov-
ernment officials, academics, national newspaper journalists, but also bloggers and
everyday citizens. Government officials making arguments that declining birth rates are
caused by women’s higher education became, for instance, Bseverely criticized^ by
others, including female journalists. Akagawa suggests that international discourses of
human rights and gender equality affect how such claims are responded to. Similar to
Ayukawa’s highlighting of how international discourses come to factor on localized
debates, Akagawa centers on contention over statistical data that show, for particular
claimsmakers, that ‘advanced’ countries such as Sweden, France and the United States
demonstrate a link between higher female labor participation and total fertility rates.
Others, however, critiqued these statistical trends in a particular ‘stat war’ over how to
interpret the numbers (Best 2001a, 2004). In comparison to Ayukawa’s emphasis on the
role public opinion has influencing populist responses to the death penalty, Akagawa’s
paper shows how popular opinion regarding the economic origins of Japan’s low birth
were Bignored^ by Bbureaucrats and business managers^. Proposed polices such as
having an increase to the available child allowance were also rejected given local
exigencies such as the BGreat East Japanese Earthquake^, which directed financial
efforts towards recovery. Also, while the role of the internet does not factor heavily in
Akagawa’s natural history, he highlights the ripple effects of one ‘viral’ blog post:
BBMy child wasn’t accepted for nursery school. Die, Japan!!!^ This post was circulated
by traditional news media and initially rejected by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (arguing
the anonymous post could not be verified) but quickly seemed to backtrack and
respond that the government is pushing for reducing child-care wait list times.

Akagawa’s incorporation of Foucault permits some interesting observations about
not just how these debates are framed, but what is ‘unsaid’ and ‘unsayable’ given the
frames invoked. For instance, he argues Bfew claims discuss the merit of low birth rates,
such as the possibilities they might solve the traffic congestion problem in urban cities,
amelioration of resources, and environmental problems, allowing people to live in
larger and less expensive houses.^ Moreover, the focus of solutions on gender-equality
and work-life balance offsets consideration of the impact of younger people postponing
marriage. Akagawa makes a strong case for asking ‘why’ questions, which help move
Bbeyond case studies^ as some have argued is necessary moving forward (Best 2015;
see also Dorothy Pawluch’s article this issue).

The American Sociologist (2019) 50:160–174 169



This issue is a clarion call for studies instilling a constructionist imagination
regarding social problems. The articles in this special issue of The American Sociologist
do not present easy paths forward. Indeed, there are challenges still to face and choices
still to make (Holstein and Miller 2003). What is clear is that a critical mass of
constructionist scholars remains highly engaged and inspired to produce significant
and vital knowledge, informed by novel questions and directions.

The Politics of Being Apolitical

The bold dismissal of structural functionalist and other normative perspectives on social
problems, geared to distinguish constructionism from other sociological approaches in
the late 1970s, may be received as more divisive today than ever before.
Constructionism, some may argue, is willfully and flagrantly guilty of indifference to
the social problems it examines; charged with being apolitical at a time when sides need
to be drawn, more than ever. One of the more erudite recent critiques from outside
constructionist circles, as mentioned above, is from R.A. Dello Buono, who charges
constructionism with being Boverly subjective^ (Dello Buono 2013: 795), and advo-
cates its Bre-link with the material and structural elements of 21st century capitalist
crises^ (ibid.). It is worth examining Dello Buono’s arguments in further detail, as they
are particularly well presented and can be taken as representative of, as Joel Best
comments this issue, the critiques that come from those (conflict or Critical) scholars
grappling with how to respond to the structural inequalities shaped by hyper-capitalism
and neoliberalism, and exacerbated by the geopolitics of today’s authoritarian global
climate. The agnostic or ‘apolitical’ approach to constructionism – whether ‘strict’ or
‘contextual’ – is rejected by Dello Buono as it offers merely Bephemeral and politically-
bracketed analyses^ which leads to Bpolitical irrelevance^ (ibid.). He argues this
approach requires displacement in favor of an Binsurgent attitude^ which would
produce Ba more powerful synthesis of social problems inquiry^ (Dello Buono 2013:
795, 796). In his more recent Presidential Address to the SSSP, Dello Buono (2015)
raised similar arguments, underscoring the incompatibility of social constructionism to
Bsocial activism^ (Dello Buono 2015: 331, see also Agger 1993), and advocating for
greater linkages between Bscholar activists^ and Bpopular movements^. Indeed, here
Dello Buono is centrally interested in the implications of a critically-infused
constructionism informing Bsocial movements activists^ (ibid., p. 332–333). Dello
Buono continues: Bsocial constructionism tends to freeze the historical moment of
the larger political economy in a way that takes our eye off the big moving ball^
(ibid., p. 335).

Before I offer my rejoinder, I should declare at the outset that I admire the call for
increased activism and agree that we are in a particularly precarious time when
sociology as a whole is being systematically attacked and the knowledge it produces
dismissed. Personally, I have always found inspirational Antonio Gramsci’s famous
invective against the indifferent. He wrote in 1917: BI hate the indifferent. I believe that
living means taking sides. Those who really live cannot help being a citizen and a
partisan. Indifference and apathy are parasitism, perversion, not life. That is why I hate
the indifferent^ (see Tiso 2018). And yet my response here is that social
constructionism offers invaluable knowledge regarding social processes related to

170 The American Sociologist (2019) 50:160–174



social problems that are needed today, perhaps more than ever before. These social
processes involve, in many respects, examinations of power, yet pay careful attention to
the nuanced and often unpredictable forms power takes. We may say power is as power
does, and constructionism’s conscious apolitical lens is its greatest strength, not its
intractable weakness. This is especially apt when examining attributions of ‘fake news’
and ‘alternative facts’. While it is tempting to ask questions such as why some people
believe in the ‘wrong facts’ (cf. Glassner 1999), rather than gearing analysis to
‘debunking’ such claims, constructionism offers the potential to unpack how such
claims making operates in particular contexts and adheres closely to member’s per-
spectives (Gubrium and Holstein 2011; Pollner 1987).

