id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
cord-004925-fj068j67	Morin, B. R.	Economic Incentives in the Socially Optimal Management of Infectious Disease: When [Formula: see text] is Not Enough	2017-09-29		.txt	text/plain	9300	471	52	Since private disease risk mitigation efforts reflect the costs of illness and illness avoidance, interventions that change those costs are also among the options available to public health authorities . Of the many intervention options open to public health authorities-quarantine, social distancing measures such as school closures, vaccination campaigns and so on-we focus on instruments that change risk mitigation by changing the private cost of illness. For R 0 (b) [ [0.95, 1.91] , the optimal public health authority intervention involves an increase in the private cost of illness-a 'tax' on illness that will stimulate higher levels of private disease risk mitigation. For diseases where infectiousness is either very low (R 0 (b) < 0.941) or very high (i.e., R 0 (b) > 1.91), the optimal public health authority intervention involves a reduction in the cost of illness-a 'subsidy' on illness that lowers private diseaserisk mitigation effort (Fig. 1) .	./cache/cord-004925-fj068j67.txt	./txt/cord-004925-fj068j67.txt