key: cord-022435-pztn9075 authors: Roach, Jeff; Kemish, Ian title: Bali Bombings: A Whole of Government Response date: 2009-11-16 journal: Tourism in Turbulent Times DOI: 10.1016/b978-0-08-044666-0.50027-0 sha: doc_id: 22435 cord_uid: pztn9075 nan which provide services to the community. Local government and voluntary organisations also play important roles, as both groups have close links with the community. While no legislation requires the Australian Government to act in emergencies, it has always accepted a responsibility to assist the states and territories where their resources are insufficient or inappropriate for the situation. A number of Australian government disaster response plans are administered by Emergency Management Australia (EMA). The most important for the purposes of this chapter are the Commonwealth Government Disaster Response Plan (COMDISPLAN) for physical assistance to the Australian states and territories, and the Australian Government Overseas Disaster Assistance Plan (AUSASSIST-PLAN) for assistance overseas. In discussing the Australian government's responses to crises, it is useful to note the political context. With agencies taking their cues from ministers, the whole of government response will be conditioned by the strength of political decisiveness and unanimity among ministers. The response to the tragic terrorist attack in Bali on 12 October 2002 underscores this observation. From the outset, the Prime Minister's instructions to senior officials were decisive: the government's response needed to be comprehensive and effective. Issues concerning resources could not be allowed to constrain the policy response -these matters could be addressed later. There was strong bipartisan support for the government's approach. Reflecting these decisive political instructions, the government established explicit and appropriate chains of command. Given its responsibility for consular services to Australians in distress overseas, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) was tasked to coordinate the whole of government response to international aspects of the crisis. Domestically, the Department of Family and Community Services (FaCS) coordinated government policy and delivery of assistance to Australians and their families affected by the crisis. A clear lesson from Bali was the extent to which overseas events can resonate at the local community level, underlining the importance of domestic and state/territory agencies being activated early in response to a major overseas crisis. The decisive establishment of clear roles and chains of command in this case contrasts with comments by McConnell and Stark (2002) concerning the response by the UK Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food to the outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in February 2001. The authors describe the response as "suffering from an institutional malaise and a fragmentary civil service, incapable (at least in the early stages) of providing a 'joined-up' response to match the scale of the crisis"(p. 665). In the case of Bali, two 'hub and spokes' models were used to coordinate the whole of the government response. DFAT took on the 'hub' role in coordinating the interagency 'spokes' response to the international aspects of the crisis. At the same time, FaCS took on another 'hub' role, coordinating the interagency 'spokes' response to domestic aspects of the recovery. The two clusters of 'hub and spokes' worked alongside each other, attending each other's meetings where necessary, to provide a comprehensive overall response. The 'hub and spokes' arrangement worked well to draw together key agencies and players to share information and coordinate policy responses. This approach represented the combination of two interdepartmental committees, each chaired by a line agency. These arrangements provided the context for effective consultation, rapid decision making, close attention to the implementation of decisions and action to address new or unforeseen difficulties. Within each committee, clear directives identified the roles and responsibilities of respective agencies, thereby ensuring that mandated issues were resolved early. Figures 19.1 and 19 .2 illustrate these institutional arrangements. While a 'hub and spokes' structure could be used in a range of crisis scenarios where there is a distinction between international and domestic issues or another clear thematic division, ultimately portfolio departments should ensure that their own crisis plans consider the appropriate linkages and structure for different scenarios relevant to their particular portfolio or industry structure. A number of observations can be made about this approach. First, within each 'hub and spoke' there was a clear division and respect for the different mandates of respective agencies. Rather than normal bureaucratic rules being abandoned, there was a strong appreciation Figure 19 .1: International aspects: crisis phase -interagency emergency taskforce. that the simplest and most direct means of achieving goals was to use the appropriate agency and established channels. Efforts at short-cutting, even where motivated by a noble desire to expedite an outcome, were ultimately more likely to result in delays and confusion. The use of traditional channels of liaison and coordination means that new relationships do not need to be established in the tumult of a crisis situation. This provides a higher degree of comfort for downstream organisations, such as state authorities, which are involved in delivering a specific response. Coordination by DFAT for international issues and FaCS for domestic issues reflected the overall responsibilities of the two departments: DFAT has responsibility for consular services overseas, assisting in responding to the deaths of about 600 Australians overseas each year (DFAT, 2003) ; FaCS supports Australian families in need (see http://www. familyassist.gov.au/). Both DFAT and FaCS held daily (twice daily in the initial aftermath of the attacks) interagency taskforce meetings, which drew major stakeholders together to share information and coordinate policy responses. Australian Public Service (APS) employees attending these meetings were at a senior