Dello Buono (ibid., p. 339) accuses constructionism simultaneously of its Btendency
towards reification in a way that neglects human agency, leading to the oversimplifi-
cation of collective action,^ while elsewhere critiquing the notion that Bthe construc-
tionist process was free to be delightfully filled with unrestrained human agency as a
response to the establishment^ (ibid., p. 333). Yet constructionist studies place human
agency as an empirical question for analysis in relation to the contexts that are
meaningful for the members themselves. In addition, the various sorts of claimsmaking
activities and Bchains^ (see Del Rosso, this issue) constructionists consider do include
social activism and social movements, but as Spector notes in his article this issue,
Blooking back, some of our key concepts may seem dated. Our central concept, claims-
making activities, and the image that the claimant is a member of, or spokesperson for,
a social movement organization, now seems slightly archaic or out of date.^ Construc-
tionists now attend to the influence and impact of social media and the mediation of
online spaces for claimsmaking (Adorjan and Yau 2015; Maratea 2014, 2015), and also
claimsmaking processes that are not successful (the Bnonproblem^), or claimsmaking
that occurs despite a lack of agency (Miller 1993, Kitsuse 1980, Ball and Lilly 1984;
see also Christensen, this issue). These approaches are particularly well geared to
examine attributions of non-agency (Adorjan et al. 2012); for instance, in cases where
‘alternative facts’ are contested – we need to know much more about how these
processes operate. I argue that we can do this best when we set aside assumptions of
normative social structure and explore how social structure is both experienced and
acted upon.

As highlighted above, Best’s argument is also to strengthen constructionism by
extending its empirical and theoretical scope, especially away from case studies that do
not build upon each other. Ibarra also offers some remarks towards the question of
social activism. In his article this issue, he discusses the original impetus inspiring
many students of sociology who are Binterested in righting certain wrongs,^ but
reinforces Kitsuse’s view that constructionist analysts should avoid Bsubstituting [their]
own definitions, claims, and assumptions for those of the members^. Significantly,
Ibarra is sympathetic to the call for ‘righting wrongs’ and social activism (see footnote
iii in his article). He argues it Bis certainly not to say that the other kinds of questions—
about warrant and objectivity—are unimportant, but only that they are beyond the
purview of constructionism as Kitsuse understood it.^ Of course, allegiance to Spector
and Kitsuse is one of the issues under contention in this special issue. Some call on a
greater focus on material conditions that mediate experience and produce certain forms

The American Sociologist (2019) 50:160–174 171



of claimsmaking (see Crawley and Del Rosso, this issue). Some call for greater
emphasis on multimethod approaches (Marvasti) while others advocate for ‘multi-
epistemic’ projects (Crawley) that aim to synthesize knowledge from ‘traditional’
constructionist studies with approaches that foreground the role of power in structuring
claimsmakers’ positions in society.

My view is that critical approaches have much to benefit from the insights social
constructionism provides, offering situated knowledge to better contextualize analytical
focuses on wider social systems (e.g., hypercapitalism, neoliberalism). Likewise,
constructionism may benefit from considering how critical approaches help
problematize questions of how we identify claimsmaking activities and consider those
positioned subaltern to power and privilege. This requires thinking through both the
material conditions that mediate social problems claimsmaking and the very form
claimsmaking takes. It may be that subaltern positioning is mediated by wider norma-
tive social structures, but knowledge is still needed regarding how this is experienced
and responded to. We still have many fascinating ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions to pursue
(see especially Pawluch’s article this issue). I argue that constructionism’s selective
agnosticism (using Schneider’s term) helps produce important knowledge regarding
how people understand and respond to social problems; knowledge not ‘better’ or
‘more true’ but simply different than that produced by critical approaches given
different epistemological lenses. This is not to suggest that constructionist studies have
nothing to learn from these approaches in expanding their empirical focus and theo-
retical toolkit. It is, however, also important to consider that sociological relevancy is
not solely a product of political relevancy. That said, while single studies that aim
to synthesize ostensibly disparate epistemological and theoretical approaches
will likely encounter difficulties, it is worth pursuing whether constructionist
alliances with other approaches in sociology can help engender in a reflexive
way knowledge that is more likely to be relevant for broader publics. Many
constructionists who are agnostic to the social problems in their analyses are
nevertheless likely to be politically left-wing in their personal values, including
their inclinations towards activism (see Pawluch’s article this issue). There is
important work to be done, sides to choose, actions to take, all of which can be
informed by constructionist analyses, but which may not be analytically rele-
vant for constructionist studies themselves.

The challenges most crudely characterized as ‘subjectivism’ versus ‘objectivism’ are
not unique to constructionism; indeed, they are longstanding in sociology. Even in their
classic work on the social construction of reality, Berger and Luckmann (1966) divided
their discussion between society as objective reality and subjective reality. While both
sections were written lucidly and with resplendent insight, it is hard to conceive how an
empirical research program would proceed by synthesizing both aspects. As sociolo-
gists we examine the same world but our theoretical lenses focus on different aspects of
it. The challenge lies in findings value in our inquiries based on the choices we make
going forward.

Acknowledgements A special thank you to Dorothy Pawluch and Lawrence Nichols for their feedback on
an earlier draft of this paper and, as ever, their enthusiastic support!

172 The American Sociologist (2019) 50:160–174



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	Social Constructionism Now More Than Ever: Following the Hermeneutic Money Trail in a Post-Truth World
	Reflections and Reminders
	The Politics of Being Apolitical
	References