level, meaning they had the authority to make on-the-spot decisions on behalf of their agency. The Bali response brought together a diverse range of agencies, many with little prior experience in working with each other. However, participants worked cohesively and collaboratively throughout the period. They were hindered little by the different departmental cultures and work practices which can be found in the APS. While it can be argued that organisational culture is the key to the whole of government success (this issue is explored further in "Culture and Capability", in Management Advisory Committee, Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia's Priority Challenges, 2004), a crisis situation elicits a high level of goodwill which appears to eliminate cultural barriers. One of the key lessons from the Bali attack was the decision to establish an overarching national plan, to be coordinated by EMA, to provide a framework for coordination to: • clarify the roles of agencies and non-government organisations in crisis responses; • review links between Australian government and state disaster plans; and • identify and rectify any gaps in interagency coordination arrangements. The development of the National Response Plan for Overseas Mass Casualty Events will provide the blueprint for federal and state contingency plans to be examined further and tested against a variety of different scenarios. At the time of publication, the preparation of this plan was well advanced. While the government's response to Bali was pursued through the parallel processes of the 'hub and spokes' models, there was no competition or mandate clash between the two structures. In the days after the Bali attack, as the evacuation of injured Australians was completed, remains stabilised and positive identification of the deceased began, the transition from crisis phase to recovery phase was well advanced. In fact, it was important that activities associated with the recovery phase were conducted in tandem with activities associated with the crisis response. While there was no clear distinction in the transition from one phase to the next, the emphasis of policy making increasingly shifted from international to domestic aspects. In driving response from crisis to the recovery phase, a high degree of discipline is required to ensure that decision making is followed through by rigorous implementation and follow-up. Coordinated whole of government policy making and implementation is integral in driving towards the recovery phase. Within the FaCS Bali response taskforce, 15 core issues were addressed in each daily meeting, with recent progress and forward planning reported against each. The core issues were: • public communication; • financial support; • domestic health services; • disability issues; • counselling; • return of effects of deceased victims to next-of-kin; • community harmony; • community support; • rural issues; • intergovernmental welfare issues; • role of airlines; • insurance coverage; • domestic economic issues; • international issues; and • interaction with other disasters. The daily review of these issues ensured that policy outcomes were closely monitored and driven forward. Similarly important is the need for crisis managers to rise above the maelstrom of the moment and obtain a more strategic view of the overall policy response. One way to do this is to create a regular opportunity for key decision makers to briefly canvass what might be the policy and media issues of the day. This discipline assists in ensuring that decision making continues to strike a balance between the proactive and the reactive, looking beyond the issues of the moment. In the case of Bali, these approaches meant that within 7 days of the attack the focus of government decision making had moved smoothly from the international to the domestic, from crisis to recovery phase. Effective crisis management is founded on good preparation. This should include: the negotiation of protocols with likely key participants and stakeholders; the maintenance of the crisis infrastructure to ensure that it is ready to use at any time (this includes fundamentals such as after-hours contact lists of key employees from other agencies); and the appropriate training and development to ensure that people can fulfil key roles, whatever the dimensions of the crisis. Human resource issues also need careful attention -a sustained crisis has the potential to burn out key people. One of the lessons of the Australian Government's FMD simulation, Exercise Minotaur (see http://www.affa.gov.au/exerciseminotaur), was the need for agencies to look at human resource capacity in a number of key areas, particularly that of skilled and trained technical employees. Experience indicates that the long-term nature of individual and community recovery will also place significant strain on human resources. A further recurring issue is the need for a compatible communications system that allows information to be shared quickly between agencies without the need for special handling. The Bali response, for example, showed that two agencies (DFAT and FaCS) that had rarely communicated with each other before found electronic communications difficult. It is critical that agencies prepare for a whole of government crisis during normal business operations. As part of this, agencies need to develop -and test -contingency plans that map out how the agency will respond in a range of different scenarios. Such plans require regular review, monitoring and testing to ensure that they can deliver against their stated goal. Desktop and trial exercises are important, both within agencies and across the whole of government. Furthermore, after a crisis, it is critical that agencies undertake a formal review and, if required, further reform of response plans subsequent to a crisis. This needs to be undertaken on a whole of government basis and it is critical that agencies come together to pool lessons learnt and negotiate reforms to their own departmental processes. The Australian Government comprehensively tested its response systems in 2002 through Exercise Minotaur. The breadth of the simulation was impressive, with the scenario testing diverse issues such as animal health responses, trade advocacy skills and even consular dimensions (see http://www.affa.gov.au/exerciseminotaur). The simulation was conducted over 4 days in September 2002, after 12 months of planning. More than 1000 people from a range of government and industry agencies were formally involved, with the simulation overseen by a panel of evaluators and observers. Another part of forward planning is the development of financial management protocols to give APS employees the discretion to authorise action. Once a crisis has begun, financial systems must be able to deliver appropriate resources to enable decision makers to quickly meet policy priorities, while also satisfying Australian government financial guidelines. This lesson is illustrated by the issuing of ex gratia payments by the Australian Government that are covered neither by legislation or regulation. Such payments require written authority, normally from the Prime Minister. However, Australian government agencies need to understand how these payments will be handled where a decision and announcement has been made at the ministerial level, but corresponding authorisations are not yet available. While the lag may be only 24 hours, announcements about government assistance will trigger an immediate response from the community. Departmental secretaries may need to develop a consistent approach to flexible bridging arrangements to ensure that financial assistance can be provided quickly in times of crisis. Some private sector corporations have taken testing one step further by using 'internal assassins' -well-versed employees who devise worst-case business disruption crises to test management systems (see Klinger, 2003) . Testing such as this on a whole of government basis would mean crisis management responses could be reviewed to ensure that existing protocols and practices keep pace with changes in the threat environment, technology and political imperatives. Exercise Minotaur enabled a thorough testing of the FMD coordination arrangements. This simulation also highlighted the importance of response protocols that include 'fire drills' to make sure that all systems are working well, including a managed approach to public communication. An approach like this moves beyond frameworks and standards, and puts in place specific action pathways with which all players can become familiar. The period between crises also provides an opportunity to review possible jurisdictional barriers to an effective crisis management. There are a number of possible sources for such difficulties. The first lies in the balance of powers between the Australian Government and state/territory governments, with divisions of responsibility established by the constitution. Protocols are required to ensure that the whole of government response at the Australian government level is matched by seamless coordination at the state/territory level. Experience has shown that e-mail should be used with some caution for priority communication during crisis management. Systems need to be robust enough to cope with the increased demands of a crisis and employees need to regularly monitor e-mail to ensure that responses are not delayed. The potential for information management issues to arise during a crisis also needs to be considered. State and Australian government agencies collect an array of data about individuals. However an agency's obligations under the Privacy Act (see http://www. privacy.gov.au/) will impact on what information can be shared among agencies. The Privacy Act can allow pragmatic decisions in times of national disaster. However, the need for personal data to be protected means it is difficult to collect information from different authorities to support ongoing whole of government work during a recovery period. Agencies may find it useful to develop a common approach to understanding the way in which the Act applies to their operations in a crisis. Without this common understanding, different interpretations of the Act can lead to inconsistent policy formulation and agency responses during the crisis. Approaches to whole of government crisis management in other countries can also provide learning opportunities for Australia. The UK Government has established rapid deployment crisis teams which can move within 24 hours to lead the government's response to an overseas crisis (see Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to the Twelfth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee Session 2001 Session -2002 Session , 2002 . The exact composition of the teams, possibly drawn from a range of agencies including foreign affairs, law enforcement and aid delivery, would depend on the nature of the crisis, from a natural disaster to a terrorist attack. The capacity of the teams to work together is likely to hinge on joint training opportunities. The pre-crisis development of a solid understanding between team members of each other's responsibilities and portfolio mandate would be vital. Lessons learnt through crisis management can also be applied to other whole of government work. All agencies address business continuity issues and lessons learnt here can be disseminated throughout the APS using reports such as this one. Times of crisis provide a litmus test of a government's capacity to work cohesively to convey information, extend medical, financial and counselling support and provide reassurance and leadership to its citizens. Community expectations are influenced by a government's record in responding to previous crises, as well as by media commentary, which closely shadows every government statement and action. The media impact on driving community expectations and turning public opinion cannot be underestimated by crisis managers (Beirman, 2003; Wilks & Moore, 2004) . As the crisis management response unfolds in the context of community expectations, government messages can be roughly divided into two categories: • Educational messages that seek to reshape community expectations in cases where expectations exceed the power and authority of the government. • Reassuring messages that confirm that the government response will be generous and equitable. Getting the balance right in blending these messages requires sophisticated and wellintegrated public affairs management. The importance of public affairs management in educating and shaping community expectations was underscored in the response to the Bali bombings. In the aftermath of the attack, there was considerable public anguish about the disaster victim identification process. The Indonesian Government implemented a positive identification process, in line with international norms and protocols. Although undertaken swiftly, the collection of information about victims from Australia meant that the identification process could not be undertaken immediately. This generated anxiety within Australia. Calls were made for the Australian Government to assume responsibility in Bali, thereby overriding Indonesian sovereign responsibility for its coronial processes. Others suggested that Australia should encourage the Indonesians to set aside international norms, thereby running the risk that a less-rigorous identification process might lead to a serious and tragic error. Given the intensity of media coverage of the Bali attacks, the educational message was difficult to advance. However, primary agencies, such as the federal and state police services, DFAT and coroners, worked to send a single and simple message: that the positive identification process, which was being properly implemented by the Indonesian Government, was the only appropriate course. Media commentary and community expectations shifted fairly quickly towards a clearer understanding of the issue. Reassuring messages to the community were delivered swiftly in the Bali example. Given a clear mandate to support Australians affected by the bombing, FaCS established a taskforce that arrived quickly to assist the community on a range of issues: emergency medical treatment, assistance for family members to visit loved ones at interstate hospitals, the establishment of family liaison officers to work one-on-one with those affected and long-term packages of support. Experience has shown that a case management approach can provide effective liaison and support for the affected families. This should be based on clearly defined agency roles and responsibilities and be provided by appropriately trained employees. Determination of the level of support provided to victims and their families required careful judgement. Issues of precedence were considered as governments frequently offer emergency assistance packages in response to natural and other disasters. There was also a need to be clear about the extent of flexibility around the application of the guidelines which provided assistance. This was important to ensure that the government's approach was not criticised for being either too strict or too lax. Clearly, this balance was struck, as media treatment and the community's response to assistance measures were uniformly positive. It is important to carefully consider the full range of community needs in the aftermath of a crisis. As well as financial assistance, people affected need information and will naturally turn to media or other sources to meet this need. The Bali experience showed also that people directly affected crave information over emotional support, at first. Over time, as the implications of the crisis become clearer, community need will, however, turn to counselling and social support. Nevertheless, this switch from information to support needs to be judged carefully and timed correctly to ensure that the government's communication efforts are appropriately formulated. In the aftermath of Bali, FaCS established a newsletter for affected families. The newsletter conveyed the government's key messages and ensured that the messages were tuned to the emotional and information needs of families at different times. A major challenge in informing the community is to make sure every agency is giving out the same message. This is difficult in any whole of government task and more so in the fast-moving environment of crisis response. While web-based information is an excellent way of providing a suite of information with links to partner agencies and other relevant sites which can be accessed at all hours, some caution is needed as some areas of Australia have difficulty opening and downloading some sites. Caution also needs to be used to ensure that websites are not the only source for information. In the Bali response, a number of different agencies needed to contact families to provide information on different elements of the government's response. DFAT consulted families about whether their loved ones had told their family that they were safe 2 , while police were in touch with families to seek material for the victim identification process, and Centrelink employees provided information about government assistance packages. While each agency provided contact details about where cross-portfolio questions could be directed, none was initially able to answer queries from a whole of government perspective. However, a common set of questions and answers was quickly developed to meet this need. One option to ensure that messages are conveyed consistently and to avoid multiple agencies contacting families in times of already high stress is to delegate authority to a single agency to represent the Australian Government. In planning for an approach like this, agencies would benefit from regular contact with each other during normal business operations (e.g. prior to Bali, contact between DFAT and Centrelink occurred only rarely). This would assist people to understand other corporate cultures and the agency's core priorities, roles and responsibilities. The handling of media briefings in times of crisis is also important. In some cases, a media briefing might be more appropriately handled by departmental employees, given technical or other specific knowledge required on a subject. An example of this was the decision during the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak to use the Commonwealth Chief Medical Officer to lead media briefings. Given the technical complexity of many potential crisis triggers (e.g. animal disease) there may be value in establishing a protocol to guide when departmental employees, rather than ministers, should lead public communications. Work to integrate the whole of government public affairs management has been taken forward by the Attorney General's Department under National Counter-Terrorism Committee 286 Jeff Roach and Ian Kemish 2 Following the attacks, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade pursued almost 5000 whereabouts inquiries triggered by families registering concern that their loved ones may have been in Bali at the time of the attack arrangements. This is aimed at ensuring that if there is a domestic terrorist crisis, careful public affairs management will reduce the scope for both rumour to replace information and for multiple or contradictory statements by different agencies. These measures rest on five key principles: (i) The community has a right to be informed and information should only be withheld if its release would be to the detriment of the national interest, including operational security. (ii) Public information management and media liaison can play a key role in national security operations, and therefore must be strategic, accurate and undergo all necessary clearances. (iii) Agencies must not comment on another agency's area of responsibility without first seeking appropriate approval from the agency in question. (iv) All agencies have a responsibility to ensure that they have a single point of coordination contact, as well as appropriately trained media liaison employees and resources to respond to any national security incident. (v) It is the responsibility of all agencies to ensure that they have clear coordination processes within their own agencies, with their ministerial offices and across agencies. In order to embed these principles in organisational behaviour, training workshops are being run which bring together public affairs employees from various governments. These workshops will not only improve skills but also build links between media staff to ensure that a collaborative approach is taken during a crisis. The community has high expectations about the substance of the Australian Government's actions during a crisis. It can be valuable to use strategic partnerships that agencies have developed in normal day-to-day business operations to assist in this response. In the Bali response, a company with long-standing experience in mass casualty incidents, Kenyons International, was contracted within 24 hours of the attacks to manage the repatriation of all deceased Australians on behalf of the Australian Government. Qantas also agreed to put on additional flights to repatriate the many hundreds of Australians who wished to leave Bali immediately. From the non-government field, the Red Cross agreed to coordinate all voluntary requests for assistance from the community, drawing on its long record in the field of international humanitarian issues. The Red Cross was also a member of the domestic taskforce and provided important support to individuals such as non-Australian citizens who were affected by the bombing but were unable to access assistance provided by FaCS. Volunteers too may need to be integrated into the overall crisis response effort. Whether planning for crises at home or overseas, agencies need to include the capacity and desire of Australians on the ground to play a constructive role in the crisis response. Clearly, with the degree of volunteer support unknown until the crisis hits, this role needs to be carefully scoped and defined. The likelihood of unaffiliated volunteers appearing should also be addressed. If there is no role for volunteers, this willingness to assist could translate into understandable frustration -most likely vocalised -about the Australian Government's handling of the crisis. The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry has recognised in developing its FMD plans the need to harness local communities, given their pivotal role in providing additional, appropriately qualified human resources to any FMD emergency. Ongoing consultation with the community is also important. Once a crisis has begun, it is also important that the affected community is involved in, and has a sense of ownership of, their own recovery. Consultation should also occur before a crisis, as part of an agency's contingency planning arrangements. There are some useful examples of how this consultation can occur. Over recent years, the government and livestock industries have reached a comprehensive agreement on the sharing of costs in dealing with outbreaks of 63 animal diseases (see Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 2004) . The agreement was a landmark as it established a positive partnership of responsibility and decision making involving industry. In conclusion, the following lessons can be learned from the Bali bombings for a whole of government crisis management response: • plan early and test the plan; • establish clear leadership; • define roles of all players early; • use formal chains of command; and • ensure strong public affairs management. Restoring tourism destinations in crisis: A strategic marketing approach. Sydney: Allen & Unwin. Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Leadership and terror Connecting government: Whole of government responses to Australia's priority challenges Foot and mouth 2001: The politics of crisis management Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to the Twelfth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee Session Risk management for tourism in the Asia Pacific region. Southport: Cooperative Research Centre for Sustainable Tourism Ian Kemish was head of Consular Branch at the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade at the time of the Bali attack. He was responsible for the overall management of the Commonwealth's response to the attacks for which he was inaugurated as a Member of the Order of Australia (AM). He is currently the Head of the International Division in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Jeff Roach was Director of the Consular Information and Crisis Management Section at the DFAT at the time of the Bali bombing. He was responsible for coordinating the activities of Australian Government agencies in response to the attacks, and was awarded an Order of Australia Medal (OAM) for his work. Jeff is currently posted with the Australian Embassy in Paris.